*Reliģiski-filozofiski raksti ir anonīmi recenzēts periodisks izdevums ar starptautisku zinātniskās redakcijas kolēģiju. T*ā mērķis ir padziļināt lasītāju zināšanas par reliģiski filozofisko ideju vēsturi, attīstību mūsdienās un to vietu Latvijas un Eiropas kultūrā. Iznāk vienu vai divas reizes gadā latviešu un angļu valodā.

Reliģiski-filozofiski raksti pieejami arī Centrālās un Austrumeiropas Interneta bibliotēkā *(C*entral and *E*astern *E*uropean *O*nline *L*ibrary, CEEOL) un SCOPUS datubāzē.

Religious-Philosophical Articles is a double-blind peer reviewed periodical with international editorial board. It publishes articles aimed at deepening readers' knowledge and understanding on history of religious philosophical ideas, their development in nowadays and their place in the Latvian and European culture. It is published once a year in Latvian and English.

Editions *of Religious-Philosophical Articles* are available in Central and Eastern European On-line Library, CEEOL, as well as in SCOPUS data-base.

SATURS / CONTENTS

STARP AUSTRUMIEM UN RIETUMIEM: JAUNATNE, RELIĢIJA UN POLITIKA

Reliģiski-filozofiski raksti XVIII atšķiras no iepriekšējiem izdevumiem, jo šis veltīts tikai reliģijpētniecībai un tikai vienam tās notikumam – starptautiskai konferencei "Starp Austrumiem un Rietumiem: jaunatne, reliģija, politika", kuru 2014. gada rudenī organizēja Latvijas Reliģijas pētniecības biedrība sadarbībā ar Latvijas Universitāti un Daugavpils Universitāti. Kāpēc tieši šim notikumam un ne kādam citam? Te varētu atbildēt ar britu rakstnieka Klaiva Steipla Lūisa slaveno frāzi, šķiet, no "Nārnijas hronikām": "*Varbūt vienīgi izņemot ekvatoru, viss sākas kaut kur*"[1]. Frāzi, kuru itin bieži piesauc, lai paskaidrotu, ka sākums kaut kam jaunam, pirmais spertais solis faktiski var būt jebkur, un arī to, ka viss ir relatīvs, tikai ar vienu izņēmumu. Mūsu gadījumā šis izņēmums ir reliģija: to var meklēt, to var pētīt, par to var filozofēt. Šis pirmais solis var sākties jebkur, taču atskaites punkts, tāpat kā ekvators, paliek nemainīgs: tā ir padziļināta interese par reliģiju, tās dabu, tās attīstību; par tās vēsturiskumu un mūsdienīgumu, arī šeit un tagad.

Par šiem un citiem jautājumiem diskutēja arī jau iepriekš pieminētajā starptautiskajā konferencē, kurā ar saviem referātiem divu dienu garumā (16.-17. oktobrī) uzstājās trīsdesmit septiņi pētnieki no divdesmit pasaules valstīm. Ar plenārām lekcijām uzstājās eksperti no Latvijas un Grieķijas, bet konferences zinātniskās komisijas darbā piedalījās vadošie speciālisti gan no Latvijas un Grieķijas, gan arī no Japānas, Itālijas un Lietuvas.

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[1] Par šīs frāzes autoru gan bieži, taču kļūdaini tiek saukts rakstnieks, ceļotājs un arī izlūks Pīters Flemings. Flemings Lūisu citē savā grāmatā *One's Company*, kurā apraksta piedzīvoto ceļojumā caur Krieviju uz Ķīnu 1933. gadā.

Latvijas Universitāti konferencē pārstāvēja seši pētnieki, Daugavpils Universitāti – trīs pētnieki.

Konferences uzmanības lokā bija jautājumi par iemesliem, kāpēc mūsdienu jaunieši iesaistās dažādās reliģijās un garīgās kustībās, kādā veidā reliģiskās organizācijas piesaista sev jaunus sekotājus, kā šīs reliģijas dažādās vēsturiskās, arī reliģijām nelabvēlīgās, situācijās darbojas, lai saglabātu savu sekotāju reliģisko identitāti un paaudžu pēctecību, un, visbeidzot, kāda ir jaunatnes līdzdalība pasaules lielo Rietumu un Austrumu reliģiju ģeopolitisko interešu īstenošanā.

Daļu no konferencē nolasītajiem referātiem jau plašākā – rakstu – formātā nu publicējam arī šajā *Reliģiski-filozofisku rakstu* laidienā, lai dotu iespēju ne tikai turpināties konferencē aizsāktajām zinātniskām diskusijām, bet lai ar konferencē izskanējušām idejām neklātienē varētu iepazīties ikviens, kuru interesē dinamiskā reliģiju pasaule un tās mūsdienu sabiedrībai mestie izaicinājumi.

BETWEEN EAST AND WEST: YOUTH, RELIGION AND POLITICS

Religious-philosophical articles XVIII differs from the previous editions in that it deals with religious studies in the context of a single academic event – the International Conference *Between East and West: Youth, Religion, Politics*, which was organized by the Latvian Society for the Study of Religions in collaboration with University of Latvia and Daugavpils University in the autumn of 2014. What is so special about this particular event? Here we could answer with the famous sentence written by British writer C. S. Lewis, presumably, in the "Chronicles of Narnia": "With the possible exception of the equator, everything begins somewhere".[1] This dictum is often quoted to indicate that the first step to something new actually can be taken anywhere and that everything is relative, with one exception, though. In our case this exception is religion: we can look for it, we can study it, and we can philosophize about it. This first step can be taken anywhere, but the starting point, just as the equator, remains unchanged: it is an in-depth interest in religion, in its nature, its development, in its historicity and modernity, that is – here and now.

Those were the topics discussed also in the previously mentioned international conference: in the course of two days (on 16th-17th of October) thirty-seven researchers from twenty countries presented reports on results of their academic research. Plenary lectures were presented by experts from Latvia and Greece. Leading specialists from both countries,

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[1] The authorship of this phrase is often mistakenly extended to a writer and traveller (and a prototype of James Bond) Peter Fleming. Fleming cites Lewis in his book *One's Company* in which he described his experiences of travelling through Russia to China in 1933.

as well as from Japan, Italy and Lithuania participated in the work of the Scientific Committee of the Conference. University of Latvia was represented by six researchers, Daugavpils University - by three researchers.

The conference focused on the issues of the causes, why young people today engage in different religious and spiritual movements. Scholars also clarified the ways in which religious organizations attract new followers, and how in various historical and adverse political situations various religious bodies are working to preserve the religious identity of their followers and to ensure generational succession. And, finally, they discussed participation of youth in the implementation of geopolitical interests of the world's great Western and Eastern religions.

Part of the papers presented at the conference is published here in a wider format in the present issue of *Religious Philosophical Articles*. Thus, we not only want to provide an opportunity for researchers to continue the scholarly discussion that began at the conference, but also to make available the results of the conference to everybody who is really interested in the dynamic world of religion and its challenges to modern society.

Solveiga Krumina-Konkova,
Editor-in-Chief

Inta Mieriņa, Ilze Koroļeva

RELIGIOUS IDENTITY AND COLLECTIVE ACTION: THE MOBILISING POTENTIAL OF RELIGION AMONG NOWADAYS YOUTH

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Introduction

The role of religion in enhancing civic activism and democratic paticipation has attracted the attention of many scholars throughout the years. At the begining of the 19th century, when Alexis de Tocqueville[1] traveled to America, he became convinced that religion was central to liberal democracy. He saw religious values as largely responsible for the selfless actions and communitarian sentiments he observed in America at the time, and overall a fundamental force in American life. Throughout history churches have mobilized people for collective action, and been a significant political resource. The so-called 'Black churches' in the United States were fundamental in the African-American civil rights movement in 1896-1954, acting as leaders and organisers of the movement.[2]

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[1] De Tocqueville A. Democracy in America. Vol. 10. – Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 2003. -P. 703.

[2] LaFayette Jr. B. The Role of Religion in the Civil Rights Movements // *Faith and Progressive Policy: Proud Past, Promising Future Conference, sponsored by the Center for American Progress, City*, 2004.

In Poland, The Great Novena – a ten-year celebration dedicated to the millennium of the Polish adoption of Christianity in 966 – awakened romantic Polish nationalism and resulted in a confrontation between the Polish Church and the communist authorities of the Polish state. The massive mobilization around the Church not only enhanced social capital but also provided training in social movements' methods and civic consciousness.[3] Building on Kenneth Wald's theory Harris[4] argues that religion serves as both an organizational and psychological resource for individual and collective political action. Previous research has linked religion with volunteering, charitable giving, and participation in all kinds of community and civic activities such as voting, attending public meetings, demonstrations, etc.[5] The question is, how to explain this link?

Among the possible positive consequences of religiosity and religious identity that might encourage people to contribute to public good and to engage in collective action - to join different groups and associations and their activities, to donate, vote, and engage in mobilized political activities - are stronger community ties and community attachment[6], higher social trust[7], empathy, compassion, moral duty to help others[8], and altruism. It is also possible that religious ideology facilitates good deeds, or that re-

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[3]   Osa M. Solidarity and Contention: The Networks of Polish Opposition, 1956–1981. – Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2003. – P. 240

[4]   Harris F. C. Something within: Religion as a mobilizer of African-American political activism // *The Journal of Politics.* 1994, Vol. 56, No. 01, – Pp. 42–68.

[5]   Lewis V. A., MacGregor C.A., Putnam, R.D. Religion, networks, and neighborliness: The impact of religious social networks on civic engagement // *Social science research.* 2013, Vol. 42, No. 2, – Pp. 331–346.

[6]   Putnam R., Campbell D. American grace: How religion is reshaping our civic and political lives. (2010); Putnam, R.D., Campbell, D. American grace: How religion unites and divides us (2010).

[7]   Traunmüller R. Moral communities? Religion as a source of social trust in a multilevel analysis of 97 German reģions // *European Sociological Review.* 2010: jcq011.

[8]   Bekkers R. Principle of Care and Giving to Help People in Need // *Public Goods through Private Eyes Project concluding conference*. Warsaw, 10/10/2014

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ligiosity influences civic engagement via cognitive framing[9]. Alternatively, it could be that participatory mechanisms explain the link[10], e.g., influence of clergy (this is not supported by evidence though), or church-based social connections.[11]

On the other hand, some research suggests that perhaps the effect of religion is not always so positive. According to Putnam[12], the Catholic Church in Italy traditionally discouraged civic participation, fearing that involvement by Catholics in political issues might endanger this status.[13] Some argue that while liberal Protestant denominations encourage civic engagement and volunteering, conservative denominations often attempt to limit volunteer activities to those within their faith communities, or discourage them altogether.[14] Overall, the distinction between ones own group and the `others' might create mistrust and thus hinder broader engagement.[15] Furthermore, conservatism, intolerance, and racism sometimes

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[9] Loveland, M.T., Sikkink, D. Myers, D.J., Radcliff, B. Private prayer and civic involvement // *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion.* 2005, Vol. 44, No. 1, – Pp. 1–14.; Zurkovska D. Extending the Limits of Empathy: Religiosity and Psychological Distance // *Public Goods through Private Eyes Project concluding conference*, Warsaw, 10/10/2014.

[10] Schwadel, P. Individual, congregational, and denominational effects on church members' civic participation." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 44, no. 2 (2005): 159-171.; Verba S., Schlozman K.L., Brady H.E. Voice and equality: Civic voluntarism in American politics. Vol. 4. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995. – Pp. 640.

[11] Wuthnow R. Saving America?: faith-based services and the future of civil society. – New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2004. – P. 349; Putnam, R., Campbell, D. American grace: How religion is reshaping our civic and political lives. (2010)

[12] Putnam R. D., Leonardi R. Nanetti R.Y. Making democracy work: civic traditions in modern Italy. - New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995.

[13] Nevertheless, in his later works in the Unbited States (Putnam, R. D. Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community. – New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 2001 Putnam does see mainline churches (Protestant and Catholic) to be schools of democracy – among other voluntary associations.

[14] Uslaner E. M. The moral foundations of trust. – Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.; Putnam R. D. Leonardi R. Nanetti R.Y. (1993) Making democracy work: civic traditions in modern Italy." (1995).

[15] Berggren N., Bjørnskov, C. Is the importance of religion in daily life related to social trust? Cross-country and cross-state comparisons // *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.* –2011, Vol. 80, No. 3, -Pp. 459-480.

associated with religiosity[16] are not conductive to such engagement. Psychologically, by promoting an otherworldly orientation religion might discourage collective action.[17]

As we can see, the evidence is mixed, and is clear that the potential of religiosity and religious identity for collective action have not been sufficiently explored in the existing literature on civil society. A significant drawback of the previous research is that it typically uses only basic measures of church attendance or religious denomination; we know much less about the link between civic engagement and religious attitudes. In this paper we argue that religiosity should be recognised as a multidimensional concept, and the implications of religious beliefs, religious practice, and religious identity are likely to differ. By understanding which dimensions are linked to collective action we might better understand the socio-psychological mechanisms driving the link, and hence answer the question 'why' religion matters for participation, if it indeed does.

The goal of this study is to explore the importance of religion for collective action among youth in Europe. We test a hypothesis that religiosity and a belonging to a certain religious community has a potential to serve as a source of solidarity, facilitating civic and political activism among youth.

Methods and data

The data we use comes from the MYPLACE (Memory, Youth, Political Legacy and Civic Engagement) project. The advantages of using this data are twofold. First, the project specifically concentrates on young people aged 16-25, thus allowing to explore with better statistical precision the mobilising potential of religiosity in this group. Second, the sample was specifically designed to suit multilevel analysis techniques. Two contrasting locations were selected in each country (including

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[16] Putnam, Robert D., and David E. Campbell. American grace: How religion unites and divides us. (2010).

[17] Harris F. C. Something within: Religion as a mobilizer of African-American political activism // *The Journal of Politics*. 1994, Vol. 56, No. 01, - Pp: 42-68.

East and West Germany) with approximately 600 respondents in one location (Appendix A).[18] Multilevel regression analysis allows testing simultaneously in one model for the effect of individual and contextual level factors. Unlike the ordinary multiple regression models, it accounts for the fact that the observations in the sample are not independent; individuals are nested within localities, thus, it provides correct standard errors and unbiased estimates of contextual effects.

In our sample 16,935 individuals are nested within 30 localities which are further nested within 14 countries, calling for the application of a three-level analysis. As three-level analysis has certain drawbacks in terms of complexity and estimation difficulty[19] we performed a number of tests to check the usefulness of such a strategy. Due to the specific sampling design of the MYPLACE survey[20], only a small proportion (2–4 per cent) of variance in our dependent variables can be found at the level of countries. It means that adding the third, country level to our analysis is not justified and, due to a small number of level 3 cases, not recommended. Hence, we opted for two-level analysis. Since there are no strong theoretical arguments why the individual or contextual explanations of civic participation should systematically vary across locations, we use random intercept models with fixed slopes.

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[18] Interviews were conducted as face-to-face personal interviews in respondents' homes, using random sampling (in some cases – full sample). The fieldwork took place between 09/2012 and 04/2013.

[19] Hox, J. Joop. Multilevel Analysis, Techniques and Applications. Second edition (2010).

[20] The fact that the sample is clustered typically leads to units within one cluster (in this case, localities in a country) being more similar to one another than if they were drawn randomly from a pool of independent units. Therefore the effective sample size is in fact smaller than the number of units in the sample. Disregarding it leads to underestimating the standard errors, especially if: the number of units in one cluster is large; and units within one cluster are very similar. In our case the number of localities within a country is only two (except for Germany where it is four), and the localities have specifically been selected on the basis of their differing socio-economic characteristics (for a description of national samples, see: http://www.fp7-myplace.eu/documents/WP4D4-5overviewreportv1.pdf), ie two localities within one country might differ more than they differ from localities in other countries. Thus, one might expect that the intra-class correlation (ICC) is small.

Dependent variables

The literature usually distinguishes between different types of democratic participation, depending on the characteristics and aims of the activity. Hence, in this paper we will be looking at the effect of religiosity on:

1. cause oriented activism - a summary index of participating at least once in the last year in signing petitions, collecting signatures, writing an article, boycotting or buycotting, participating in demonstrations, strikes, violent political events, occupying buildings or blocking streets / railways, participating in a flashmob (a scale from 0 to 9).

2. campaign oriented activism – volunteering in an election campaign, contacting a politician, attending a public meeting on social or political issues, giving a political speech, distributing political leaflets, writing political messages or graffiti on walls, wearing a badge with a political message, donating money to a political group, writing or forwarding a political letter, uploading a political material to the Internet, voting in student union elections (0–11).

3. civic engagement index – a summary index of organisations or groups respondent is a member of, participated in activity, or did voluntary work for (0–15).

4. overall participation index - a summary index of all the above mentioned activities (0–35).

Independent variables

Based on our assumption of the multi-dimensionality of religiosity we include three different independent variables:

1. *Religious denomination* – what is your religion, even if you are not currently practising? Catholic, Protestant, Christian Orthodox, Muslim, Jewish, Other, None.

2. *Religiosity* – factor score from three items:
   a) Regardless of whether or not you belong to a particular religion, how religious would you say you are? (0–10);

b) To what extent do you agree or disagree: `There is only one true religion';

c) To what extent do you agree or disagree: 'None of the major religions have any truths to offer' (reversed).

3. Frequency of *attending religious services*, apart from weddings and funerals (several times a week, once a week, at least once a month, more than twice a year, once a year, less than once a year, never).

In the statistical models we also control for social background characteristics: education; income (how easy to cope on present household income); economic status (full-time employment, in education, other); social class[21]; age; and gender. Other control variables are citizenship (citizen, not a citizen), majority ethnic/nationality group, knowledge of politics (sum of 3 knowledge questions), interest in politics, intensity of following news in media (summary index 0 to 12), social trust index, political trust index, and trust in religious institutions.

At the macro level we include dummy variables for welfare state type[22]. We also control for contextual characteristics such as the size of the area, changes in GPD during the recent economic crisis (2008-11), whether there were elections at or before the start of the fieldwork in 2012, locality-level poverty rates[23], as well as the religious fractionalisation[24] and % of people who consider themselves religious.[25]

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[21] Social class is usually calculated on the basis of occupation. Considering that many young people have not entered the labour market yet, we use parents' social class as a proxy for young people's social class (see: Appendix B).

[22] Kääriäinen J., Lehtonen H. The variety of social capital in welfare state regimes–a comparative study of 21 countries // *European Societies.* 2006, Vol. 8, No. 1, Pp. 27–57.

[23] Percentage of families who find it very difficult to get by on present income is aggregated from the answers of respondents as this is the most precise available measure at the level of localities. One must note, however, that the answers only refer to households with at least one young person 16–25 years of age, so the variable can only be considered a crude proxy for the level of the prosperity of the area.

[24] Alesina A., Devleeschauwer A., Easterly W., Kurlat S., Wacziarg R. Fractionalization // *Journal of Economic growth,* – 2003, Vol. 8, No. 2. – Pp.155-194.

[25] Teorell J., Holmberg S., Rothstein, B. The quality of government dataset // *University of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute*, 2011.

Results

Before we begin our analysis of the role of religion in facilitating civic activism, we shall have a brief look at the most recent data on religiosity in Europe. According to European Values Study (EVS) data, the most religious people in Europe can be found in the South-East part of Europe (Cyprus, Greece, Macedonia, Kosovo, Bosnia Herzegovina, Montenegro, Turkey, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan). In Poland, Serbia, and Albania too approximately 90% of people consider themselves religious (Figure 1). In Romania and Malta the percentage is somewhat smaller, yet religion is very important in peoples' lives. Religion plays the smallert role in the Eastern part of Germany, Czech Republic, Estonia, Sweden, Finland, Norway, France, Spain, and Great Britain.

The patterns of dynamics of importance of religion in one's life are very diverse in Europe. According to EVS data, it has decreased significantly in Spain, Ireland, Austria and Poland, but increased in, for example, Bulgaria and Romania. Similarly, the number of religious people has decreased by at least 10 percentage points is Austria, UK, and Spain and Germany, whereas in the Baltic countries and Bulgaria this number -- from 1990 to 2008 -- has increased by more than 20 percentage points. One can observe a large increase in people who belong to a certain denomination in the Baltic countries, Ukraine, Belarus, and Bulgaria since the beginning of 1990s. Overall though the tendencies in Western Europe are slightly towards decreasing religiosity.

Studies analysing the dynamics of religiosity across different generations find that young people in most countries, even in most countries in Central and Eastern Europe, seem to be less religious than the rest of the population.[26] Overall, the data indicates that there is a generational change in the direction of more secularisation among European youth.[27]

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[26] Voas D, Doebler S. Secularization in Europe: Religious change between and within birth cohorts // *Religion and Society in Central and Eastern Europe* 4, - 2011, No. 1. – Pp. 39-62.

[27] Voas D. The rise and fall of fuzzy fidelity in Europe // *European Sociological Review. – 2009, Vol.* 25, No. 2. – Pp. 155-168.

Figure 1. Religiosity in Europe (European Values Study 2008)

According to the European Values study data (Table 1), in 2008–2010 the number of young people who are members of religious organisations or have done voluntary work for them in the last 12 months is smaller than it was observed in previous rounds of the survey.

Table 1. Involvement in religious organisations

	Member of a religious organisation		Voluntary work for a religious organisation	
	All EVS	Up to 25	All EVS	Up to 25
1990–1993	13,8%	10,2%	6,6%	4,5%
1999–2001	13,5%	10,8%	5,5%	3,9%
2008–2010	9,8%	7,3%	4,4%	3,4%

Source: European Values Study

Turning to the analysis of the role of religion in facilitating different kinds of activism, we begin by looking at the effect of religiosity on cause oriented activism.

The initial analysis of variance components (Table 2) reveals that a significant proportion – 21 per cent of variance in cause oriented activism lies at the level of localities. Inclusion of the individual level variables resulted in a 8 per cent decrease of residual, individual level variance of cause oriented activism and an even larger – 44 per cent – reduction in intercept variance. This means that much of the observed difference between research locations is due to the composition effect, ie., differing individual characteristics among their young residents. Adding contextual variables significantly improves the model fit; it decreases the intercept variation by 74%. The likelihood ratio test confirms that this reduction is statistically significant (Sig.<0.001).

Turning to the substantive results (Table 3), contrary to our hypothesis, we find that religiosity reduces cause oriented activism (B=-0.102, Sig.<0.001). Belonging to a certain denomination also reduces cause oriented activism for Christian Orthodox, Catholic and Protestant youth (-0.235, -0.155 and -0.130, respectively). However, attending religious services has a positive effect on cause oriented activism (B=0.026; Sig.<0.001). At the macro level, neither the number of religious people in the country nor religious fractionalisation matter for cause oriented activism.

Table 2. Variance components of regression models
explaining activism

		Empty model (random intercept only)	With individual level explanatory variables	With country level explanatory variables
Cause oriented activism	σ (individual level)	1,724	1,578	1,578
	σ (country level)	0,450	0,253	0,065
	σ(slope)			
	-loglikelihood	42828,650	41819,964	41830,018
Campain oriented activism	σ (individual level)	2,601	2,269	2,269
	σ (country level)	0,373	0,164	0,039
	σ (slope)			
	-loglikelihood	48043,589	46417,992	46432,525
Civic engagement in organisations	σ (individual level)	2,689	2,524	2,524
	σ (country level)	0,363	0,233	0,112
	σ (slope)			
	-loglikelihood	49069,664	48365,529	48387,813
Overall participation	σ (individual level)	13,690	12,041	12,041
	σ (country level)	3,081	1,505	0,419
	σ (slope)			
	-loglikelihood	68448,325	66893,871	66887,877

Table 3. Regression of religiosity on cause oriented activism

Parameter	Estimate		Std. Error	Estimate		Std. Error
Intercept	,860	***	,188	,785		,599
Catholic	-,163	***	,040	-,155	***	,040
Protestant	-,120	**	,043	-,130	**	,043
Christian Orthodox	-,234	***	,058	-,235	***	,057
Muslim	,114		,081	,110		,081
Jewish	,004		,307	-,001		,307
Other religion	-,022		,061	-,024		,061
None	Ref.		Ref.	Ref.		Ref.
Trust in religious institutions	-,008		,005	-,008		,005
Religiosity	-,104	***	,020	-,102	***	,020
Frequency of attending religious services	,026	**	,008	,026	***	,008
Religious fractionalization				,068		,743
% of people who consider themselves religious				-,023		,344

***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, ~p<0.1, two-tailed tests.

Note: The model also controls for the individual and contextual level variables described in the text.

As regards to campaign oriented axctivism, results are nearly identical. Again, contrary to the hypothesis, religiosity has a negative effect on campaign oriented activism (B=-0.064, Sig.<0.01), as well as identifying as Christian Orthodox (B=-0.268, Sig<0.001). Attending religious services, on the other hand, has a positive effect on campaign oriented activism (Sig.<0.01).

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Table 4. Regression of religiosity on campaign oriented activism

	Est.		S.E.	Est.		S.E.
Intercept	0,956	***	0,210	1,204	*	0,502
Catholic	-0,073		0,048	-0,073		0,047
Protestant	-0,033		0,052	-0,046		0,052
Christian Orthodox	-0,303	***	0,068	-0,268	***	0,066
Muslim	-0,092		0,096	-0,096		0,096
Jewish	-0,004		0,380	-0,005		0,380
Other religion	0,016		0,073	0,016		0,073
None	Ref.		Ref.	Ref.		Ref.
Trust in religious institutions	0,002		0,006	0,002		0,006
Religiosity	-0,067	**	0,024	-0,064	**	0,024
Frequency of attending religious services	0,039	***	0,009	0,040	***	0,009
Religious fractionalization				-0,036		0,597
% of people who consider themselves religious				-0,455		0,279

***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, ~p<0.1, two-tailed tests.

Note: The model also controls for the individual and contextual level variables described in the text.

If we look at the civic engagement in organisations, in general religiosity seems to facilitate civic engagement: becoming a member of an organisation, doing voluntary work or engaging in activities of the organisation (B=0.072; Sig<0.01). However, a more in-depth analysis reveals that this positive effect of religiosity on institutional civic engagement is only due to engagement in church organisations, as for many young people they constitute the only form of engagement. At the same time, people who are highly religious are less likely to engage in such organisations as sports clubs, trade unions, animal welfare groups, anti-globalisation organisations or movements, or human rights organisations. One can observe differences

between young people belonging to different denominations. Identifying as Protestant (Sig.<0.01) or Muslim (Sig.<0.1) increases civic engagement compared to nonbelievers, whereas the effect of being Orthodox is again negative. Similarly as in the case of mobilised activism, attending religious services has a positive effect on civic engagement (B=0.058; Sig.<0.001), pointing to the organisational role of the church. Interestingly, a larger proportion of religious people in the community is associated with lower levels of participation in associations. It shows that communities with a high number of religious people rather discourage associational life, particularly in sports clubs and national cultural organisations.[28]

Table 5. Regression of religiosity on civic engagement in organisations

Parameter	Est.		S.E.	Est.		S.E.
Intercept	1,344	***	0,224	3,461	***	0,785
Catholic	-0,027		0,050	-0,023		0,050
Protestant	0,169	**	0,054	0,151	**	0,054
Christian Orthodox	-0,307	***	0,072	-0,279	***	0,072
Muslim	0,193	~	0,101	0,188	~	0,101
Jewish	-0,268		0,389	-0,259		0,389
Other religion	0,123		0,076	0,123		0,076
None	Ref.		Ref.	Ref.		0, Ref.
Trust in religious institutions	0,004		0,007	0,004		0,007
Religiosity	0,068	**	0,025	0,072	**	0,025
Frequency of attending religious services	0,057	***	0,010	0,058	***	0,010
Religious fractionalization				-1,970	~	0,977
% of people who consider themselves religious				-1,378	**	0,451

***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, ~p<0.1, two-tailed tests.

Note: The model also controls for the individual and contextual level variables described in the text.

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[28] see also Prouteau L., Sardinha B. Volunteering and Country-Level Religiosity: Evidence from the European Union // *VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations* – 2013, Pp. 1-25.

Finally, we turn to the analysis of the effect of religiosity on over-all participation. The data on variance components is encouraging, as it shows that the model has a good predictive power: adding individual level predictors leads to 12% reduction in individual level variation and 51% reduction in the intercept variation. 18% of the variation is at the level of localities, and adding contextual variables decreases the intercept variation by 72% (Table 2).

Both in the model with and without contextual variables the results are similar. The effect of religiosity on overall social and political par-ticipation is negative, even though it is only statistically significant at Sig.=0.1 level. As we noted earlier, the effect is negative for mobilised activism, but – due to increased involvement in religious organisations – positive for institutional activism. Identifying as a Christian Orthodox is linked to much lower overall social and political participation rates (B=-0.727; Sig.<0.001), and so is identifying as Catholic, although the effect is not as strong (B=-0,248, Sig.<0.05). Identifying as a Muslim seems to increase overall participation compared to nonbelievers, how-ever, the effect is not statistically significant. Attending religious services has a large positive effect on social and political participation. Religious fractionalisation overall does not affect participation rates, but the effect of the number of people who consider themselves religious is only sig-nificant at 0,1 level.

Table 6. Regression of religiosity on overall participation

Parameter	Est.		S.E.	Est.		S.E.
Intercept	3,167	***	0,508	5,378	**	1,544
Catholic	-0,260	*	0,110	-0,248	*	0,110
Protestant	0,027		0,120	-0,010		0,120
Christian Orthodox	-0,776	***	0,160	-0,727	***	0,158
Muslim	0,231		0,224	0,221		0,224
Jewish	-0,364		0,875	-0,362		0,875
Other religion	0,101		0,170	0,101		0,170
None	Ref.		0,000	Ref.		0,000
Trust in religious institutions	-0,005		0,015	-0,004		0,015
Religiosity	-0,098		0,055	-0,091		0,055
Frequency of attending religious services	0,123	***	0,022	0,125	***	0,022
Religious fractionalization				-1,613		1,904
% of people who consider themselves religious				-1,967	~	0,882

***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, ~p<0.1, two-tailed tests.

Note: The model also controls for the individual and contextual level variables described in the text.

Conclusions

In this paper we have tested the proposition that religion can play an important role in facilitating young peoples' civic activism on the basis of a new comparative youth survey in 14 European countries as part of the MYPLACE (*Memory, Youth, Political Legacy And Civic Engagement,* FP7-266831) project.

The picture that emerges is quite complex, and it shows that it is important to distinguish between religious praxis, beliefs and identity. Practising religion, i.e., frequent attendance of a religious services, is positively linked to all modes of civic and political participation – both mobilised

and institutional.[29] Young people who attend church frequently are more likely to engage in cause-oriented and campaign-oriented political activities, as well as take part in activities of voluntary associations. In fact, for many young people participation in church organisations and activities is the only form of engagement. However, strong religiosity as a devotion to a particular religion, although contributes to associational activism by facilitating engagement in religious organisations, has a negative effect on mobilised activism, especially cause-oriented activism: collecting signatures, signing petitions, boycotting, participating in demonstrations or strikes, flashmobs, violent political activities, occupying buildings, writing articles to student newspapers, etc. One can conclude that internal religiosity, a psychological dimension of religion, is detrimental to collective action. Moreover, the data suggests that the effect works both at the individual and at the collective level: a high number of religious people in the community discourages young people from getting involved in associations, particularly national cultural associations and sports clubs. This can be explained either by negative societal norms regarding this kind of participation in a highly religious society, or lack of the necessary facilities.

Our data are in line with Robyn Driskell et al. (2008)[30] findings that for religious activities, identifying with a religious tradition reduces-, but participation in church activities increases national political participation. One can conclude that church does indeed have a certain potential to mobilise youth for political activism, yet the potential is not hidden in religiosity and religious identity per se but rather the participatory aspects

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[29] See also Wang L, Handy F. Religious and Secular Voluntary Participation by Immigrants in Canada: How Trust and Social Networks Affect Decision to Participate // *VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations.* – 2014, Vol. 25, No. 6. – Pp. 1559-1582.; Lewis V. A., MacGregor C.A., Putnam R.D. Religion, networks, and neighborliness: The impact of religious social networks on civic engagement // *Social science research* 2013, Vol. 42, No. 2. –Pp. 331-346.; Wuthnow, R. Mobilizing civic engagement: The changing impact of religious involvement // *Civic engagement in American democracy.* -1999, Pp. 331-363.

[30] Driskell R., Embry E, Lyon L. Faith and Politics: The Influence of Religious Beliefs on Political Participation // *Social Science Quarterly.* – 2008, Vol 89, No. 2.- Pp. 294–314.

of organised religion. A recent study by Lewis, MacGregor and Putnam (2013)[31] too shows that it is not beliefs or affiliation, but religious social networks that matter most for civic participation, and that having a strong network of religious friends explains the effect of church attendance.

Importantly, we find differences in participation among members of different denominations. For instance, Christian Orthodox youth are least likely to become involved in any social, civic, or political activities or organisations. Catholic youth are also less likely to be politically active, particularly by mobilising around a certain cause. However, Protestant youth, even though they are less likely than nonbelievers to engage in cause-oriented activism, are more active members of different voluntary associations, especially sports clubs, or political organisations such as trade unions or student unions. Muslim youth are in general more active than nonbelievers, except for political, campaig-oriented activism.

The positive effect of church attendance has been noted in previous studies.[32] However, the finding concerning the negative macro level effect of religiosness is contrary to some previous knowledge, but supported by some other recent literature.[33] Overall, our study confirms that faith-based organisations can, without doubt, serve as agents of societal change, but more research is needed to shed light on the cultural, social, psychological, and ideological factors driving this effect.

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[31] Lewis V. A., MacGregor, C.A. Putnam R.D. Religion, networks, and neighborliness: The impact of religious social networks on civic engagement (2013).

[32] See also Wang L, Handy F. Religious and Secular Voluntary Participation by Immigrants in Canada: How Trust and Social Networks Affect Decision to Participate. (2014); Lewis V. A., MacGrego C.A., Putnam R.D. Religion, networks, and neighborliness: The impact of religious social networks on civic engagement (2013); Wuthnow, R. Mobilizing civic engagement: The changing impact of religious involvement // *Civic engagement in American democracy,* 1999. –Pp. 331-363.

[33] Eg., Prouteau, L., Sardinha B. Volunteering and Country-Level Religiosity: Evidence from the European Union. (2013).

Appendices

Appendix A Countries and localities included in the sample

Location		Sample size
Croatia	Podsljeme	610
	Pescenica Zitnjak	606
Denmark	Odense East	413
	Odense Center	402
Estonia	Narva area	617
	Tartu	634
Finland	Lieksa and Nurmes	452
	Kuopio	430
Georgia	Kakhinauri region of Kutaisi	579
	Telavi	588
Western Germany	Bremen	604
	Bremerhaven	332
Eastern Germany	Jena	608
	Rostock	608
Greece	New Philadelphia	600
	Argyroupouli	595
Hungary	Downtown area of Sopron	597
	Downtown area of Ozd	590
Latvia	Agenskalns apkaime in Riga	600
	Forstate&Jaunbuve in Daugavpils	600
Portugal	Lumiar	596
	Barreiro	594
Russia	Kupchino	599
	Part of Vyborg	600
Slovakia	Vic	600
	Sant Cugat del Vallès	600
Spain	Vic	597
	Sant Cugat del Valles	592

Appendix B Question wording

Questions	Factor
On an average day, how much time do you spend keeping yourself informed about politics and current affairs using the following media: radio, TV, Internet, newspapers (no time at all, less than 1/2 hour, 1/2 hour to 1 hour, more than 1 hour)	Media exposure index
Which of the descriptions on this card comes closest to how you feel about your household's income today? : Living comfortably on present income, Coping on present income, Finding it difficult on present income, Finding it very difficult on present income	Income
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people? Please tell me on a score of 0 to 10, where 0 means most people can be trusted and 10 means you cant be too careful. (0-10)	Social trust
Please tell me on a scale of 0-10 how much you trust each of the following institutions and organisations. 0 means 'do not trust at all', and 10 means 'complete trust': The head of government (PM), Parliament, Political parties.	Political trust index
Please tell me on a scale of 0-10 how much you trust each of the following institutions and organisations. 0 means "do not trust at all", and 10 means "complete trust": Religious institutions.	Trust in religious institutions
Calculated on the basis of parents education and occupation when the respondent was 16 years of age. Parents social class measured on 0-4 point scale, where 1 point is given for a parent having a higher education or having a professional and technical occupation (doctor, teacher, engineer, etc.) or administrator occupation (banker, high government official, etc.).	Social class

Source: Memory, Youth, Political Legacy And Civic Engagement (MYPLACE).

Inta Mieriņa, Ilze Koroļeva

Reliģiskā identitāte un kolektīvā rīcība: reliģijas mobilizējošais potenciāls mūsdienu jauniešu vidū

Kopsavilkums

Šajā rakstā darba autores sniedz ieskatu pētījumā par reliģiozitātes un reliģiskās identitātes lomu Eiropas jauniešu sociālās un politiskās aktivitātes veicināšanā. Pētījums balstīts uz kvantitatīvas starptautiski salīdzinošas 16–25 gadu vecu jauniešu aptaujas, kas veikta 14 Eiropas valstīs 2013.–2014. gadā projekta "Memory, Youth, Political Legacy and Civic Engagement (MYPLACE)" ietvaros. Statistiskā analīze veikta, izmantojot daudzlīmeņu regresiju analīzi, kurā 16935 respondenti grupēti 30 apkaimēs.

Rezultāti skaidri liecina, ka, runājot par reliģijas ietekmi uz kolektīvo rīcību, nepieciešams nodalīt reliģijas praktizēšanu, reliģiozitāti un reliģisko identitāti (piederības izjūtu noteiktai konfesijai). Reliģijas praktizēšana, t.i., biežs dievkalpojumu apmeklējums ir pozitīvi saistīts ar visa veida pilsonisko un politisko līdzdalību. Jaunieši, kuri bieži apmeklē dievnamu, biežāk iesaistās uz kādu mērķi vērstā aktīvismā, kampaņveida politiskās aktivitātēs, kā arī brīvprātīgo organizāciju darbā. Taču spēcīgas reliģiskās jūtas, reliģiozitāte, lai gan palielina iesaisti reliģiskās organizācijās, negatīvi ietekmē mobilizētās līdzdalības formas, īpaši uz kādu mērķi vērsto aktīvismu. Jāsecina, ka iekšēja reliģiozitāte, t.i., reliģijas psiholoģiskā dimensija, mazina iesaisti kolektīvās aktivitātēs. Jo vairāk, dati liecina, ka šī ietekme attiecas gan uz indivīda līmeni (psiholoģiskie aspekti), gan uz kolektīvo

līmeni (kopienas aspekti): kopienās, kurās ir liels skaits reliģiozu cilvēku, jaunieši asociācijās – īpaši kultūras asociācijās un sporta klubos – iesaistās mazāk.

Pētījuma rezultāti apliecina Driskelas u.c. (2008) izdarītos secinājumus, ka identificēšanās ar reliģiskajām tradīcijām mazina, bet līdzdalība baznīcas aktivitātēs veicina politisko līdzdalību. Tātad iespējams izdarīt secinājumu, ka, lai gan baznīcai tik tiešām ir potenciāls mobilizēt jauniešus politiskam aktīvismam, kuru vairākkārt nodemonstrējusi arī vēsture (piem., Lielā Novena Polijā, ASV pilsoņu tiesību kustība 1896–1954), šis potenciāls neslēpjas vis reliģiozitātē vai reliģiskajā identitātē, bet gan organizētās reliģijas līdzdalības aspektos. Nesenais Luisas, Makgregoras un Patnema pētījums (Lewis, Macgregor, Putnam 2013) arī apliecina, ka nevis uzskati/ ticība vai piederība noteiktai reliģiskai konfesijai, bet gan reliģiskie sociālie tīkli ir tas, kam ir vislielākā ietekme uz pilsonisko līdzdalību, un ka tieši ciešs reliģisku draugu loks izskaidro baznīcas apmeklējuma pozitīvo lomu pilsoniskās aktivitātes rosināšanā.

Būtiski ir arī tas, ka pētījums izgaismo atšķirības starp dažādu reliģisko konfesiju pārstāvjiem. Piemēram, pareizticīgie jaunieši krietni retāk nekā citi iesaistās dažādās sociālās, pilsoniskās vai politiskās aktivitātēs un organizācijās. Katoļu jaunieši arī salīdzinoši mazāk ir politiski aktīvi, īpaši attiecībā uz mobilizēšanos konkrēta jautājuma risināšanai. Taču protestantu jaunieši, lai gan mazāk nekā tie, kuri nepieder nevienai konfesijai, mobilizējas uz kādu jautājumu vērstā pasākumā, ir aktīvāki dažādu brīvprātīgo asociāciju, īpaši sporta klubu vai politisku organizāciju (arodbiedrības, studentu apvienības), biedri. Musulmaņu jaunieši kopumā ir aktīvāki nekā tie, kuri nepieder nevienai konfesijai, izņemot iesaisti politiskās, kampaņveida aktivitātēs.

Kopumā pētījums apliecina, ka uz ticību balstītas organizācijas nešaubīgi var kalpot par sabiedrisko pārmaiņu veicinošu spēku, taču vienlaikus tas apliecina nepieciešamību pēc turpmākiem pētījumiem, kas izskaidrotu kultūras, sociālos, psiholoģiskos un ideoloģiskos faktorus, kuri virza šo ietekmi.

Rita Hegedűs, Ferenc Moksony

TYPES OF YOUTH RELIGIOSITY

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The last survey explicitly focusing on youth religion in Hungary was conducted in the 1980s, but some more recent analyses have also been done, especially by the late Miklós Tomka as well as his younger students, Gergely Rosta and Ádám Hámori.[1] These studies have shown that while *churchly religiosity* (that is, religious belief and practice following the traditions of the main Christian churches) has declined among the youth due to the lack of religious socialization in the socialist era and the general tendency of secularization, *more liberal forms* of religion have increased quite until the mid-2010s. Today, core believers and core atheists both form small minorities and the religious landscape is dominated by two major groups – those who are religious "in their own way" and those who are indifferent to religious matters. (*Figure 1*)

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[1] See Á. Hámori, G. Rosta, "Youth, Religion, Socialization. Changes in youth religiosity and its relationship to denominational education in Hungary", *Hungarian Educational Research Journal*, 3 (4) (2014); A. Molnár and M. Tomka, , "Ifjúság és vallás", *Világosság*, No. 4 (1989), pp. 246-256; Tomka Miklós "Az ifjúság változó vallása – nemzetközi összehasonlításban". In Rosta Gergely (ed.), *Ifjúság – értékrend – vallásosság*. Budapest: Faludi Ferenc Akadémia, 2003, pp. 9–27; M. Tomka, «Az ifjúsági vallásosság három évtizede"' *Új Ifjúsági Szemle*, No. 2 (2006), pp. 5–19; Tomka Miklós: "Vallási helyzetkép – 2009". In G. Rosta, Gergely – M. Tomka (eds.): *Mit értékelnek a magyarok?* Budapest: OCIPE Magyarország – JTMR Faludi Ferenc Akadémia, 2010, pp. 400–449.

The chart shows horizontal stacked bars for years 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012:

2012: 7 | 31 | 8 | 40 | 7 | 7
2008: 7 | 43 | 6 | 35 | 8 | 1
2004: 10 | 48 | 4 | 24 | 13 | 1
2000: 10 | 46 | 6 | 28 | 8 | 2

Legend:
■ I am religious, I follow the teaching of the church ■ I am religious by my own way
■ I cannot decide whether I am religious or not ■ I am not religious
■ I am not religious, I have a different conviction □ I do not answer

Source: Youth2012, Rosta, G. (2013)[2]

Figure 1. The frequency of religious self-identification,
2000–2012, percentages

Devoted religiosity, then, is relatively rare among young people in Hungary (just as it is also relatively rare, although not quite to the same degree, among older persons), so the basic issue to us rather is to find out what kind of religiosity characterizes these – not too many – young individuals. Our analysis is based on the typology by Ch. Taylor,[3] borrowed from R. Wuthnow,[4] which distinguishes two groups – *dwellers*, who feel at home within the church, and *seekers*, who are open to religion and use it to find meanings in life. Although this typology is similar to the one

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[2] G. Rosta, "Hit és vallásgyakorlat". In Székely, L. (ed.), *Magyar ifjúság 2012*. Budapest: Kutatópont, 2013, pp. 316–330.

[3] Ch. Taylor, "The Church Speaks – to Whom". In Taylor, Ch.–Casanova J.–McLean, G. F. (eds.). *Church and People: Disjunctions in a Secular Age,* Washington D.C.: Council for Research in Values & Philosophy, 2012, pp. 17-24.

[4] R. Wuthnow, *After Heaven: Spirituality in America Since the 1950s*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998.

that distinguishes those who are churchly religious from those who are religious "in their own way", it has the distinctive feature that it focuses on the manner in which religious issues are approached and spiritual demands are satisfied: while dwellers take the answers for granted, seekers try to find the answers themselves.

With our colleague Gergely Rosta,[5] we used the 2008 ISSP[6] survey to identify the two groups of dwellers and seekers and found that while they form but a small (close to 20 percent) segment of Hungarian society, the cluster of those whore are not indifferent to religion is much larger.

If we narrow our focus down to young people (the age group from 18 to 30), then the share of the two groups turns out to be even smaller, with seekers and dwellers making up 5.8 and 4.7 percent of the sample, respectively. Adding to these numbers that of those who fall between the two types (1.6 percent), we find that overall, 12.1 percent of 190 respondents, that is, only 23 persons, are available for study, which practically precludes any detailed analysis. We, therefore, decided to use data from a youth survey from the same year (2008)[7], which had an original sample size of 8000. Unfortunately, not all respondents were asked the questions that are necessary for our typology, so eventually, our sample size went down to 1998.

We tried to reproduce the ISSP groups, but this was only partially possible, due to some important items missing in the questionnaire. In both data sets, only those believing in God were included in the typology, since in the absence of other questions more specifically tailored to our research purposes, it was this characteristic that enabled us to narrow our study down to individuals who are at least minimally devoted to religion. In the ISSP sample, *dwellers* were taken to be those who said they are religious "beyond any doubt", are at least somewhat religious and trust

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[5]   G. Rosta, and R. Hegedűs, *Seekers and Dwellers in the Light of Empirical Social Research* (*forthcoming*).

[6]   International Social Survey Programme, see *http://www.issp.org/.*

[7]   For a more detailed description of the research used in our analysis (in Hungarian), see *http://www.ncsszi.hu/kutatasi-archivum/ifjusagkutatas/96/news.*

the church, while in the 2008 youth survey, they were those who said they believe "with certainty", are churchly religious and want to get married in church. *Seekers*, in contrast, were taken to be those who defined themselves as a spiritual personality, one who has a special relationship to God, in the ISSP sample, while in the other data set, they were those who said they are religious "in their own way" and attended church at least monthly. Items in the youth survey questionnaire were less suitable for capturing attitudes to religion, so we had to include occasional church going as a separate criterion, in order to be able to exclude respondents with no actual religious attitude at all. This, on the other hand, resulted in a drastic decrease in the size of this group, as only 11 percent of those who said they are religious "in their own way" attended church at least monthly. Since the two forms of religiousness (churchly and "in their own way") were mutually exclusive, in the typology created using the 2008 youth survey there were no overlap between dwellers and seekers. (See *Table 1*.)

Table 1. Criteria of the two types of religiosity

Criteria	Dweller	
	ISSP2008	Youth2008
Evidence in belief in God	No doubt	Belief for sure
Religiosity	Somewhat, very or extremely religious	Churchly religious
Relationship with church	Complete or great confidence in churches	Wants marriage in church
	Seeker	
Spiritual openness	Spiritual person	Goes to church at least monthly
Own relation toward the Saint	Own way of connecting with God: agree or strongly agree	Religious on his/her own way

Despite all these differences, the two data sets produced fairly similar results. Dwellers and seekers in each sample formed rather small groups, although their relative sizes were somewhat different: in the 2008 youth survey, seekers outnumbered dwellers a bit, while in the ISSP survey, the opposite was the case. (See *Figure 2*.)

Figure 2. Types of religiosity in the two youth samples

Our main goal with the typology was to identify some of the more important characteristics that distinguish the two classes of individuals who all have genuine interest in religion but differ from each other in the degree to which they think they found assurance in church.

From the 2008 youth survey, it is evident that dwellers do in fact re-present a sort of religious core, since they are much more likely than the rest of the sample to attend religious services (52.8 percent of them attend church at least weekly) and they are also much more likely than others to accept various religious doctrines, such as belief in the Holy Trinity (75.0 percent), belief in heaven (66.3 percent), belief in the saints (63.2 percent), and belief in resurrection (55.7 percent).

Compared to dwellers, seekers are less likely to accept basic Christian doctrines, but they are still much above average in this respect. As for non-Christian doctrines, on the other hand, such as belief in horoscope

or telepathy, they are more receptive than are those in the other group. It should be added, though, that the differences are, in general, not statistically significant and the level of acceptance of non-Christian doctrines is relatively small even among seekers (for instance, only 21.9 percent of them believes in telepathy). The two most popular doctrines are of Christian nature in this group: 41.9 percent of seekers believe in Heaven and 40.3 percent of them believe in the Holy Trinity.

It is useful to contrast the dweller/seeker typology with the one distinguishing churchly religious from those who are religious "in their own way". Of the two tables that follow, the first reports acceptance of various religious doctrines, while the second summarizes the religious background of respondents. (See *Tables 2 and 3*.)

Table 2. Acceptance of various religious doctrines

Respondent definitely believes in…	Churchly religious	Religious by his/her own way	"Dweller"	"Seeker"	Other	Total
God	73.5	33.9	100.0	68.5	15.9	21.8
Resurrection	40.3	9.3	55.7	22.5	4.6	7.5
Holy trinity	54.0	15.8	75.0	40.3	7.3	11.5
Immaculate conception	40.9	9.2	56.8	21.6	4.7	7.5
Heaven	49.7	18.0	66.3	41.9	8.9	12.7
Devil	34.9	12.3	47.7	27.4	6.5	9.1
Hell	34.0	12.2	47.7	24.3	6.6	9.0
Saints	46.7	13.0	63.2	34.2	6.5	10.1
Miracles	23.3	9.6	34.1	21.9	6.0	7.8
Life after death	30.2	15.2	46.6	33.8	8.4	11.0
Transmigration of souls	4.0	11.0	6.7	16.2	6.8	7.2
Horoscope	11.3	9.9	(12.5	10.8	8.0)	8.3
Mascot, talisman	4.0	7.6	(5.7	8.1	5.2)	5.4
Telepathy	10.7	18.5	10.2	21.9	12.7	12.9
Magic	2.7	6.7	(2.3	9.6	4.3)	4.4
UFO	7.3	8.8	(7.9	16.1	7.3)	7.6

Table 3. Religious origin by religious types

Respondent	Churchly religious	Religious in his/her own way	"Dweller"	"Seeker"	Other	Total
is christened	96.6	93.1	97.7	97.2	74.8	76.8
thinks he/she belongs to a church	91.8	74.4	91.7	91.2	46.9	50.9
got religious upbringing	94.0	55.7	96.6	76.4	29.4	34.1

As can be seen from these tables, the two groups of young people who are actively interested in religion are rather different from the rest of the sample, which is much larger in size and consists of individuals who are either not religious or are indifferent to religious matters. The acceptance of Christian dogmas is much greater among them and they are much more likely to have some religious background (a great proportion, for instance, reported religious upbringing).

A distinctive feature of seekers, as already noted in comparison to dwellers, is the high level of acceptance of non-Christian doctrines. While the differences sometimes are rather small, they all point to the same direction (with the exception of belief in horoscope). It is especially interesting that almost every 6th seeker believe in the transmigration of souls. Those believing in this dogma are not less likely to believe in Christian doctrines – on the contrary!

In order to further examine the picture that has emerged from the tables presented thus far, we developed two numerical scales, each consisting of 5 items. One scale captured belief in typical Christian dogmas such as the existence of the Holy Trinity, while the other captured belief in typical non-Christian doctrines such as the possibility of telepathy. Using linear regression analysis, we found that belief in non-Christian doctrines had a positive effect on belief in Christian dogmas (the regression coefficient was 0.511, statistically significant at the usual 5 percent level). When we

looked at the two groups, seekers and dwellers, separately, however, the effect proved significant only among seekers, where the numerical value of the coefficient was also greater (b_1 = 0.817).

Summary

All in all, our results show that a reflective approach to religion characterizes only a small segment of the young population and the two groups that we identified form two separate parts of this small segment. However, these two groups conform not so much to the seeker/dweller typology, but rather it seems that the differences we found are manifestations of a stronger and looser relationship to the church, a more traditional and a more liberal form of religiosity. The group called seekers can be said to represent a sort of "patchwork" religiosity.

Measurement problems have, in all probability, also contributed to the fact that we were able to capture with greater precision the difference between churchly and non-churchly religiousness than that between dwellers and seekers. It should also be noted that in addition to the two groups discussed here, there also are individuals – albeit in small number – who would have been identified as religious had we focused on other aspects or characteristics of religiosity.

Finally, as we already mentioned, more than two decades have already passed since the last survey on youth religiousness was conducted in Hungary. This fact deserves emphasis because without such surveys, which are based on a relatively large sample and include many questions specifically developed to capture religion, different types of religiosity are very hard to investigate.

Rita Hegedűs, Ferenc Moksony

Types of Youth Religiosity

Summary

Members of contemporary western societies may on paper be born into their parents' religion, but this no longer determines their later ideological and community commitment. Individual freedom of choice is clearly present in the realm of religion. Still, religious background undoubtedly affects children in modern societies. Kids of Catholic, Protestant, or Jewish parents will even today most likely be Catholics, Protestants, or Jews – if they will be religious at all. But by what type of religiosity can these young people be characterised? Or are there more types? We examined this question by secondary analysis of two public international data bases from 2008 (International Social Survey Programme and Youth 2008). Two approaches to religion is analysed, using a new typology introduced by Charles Taylor ("seekers" vs. "dwellers").

Alexandros Sakellariou

YOUTH AND RELIGION: BELONGING, BELIEVING AND PARTICIPATING

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The relation of young people with religion has been a separate interest among researchers during the last years.[1] The basic purpose of this paper is to reflect on young people's religiosity, social activism and civic engagement and the main questions that I will try to answer are the following: which is the role of religion and religious values in the lives of young people? And in which types of activism are young people involved in and what does this participation mean to them?

This paper is a reflection on the findings of the MYPLCAE (Memory, Youth, Political Legacy and Civic Engagement) project.[2] The analysis is based on six case-studies of religion-based groups in five countries (Greece, Portugal, Georgia, Latvia and Slovakia). These ethnographic studies took place in each country including almost all major religions (Christianity-Protestant, Catholic, Orthodox, Islam and Buddhism) and were based on participant observation and semi-structured interviews. In

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[1] The National Study of Religion and Youth (*www.youthandreligion.org*) in the US, University of Notre Dame, H.G. Ziebertz, W.K. Kay (eds.), *Youth in Europe II: An International Empirical Study about Religiosity*, Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2006 and H.G. Ziebertz, W.K. Kay, U. Riegel (eds.), *Youth in Europe III: An International Empirical Study about the Impact of Religion in Life Orientation*, Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2009.

[2] More information about the MYPLACE project can be found in *http://www. fp7-myplace.eu/*

this paper I am going to present the findings from these ethnographic case-studies following meta-ethnography, using common concepts as an analytical tool and trying to cluster possible similarities and differences.[3] The six case-studies analyzed were: Young Greek Evangelicals (Greece, hereafter YGE), Latvia for Tibet (Latvia, hereafter LFT), Latvian Muslim Community (Latvia, hereafter LMC), Catholic Labor Youth (Portugal, hereafter CLY), Christian Democratic Youth (Slovakia, hereafter CDY) and Church Choir in Telavi (Georgia, hereafter CCT).[4] As it is clear from the above short descriptions the groups under analysis are of different backgrounds and this makes comparisons and analyses quite difficult but intriguing as well. Finally, two points should be underlined: The organizations under analysis are not exclusively religious and in addition they are not exclusively youth organizations, at least not all of them.

The role of religion in young people's lives

Despite the fact that the organizations are not all religious and that religion plays sometimes a secondary role, e.g. in the case of CDY or in LFT, it is unquestionable that religion lies at the core of these groups, directly or indirectly and influences young people's lives and activism. The

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[3]   The meaning of meta-ethnography is a form of synthesis for ethnographic or other interpretive studies. It enables researchers to talk to each other about their studies; to communicate to policy makers, concerned citizens, and scholars what interpretive research reveals. Meta-ethnography is a method for the synthesis of qualitative empirical data (secondary sources) that is interpretive rather than aggregative in approach. It works through the principle of the 'reciprocal translations' of the meanings of one case into the meanings of another. Through this process overarching themes, concepts or 'metaphors' evolve. G.W. Noblit, R.D. Hare, *Meta-ethnography: Synthesizing Qualitative Studies*, California, Sage, 1988, pp.11-14.

[4]   All interviews and quotes have been anonymized. Further analyses about their relation with politics, their views about politics, history, political participation and ideological background have taken place, but due to the lack of space selection of findings is only presented in this paper. For more information about each case-study and the analysis conducted see project reports at *http://www.fp7-myplace.eu/deliverable_7.php*.

concepts that emerged from the analysis of how religion frames activism and everyday lives are: (1) Belonging without believing, (2) Religious values and (3) Transmission of religious memory.

Belonging without believing

A reasonable hypothesis would be that the members of religion-based groups and organizations are highly religious. However, and having in mind the debates about believing without belonging, belonging without believing or neither believing nor belonging,[5] it could be argued that this need not be the case for every member. For example one member of the CDY actually said that he had lost his faith and was facing a dilemma regarding his participation in the organization. He remained a member of the group, because he agreed with Christian values, as reflected in attitudes to social issues (abortion, euthanasia, homosexuality, etc.). In this sense, religion to him was more a kind of cultural heritage than a transcendental experience, and another participant, in the LFT organization, declared himself to be an atheist; another counter-intuitive self-identification. The most interesting case, however, is that of the LMC since, as reported by quite a few respondents, participants are not very religious; they do not observe religious duties, some were not aware that there is a mosque in Latvia, while others said that neither they nor their families practiced Islam and characterized themselves as secular Muslims, meaning that religion is taken more as a cultural element of their identity. Nonetheless, it should be noted that the majority of the respondents, especially of those organizations directly connected to a religious group or a Church are faithful and follow the traditions of their religion. Even in the case of LFT, a religious freedom and human rights organization, many members are practicing Buddhists.

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[5] Davie, Grace. *Religion in Britain since 1945: Believing without Belonging*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1994; D. Hervieu-Leger, "The Role of Religion in Establishing Social Cohesion", 2006, available at: *http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2006-08-17-hervieuleger-en.html* [last access 7 November 2014] and D. Voas and A. Crockett, "Religion in Britain: Neither Believing nor Belonging", *Sociology*, 39 (1): pp. 11-28.

Attempting to understand these findings, it might be noted that belonging to a religion-based group does not necessarily imply believing in that particular religion. The fact that the group's values are nonetheless accepted suggests that these values may be less religious than social values incorporated from religions over the course of time.

Religious values

Religious values are central to decisions to become a member of the groups studied in this analysis and play a crucial role in young people's lives. Many respondents of the CDY, for example, mentioned that, 'the reason I joined the organization were Christian and democratic ideas' (Anna, CDY). Another explained what these Christian values are: 'These are especially principles and values we share with Christian doctrine' (Pavol, CDY).

The role of the family is very important since most of the respondents grew up with these values: 'Our family follows Christian values. Both my parents taught us to practice according to Christian values' (Dominik, CDY); 'My parents are Catholic and always educated me in the Catholic faith and always had this family background' (Carlos, CLY).

In another social framework, that of the crisis in Greece, young people said, that people should turn to God and Jesus Christ if they want things to change, because 'every human being should understand that some things are stable, like God for example' (Ifikratis, YGE) and that, 'a better future will not come without Christ' (Stylianos, YGE). Similar views were mentioned in the Georgian case and anxiety was expressed about the spiritual condition of people in contemporary Georgian society.

Transmission of religious memory

Another aspect of the discussion about young people's religiosity and religious participation is related to studies about the transmission of religious beliefs across generations, where religion is examined as a

chain of memory,[6] meaning that religion is reproduced through the family channels creating something like a chain of memory among the members of the religious group. From young people's answers it is clear that family plays a significant role in both their religious and political choices, as already mentioned. Most of the respondents in the case studies of CLY, YGE, CDY, LMC and CCT follow the religion of their parents, meaning that religion is transmitted through family channels and functions like memory.

The exception to this rule comes from the case of Latvia for Tibet. Within a basically Christian society and regardless of the fact that in some cases the respondents also mentioned other members of their family practising Buddhism, it is clear that in this case we observe a rupture of this chain of religious memory. Young people changed their religious belonging despite strong environmental factors pushing them in a different direction: 'Basically, that's how it has been established in the society. You are forced to accept some religion in childhood. Yes, and you just have to follow it' (LFT21, LFT). The same applies for some LMC case study respondents who grew up in a Christian family and then converted to Islam, but this is certainly not the rule.

As a consequence, it could be argued that families play a crucial role in the transmission of religion, but there are also exceptions as it is evident from the examples mentioned, basically from the LFT case. That means that especially nowadays that young people have access to information from around the world about belief systems, ideologies and religious ideas it is more probable for them to be attracted by a religion different from that of their parents.

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[6]   V.L. Bengtson, *Families and Faith: How Religion is Passed Down across Generations*, Oxford University Press, 2013, D. Hervieu-Leger, *Religion as a Chain of Memory*, Cambridge,: Polity Press, 2000 and M. Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992.

Social engagement and its meaning

The six case studies considered differ not only in terms of organization, background and religion but also in the forms of activism in which young people are involved within their organizations. The forms of activism engaged in, based on what young people mentioned in their interviews and what the researchers observed include participation in regular meetings, in summer camps, distribution of religious material, practicing their religion, participating in protests, demonstrations, boycotts, excursions and relations with other youth groups, charity activities (e.g. food donations, blood donations, helping children, prisoners, prostitutes), etc. Exploring what the data tell us about how young people understand and feel about their activism, revealed four key concepts: Togetherness, Usefulness, Emotions and Personal benefits. The first two concepts capture how young people understand and explain their participation, while the second two articulate what young people get out of their activism. Based on the data synthesis it could be argued that emotions are not necessarily opposed to reason[7] and that both reason and emotions are a crucial parameter in order to understand young people's participation.

Togetherness

Young people usually get involved in various activities either as a result of influence from their family or because some of their friends, most often their closest ones, participate in these activities. Thus one of the most important reasons for young people's participation is 'togetherness'. However, they do not want just to do what their friends or relatives do, but to get together with their peers and feel part of a group with common interests, ideas, backgrounds, worries and anxieties. Thus 'togetherness' is not only a consequence of participation but sometimes a reason for becoming a member of the group in the first place or one of the main objectives of

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[7] N. Crossley, *Making Sense of Social Movements*, Buckingham, Philadelphia: Open University Press, 2002, pp. 49-50.

participation. Respondents described their motivations for participation, for example, as meeting with people of the same age and making new friends. This sometimes becomes a goal of the whole organization, albeit unofficially: '[We organize] some excursions either out of Athens or within the Athens region and we come closer [with members of the other youth divisions] (Gabriel, YGE).

Through these contacts personal relations grow and strong bonds between young people evolve and this seems to be equally important for some respondents. These close relations are particularly expressed by members of the CLY, CDY and YGE. The heightened importance of togetherness in these groups might be explained by the fact that they are exclusively youth organizations while the other three organizations are adult organizations in which young people participate.

Usefulness

A second reason why young people participate in a range of activities both within and beyond their organizations, seems to be the need to offer something to society – a need to feel useful – even if this is no more than offering a plastic bag with food to homeless people. In some other cases respondents feel that they have a mission to accomplish.

> [B]ut I also feel that I have a very big mission to distribute all this experience that I have gained – pass on all the experiences I have collected to other young people in order to help them as they helped me, be a voice of hope for them, a reference (Maria, CLY).

For everyone this kind of activism is done on a voluntary basis and they participate even when it affects their paid work, since their involvement is also viewed as a duty to be useful. Based on their own narrations, therefore, we could argue that young people's choice to enter and participate in such groups is founded on two needs: the need to feel socially integrated by meeting new people, making friends, exchanging views and ideas with peers; and the need to act, to be useful, not only for their group, but for society as a whole.

Emotions

Emotions or emotional richness is an important feature of young peo-ple's activism. The emotions participation evokes include: passion, guilt, happiness, joy, shock, compassion, fear and satisfaction. Even when it comes to activities like the night-time distribution of food to homeless people and drug addicts on the streets of Athens, once the initial shock is overcome, the experience leaves a feeling of satisfaction: 'Okay, yes… I went there, it was very shocking, the first time was shocking. The follow-ing times were not the same, but the first time, yes, it is something that leaves a big impression on you' (Gabrihl, YGE).

> The first time that I participated in an activity [...], invited me to go to an activity and it was a thing [...] it was a completely un-known reality, I had never been in a neighborhood like that, but I was received in such a manner that I thought how incredible it was that anyone would say that it was not safe (Mário, CLY).

We have to keep in mind that for the majority of them, it is the first time they actually get out of home and participate in such activities and facing the real or to be more exact the hard face of life, as they themselves admit. In that sense it is important that, despite what they have seen and faced, they continue to participate and in many cases they want to become more active in the future. They surpass their fears and the shock of the social reality, which probably help them to mature as persons and citizens. As one girl have put it: 'I think that you grow up through these activities, necessarily, you learn many things […]. It is a process that you give, you receive and you move on' (Nektaria, YGE).

Personal benefits

In addition to the positive emotional experiences described above, re-spondents also noted a number of personal benefits arising from their participation. These include: gaining more knowledge about social reality, learning new things, self-improvement, and personal change.

One of the most important dimensions of activism for young people is that it puts them in touch with the real world at a time particularly

characterized by social and economic crisis. This is especially evident in the narratives of respondents in Greece and Portugal.

> It was in the accompaniment of some young people in some pro-
> blematic neighborhoods, I was not used to dealing with this type of
> realities and was learning that there were realities even socially very
> disadvantaged; luckily I have not had this experience, I saw young
> people facing difficulties and it was also a very important milestone
> and I had to deal with quite different situations (Carlos, CLY).

If we want to draw some provisional conclusions, we might argue that social activism helps young people to familiarize themselves with social reality and even shape their views, ideas and lives. Most importantly, young people do not regret participating in such activities while the richness of their emotions, as these are expressed in the interviews, clearly shows that the benefit they get is quite important for their personal development.

Conclusions

After the above brief data synthesis of young people's participation the critical question is: What are the main conclusions derived from these case studies? What is confirmed and what is refuted based on the existing literature? Is something new added and are there any new stimuli for further research?

Regarding young people's involvement in their own organizations the main outcome was that young people are not passive members and are not completely indifferent for social and political issues. From the data synthesis it could be argued that young people are also engaged in other types of activism, i.e. not only within their organizations. However, it is not clear if this activist attitude that goes beyond the borders of their organization is explained by the fact that they are members of a group already or it is based on other reasoning.

Another finding based on the data synthesis is that emotions are not necessarily opposed to reason and that both reason and emotions are a crucial parameter in order to understand young people's participation.

Young people mention family and peer influence as a crucial parameter for the involvement in the organization. In addition, they argue that their participation is based on their will to be useful and offer both to their group and to society and gain some benefits on the personal level, but emotions are also described as important.

Regarding religion the analysis conducted concluded that young participants openly express their religious feelings and they participate in their religion's activities of both religious and social character. Religion plays an important role for the majority of them and religious values are influencing them directly in their lives and choices. Finally, and despite the fact that religion is the critical parameter of these groups, with the case of CDY being the exception, it should be stressed that according to the data synthesis some of the participants don't take religion as the only and exclusive reason for participation, confirming at some point the idea of belonging without believing, supporting the finding that togetherness and social activism are sometimes more important than religious affiliation.

As a consequence, what can be derived from the data synthesis of these religion-based organizations? It seems that the main outcome is that these particular groups point to the intersection of religious and social activism. Participants are not only interested in fulfilling their religious duties and being 'good' and faithful devotees. Their interest in social issues and their engagement in such activities support this argument. It is crucial, though, to keep in mind that we dealt with very different case-studies in terms of religious and minority/majority backgrounds and this makes it difficult to come to some common conclusions. In any case, the ground is open for more research in this particular field since religion still plays a crucial role in contemporary western societies and young people are seeking alternative forms of socio-political engagement.

Alexandros Sakellariou

Youth and religion: Belonging, believing and participating

Summary

This paper is based on the findings of the MYPLCAE (Memory, Youth, Political Legacy and Civic Engagement) European research project. Among qualitative and quantitative studies a special attention was paid to specific religion-based groups in five countries (Greece, Portugal, Georgia, Latvia and Slovakia). These ethnographic studies took place in each country and include almost all major religions (Christianity-Protestant, Catholic, Orthodox, Islam and Buddhism) and were based on participant observation and semi-structured interviews. In this paper I am going to present the findings from these ethnographic case-studies following meta-ethnography, using common concepts as an analytical tool and trying to cluster possible similarities and differences. The basic purpose of this paper is to reflect on young people's religiosity and social participation and activism and the main questions that I will try to answer based on the existing data are the following: Which is the role of religion and religious values in the lives of young people? And in which types of activism are young people involved in and what does this participation mean to them?

Marika Laudere

SOCIALLY ENGAGED BUDDHISM IN LATVIA: "LATVIA FOR TIBET"

Daugavpils University, Latvia

In recent years there has been growing academic acknowledgement of a contemporary Buddhist phenomenon described as Engaged or Socially Engaged Buddhism (SEB). Finding its roots in Vietnam through the Zen Buddhist teacher Thich Nhat Hanh (1926) who opposed Vietnam War in 1960s, Engaged Buddhism has grown in popularity in the West[1] and at present this movement cuts across the lay-monastic divide. In general, this term refers to contemporary movements that develop Buddhist solutions to political, social and ecological problems. Except Buddhists from traditional Buddhism areas, it also includes Western converts[2]. Inspired by Buddhist values and united by a commonality to reduce suffering in the world, such individuals and groups are socially engaged in many forms of social and environmental protests, social service and analyses. In this way Buddhists try to cultivate inner peace and compassion both introspectively and socially.[3]

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[1] Queen, Chris and King, Sallie. Engaged Buddhism: Buddhist Liberation Movements in Asia. New York: Albany State University Press, 1996, p. 2.

[2] Keown, Damien. A Dictionary of Buddhism. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 86

[3] Phil, Henry. Adaptation and Developments in Western Buddhism: Socially Engaged Buddhism in the UK. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013, p. 6.

One of political events that concerns Buddhists all over the world is the Chinese invasion of Tibet[4]. China's control over Tibet since 1950s and the tragic events in Tibet of Spring 2008, namely protest actions and Buddhist monks' self-immolations before Olympic Games in Beijing, have led to the creation of human rights organisations and associations in support of Tibet in many countries. Since Buddhism in Latvia has not been a foreign religion anymore and there are several acting Buddhist groups in Latvia, Latvian people from different social strata and groups, including young people, also decided to express their support for Tibetans by founding the association "Latvia for Tibet".

Free Tibet Movement in Latvia "Latvia for Tibet"

Historical Background

"Latvia for Tibet" is a social movement set up on a voluntary and common interest basis that emphasises the idea of global justice. Its origins lies in the protests that took place in Tibet, in spring 2008, which were cruelly suppressed by Chinese military corps. Latvian people from different social strata and groups, including young people, also decided to express their support for Tibetans by founding the association in support of Tibet.

"Latvia for Tibet" was officially registered as an association on 10 July 2008, in Riga. It states that it: (1) commits to the rights of Tibetans to cultural and religious autonomy, (2) promotes Tibetan culture, religious and medical traditions, and (3) raises public awareness of socio-political events in Tibet. Latvia for Tibet opposes not only violence and repression in Tibet but also forced abortions and sterilisation performed in China along with capital punishment, psychological and physical torture of political prisoners, forced labour, failure to respect the rights of employees and other human rights violations.[5]

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[4] Keown, Damien and Charles S. Prebish Introducing Buddhism. London: Routledge, 2006, p. 208.
[5] Lursoft data bases of enterprises. 2013. 'Latvija Tibetai', http://company.lursoft.lv/latvija-tibetai, accessed 29 January 2013.

At the beginning the organisation was formed through a merger of three groups: youth from Andrejsala[6]; young people interested in or practicing Buddhism; and high-profile intellectuals and political figures. When these groups, independently of each other, notified the public of their first support campaigns for Tibet (youth from Andrejsala and Buddhists) and shown the interest in solving this problem (well-known to people in Latvia), they decided to unite to organise common activities.

The key factor which consolidated these groups into a single organisation was support for Tibetan independence and the right of Tibetans to a democratic society. In addition, the historical experience of Latvia, accumulated over the years of totalitarianism, also played an important role in the consolidation process. Drawing on the historical parallels[7] between Tibet and Latvia as well as Latvia's experience of regaining independence and renewing its democracy, the association Latvia for Tibet shows solidarity with Tibetans in their efforts to win the right to self-determination. At the same time it also stands up for the ideals and values of Latvia.

The Present State

Although Tibet is not one of the most important of topical issues among the public, the association "Latvia for Tibet" continues to operate. Significant changes have taken place during the five years of its existence, and have had an impact on the organisation's activities. Its first campaigns organised in 2008 were wide-ranging and brought together more than 100 members. Today its membership has decreased by more than half that can be explained by the following reasons: (1) the public's interest in the Tibetan problem has declined and new, more important problems have emerged in the world; (2) many young people participated in group's activities not only because of the idea of freedom and justice, but also to

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[6] Mainly students, artists and representatives of various alternative cultures in their early twenties who resided in a district of Riga named Andrejsala.

[7] Tibet has been an autonomous region of the People's Republic of China since the 1950s. After the Tibetan uprising of March 1959, the government of Tibet went into excile. Latvia was part of the USSR from 1940 to 1991.

spend time together with their friends; (3) the third reason lies in the inner structure of the organization. According to the data, at the beginning there were no clear leaders, but in the course of time, coordination of the group's work, planning of events and decision making were assumed by people related to politics. The role of youth in the group decreased. Generally, these reasons led to the fact that young people left the association and especially it concerned the largest group within the organisation – i.e. young people from Andrejsala.

The research in the group shows that from its inception, "Latvia for Tibet" was partly a self-initiative group of young people and today it has preserved its nucleus. People who laid its foundations are still members. Currently they are 30 to 40 years old and are approaching the borderline of the middle-aged generation. More specifically, they started working with the group when they were youngsters. As for the activities organized by "Latvia for Tibet", youth aged from 22 to 25 participate most actively in different events. Several young people in this age group have joined the organisation from various Buddhist communities. Along with the youth and the middle-aged generation, the older generation (aged 55-65) also actively participates in the group's activities. Thereby "Latvia for Tibet" is open to various age groups which enjoy cooperative relations.

Buddhists in the group

Buddhists create a significant part of "Latvia for Tibet". The main part of them belongs to "Ganden" meditation centre[8] that had a special role in the foundation and functioning of "Latvia for Tibet":

> [In the society functioning] "Ganden" is more involved; it is the representative of Gelug school in Latvia headed by Dalai Lama, thus

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[8] "Ganden" is a centre of Tibetan Buddhism the goal whereof is popularizing Buddhist teaching and practice as well as help integrating it into the everyday life of everybody who is interested. The centre was founded by Uldis Balodis, a Latvian living in Australia (b. 1949) who arrived to Riga in 2000 to organize the visit of Dalai Lama to Latvia. Before the visit, Uldis Balodis delivered lectures in Latvia Culture Academy as well as individuals. When a group of interested people had gathered, in 2003 it was officially registered as a religious organization.

this school provides the greatest support for the society's activities and our school is more involved in Tibetan activities than, say, those schools that are more attached to Western Buddhism and its teachers.[9]

Exactly young people from "Ganden" centre were among the first who in 2008 reacted to the events in Tibet and decided to show their support to Tibet:

I was sitting and watching TV when I saw a newsreel about those protests. It was in 2008 when there were bloodshed and protest actions, when the monks were killed. It left a terrifying impression and I thought that something had to be done and I wrote a message in Buddhist forum. When I and my friends went to write the application [for registering a picket] another guy had written and we decided to cooperate, and finally put all that together.[10]

Such reaction of young people and their decision to participate in further Tibet support activities, first of all, were caused by their religious identity. Having practiced Buddhism for several years, young people had developed a bond with religion, religious teachers and also with Tibet that was closely associated with Buddhism in their awareness: "Tibet is the source of my religion and the violations of religious freedom in this country are absolutely unacceptable for me."[11] Buddhists were worried both about violations against religious freedom and the fact that the Tibetan culture which they considered unique and important was doomed:

Of course, Latvia doesn't have the enormous heritage of Buddhism like Tibet. Now you have to watch how the monasteries and homes of monks have been destroyed and how Chinese troops enter their territory //… // I believe that such cultural and historical values must be preserved as long as possible. Tibetan and other monks try to advance love, peace, understanding, and harmony in the world //… // soldiers destroy all this. This is terrible.[12]

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[9] LFT1. Personal interview. 15 March 2012.
[10] LFT7. Personal interview. 14 April 2012
[11] LFT2. Personal interview. 15 March 2012.
[12] LFT6. Personal interview. 24 March 2012.

No less important reason for their activities is found in the idea of social justice based on the historical experience of Latvia under the conditions of totalitarian regime. In the frame of FP7 collaboration project *Memory, Youth, Political Legacy and Civic Engagement (MYPLACE)* that researches how the social activity of contemporary youth is influenced by remnants of totalitarianism and populism in Europe youth from "Latvia for Tibet" were asked to express their opinion on the present state of the country and processes within it, as well problematic issues in the history of Latvia and their influence on present state. The results of research show that exactly the Soviet occupation and the period of Soviet rule were mentioned as the most problematic events which still have influence on society. According to respondents' opinions the most negative aspects of the Soviet regime were not only the loss of national independence, the impossibility of freely expressing one's opinion but also disparaging attitudes towards spiritual values and the prohibition of religious life.[13] Referring to historical parallels and events in Latvia that opened the way to reconstructing independence and democracy with freedom as the supreme value the society "Latvia for Tibet" supported Tibetans in their striving for freedom:

> We came together, people who hold freedom as an important value and who consider the rights of national self-determination vital, who feel close to this land for a spiritual or another reason. One of the motives [of the society's functioning] was that the support out in the world had been important for Latvia in its fight for independence and if we did not support Tibetan fight for freedom we would betray in a sense ourselves and our civic awareness.[14]

It should be added that Dalai Lama was among the first political and spiritual leaders who recognized the restoration of independence of Latvia in 1991. It was also emphasised by Latvian poet Roberts Mūks (1923-2006) who considered his recognition more important than by Kohl, Bush

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[13] For example, LFT2. Personal interview. 15 March 2012.; LFT18. Personal interview. 18 November 2012; LFT25. Personal interview. 10 March 2013.

[14] LFT3. Personal interview. 23 March 2012

and other politicians[15]. In his first visit to Latvia on 2 October 1992, Dalai Lama stated: "Proclaiming the independence of Baltic States was a very inspiring event not only for us but also other smaller nations that are occupied."[16] Therefore Buddhists from "Latvia for Tibet" felt a duty to support the country that had supported them before; as well participation in the activities of association more deepened youth's spiritual connection with religion, Tibet and Dalai Lama.

The Activity of "Latvia for Tibet"

"Latvia for Tibet" works on several fronts. First, it organises political activities (e.g. protest campaigns, pickets) that are addressed both to Latvian government and to Chinese embassy. The primary aims of them are the followings: to invite state officials to express strict condemnation to Chinese ambassador in Latvia over violations of human rights in China; to attract mass media attention; and remind the public of human rights violations in Tibet, of its occupation and of the systematic extermination of its people and culture.

The main annual political event of the association is a picket in early March, the day of the uprising of Tibetan people that takes place at the building of Chinese embassy in Riga: "Basically everything takes place in front of Chinese embassy. This is the major goal of our actions – to organize events in order to develop communication, a bond with the embassy, so that they would see what's going on, that Latvia is not a silent, small country and its people are aware of the situation in China and they wish to demonstrate it to the world."[17] As a rule, during these pickets slogans are chanted, posters are erected, and participants of pickets are holding either Tibetan or Buddhism prayer flags. Other political activities are usually organized during the visits of government representatives of China to Latvia and the similar attitude towards Tibetan issue is demonstrated as well.

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[15] Berelis G. "Mūks bez klostera", Karogs – Nr. 1 (1992), 10. lpp.
[16] Vidauskis U. "Tibetas budisma līderis", Diena (1991.3. okt.), 14. lpp.
[17] LFT1. Personal interview. 15 March 2012.

If political activities are addressed to Chinese embassy and Latvian government, the possibility of how to inform the society about Tibet and human rights violations, as well to promote Tibetan culture in Latvia is to organize socio – cultural activities. These are: (1) film shows telling about human rights violations in Tibet, e. g., *Cry of The Snow Lion, Leaving Fear Behind)*; (2) participation in international peace campaigns and events for Tibet, e. g. international relay race "Flame of Truth" in October, 2012[18]. Within the frame of this event, several activities took place in Riga over two days: a press conference with Buddhist monk, representative of Tibetan parliament in emigration, on the premises of political party "Democratic Patriots" in Riga's Council; several meetings with deputies of Latvian Parliament; a lecture for law students at the University of Latvia, and collection of signatures for the petition to the UNO.

The third direction of activities of "Latvia for Tibet" aims at promoting Tibetan Buddhism, namely organization of religious events. Since Buddhists create an important part of the association, organization of religious events is mainly under their responsibility. Activities dedicated to Tibet and Buddhism are regularly organized on the premises of "Ganden" centre: film shows, discussions with monks, as well as travellers, meditations and prayers for Tibet.

One of the most important events in the calendar of the association that falls both into categories of religious and socio-cultural activities are visits of Dalai Lama to Latvia wherein two of the last took place in 2013 and 2014. The visit of Dalai Lama in September, 2013 included various cultural events organized by Buddhist groups in Riga; meetings with Buddhists from Latvia and Russia, public talk; and meeting with representatives of Tibet Support group in Parliament of Latvia and members of "Latvia for Tibet". On the contrary the last visit of Dalai Lama in

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[18] It was an international campaign organized by Tibetan parliament in exile, the representatives whereof, several Buddhist monks, visited many world countries with the symbolic torch and addressed the international community with a request to sign the petition to the UNO for sending independent experts to Tibet.

May 5-6, 2014 was significant for the fact that for the first's time Dalai Lama came to Latvia in order to give teachings for Buddhists from Baltic States, Russia and the nearest countries.

Conclusion

"Latvia for Tibet" was composed of multiple groups and was united around a specific and limited goal that was support for Tibetan independence and the right of Tibetans to a democratic society. Since its foundation in 2008, it has been a politically active group. It implies not only organization of political activities such as pickets, protests, etc., but during the early events organized in 2008, several well-known politicians (Sandra Kalniete, Silva Bendrāte, and Ingūna Rībena) acted together with young people. Currently several group members are closely connected to politics, the leader of Latvia for Tibet was a member of the Riga City Council until the summer of 2013. In addition, Latvia for Tibet has close cooperation with Tibet support group in the Latvian Parliament which in cooperation with "Latvia for Tibet" has organised visits of representatives of Tibetan Parliament in Exile and Dalai Lama's receptions in Latvia.

The research shows that the involvement of the current members of "Latvia for Tibet" was directly motivated by their values, beliefs and personal norms (i.e. feelings of personal obligation that are linked to one's self expectations) that impel individuals to act in ways which support the goals of the movement[19]. Personal norms and altruistic (selfless) values are important since social groups, unlike pure interest groups, are based on normative requirements where individuals and social organisations act according to the movement's principles rather than self-interest.[20] Firstly,

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[19] Schwartz, H. Shalom, "Normative Influences on Altruism". In L. Berkowitz (ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology 10, New York: Academic Press, 1977, pp. 221-279.

[20] Stern, C. Stern, Dietz, Thomas, Abel, Troy, Gregory A. Guagnano, and Kalof, Linda, "A Value-belief-norm theory of support for social movements: the case of environmental concern". In Human Ecology Review 6.2 (1999), pp. 81–97. Available at http://www.humanecologyreview.org/pastissues/her62/62sternetal.pdf (Date of retrieval: 15 January 2014).

itsactivities are rooted in historical experience accumulated over years of totalitarianism. Social engagement in this organization means for members of "Latvia for Tibet" expression of their opinion on the state of affairs in Tibet, standing for social justice, peace in the world and acknowledgment of historical parallels between Latvia and Tibet.

Secondly, no less important driver in formation and existence of association was religion. According to sociologist Christian Smith views, religion can provide a moral justification for activism, key resources for mobilization and useful tools for framing.[21] It also provides emotional background for social movements and is a good source of "ready-made symbols, rituals, and solidarities that can be accessed and appropriated by movement leaders".[22] Concerning "Latvia for Tibet" exactly Buddhists and people who feel close for spiritual reasons to Tibet form a significant part of the present members of the group. Therefore, not only historical memory about past events in Latvia and solidarity with Tibetans but also Buddhism is an important source of inspiration and motivation that keeps Buddhists in this organization.

According to the data, social engagement for Buddhists means more than just standing for social justice and peace in the world. It is one of the ways how to express their own religious identity and practice Buddhism. Therefore, at the end of the article, it can be concluded that standing for rights of Tibet and be a part of SEB movement in the world, firstly, makes them firm about their religious identity, and, secondly, develop in them qualities important for each Buddhist, such as love and compassion.

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[21] Smith, Christian, "Correcting a Curious Neglect, or Bringing Religion Back In". In Christian Smith (ed.), Disruptive Religion: The Force of Faith in Social Movement Activism, New York: Routledge, 1996, pp. 1-28.

[22] Tarrow, Sidney, Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics. Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 12.

Marika Laudere

Sociāli aktīvs budisms Latvijā: "Latvija Tibetai"

Kopsavilkums

Tā saucamais sociāli nodarbināts budisms ir jauna parādība budisma attīstībā pasaulē. Viens no jautājumiem, kas nodarbina šīs kustības budistus, ir cilvēktiesību pārkāpumi un sociālā netaisnība. Šis raksts vispirms sniedz informatīvu pārskatu par Tibetas neatkarības kustību Latvijā – "Latvija Tibetai", kuras locekļi iestājas pret vardarbību un represijām Tibetā, ka arī aizstāv tibetiešu tiesības uz kulturālu un reliģisku autonomiju. Rakstā prezentētā informācija ir balstīta uz vairāku mēnešu garu (2012. gada marts – 2013. gada aprīlis) lauka pētījumu biedrībā "Latvija Tibetai", kas tapa FP7 sadarbības projektā "Vēsturiskā atmiņa, jaunatne, politiskais mantojums un pilsoniskā aktivitāte" (MYPLACE) ietvaros. Rakstā galvenā uzmanība tiek fokusēta uz šādu jautājumu atspoguļošanu: 1) budistu iesaistīšanās iemesli organizācijas darbībā; 2) aplūkojot "Latvija Tibetai" aktivitāti, parādīt, kādā veidā notiek šī iesaistīšanās biedrības darbībā.

Anita Stašulāne, Jānis Priede

POLITISKAIS UN PILSONISKAIS NARATĪVS: LATVIJAS MUSULMAŅU JAUNIEŠU POLITISKĀS LĪDZDALĪBAS NOTEICOŠIE FAKTORI

Daugavpils Universitāte

Atguvusi neatkarību, Latvija ir kļuvusi par pilntiesīgu ES dalībvalsti (2004), NATO alianses locekli (2004), Šengenas līguma dalībvalsti (2007) un Eirozonas valsti (2014). Šādējādi pilnībā integrējoties Rietumu struktūrās, Latvija ir radījusi priekšnosacījumus, lai kļūtu par vienu no "mērķa valstīm migrantiem, kas ierodas no jauno reģionālo ģeohierarhiju robežām".[1] Latvijas Republikas Centrālās statistikas pārvaldes dati liecina, ka 2012. gadā Latvijā uz dzīvi ieradās vairāk nekā 13 tūkstoši, 2013. gadā – vairāk nekā 8 tūkstoši, 2014. gadā – vairāk nekā 10 tūkstoši ilgtermiņa imigrantu.[2] Grūtības un problēmas, ar ko saskaras Latvija, vairs nav lokālas, bet iekļaujas kopējā "Eiropas dilemmā",[3] respektīvi, arī Latvija saskaras

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[1] Overbeek, H. *Globalisation and governance: contradictions of neo-liberal migration management*, *HWWA Discussion Paper 174*, Hamburg: Hamburg Institute of International-al Economics, 2002. *http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/19336/1/174.pdf* (skatīts 22.06.2015). (Šeit un turpmāk – autoru tulkojums.)

[2] Centrālās statistikas pārvaldes datu bāzes. Iedzīvotāju ilgtermiņa migrācija. *http://data.csb.gov.lv/pxweb/lv/Sociala/Sociala__ikgad__iedz__migr/IB0010.px/table/tableViewLayout1/?rxid=7ee5bb2b-7c93-4ccb-8a34-1aa4ade09cc3* (skatīts 22.06.2015).

[3] Cf. Schierup, C. U., Hansen, P. , Castles, S. *Migration, citizenship and the European welfare state: a European dilemma*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.

ar darbaspēka migrācijas etnopolitiku: "Jauniem migrācijas viļņiem pakāpeniski sasniedzot Latviju, valstī pirmoreiz ierodas migranti, kuri nav eiropieši, tā radot jaunus izaicinājumus dažādu rasu, tautību un reliģisko minoritāšu integrācijai."[4]

Tā kā Latvijā tautas skaitīšanā vairs netiek iekļauts jautājums par reliģisko piederību, precīzi dati par musulmaņu skaitu šobrīd Latvijā nav pieejami. Pēdējā tautas skaitīšana, kurā tika vākti dati par reliģisko piederību, notika 1989. gadā, kas sniedza ziņas, ka Latvijas PSR ir vairāk nekā 12 000 musulmaņu izcelsmes iedzīvotāju: tatāri, azeri (azerbaidžāņi), kazahi, uzbeki u.c., bet mūsdienās musulmaņu skaits tiek lēsts ļoti plašā diapazonā no reģistrēto draudžu nepilniem 500 locekļiem līdz aptuveni 5000–12000.[5] Iegūt precīzus datus par musulmaņu skaitu Latvijā apgrūtina tas, ka daudzi, kas sevi uzskata par musulmaņiem, nepraktizē islāmu un nav reģistrēti nevienā Latvijas musulmaņu draudzē, tāpēc praktizējošo musulmaņu skaits, ko Tieslietu ministrijai iesniegtajos pārskatos ir norādījusi Latvijas musulmaņu kopiena, ir visai neliels: 2008. gadā Latvijā bijuši 369 musulmaņi, 2009. gadā – 267 musulmaņi, 2010. gadā – 263 musulmaņi, 2011. gadā – 319 musulmaņi, 2012. gadā – 340 musulmaņi. 2013. gadā – 343.[6] Toties intervijās presei Latvijas musulmaņi ir snieguši ziņas par visai atšķirīgu Latvijas musulmaņu skaitu: gan 500[7], gan 5000[8]

[4] Diène, D. *Racismo, discriminación racial, xenofobia y formas conexas de intolerancia: seguimiento y aplicación de la declaración y programa de acción de Durban*, Naciones Unidas, 2008, 20.

[5] Brands-Kehre, I. "Musulmaņi un islamofobija Eiropas kontekstā", V. Tēraudkalns (ed.). *Antisemītisms un islamofobija Latvijā – pagātne, aktuālā situācija, risinājumi,* Rīga: Latvijas Bībeles biedrība, 2006, 55. Ščerbinskis, V. "Latvia", J. S. Nielsen *et al.* (eds.) *Yearbook of Muslims in Europe*, *Volume 5*, Leiden, New York: Brill, 2013, 383.

[6] *Publiskais pārskats par Tieslietu ministrijā iesniegtajiem reliģisko organizāciju pārskatiem par darbību 2013. gadā. https://www.tm.gov.lv/lv/cits/publiskais-parskats-par-tieslietu-ministrija-iesniegtajiem-religisko-organizaciju-parskatiem-par-dar* (skatīts 22.06.2015).

[7] Prēdele, A. "Par Latvijas musulmaņiem", *Jaunā Avīze* 2003. gada 12. septembris, 24.

[8] Riekstiņa, A. "Spēka avots – ramadans". *5 min*. 2008. gada 15. septembris, 3.

vai 6000[9], līdz pat 10000.[10] Lielāko musulmaņu skaitu ir minējis Latvijas musulmaņu kopienas vadītājs Zufars Zainuļins, piebilstot, ka no tiem tikai 10–20% ir praktizējošie musulmaņi. Paļaujoties uz viņa apgalvojumu, sniedzot intervijas, to atkārtoja arī kopienas locekļi (LVM2 un LVM22). Par musulmaņu draudžu aktivitātes palielināšanos liecina pieaugošais reģistrēto draudžu skaits: 1990 – draudzes nebija organizētas, 1995 – 3 draudzes, 2000 – 6, 2005 – 14, 2012 – 17 draudzes, 2013 – 17 draudzes.[11]

Nominālo musulmaņu skaitu Latvijā varētu aplēst, ņemot vērā 2011. gada Tautas skaitīšanas datus, kuros norādīts, ka Latvijā dzīvo 2164 tatāri, 1657 azerbaidžāņi, 339 uzbeki un 241 kazahs,[12] tātad Latvijā ir apmēram 5000 padomju laikā no Kaukāza un Vidusāzijas ieceļojušo jeb tā dēvēto autohtono musulmaņu, kas Latvijā dzīvo otrajā un pat trešajā paaudzē. Šķiet, balstoties tieši uz šiem datiem, izdevumā "Yearbook of Muslims in Europe" ir norādīts, ka "aptuvenais nominālo musulmaņu skaits 5000 ir tuvāks realitātei".[13] Jāņem vērā arī vairāku simtu latviešu un krieviski runājošo Latvijas iedzīvotāju konvertēšanās islāmā, jo "mošejas vadība apgalvo, ka islāmu aizvien vairāk pieņem arī latvieši un krievi – katru gadu ap simt cilvēku, kaut parasti vēlāk viņi mošeju regulāri neapmeklē".[14]

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[9] Šabanovs, A. "Mošeja Brīvības ielā", *Sestdiena*, 2005. gada 27. augusts–2. septembris, 14.

[10] Aginta I., Burkovskis H. (2011) 'Latvijas musulmaņi sapņo par klasisku mošeju Rīgā', *http://www.tvnet.lv/zinas/latvija/364940-latvijas_musulmani_sapno_par_klasisku_moseju_riga* (skatīts 22.06.2015.).

[11] Centrālās statistikas pārvaldes datu bāzes. Valstī reģistrēto reliģisko draudžu skaits. *http://data.csb.gov.lv/pxweb/lv/visp/visp__ikgad__politika/PR0130.px/?rxid=992a0682-2c7d-4148-b242-7b48ff9fe0c2* (skatīts 22.06.2015).

[12] Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia (2012) 'Population and Housing Census 2011', *http://data.csb.gov.lv/dialog/Saveshow.asp* (skatīts 22.06.2015.).

[13] Ščerbinskis, V. "Latvia", J. S. Nielsen *et al.* (eds.) *Yearbook of Muslims in Europe*, *Volume 5*, Leiden, New York: Brill, 2013, 384.

[14] Šabanovs, A. "Mošeja Brīvības ielā", *Sestdiena*, 2005. gada 27. augusts–2. septembris, 14.

Anita Stašulāne, Jānis Priede. Politiskais un pilsoniskais naratīvs

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Pieņemot, ka musulmaņu skaits Latvijā nepārsniedz 0,4% no valsts iedzīvotājiem[15] un balstoties uz jaunākajiem pētījumiem par iedzīvotāju skaitu Latvijā,[16] varam aplēst maksimālo iespējamo nominālo musulmaņu skaitu Latvijā: no Latvijas 1,9 miljoniem iedzīvotāju 7600 varētu būt musulmaņi. Tā kā saskaņā ar musulmaņu kopienas apgalvojumu 10%–20% no musulmaņiem ir praktizējoši ticīgie, varam lēst, ka Latvijā varētu būt apmēram 760–1500 praktizējošu musulmaņu. Savukārt, ņemot vērā pastāvīgo iedzīvotāju emigrāciju no Latvijas, nominālo musulmaņu skaitu Latvijā varētu lēst ap 5000, no kuriem regulāri praktizējošie musulmaņi ir pāris simti. To apstiprina lauka pētījumā veikto interviju dati. Lai gan, nosaucot kopīgo musulmaņu skaitu Latvijā, kopienas aktīvisti atkārtoja kopienas vadītāja presei minētos 10000, respondentu sniegtie precizējumi ir vērā ņemami: "Šeit [Latvijā] ir 10000 musulmaņu, bet to, kas sevi uzskata par musulmaņiem, varētu būt 1500–2000 cilvēki, no kuriem mošeju apmeklē apmēram 150, pārējie nenāk" (LVM2). Līdzīgās domās bija arī cits respondents, kas runāja par 1000–1500 nominālo musulmaņu Latvijā (LVM22).

Ņemot vērā bruņotos konfliktus musulmaņu apdzīvotājās valstīs, varam prognozēt, ka tuvākajā laikā arvien pieaugs patvēruma meklētāju un bēgļu skaits Latvijā, kas sekmēs musulmaņu skaita pieaugumu valstī. ES statistikas pārvaldes *Eurostat* dati par 2014. gadu liecina,[17] ka salīdzinājumā

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[15] Górak-Sosnowska, K. "Muslims in Europe: different communities, one discourse? Adding the Central and Eastern European perspective," K. Górak-Sosnowska (ed.) *Muslims in Poland and Eastern Europe: widening the European discourse on Islam*, Warszawa: Univerisity of Warszaw, 2011, 17.

[16] Neviens no statistikas datu vākšanas mehānismiem nevar gluži precīzi noteikt, cik šobrīd ir iedzīvotāju Latvijā, jo tie, kas ir izbraukuši no valsts, joprojām ir deklarēti dzīvesvietās Latvijā. Lai gan Centrālais statistikas birojs joprojām norāda, ka Latvijā ir 2,2 miljoni iedzīvotāju, bet no statistikas datu analīzes izriet, ka Latvijā ir apmēram 1,9 miljoni iedzīvotāju. Sk.: Hazans, M. "Kas šodien dzīvo Latvijā? Reālā demogrāfiskā situācija šķērsgriezumā. Publiskā prezentācija LU EVF", 2011. g. 12. septembris, *http://www.lu.lv/zinas/t/7594/* (skatīts 22.06.2015.); Krasnopjorovs, O. "Cik cilvēku Latviju pameta, un cik vēl pametīs?" Macroeconomics, *http://www.makroekonomika.lv/cik-cilveku-latviju-pameta-un-cik-vel-pametis* (skatīts 22.06.2015.).

[17] Eurostat. Asylum and first time asylum applicants. *http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_asyappctza&lang=en* (skatīts 22.06.2015.).

ar iepriekšējo gadu Latvijā ir pieaudzis saņemto patvēruma meklētāju iesniegumu skaits: no 162 līdz 352 iesniegumiem. Lai gan absolūtos skaitļos ES kontekstā pieteikumu skaits ir neliels, pieaugums ir būtisks – 92%. Tuvākajā nākotnē Latvijā nāksies risināt musulmaņu reliģiskās minoritātes integrācijas problēmas, to skaitā arī jautājumu par musulmaņu politisko līdzdalību.

7. Ietvarprogrammas projekta MYPLACE (*Memory, Youth, Political Legacy And Civic Engagement)* lauku pētījumā, kas ilga no 2012. gada jūnija līdz 2013. gada 31. janvārim, iegūtie dati raksturo Latvijas musulmaņu jauniešu politiskās līdzdalības noteicošos faktorus: informācijas pieejamību, demokrātijas izpratni, spēju identificēt problēmas, attieksmi pret vēlēšanām, attieksmi pret jauniešu līdzdalību, motivāciju un spējām. Lauka pētījumā tika iegūtas 32 padziļinātās daļēji strukturētas intervijas un novēroti 11 pasākumi. Pirms datu analīzes intervijas tika transkribētas un anonimizētas, stingri ievērojot MYPLACE projektā izstrādātos noteikumus, kas izslēdz iespēju identificēt respondentu pēc personas datiem un biogrāfijas elementiem. Datu analīze tika veikta, izmantojot NVivo 9.2 datorprogrammu.

Informācijas pieejamība

Intervijās iegūtie dati liecina, ka respondenti regulāri iepazīstas ar jaunāko informāciju, jo atrunāšanās: "Nē, mums tam nav laika" (LVM26) izskanēja tikai vienā atbildē. Uz jautājumu par informācijas avotiem jaunieši norādīja galvenokārt internetu: "Caur internetu… es katru dienu lasu avīzes, galvenokārt internetā, jo ir maz laika" (LVM25). Ievērojami retāk tika minēta televīzija (LVM26), radio (LVM24) un prese (LVM31). Turklāt par labāko informācijas iegūšanas veidu tika atzīta lasīšana, "jo lasot cilvēks saprot, kas notiek. Tev ir laiks to analizēt un saprast savākto informāciju, bet, ja tu skaties, – tu tikai skaties" (LVM28).

Valoda, kādā tiek iegūta informācija, ir atkarīga no respondenta lingvistiskajām prasmēm: bez dzimtās valodas tika minēta krievu un angļu valoda. Svešvalodu zināšanas musulmaņu jaunieši izmanto galvenokārt in-

formācijas iegūšanai par notikumiem ārvalstīs: "Par ārvalstīm – angliski, bet par manu [izcelsmes] valsti – manā dzimtajā valodā' (LVM31). Latvijā nesen ieceļojošiem musulmaņu jauniešiem šķērslis informācijas iegūšanai ir latviešu valodas nezināšana:

> Nē, kopš es ierados Latvijā, es neesmu pamanījis nevienu avīzi angļu valodā, bibliotēkā es redzēju dažas, bet gandrīz visas avīzes ir latviešu valodā, televīzijas pārraides arī latviešu valodā (..). Nē, man, ja runā atklāti, valoda ir šķērslis [*smejas*], angļu valoda ir OK, bet ar latviešu valodu man joprojām ir problēmas (LVM28).

Musulmaņu jauniešiem, kas ieceļojuši Latvijā, ir mainījušies informācijas iegūšanas paradumi:

> Īstenībā, kad es studēju universitātē, es parasti lasīju daudz jaunākās ziņas un mēs tās pārrunājām, tā es guvu informāciju no draugiem; jā, no saviem kursabiedriem tāpēc, ka mēs parasti diskutējām savā starpā, bet kopš es esmu šeit [Latvijā], es neskatos televīziju, nelasu ziņas, šķiet, ka informāciju iegūstu no *Facebook* [*smejas*] (LVM27).

Viens respondents minēja, ka par notikumiem Latvijā viņš uzzinot galvenokārt no draugiem (LVM26).

Bijušajās PSRS republikās ir pieejama informācija, kas tiek pārraidīta no Krievijas (LVM24), tāpēc jaunieši, kas ir ieradušies Latvijā no šīm Vidusāzijas valstīm, jau ir pazīstami ar Krievijas informatīvo telpu un to identificē arī Latvijā: "Man ir lapa *mail.ru*, un tā ir piesaistīta latviešu lapām. Liekas, ka tur vairāk [vēršas] pie krievvalodīgajiem" (LVM9). Tomēr ne visi ieceļotāji no Vidusāzijas informācijas iegūšanai Latvijā izmanto krievu valodu: "Savā valstī es devu priekšroku lasīšanai uzbeku valodā, bet reizumis es lasīju krieviski, bet kopš es ierados šeit [Latvijā], es sāku lasīt tikai angliski" (LVM28). Viens no respondentiem (LVM28) nekad nav dzirdējis, ka Latvijā var skatīties Krievijas televīzijas kanālus.

Respondentu uzskats, ka plašsaziņas līdzekļu sniegtajai informācijai nevar pilnībā uzticēties, ir balstīts pašu pieredzē, kas gūta novērojumu ceļā.

Jaunieši ir pārliecinājušies, ka vienu un to pašu notikumu plašsaziņas līdzekļos interpretē dažādi, jo katrā informācijas telpā tas tiek pasniegts cita mērķa sasniegšanai:

> Veids, kādā masu mediji interpretē notikumus, atšķiras. Viens, lai piesaistītu uzmanību, stāsta, ka viss ir slikti. Otrs nonācis politiķu ietekmē. Trešais, es nezinu, kāpēc… Bet es domāju, ka cilvēks, kurš skatās TV kanālu, nevar būt pilnīgi drošs, kamēr viņš nav nonācis tur un redzējis, kas notiek. (..) Masu mediji "uzpūš" notikumus. Tā notiek, bet patiesība ir starp tavām domām un to, ko publicē; tev pašam jāizlemj, kas ir patiesība (LVM28).

Demokrātijas izpratne

Respondentu izpratnē demokrātiju raksturo: (1) decentralizēta vara – "ne viss ir atkarīgs no viena valdnieka, līdera" (LVM24); (2) tautas vara "viss ir atkarīgs no tautas; ko vairums vēlas, tas notiek" (LVM24), "varai jāpieder tautai" (LVM9); (3) vienlīdzīgas tiesības – "visiem ir vienādas tiesības" (LVM21), "katram cilvēkam lai būtu tiesības" (LVM33), (3) balsstiesības: "katram ir balsstiesības" (LVM33), (4) vārda brīvība – "tu vari runāt" (LVM21), "cilvēkiem jābūt brīviem, tas nenozīmē, ka viņi var darīt visu, ko grib, nē! Jābūt brīviem, nav jābaidās izteikt savu viedokli" (LVM25), (5) uzskatu pluralitāte – "ikvienam jaunietim ir savi uzskati un tiesības" (LVM28), (6) drošība (LVM18), ko īpaši novērtē musulmaņu jaunieši, kas ir ieceļojuši no Vidusāzijas: "Tadžikistānā viss ir lieliski, viss labi – demokrātija, nav nekādu teroristu, nekādu bandu… nu, normāli dzīvojam" (LVM18). Viņu skatījumā demokrātijas pirmais nosacījums ir reliģijas nošķiršana no valsts: "Pie mums politika ir viena lieta, bet islāms – cita lieta, pie mums viss [notiek] demokrātiski" (LVM18).

Respondenti atzīst Latviju par demokrātisku valsti (LVM33), lai gan norāda, ka "nevarētu teikt, ka tā [demokrātija] ļoti labi strādātu pie mums" (LVM35), jo "šajā demokrātijā vienalga visu izlemj mūsu vietā" (LVM32). Respondentu skatījumā "demokrātija ir gan veiksmīga, gan neveiksmīga"

(LVM35), jo pastāv "diezgan lielas atšķirības, vai tā ir demokrātija Ame-rikā, vai tā ir pie mums – šeit. Tās tomēr ir pilnīgi atšķirīgas lietas" (LVM35). Respondents, kas balsoja pret iestāšanos Eiropas Savienībā, uz-skata, ka "demokrātijas šeit [Latvijā] nav, liekas, ka ir tāpat kā savā laikā ar to okupāciju, viņi izlēma, ka mums tā būs labāk" (LVM32).

Salīdzinot demokrātiju ar citām valsts pārvaldes formām, vairums re-spondentu to vērtē pozitīvi (LVM37, LVM25, LVM24):

> Es tomēr uzskatu, ka demokrātija galu galā ir it kā labāk, jo kat-ram cilvēkam jābūt savām tiesībām. Tā, lūk, Latvijā, pie mums, mēs skaitāmies valsts ar demokrātiju, mums katram ir balsstiesības, es esmu par demokrātiju. Monarhija – tā jau ir palikusi, man šķiet, pagātnē (LVM33).

Tikai viens respondents norādīja, ka demokrātija – tas nav "pārāk labs cilvēka izgudrojums": "Diemžēl demokrātiju izdomāja tāpēc, lai valdītu pār masām. Tas ir ļoti labs masu, cilvēku pārvaldīšanas instruments. Ja tam vēl pievieno masu medijus, var ideāli zombēt cilvēku jebkurā virzienā, kā vien gribi. Tie viņam dod brīvības ilūziju, izvēles ilūziju" (LVM32). Saska-tot demokrātijā iespējas manipulēt ar masām, respondents par ideālu valsts pārvaldes formu uzskata monarhiju:

> Ar ko ir labs cars? Ar to, ka viņš domāja par savu tautu. Jā, bija cari, kuri vispār ne par ko nedomāja, tāpat kā liela mantojuma man-tinieki, kas to izsēj gada laikā. Bet principā cilvēks, kas ir cienīgs būt par monarhu, kaut vai ar parlamentu kā Lielbritānijā, viņiem normāli iet, vai sociālisms kā zviedriem. Ļoti stabils sociālisms (LVM32).

Respondenta monarhijas ideja, ko pats atzīst par "skolotāju utopisku ideju", ir balstīta teokrātijas modelī:

> Kad pie varas būs nevis politiķi intriganti, bet skolotāji, kuri centīsies visu labā, gudri. Tā kā kādreiz bija austrumos, kad pēc padoma gāja pie gudrajiem. Kā Zālamans – Suleimans, ja arābiski – viņš izlēma jautājumus, strīdus, lietas. Un nevienam neklājās slikti. Viņš domāja gan par lielo, gan par mazo, bet viņš, tādi ļaudis bija

gudri, saprata lietas, viņi ir it kā tiem, kas tic Dievam" (LVM32). Respondents pieļauj iespēju, ka tālā nākotnē šādu sabiedrības iekārtu varētu realizēt dzīvē: "Mēs nonāksim pie tā, musulmaņu ģimenēs pieradinot lasīt Korānu, nevis vienkārši lasīt, bet izprast, kas tur notiek (LVM32).

Musulmaņu jaunieši neatbalsta demokrātijas ieviešanu citās valstīs "no ārienes", jo ir "jāskatās, kurai sabiedrībai tā ir piemērota, kurai nav" (LVM35). Centieni ieviest demokrātiju musulmaņu valstīs no ārpuses tika vērtēti negatīvi:

> Labāk, lai neviens neiejaucas citu valstu lietās, šķiet. Protams, mēs visi esam gudri, kad skatāmies no malas. Visiem, katrai tautai ir sava vēsture un nevar tā vienkārši ierasties un uzspiest kaut kādus savus ideālus, tā es domāju. Man liekas, demokrātija austrumos nav iespējama. Tā nav izeja. Tā, man šķiet, būs liela problēma, ja tur izveidos demokrātiju. Tā neder austrumos (LVM34).

Spēja identificēt problēmas

Atbildot uz jautājumu par problēmām sabiedrībā, tikai divas musulmaņu jauniešu atbildes ietvēra reliģisku atsauci, norādot, ka "tikai Dievs ir bez problēmām" (LVM18), ka problēmas – "tie ir Visaugstā Dieva [arābiski] sūtīti pārbaudījumi" (LVM30). Pēc respondentu uzskatiem, pasaulē arvien pieaug problēmu skaits, un "haoss ir gan musulmaņu, gan nemusulmaņu valstīs" (LVM33). Globālā mērogā respondentus īpaši satrauc "problēmas, kas saistītas ar ekoloģiju" (LVM28), jo "dabas resursi sarūk un vides kvalitāte pasliktinās" (LVM28). "Izspiešana, laupīšana" (LVM21), kas esot īpaši raksturīga Amerikai, ir "cīņa par kontroli pār sabiedrību" (LVM21). Ir minēta arī pasaules drošības problēma: "Jādzīvo mierā, nevajag ražot kodolieroču – kāpēc tie vajadzīgi? Cilvēki paši meklē nāvi. Ja mēs visi esam cēlušies no viena cilvēka, kāpēc ir jānogalina vienam otrs? Jādzīvo mierā" (LVM18).

Runājot par lokālajām Latvijas sabiedrības problēmām, musulmaņu jaunieši minēja alkoholismu (LVM23, LVM17, LVM21), pārlieku lielo

individuālismu (LVM28), kolektīvisma trūkumu (LVM28), karjeras un biznesa vērtēšanu augstāk par ģimeni (LVM28), demogrāfijas problēmas (LVM28, LVM32), korupciju (LVM21), noziedzības pieaugumu (LVM21), sabiedrības arvien lielāku noslāņošanos bagātajos un nabadzī-gajos, izzūdot vidusslānim (LVM32), zemo dzīves līmeni, kas īpaši smagi ir skāris pensionārus: "Uz ielas redzi pensionārus, kas lūdz žēlastības dāva-nas tāpēc, ka viņiem nav no kā dzīvot. Tā minimālā izdzīvošanas summa ir mazāka par to, kas tev nepieciešams. Turklāt pensionāriem vajadzīgas zāles, tās neviens nedod par velti" (LVM32). Savukārt iebraucēji no jaunattīs-tības valstīm asi izjūt dzīves līmeņa atšķirības Latvijā un savā valstī, tālab intervijas laikā atskanēja retorisks jautājums: "Nabadzība, vai jūs maz zināt, kas tā tāda ir?" (LVM21)

Par lielāko problēmu Latvijā tika atzīts bezdarbs, turklāt uzsverot, ka tā ir visu paaudžu problēma: "Tā skar jauniešus un vecākus cilvēkus" (LVM24). Respondentu atbildes liecina, ka iebraucējiem ir grūtāk iekļau-ties Latvijas darba tirgū. Musulmaņu jauniešiem Latvijā nav darba piere-dzes: viņi nav strādājuši algotu darbu ne savā zemē, ne arī Latvijā. Atšķirībā no viņiem Latvijas jaunieši studiju gados strādā vai arī intensīvi meklē darbu, lai nodrošinātu sev iztiku. No otras puses, musulmaņu jaunieši nav motivēti meklēt darbu Latvijā, jo tie, kas ierodas Latvijā studēt, ir pietie-kami labi situēti: viņiem ir nodrošināta mācību maksa un iztika Latvijā. Respondentu vērtējumā Latvijā labākas izredzes atrast darbu ir augsti kva-lificētiem speciālistiem:

> Ja runājam par darbu, var atrast darbu, ja gribi. Bet darbs ir, ja tu esi speciālists, tu nonāc labos apstākļos; ja tu neesi speciālists, tu nonāc ļoti sliktos apstākļos. [..] Speciālists, jā, var saņemt ļoti labu algu, nespeciālistam – ļoti grūti kaut ko atrast (LVM32).

Ekonomiskās recesijas periodā darba meklējumos no Latvijas ir iz-braucis ievērojams skaits cilvēku, arī jaunieši pēc augstskolas beigšanas:

> "Ko lai dara Latvijā, ja ir tik mazas algas? Tu te beidz universitāti, iestājies darbā, un, paldies Dievam, ja strādā savā specialitātē, saņem nožēlojamu algu, bet kaimiņos, Eiropā, nu pāris stundu braucienā ar

> mašīnu, lūdzu, tevi gaida daudz lielāka alga, nedaudz zemāka nekā
> vietējiem, tā, lūk. Un tu saproti, ka tur tiešām ir labāki apstākļi, tur
> tev maksās vairāk (LVM34).

Musulmaņu jaunieši ir identificējuši smago darba apstākļu un darba
aizsardzības problēmu Latvijā. Šis jautājums Latvijas sabiedrībā saasinājās
pēc 2013. gada 21. novembra, kad Rīgā sabruka lielveikala *Maxima* jumta
pārsegums, nogalinot 54 personas. Pēc šī traģiskā notikuma veikalā strādā-
jošie, lai gan slēpjot savu identitāti, tomēr beidzot sāka runāt par darba
apstākļiem veikalu tīkla *Maxima* tirdzniecības vietās. Zīmīgi, ka respon-
dents tieši par šī uzņēmuma attieksmi pret saviem darbiniekiem runāja jau
2012. gada rudenī:

> Paskatāmies Maksimu, to ir daudz, cilvēki tur daudz iepērkas, bet
> viņi izkalpina kasierus, personālu. Un, ticiet man, viņiem maksā ne
> pārāk lielu algu, bet cilvēks strādā katru dienu no rīta līdz vaka-
> ram. Iedomājieties mehāniskās darbības, kad cilvēks saņem naudu,
> ieliek, izdod, skaita. Patiesībā tas ir ellīgs darbs. [..] Un par tādu
> elles darbu, kad viņi top par mašīnām, nevis cilvēkiem, viņiem
> maksā kapeikas un vēl atlaiž no darba (LVM32).

Sociālo problēmu risinājums, paaugstinot pensionēšanās vecumu, tiek
vērtēts ārkārtīgi negatīvi: "Vecumā viņi nevienam nav vajadzīgi, pirmām-
kārtām, valstij, no viņiem mēģina tikt vaļā. Viņiem paaugstina pensionē-
šanās vecumu. Ziniet, paaugstināsim līdz simt gadiem, un viss, vispār
nebūs pensionāru nekad" (LVM32). Turpretim respondentam, kas ir iece-
ļojis no jaunattīstības valsts, ir neizprotamas Eiropā pastāvošās sociālās
garantijas, kam, viņa skatījumā, ir degradējoša ietekme:

> Man liekas, ka Eiropā cilvēkiem nepatīk strādāt, viņi ir mazliet
> slinki tāpēc, ka ir tāda sistēma; viņi maksā tiem, kas nestrādā. Es
> domāju, ka tā nav laba ideja. Tas būtu jāizbeidz, jāpieņem tāds
> likums, ka tiem, kas nestrādā, jāskaidro, kāpēc viņi nestrādā, un tikai
> tad var maksāt, bet te [Eiropā], ja tu nestrādā, mēs tev maksājam,
> un šī ideja nav laba, es domāju (LVM21).

Uzskaitot problēmas, tika minēta nepieciešamība arī tās risināt, sākot
ar svarīgāko: "Vispirms [jāatrisina] vides problēmas, tad ekonomiskā attīs-

tība, tad veselība" (LVM28). Cits respondents norādīja, ka nepieciešams "sākt kaut vai ar to, lai risinātu finanšu problēmas Latvijā, risinātu iedzīvotāju noslāņošanās problēmu" (LVM34). Lai risinātu smēķēšanas un alkoholisma problēmas, tika ierosināts ievērojami paaugstināt nodokļus cigaretēm un alkoholam (LVM21).

Politiķu vidū bieži diskutēto jautājumu par Latvijas pilsonības piešķiršanu tā dēvētajiem nepilsoņiem musulmaņu jaunieši komentēja pārsteidzoši lojāli šobrīd esošajai pilsonības piešķiršanas kārtībai. Lai gan tika apgalvots, "ja nu cilvēks Latvijai ir piederīgs un viņš dzīvo mūsu sabiedrībā, tad viņam ir tiesības būt arī Latvijas pilsonim" (LVM35), un jaunieši atsaucās uz "lozungu, kad bruka Padomju Savienība, [solīja], ka pilsonību piešķirs visiem Latvijas iedzīvotājiem" (LVM34), respondenti atzina, ka pilsonību var piešķirt tikai tiem, kas ir apguvuši latviešu valodu: "Tas, ka pie mums te pilsonību var saņemt, noliekot eksāmenu, zinot valodu, ir pareizi, lai tā arī paliek" (LVM33). Par to, cik sarežģīti ir iegūt Latvijas Republikas pilsonību, respondenti priekšstatu ir guvuši pastarpināti no citu personu stāstītā: "Es zinu, ka ļoti grūti, jo man ir viena draudzene, kura gribēja saņemt pilsonību, latviešu, Latvijas pilsonību. Viņa teica, ka tur ir ļoti, ļoti grūti, pat jāliek kaut kāds eksāmens" (LVM36). Respondente pati gan nav interesējusies par pilsonības iegūšanu, bet ir dzirdējusi, ka "tie, kas ir beiguši [skolu], saņēmuši [..] "B" līmeni [..] latviešu valodā, tie var vienkārši pieņemt pilsonību, latviešu pilsonību" (LVM36). Lai pierādītu, ka valodas zināšanas nav problēma pilsonības iegūšanai, respondents stāstīja par savas ģimenes pieredzi:

> Mana vecmāmiņa sešdesmit gados nolika [eksāmenu] pilsonībai. Viņa sāka no nulles mācīties latviešu valodu sešdesmit gadu vecumā, pusgada laikā viņa iemācījās latviešu valodu tādā līmenī, kāds vajadzīgs, lai nokārtotu pilsonības [eksāmenu] vēsturē, un viss, tā, lūk, saņēma pilsonību. Un man šķiet, ka viņai vispār nav dotību uz valodām. Tā ka, skatoties uz to, kā viņa to varēja izdarīt pusgada laikā, es domāju, ka tas ir vienkārši, teiksim, [citiem] cilvēkiem tā ir vienkārši atrunāšanās, viņi vienkārši negrib neko darīt (LVM34).

Attieksme pret vēlēšanām

Respondents, kurš uzskata, ka Latvijas politikā ir nepieciešama "paaudžu maiņa", apgalvoja, ka ir balsojis vienmēr un ir apņēmības pilns balsot arī nākamajās vēlēšanās:

> Es gribu balsot. Es balsoju katru reizi. [..] Es balsošu par jauniem [politiskiem spēkiem], kas vēl nav sarijušies, sazagušies, iespējams, ka viņi tiešām vēl kaut ko grib mainīt" (LVM32). Jauniešu piedalīšanās vēlēšanās tiek vērtēta kā atbildīgs solis, kad "cilvēkam jāsaprot, cik svarīgs ir viņa lēmums un kādas tam varētu būt sekas" (LVM32).

Respondenta skatījumā ir augusi vēlētāju aktivitāte:

> Pirms pieciem gadiem cik cilvēki piedalījās vēlēšanās? Ļoti neliels procents, tāpēc ka neviens neticēja, ka kaut ko var mainīt. Paskatieties pēdējos gadus, kā ir pieaudzis šis procents.[18] Viņi sajuta savu atbildību, un viņi tic tam, ka viņi var kaut ko ietekmēt (LVM32).

Respondentu atbildes krasi dalījās jautājumā par balsstiesību vecumu: 16 gadi vienam šķita "būs normāli" (LVM37), bet citam raisīja iebildumus, ka šādā veidā politiķi cenšas iegūt balsis no jauniešiem, kuriem vēl vajag "izveidot savus uzskatus, nedaudz apskatīties riņķī, iegūt pieredzi" (LVM30), tāpēc par pieņemamāku tika atzīts 18 gadu vecums, argumentējot, ka līdz 18 gadiem "cilvēks iepazīst dzīvi, viņš ir tikko beidzis skolu, viņš dzīvi vēl nav redzējis, viņš vēl nav strādājis, ir tikai mācījies, vēl nav iepazinis dzīves grūtības" (LVM30). Tomēr vairums respondentu deva priekšroku balsstiesībām pēc 20 gadiem: "Astoņpadsmit gados, kad tu vēl dzīvo pie vecākiem, kas tas ir? Tu neko nesaproti, kas ir kas. Parunājies ar citiem. Ejam? Ejam! Balsojam par šitiem te? Nu, balsojam" (LVM32).

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[18] Respondents ir pievērsis uzmanību tikai to vēlētāju skaitam, kas ir balsojuši par "Saskaņas centru", jo īstenībā pēdējos 20 gados vēlētāju aktivitāte Latvijā ir samazinājusies: 1993. gada Saeimas vēlēšanās piedalījās 89,9% vēlētāju, 1995. gadā – 71,9%, 1998. gadā – 71,89%, 2002. gadā – 71,51%, 2006. gadā – 60,98%, 2010. gadā – 63,12%, 2014. gadā – 58,85%. Sk.: Centrālā vēlēšanu komisija. *http://www.cvk.lv/pub/public/30803.html* (skatīts 22.06.2015.).

Minot divdesmit gadus, tika sniegts šāds arguments: "Tāpēc, ka šajā vecumā viņi ir beiguši skolu, viņi studē universitātē, viņi var domāt un izvērtēt situāciju un tad viņi var vēlēt" (LVM24, respondents, kuram intervijas brīdī ir 19 gadi). Divdesmit vienu gadu minēja "tāpēc, ka tad cilvēks ir daudz nopietnāks" (LVM25). Vecuma lielākā robeža tika nosaukta ar pamatojumu, ka "viņi var formulēt savas domas 24 gadu vecumā" (LVM23, divdesmitgadīgs respondents). Savukārt respondents, kuram bija 25 gadi, apšaubīja visus iepriekš minētos balsstiesību vecumus: "Nav teikts, ka ar vecumu tās lietas labāk sapratīsi" (LVM35).

Attieksme pret jauniešu līdzdalību politikā

Respondentu attieksme pret jauniešu iesaistīšanos politikā ir ambivalenta: tiklīdz to attiecināja uz pašu respondentu, tūdaļ sekoja paziņojums, ka viņu neinteresē piedalīšanās politiskajos procesos (LVM36, LVM25). Neviens respondents neizteica vēlēšanos pašam iesaistīties politikā, arī respondentu paziņu lokā "neviens neinteresējas par politiku, jo tie ir meli" (LVM32), lai gan tika atzīts, ka būtu labi iesaistīties politikā "tāpēc, ka politika tiešā veidā ietekmē mūsu dzīvi: izglītību, satiksmi, viss ir saistīts ar valsts sistēmu" (LVM31). Lai notiktu pārmaiņas sabiedrībā, musulmaņu jaunieši piedāvāja nevis censties mainīt kaut ko ārpus sevis, bet mainīties pašiem: "Mēs varam mainīt tikai sevi. Gribi ietekmēt valsti? Ej tur pats, ej politikā, lien, un Dievs dod, lai tev pietiktu degsmes, vēlmes palīdzēt cilvēkiem. Man ir cits ceļš" (LVM32). Jauniešu noraidošā attieksme pret politiskajām aktivitātēm sakņojas nepatikā pret politiķiem, it īpaši pret viņu izšķērdību (LVM31), egoismu (LVM20), korumpētību (LVM20). Turklāt savā zemē gūtā pieredze tiek vispārināta un attiecināta uz politiķiem visā pasaulē:

> Es neesmu politiski aktīvs un man nepatīk politiķi, jo es nāku no zemes, kura ir politiski korumpēta, – Bangladešas. Un mūsu zemē politika ir lielākā problēma, tas ir galvenais valsts attīstības šķērslis, vairums mūsu politisko līderu ir korumpēti. Viņi neko nedara valsts labā, viņi rūpējas tikai par sevi, personīgi es ienīstu politiku. [..] es

ienīstu arī pasaules politiku, jo to arī veido politiķi. Politika neko
nedod sabiedrībai vai cilvēcei, politiķi strādā tikai savās interesēs
[..], tāpēc man nepatīk politika (LVM19).

Turpretim, runājot par jauniešu iesaistīšanos politikā vispārīgi, attiek-
sme bija pozitīva:

[Jaunieši] – tie ir cilvēki ar atšķirīgu domāšanu, piemēram, nekā
maniem vecākiem, tie ir sabiedrības slāņi, kam viedokļi ir atšķirīgi,
ir cits izglītības līmenis un cits skatiens uz lietām. Tādējādi tur arī
var rasties ļoti labas idejas un diskusiju gaitā var rasties domas, ide-
jas un tām noteikti vajadzētu būt (LVM35).

Salīdzinot vecākās un jaunākās paaudzes attieksmi pret problēmām,
respondents norādīja, ka jaunieši tic iespējai atrisināt problēmas viegli un
ātri (LVM31), ka jaunieši ir enerģiskāki, aktīvāki (LVM28, LVM26,
LVM21), ka viņiem ir svaigas idejas (LVM26, LVM21) un cita mentali-
tāte (LVM21). Tika izteikta cerība, ka "varbūt jaunieši domās par savu
valsti un nāciju – viņiem jākļūst par politiķiem" (LVM20). Tika akcentēta
arī nepieciešamība pārmantot vecākās paaudzes pieredzi, nevis to vienkārši
noliegt: "Vajag pārņemt pieredzi. Parasti saka, jaunieši – tā ir nākotne.
Viņi nav bandinieki [..], nākotnē viņi paši kļūs par jaunu ideju iniciato-
riem. Šobrīd viņi ir izpildītāji, vēlāk viņi būs vadībā" (LVM9). Galu galā
tika atzīts, ka politika var būt "laba", "ja to veido ikviens sabiedrības loce-
klis, no jauniešiem līdz vecāka gadagājuma cilvēkiem" (LVM28).

Vairāku respondentu priekšrokas došana "politikā pieredzējušiem cilvē-
kiem" (LVM26) ir balstīta Austrumu sabiedrības cieņā pret vecāko paaudzi:
"Es nevaru viņiem runāt pretī tāpēc, ka viņiem ir augstāka izglītība, viņi ir
vecāki par mani, viņi ir gudrāki par mani, viņiem ir pieredze, bet es esmu
tikai jaunietis un nevaru viņus tiesāt" (LVM23). Arī politiskās diskusijas
tiek uzskatītas par vecākās paaudzes prerogatīvu: "Politika – nē, nē, tā ir dis-
kusiju tēma vecākiem cilvēkiem, viņi atceras pārmaiņas un zina, par ko runā
[..], ja tu zini, par ko runā, tas ir labi, bet, ja nezini, tad nerunā" (LVM28).

Uz jautājumu, vai ir jūtama jauniešu iesaistīšanās politikā, respondenti
izteica pilnīgi pretējus viedokļus, piemēram, viens respondents norādīja, ka

viņš nesaskata "nekādu tādu baigo [jauniešu] aktivitāti" (LVM35), otrs, ka "jauniešiem ir aktīva pozīcija" (LVM30). Savukārt ieceļotājs no Tadžikistānas atzīmēja, ka "tagad jaunatne piedalās politiskajos procesos" (LVM22). Otrs respondents no šīs zemes gan precizēja, ka jaunieši darbojas vairāk sportā un nevis politikā (LVM18). Musulmaņu jaunieši, kas ir ieradušies Latvijā no Tadžikistānas, ir apmierināti ar savas valsts jauniešu politiku (LVM18).

Lai gan jaunieši neizteica vēlmi pašiem aktīvi iesaistīties politikā, viņi tomēr vēlas, lai viņu idejas, kas izkristalizējas diskusijās ar ģimenes locekļiem vai draugiem, sasniegtu politiķus: "Noteikti būtu pozitīvi, ja veidotos [..] kaut kādas oficiālas struktūras, kas varētu pārstāvēt sabiedrību, lai es, kā vienkāršais cilvēks, savas idejas arī varētu nodot tālāk" (LVM35). Lai sekmētu jauniešu politisko un sociālo iesaisti, tika ierosināts veidot organizācijas skolā (LVM33), kur jaunieši varētu gūt pieredzi sabiedriskajā darbā. Tomēr jauniešu organizāciju iespējas sekmēt pārmaiņas tika noliegtas: "Tiklīdz varasvīri sapratīs, ka rodas problēmas, viņi slēgs [jauniešu organizāciju]" (LVM32). Necerot uz iespēju tieši ietekmēt politiskos procesus, respondents piedāvāja jaunajiem politiķiem pārņemt varu pēc nesenā Krievijas parauga:

> Pats labākais – tā ir iefiltrēšanās, tāpat kā spiegi iefiltrējas, pa vienam katrā partijā, lai būtu savi cilvēki, kas agrāk vai vēlāk kļūs par vienu veselu. Tā kā ir noticis Krievijā: bijušie priekšnieki, VDK darboņi klusītēm ieņēma visu [valsts] aparātu, un galu galā palika tikai viņi (LVM32).

Lauka pētījums ļāva pārliecināties, ka arī Latvijā, kur musulmaņu skaits nav liels, ir aplami runāt par monolītu musulmaņu kopienu, jo šāds uzskats būtu viens no "Rietumos plaši izplatītajiem pārpratumiem, ka islāms ir monolīta reliģija, kuras piederīgajiem piemīt universāla tieksme uz radikālo reliģisko fundamentālismu neatkarīgi no etniskās un nacionālās piederības."[19] Islāma reliģiskajā sistēmā svarīga loma ir pakļaušanās[20]

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[19] Pauly, R. J. *Islam in Europe: manifestations of marginalization*,. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004, 2.

[20] Arāb. val. *islām* ir atvasināts no verba *aslama* – 'pakļauties'.

elementam, kas līdz ar austrumu kultūrām raksturīgo godbijību pret vecāko paaudzi veic determinējošo funkciju jauniešu un citu kopienas locekļu attiecību veidošanā: lai arī kopienā ir ievērojams jauniešu skaits,[21] viņi nav vadošie tās locekļi. Tomēr Latvijas musulmaņu kopienā pastāv dinamiska jaunās un vecākās paaudzes mijiedarbība, ko virza migrācijas faktors: musulmaņu studentiem ir bijusi un joprojām ir nozīmīga loma kopienā. Jau kopš 1970. gadiem Latvijā ieradās studēt jaunieši no dažādām islāma valstīm (Alžīrijas, Ēģiptes, Irākas, Lībijas, Sīrijas, Libānas), ar kurām padomju vara bija noslēgusi sadarbības līgumus ideoloģisku un politisku apsvērumu dēļ.[22] Beidzot studijas, daļa šo jauniešu integrējās Latvijas darba tirgū, tāpēc šobrīd šī pirmā izglītības imigrantu paaudze ir piederīga sabiedrības vidusslānim. Tā kā studēt ieradās galvenokārt vīrieši, ģimenes tika dibinātas ar Latvijas vietējās sabiedrības sievietēm, kas tiem deva iespēju sekmīgi integrēties vietējā sabiedrībā, apgūstot vietējo valodu un kultūras tradīcijas. Tieši šo musulmaņu jauniešu darbība radīja izmaiņas musulmaņu kopienas struktūrā Latvijā – nošķiršanos starp autohtonajiem musulmaņiem un musulmaņiem imigrantiem, jo viņu reliģiozitātes modeļi atšķiras.

Motivācija un spējas

Politiskās līdzdalības procesu nosaka motivācija un "spējas piedalīties politiskajā dzīvē".[23] Musulmaņu jaunieši Latvijā nav pārlieku motivēti piedalīties sociālajās un politiskajās aktivitātēs, viņi jūtas atsvešināti no valsts, viņiem ir samērā negatīva attieksme pret varas struktūrām un neuzticēšanās politiskajām partijām, viņi neizprot savas līdzdalības nozīmi ne sabiedrisko organizāciju aktivitātēs, ne politiskajos procesos. Musulmaņu

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[21] Lauka pētījumā tika novērots, ka piektdienās no visiem sanākušajiem uz kopīgo rituālo lūgšanu 30–40% ir vecumā no 14 līdz 35 gadiem.

[22] Ievērojams ārzemju studentu skaits bija Rīgas Medicīnas institūtā (tag. Rīgas Stradiņa universitāte), Civilās aviācijas institūtā (tag. Rīgas Tehniskās universitātes Aviācijas institūts) un Rīgas Politehniskajā institūtā (tag. Rīgas Tehniskā universitāte).

[23] Verba, S., Schlozman K. and Brady, H. *Voice and equality: civic voluntarism in American politics*, Harvard University Press, 1995, 3.

jauniešu aktivitāti ierobežojošais faktors ir nevis reliģiskā piederība, bet, kā liecina intervijas, valodas zināšanas, pilsonības jautājums, negatīvā informācija par musulmaņiem plašsaziņas līdzekļos, informācijas trūkums par līdzdalības iespējām un uzturēšanās mērķi Latvijā.

Gan zinātniskā metode, gan Latvijas realitāte prasa, lai, pētot jauniešu politisko un sociālo līdzdalību, tiktu ņemts vērā pašorganizēšanās faktors. Politiskās un sociālās līdzdalības pētnieki uzskata, ka pašorganizēšanās un mērķtiecīga iesaiste dažādās apvienībās ir būtisks ceļš uz līdzdalības attīstību.[24] Arī Latvijas musulmaņu kopienā ir vērojami piemēri jauniešu pašiniciatīvai, ar kuras starpniecību notiek iesaistīšanās dialogā ar sabiedrību un centieni pārvarēt integrācijas procesa grūtības.

Lai arī vairums respondentu nepauda apņēmību aktīvi līdzdarboties politikā un sociālās organizācijās, tomēr zināmu pieredzi viņi ir jau guvuši. Uzskaitot respondentu minētos aktivitāšu veidus, nākas izcelt: (1) politiskās aktivitātes, piem., LVM32 ir pieteikusies piedalīties Azerbaidžānā organizētā politiskā forumā krievu valodas aizstāvībai Latvijā, LVM25 ir iesaistījies politiskās partijas jaunatnes nodaļas darbā, LVM31 ir piedalījies protesta demonstrācijās; (2) sociālās aktivitātes, piem., LVM28 ir darbojies nevalstiskā organizācijā, jauniešu kustībā, LVM26 ir piedalījusies starptautiskā projektā jauniešiem; (3) brīvprātīgo darbu, piem., LVM33 piedalās brīvprātīgo darbā, LVM27 ir veikusi brīvprātīgo darbu ANO organizācijā UNPF (*United Nation Population Fond*); (4) karitatīvās organizācijas, piem., LVM25 kopā ar citiem musulmaņiem palīdz bērnunamiem, LVM33 darbojas labdarības fondā; (5) izglītojošās organizācijas, piem., LVM24 ir bijis skolā organizētās jauniešu organizācijas loceklis; (6) vides aizsardzības organizācijas, piem., LVM29 ir darbojies *Tema Foundation*, kas vēršas pret mežu iznīcināšanu. Zīmīgi, ka pat tie respondenti, kas ir politiski pasīvi un kas ir deklarējuši, ka viņiem politika neinteresē un ka viņi pat nevēlas par to runāt, atzinīgi vērtē iesaistīšanos vides aizsardzības grupās, piem., LVM25.

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[24] Barnes, H. S. "The Changing participation of post Communist citizens", *International Journal of Sociology,* 36 (2), 2006, 79.

Jauniešu darbības motivācija un intensitāte ir individuāla un atšķirīga, piem., LVM25 darbojas politiskās partijas jaunatnes organizācijā, jo tā apmaksā studijas ārzemēs, bet uz jautājumu, ko tieši respondents dara šajā organizācijā, skanēja atbilde: "Neko nedaru; kad visus aicina, tad eju, aicina uz forumiem, kas veltīti kaut kādām valsts problēmām, bet es tur biju tikai vienu reizi" (LVM25). Respondente (LVM24) ir piedalījusies dažos skolā izveidotās jauniešu organizācijas pasākumos, "piemēram, diskusijās par smēķēšanu, alkoholu, dažādām slimībām. Reizumis par dažādiem vēstures notikumiem, par dažādiem slaveniem cilvēkiem" (LVM24).

Cik lielā mērā tiek diskutēts par politiku ģimenē un ar draugiem, – par to musulmaņu jauniešu atbildes krasi atšķīrās. Vieni teica, ka reizumis ar draugiem un ģimenes locekļiem pārrunā jaunumus politikā (LVM24, LVM26), bet citi respondenti norādīja, ka par politiku diskutē ar draugiem (LVM31, LVM29), savukārt ģimenē izvairās par to runāt: "Mēs nemokām sevi ar politiskiem jautājumiem un politiskām problēmām, manās mājās ģimenē viss ir gana mierīgi un labi, mēs nediskutējam par kaut kādām politiskām lietām" (LVM23). Toties ģimenēs tiek runāts par jautājumiem, kas skar ekonomiku un biznesu (LVM28). Respondente (LVM31) vēstīja, ka diskutējot par politiku ar radiem un draugiem, bet tikai savā dzimtenē. Latvijā ir jāpārvar valodas zināšanu problēma: krieviski un angliski viņš runā slikti, bet latviešu valodu vispār nepārvalda. Tādējādi, nonākot citā vidē, ir samazinājusies iespēja diskutēt par politiskiem jautājumiem. Zīmīgi, ka par politiku musulmaņu jaunieši diskutē reliģiskajā kopienā, kad pēc piektdienas rituālās lūgšanas ir iespēja uzdot jautājumus kopienas vecākajiem, apspriest pieņemtos likumus un "izmaiņas tajos, vieni politiku grib tā taisīt, citi – citādāk: tā, kā ir vai nav atļauts no reliģijas viedokļa" (LVM30).

Reliģiskajām aktivitātēm ir būtiska vieta musulmaņu jauniešu aktivitāšu spektrā, lai gan, ka sekulārisms ir skāris arī jauno musulmaņu paaudzi, kas norāda: "Es skaitos musulmanis, mana reliģija ir islāms, es sekoju tikai dažiem likumiem, es necenšos ievērot visus likumus," (LVM24) – un nekādās musulmaņu reliģiskajās aktivitātēs neiesaistās (LVM36). Rīgā musulmaņi pulcējas uz kopīgo piektdienas dienasvidus lūgšanu, kas notiek

Brīvības ielā 104, kur piedalās arī jaunieši. Lauka pētījumā tika novērots, ka vecumā no 14 līdz 35 gadiem ir apm. 30–40% pasākuma dalībnieku. Musulmaņu kopienas mistiķu atzars – sūfiju grupa pulcējas biežāk: "Nodarbības notiek trīsreiz nedēļā, plus [..] semināri trīs reiz gadā uz vietas" (LVM32). Latvijas musulmaņu kopienā tiek veikti arī reliģiskie riti: "Bēres notiek pēc islāma tradīcijas, kad svin kāzas, svin [nosaukums] ritu, kad viņiem piedzimst bērni, tiek svinēta vārda došana" (LVM17). Citas LMC aktivitātes ietver: (1) pašmācību islāmā (LVM17); (2) individuālu apmācību rituālajā lūgšanā (LVM17); (3) islāma studijas, kas notiek ārvalstīs, piem., Sudānā, bet tatāru grupai – Krievijā (LVM17), sūfiji mācās pie skolotājiem Turcijā, Irānā un Indijā; (4) musulmaņu literatūras izplatīšana Latvijā (LVM2; tatāri izplata literatūru krievu valodā – LVM17); (5) islāma literatūras tulkošana Latvijas lasītāju vajadzībām (tatāri tulko krievu valodā – LVM17); (6) ieslodzīto garīgā aprūpe (LVM17); (7) piedalīšanās musulmaņu konferencēs, kas ir notikušas Austrijā, Vācijā, Ukrainā un Krievijā (LVM17).

Savukārt jauniešu līdzdalības spējas sakņojas, pirmkārt, "nepolitiskajās institūcijās, ar kurām viņi ir saistīti savā dzīvē",[25] t.i., ģimenē un skolā, jo sociālās un politiskās aktivitātes pamati veidojas, vēl pirms persona sasniedz balsošanas vecumu: "Ir skaidrs, ka vēlme iesaistīties politikā veidojas jau 14 gadu vecumā."[26] Musulmaņu jauniešu spēju līdzdarboties ir būtiski ietekmējusi ģimene un skola: vairāki respondenti minēja, ka ģimenē viņi mēdza pārrunāt sociālās un politiskās norises, ka skolā ir piedalījušies dažādās aktivitātēs, ka mēdz lasīt jaunākās ziņas plašsaziņas līdzekļos. Otrkārt, jauniešu līdzdalības spējas ir būtiski ietekmējusi situācija viņu izcelsmes valstīs, kur viņi veidoja savas sākotnējās attiecības ar sabiedrību un valsts struktūrām: tie, kas ir dzimuši Latvijā vai dzīvo šeit jau ilgāku laiku, vai arī ir iebraukuši no demokrātiskām valstīm, pauda lielāku gatavību

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[25] Verba, S., Schlozman K., Brady, H. *Voice and equality: civic voluntarism in American politics*, Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1995, 3.

[26] Fridkin, K. *et al.* "On the margins of democratic life: the impact of race and ethnicity on the political engagement of oung people," *American Politics Research*, 34(5), 2006, 606.

iesaistīties sociālajās un politiskajās norisēs. Savukārt tie, kas neilgi uzturas Latvijā un ir ieradušies no valstīm, kur ir vāji demokrātijas institūti, ir izteiktas pasivitātes piemēri, bet aktivitātes ir vērstas galvenokārt personiskā labuma gūšanas virzienā.

Runājot par kopsakaru starp reliģisko un politisko līdzdalību, jāatzīmē, ka Latvijas musulmaņu kopienas gadījumā var piekrist Verbam, reliģiskās kopienas nodrošina iespējas lajiem gūt nepieciešamās prasmes politiskajai līdzdalībai.[27] Veicot lauka pētījumu, nācās pārliecināties, ka kopienā jaunieši var gūt organizēšanas iemaņas (tiek iesaistīti jauniešiem veltītu pasākumu organizēšanā), kopīgu tālejošu mērķu plānošanas iemaņas (seko mošejas celtniecības plānošanai Rīgā), socializēšanās iemaņas (iesaistās kopienas pārrunās pēc piektdienas rituālās lūgšanas), argumentēšanas iemaņas (jaunieši tiek iedrošināti interneta vidē atvairīt pret islāmu vērstos pārmetumus). Reliģiski aktīvo musulmaņu jauniešu sociālās un politiskās aktivitātes spektrs ir plašāks nekā tiem jauniešiem, kas sevi uzskata par musulmaņiem, bet kopienas dzīvē neiesaistās. Pie šāda secinājuma ir nonācis arī Ajers un Hofsteters: reliģisko uzskatu piekopšana bez iesaistīšanās reliģiskajā kopienā ir tieši proporcionāla zemai politiskajai un sociālajai līdzdalībai.[28]

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[27] Verba, S., Schlozman K., Brady, H. *Voice and equality: civic voluntarism in American politics*, Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1995, 547–548.

[28] Cf. Ayers, J.W., Hofstetter, C. R. "American Muslim political participation following 9/11: religious belief, political resources, social structures, and political Awareness," *Politics and Religion*, 1 (1) 2008, 3-26

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Political and Civic Narrative:
Factors Determining the Political Participation of Muslim Youth in Latvia

Summary

Analyses presented in this paper are a part of a broader FP7 collaborative research project "Memory, Youth, Political Legacy and Civic Engagement" (MYPLACE) on how young people's social participation is shaped by the shadows of totalitarianism and populism in Europe. It is based on 32 qualitative in-depth interviews with Muslim youth in Latvia and ethnographic research data. The paper briefly covers problems to determine the number of Muslims in Latvia where the Muslim population constitutes the second or even the third generation of immigrants predominantly from former soviet republics. Assuming that the number of Muslims in Latvia does not exceed 0.4 per cent of the country's population and on the basis of recent studies on the population in Latvia, the author estimates the maximum possible number of nominal Muslims in Latvia to be 7600 out of a total population of 1.9 million. Since the Muslim community states that 10–20 per cent of Muslims are practising, authors estimate that there are approximately 760 to 1500 practising Muslims. Taking into account the steady emigration from Latvia, the total number of nominal Muslims today in Latvia could be about 5000, and Muslims practising on a daily basis may hardly exceed a few hundred. By fully integrating in Western structures, Latvia has fulfilled all preconditions

for becoming one of the destination countries for immigrants. Data show that 92% more applicants asked for asylum in Latvia in 2014 compared to 2013. Difficulties and problems Latvia is facing are not local anymore, but they are incorporated in the common "European dilemma." The paper provides a summary of findings on the main research question on the factors determining the political participation of Muslim youth in Latvia: access to information, understanding of democracy, capacity to identify problems, attitude towards elections and youth involvement in politics, motivation and capacity to take part in political life.

The data obtained during interviews show that the respondents have up-to-date information on a regular basis. The language through which information is obtained depends on the language proficiency of the respondents; in addition to their native language respondents mentioned Russian and English. Lack of Latvian language skills is an obstacle for recently-arrived Muslim youth to obtain information. In the respondents' opinion, democracy is described by decentralised power, power of the people, equal rights, voting rights, freedom of expression, plurality of opinions, security. In response to the question regarding problems faced by society, Muslim youngsters referred to religion and pointed out that "God is the only one who doesn't have problems." The respondents believed that the number of problems was increasing worldwide, and "there is chaos both in Muslim and non-Muslim countries." On the global level, the respondents were especially concerned about problems which relate to ecological issues. Participation of young people in elections was considered a responsible step when "a person has to understand the importance of his decision and the possible consequences." The respondents' answers were strongly divided in relation to the voting age: from 16 to 24. The respondents' attitude towards engagement of young people in politics was ambivalent. When asked about their engagement as individuals, there was little if any interest in participating in political processes. None of the respondents wanted to engage in politics although it was recognised that it would be good to engage in politics. The young Muslims felt that instead of trying to change things outside of oneself in order to change society it was better to start

with oneself. The firm opposition of the young people to political activities is rooted in their dislike of politicians, especially regarding their wastefulness, selfishness, and corruptibility. The experience gained in their country has been generalised and attributed to politicians worldwide. The participatory process is determined by motivation and capacity to take part in political life. Muslim youth in Latvia is not very motivated to take part in social and political activities; they feel alienated from the state, their attitude towards power structures is rather negative, they do not trust political parties. According to the interviews, the factor limiting the activity of young Muslims is not their religion but language proficiency, the issue of citizenship, negative information about Muslims in the media, and lack of information about the possibilities of participation, and the objective of their stay in Latvia. The ability of youth to participate is rooted, firstly, in the fundamental non-political institutions with which individuals are associated during the course of their lives, i.e. in family and school since the basics of social and political activities develop before a person reaches voting age. The family and school have had a significant impact on the ability of Muslim youngsters to participate. Several respondents mentioned that they discuss social and political developments in their families, that they have participated in various activities at school, and that they sometimes read the latest news. Secondly, the ability of youth to participate is rooted in the situation in their home country where they formed their first relationships with society and state structures has had a significant impact on young people's participation abilities. Those who were born in Latvia or have lived here for a longer period, or those who have arrived from democratic countries expressed greater readiness to engage in social and political developments. In turn, those who had lived in Latvia for a shorter period and had arrived from countries where democratic institutes are weak, are typical examples of passivity, and their activities are mainly targeted at personal gain. With regard to the interconnection between religious and political participation, it should be pointed out that in the case of the Latvian Muslim community one can agree with Verba that religious communities provide opportunities for lay people to gain the necessary

skills for political participation. When carrying out the fieldwork, it was possible to see that young people can acquire organisational skills in the community (e.g. they are involved in the organisation of youth events), skills for planning of joint far-reaching objectives (e.g. they had followed the planning process of the construction of a mosque in Riga), socialising skills (e.g. engagement in community discussions after Friday prayers), argumentation skills (e.g. young people are encouraged to contest criticism against Islam in the Internet environment). The spectrum of social and political activity of religiously active Muslim youth is broader than that of their counterparts who consider themselves Muslims but do not engage in community life. Ayers and Hoffstetter have come to the same conclusion, that holding religious beliefs, without involvement in a religious community, goes with lower-than-average participation.

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JUGENDRELIGION UND ZWEIREICHELEHRE

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I.

Wie attraktiv radikale Religiosität für Jugendliche sein kann, illustriert neuerdings die Anziehungskraft des "Islamischen Staates". Aber schon Spranger spricht von einer Neigung der Jugend zum "Gerechtigkeitsfanatismus"[1], und die europäischen Jugendbewegungen des 20. Jahrhunderts bieten zahlreiche Beispiele für eine von Aufbruchstimmung, Hingabebereitschaft und Kompromißlosigkeit geprägte Religiosität. Verallgemeinernd ist die Rede von der besonderen Intensität jugendlicher Religiosität und der "entschiedenen Ungeduld des jugendlichen Verlangens nach dem Absoluten"[2].

In den Modellen, mit denen Pädagogik und Psychologie jugendliche Religiosität erfassen, bleibt der Sachverhalt unberücksichtigt. Jugend gilt seit Comenius als Übergangsphase, und jugendliche Religiosität als Teil eines nahtlosen Prozesses, der kontinuierlich überleitet von der Religiosität des Kindes zu der des Erwachsenen.

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[1] Spranger, Eduard. Psychologie des Jugendalters, Leipzig: Quelle und Meyer, 1924.

[2] Kuhn, Helmut. Ideologie – Hydra der Staatenwelt, Köln: Heymanns, 1984.

So entwerfen Nobiling und Gruehn[3] das Modell eines prozeßhaften Übergangs von einer magisch geprägten Frühphase kindlicher Religiosität über eine vertragsähnlich geprägte Phase der späteren Kindheit und das Infragestellen religiöser Bindungen in der Jugend hin zur gefestigten Religiosität des Erwachsenenalters. Goldman[4] unterscheidet, anschließend an Piagets Stadienmodell, drei Stufen religiöser Entwicklung: das anthropomorphe Gottesbild des "präoperativen Stadiums", dann eines, in dem magische und animistische Vorstellungen zugunsten einer Integration religiöser Inhalte in das Alltagsleben zurückträten, und schließlich ein durch abstraktes religiöses Denken gekennzeichnetes "formal-operationales Stadium".

Fowler und Dell setzen den Akzent auf das Verhältnis zwischen Glauben (*faith*) und Glaubenssätzen (*beliefs*)[5]. Sie beschreiben das Jugendalter als Transformation von einem "synthetisch-konventionellen Glauben", der sich an den Glaubensinhalten der sozialen Umwelt orientiere und diese mit eigenen Glaubensüberzeugungen synthetisiere, zu einem "individuierend-reflektierenden Glauben", der es den Jugendlichen erlaube, Glaubenslehren zu hinterfragen und ein eigenes Verhältnis zu ihnen zu entwickeln.

Ein strukturgenetisches Stufenmodell wird vorgeschlagen von Oser und Gmünder[6]: auf die Vorstellung eines direkt in die Welt eingreifenden Absoluten (frühes Kindesalter) folgt bei Schulkindern die eines Verhandlungsverhältnisses ("do ut des"). Die dritte, im Erwachsenenalter erreichte

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[3] Nobiling, E. "Der Gottesgedanke bei Kindern und Jugendlichen", in: Werner Gruehn, Hrsg., Archiv für Religionspsychologie und Seelenführung, 4, S. 43-216, 1929; Gruehn, Werner. Die Frömmigkeit der Gegenwart. Münster: Aschendorff, 1956.

[4] Goldmann, Ronald. Religious thinking from childhood to adolescence. London: Routledge & Kegan, 1964.

[5] Fowler, James W. und Mary Lynn Dell. "States of faith from infancy through adolescence: reflections on three decades of faith development theory", S. 34-45 in: C. Roehlekepartain u.a. (Hrsg.), The Handbook of spiritual development in childhood and adolescence, London – New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2006.

[6] Oser, Fritz K. 1991. "The Development of Religious Judgement", S. 5-25 in: Fritz K. Oser u W. George Scarlett (Hrsg.), Religious Development in Childhood and Adolescence. New Directions for Child Development, Nr. 52, . New York u.a.: Summer 1991.

und typischerweise nicht überschrittene Stufe sei durch menschliche Eigenverantwortung gegenüber dem Absoluten geprägt, das gleichsam einen eigenen Zuständigkeitsbereich erhalte. Selten erreicht würden eine vierte (Kopplung von menschlicher Freiheit an das Absolute) und fünfte Stufe (Intersubjektivität als Bedingung religiöser Autonomie).

Gemeinsam ist all diesen Modellen die Vorstellung, man habe es mit einem sich im Zeitablauf gleichsam von selbst vollziehenden Übergang von Heteronomie zu Autonomie zu tun. Eingewandt wird bisweilen, die heutigen Modelle kennzeichne eine Tendenz zu übermäßiger Vereinfachung, die weder der biographischen Variationsbreite noch der Vielgestaltigkeit des Übergangsprozesses ausreichend Rechnung trage. Nötig sei eine stärkere Differenzierung, die insbesondere die Bedeutung des Lernens deutlicher akzentuiere[7]. Solche und ähnliche Vorschläge zielen aber offenbar nicht darauf, die eingangs genannten Phänomene in all ihrer Fremdheit angemessen zu berücksichtigen. Phasen, in denen – um die Barthsche Formulierung aufzugreifen – ein transzendenter Impuls gleichsam "senkrecht von oben" das bisherige Leben durcheinanderwirft und völlig neue Prioritäten setzt, finden in Modellen, die einen allmählichen Übergang beschreiben, keinen Platz.

Bei einer Modifikation der vorhandenen Modelle muß u.a. bedacht werden, daß das Jugendalter anscheinend besonders, aber offenbar nicht immer gleichermaßen empfangsbereit ist für derartige Impulse "von oben". Dies hat zuletzt das Phänomen der sog. Jugendreligionen illustriert. Der Begriff war in den 1970er Jahren in Westdeutschland aufgekommen und sollte die Anziehungskraft von Religionen asiatischer Herkunft (Bhagwan-Bewegung, Hare Krischna-Bewegung u.a.) auf einen gewissen Teil der westdeutschen Jugend beschreiben. Die Wirkung dieser Anziehungskraft auf die betreffenden Alterskohorten stand in deutlichem Kontrast aber nicht nur zur abwehrend-nüchternen Geisteshaltung der vorange-

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[7] Scarlett, W. George. 2006. "Toward a developmental analysis of religious and spiritual development", in: C. Roehlekepartain u.a., Hg, The Handbook of spiritual development in childhood and adolescence, London – New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2006, S. 21-33.

henden "skeptischen Generation" (Schelsky), sondern auch zu der der nachfolgenden „Generation Golf" (Illies). Das Phänomen blieb zeitlich begrenzt und der Begriff der "Jugendreligion" gilt deshalb heute als überholt.

Die in Zusammenhang mit der Klassifizierung von "Jugendreligionen" geführten Diskussionen aber erleichtern ein Verständnis des Sachverhalts. Biezais[8] bezeichnet Jugendreligionen unter Bezug auf Guiart, Cohn, Mühlmann und Lanternari als millenaristisch und schließt damit an eine bereits von Gassert gemachte Beobachtung an: "Der Jugendliche will lieber darauf losstürmen, und diesem Aktivismus entspricht auf religiösem Boden etwas Ähnliches. So zeigt sich in einem Zweig der Jugendbewegung das Drängen auf ein ‚entschiedenes Christentum' und das Ringen um eine wahre Christusfrömmigkeit"[9]. Nicht zuletzt bei den Anhängern des "Islamischen Staates" hat es den Anschein, als sei es gerade dieser millenaristische – oder neutraler: millenarische – Akzent, der dem Vorhaben seine Dynamik verleiht.

Die Beschreibung des hier interessierenden Spezialfalls jugendlicher Religiosität muß also ergänzt werden: nicht allein religiöse Radikalität, Hingabebereitschaft und Kompromißlosigkeit machen den Sachverhalt aus, sondern auch seine millenarische Färbung. Gemeint ist ein religiöser, teils religiös-politischer Aktivismus, der die Lebensform der Gemeinde auf die Welt erstrecken möchte und dabei in unterschiedlichem Umfang von der Überzeugung motiviert ist, in einer welthistorisch entscheidenden Auseinandersetzung zu stehen.

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[8] Biezais, Harald. "Zur Problematik der neuen Religionen", S. 7-30 in: ders, Hrsg., New Religions, Almqvist & Wiksell, Stockholm 1975; vgl. Galanter, Marc. 1996. "Cults and charismatic group psychology", in: E. P. Shanfranske, Hrsg., Religion and the clinical practice of psychology, American Psychological Association, Washington DC, S. 269-296.

[9] Gassert, Karl Georg. Psychologie der Kindes- und Jugendreligion. Bühl, 1932, S. 52.

II

Die Frage nach dem angemessenen, insbesondere dem therapeutisch richtigen Umgang mit solchen Phänomenen stellt sich nicht nur in Zusammenhang mit dem "Islamischen Staat", sondern – und das ist Gegenstand der folgenden Überlegungen – auch mit Blick auf vorstellbare "jugendreligiöse" Aufbrüche auf christlicher Grundlage. Angesprochen ist insofern neben Pädagogik, Psychologie und eventuell Neurophysiologie[10] insbesondere die Theologie: Der Sachverhalt millenarischer Religiosität ist ein theologischer, nicht zuletzt deshalb, weil sich die Theologie erst in der Auseinandersetzung mit millenarischen Strömungen – in den ersten nachchristlichen Jahrhunderten und nochmals in der Reformationszeit – eigentlich konstituiert hat.

Die Antwort der Theologie auf den Millenarismus ist, konfessionsübergreifend einheitlich, deutliche und kompromißlose Ablehnung. Die Theologie wendet sich also gegen alle Ansätze, die ein Reich Gottes für innerweltlich möglich halten oder ihm gar durch eigene – politische, militärische – Aktivität den Weg bereiten wollen. Überträgt man diese Stellungnahme auf die Frage nach dem Umgang mit millenarischer Jugendreligion, hätte man sie als pathologisch zu klassifizieren und zu bekämpfen.

Nun bietet aber die Theologie zur Frage des Umgangs mit millenarischer Jugendreligion mehr als die Ablehnung des Millenarismus. Löst man diesen nämlich von seinem historischen Rahmen (die Erwartung des Reiches Gottes), so bleibt ein wohlbekannter Sachverhalt übrig mit sozialpsychologisch betrachtet ebenfalls millenarischen Zügen: die christliche Gemeinde. Sie lebt heute, was ein *großer Millenarismus* in politisiert-umfassender Weise für die Zukunft erwartet. Ihr *kleiner Millenarismus* legt im Unterschied zu der geschichtsphilosophisch angelegten, weiterreichenden

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[10] Vgl. Newberg, Andrew B. und Stephanie K. "A neuropsychological perspective to spiritual development". S. 183-196 in: Eugene C. Roehlkepartain, Pamela Ebstyne King, Linda Wagener und Peter L. Benson (Hrsg.), The Handbook of spiritual development in childhood and adolescence. London – New Delhi, 2006.

Variante, die das "noch nicht" betont, den Akzent auf das "schon jetzt". Die Gemeinde – oder bei Augustin: die Kirche insgesamt – verkörpert, wenngleich unvollkommen, schon heute das, was die radikale Fraktion für eine innerweltliche Zukunft erwartet: ein Zusammenleben in Liebe und Gnade.

Das Verhältnis dieses gemeindlichen, kleinen Millenarismus' zur "Welt" entspricht gerade dem Problem, das sich in Hinblick auf millenarisch gefärbte Jugendreligionen stellt: wie soll das Verhältnis vorgestellt werden zwischen dem Außen und dem exklusiven Innen, das die Ämter und die Legitimität des Außen in Frage stellt? Das, was in der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts aus situationsbezogenen Stellungnahmen Luthers systematisiert und auf den Begriff der "Zweireichelehre" gebracht wurde, gibt auf diese Frage eine differenzierte Antwort.

<center>III.</center>

Die Zweireichelehre Luthers schließt, wo sie das Verhältnis zwischen Welt und Reich Gottes als Gegensatz versteht, an die Zweiteilung an zwischen eigen und fremd, zugehörig und nichtzugehörig, die zu alten Menschheitsbeständen gehört. Sie war in der Philosophie des antiken Griechenlands in den Einzelnen hineinverlegt worden mit der Unterscheidung zwischen äußerlich-irdisch und innerlich-himmlisch. Eine erste Umdeutung hatte Augustinus vollzogen, der den altgriechischen Kontrast kollektiviert hatte zur Vorstellung zweier gegnerischer, jeweils exklusiver, aber von außen ununterscheidbarer Menschengruppen – der *civitas Dei* und der *citivas diaboli*. Eine zweite Neudeutung verbindet sich im Rahmen der *einen* mittelalterlichen Christianitas mit der Aufgabenteilung zwischen den konkurrierenden Gewalten von Kaiser und Papst.

Luther lokalisiert nun den Gegensatz erneut im Einzelnen und kehrt mit der Unterscheidung zwischen dem "Reich zur Rechten" (der christlichen Gemeinde) und dem "Reich zur Linken" (dem weltlichen Reich) gleichsam zum altgriechischen Ausgangspunkt zurück: die Grenze

zwischen den beiden Reichen als zwischen zwei zeitgleich stattfindenden Regierweisen Gottes geht durch den Einzelnen hindurch, indem sie zwei Grundmodalitäten christlichen Handelns – Liebe und Gewalt – voneinander trennt und zugleich im Handelnden zusammenführt.

So darf der Pfarrer Notwehr gegen einen Angriff nur dort leisten, wo ihm dieser als Bürger gilt, nicht aber da, wo er ihn als geistlichen Amtsträger trifft. Er ist gewissermaßen Inhaber von zwei Staatsbürgerschaften, die mit unterschiedlichen Handlungsnormen verknüpft sind. Diese Handlungsnormen gehören zu zwei Regimenten, die sich in Zielsetzung und Mitteln unterscheiden, aber als Verwirklichung göttlicher Herrschaft beide gleichermaßen legitim sind.

In der christlichen Gemeinde, dem Reich zur Rechten, herrschen Liebe und Vergebung, im Reich zur Linken Gewalt und Bestrafung. Auch letztere aber sind, und in dieser Deutung liegt die bahnbrechende Leistung Luthers, Varianten christlichen Handelns. Nicht nur der Vergebende erweist sich als Christ, auch der Strafende, denn auch er praktiziert, wo er den Schwachen schützt, christliche Nächstenliebe. Luthers Verdienst liegt darin, erstmals auch die Berufsaufgaben von "Henker, Büttel und Jurist" als christlich qualifiziert zu haben.

Die beiden Reiche werden nun bei Luther in einer Weise voneinander geschieden, die im Ergebnis der traditionellen Kontrastierung von Welt und Eschaton entspricht. Wo diese diachron zwischen Jetzt und Dann unterscheidet, da jene synchron zwischen Rechts und Links. Das, was eine realistische Anthropologie als den status quo beschreibt - in der gefallenen Welt gebe es Frieden nur durch Drohung mit dem Unfrieden und könne das Gute nur gepanzert leben –, wird nicht erst später im Reiche Gottes überwunden, sondern schon jetzt in der christlichen Gemeinde. Die verwirklicht bereits den Zustand, daß die "Menschen in Demut, Furcht und völligem Vertrauen in allem ihrem Wesen und Handeln auf Gott bezogen sind"[11]. Die Frage nach dem Verhältnis von "Welt" und eschatologischem Tatbestand ist damit nicht mehr Gegenstand von Prophetie, sondern be-

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[11] Althaus, Paul. Staatsgedanke und Reich Gottes. Langensalza: Beyer, 1923, S. 10.

zieht sich auf einen gegenwärtigen Sachverhalt: das Verhältnis zwischen christlicher Gemeinde und Umwelt bzw. – bezogen auf das hier in Frage stehende Problem – auf das Verhältnis zwischen messianischer Jugend-religion und Beobachter/Therapeut.

<div align="center">IV.</div>

Für diesen therapeutischen und überhaupt den bewertenden Blick bringt die Bezugnahme auf Luthers Zweireichelehre einen dreifachen Vorteil:

1. Zunächst führt die lutherische Akzeptanz der Welt zum Gedan-ken der wechselseitigen Anerkennung der Existenzberechtigung von Welt *und* Gemeinde. Sie wendet sich gegen Staatsverneinung *und* Staatsver-absolutierung gleichermaßen, gegen die anthropologische Ignoranz der Schwärmer *und* gegen die Religionsblindheit der Etatisten. Wechselsei-tige Anerkennung befreit von unangemessener Selbststilisierung. So be-tont Thielicke unter Hinweis auf Bismarck, daß eine Orientierung an der Zweireichelehre vor der Hybris bewahre, im außenpolitischen Kräftespiel mehr sein zu wollen als Anwalt unter Anwälten. Unvereinbar mit der Lehre Luthers sei infolgedessen alles, was Anklänge an politische Kreuz-züge aufweist. Gegen die heuchlerische Neigung zu Moralisierung und Idealisierung weise die Zweireichelehre den Weg zu einer heilsamen Be-grenzung auf die bloße Interessenwahrnehmung.

Illegitim wäre damit auch das Ansinnen, die Welt möge sich ein Bei-spiel an jugendreligiösem Pazifismus, Egalitarismus und Anarchismus nehmen. Durchaus aber kann aus therapeutischer Außensicht die Le-gitimität einer radikal-religiösen Lebensform anerkannt werden, sofern diese ihrerseits die Legitimität der Welt und ihrer Handlungsnormen an-erkennt. Dafür wird die millenarische Gemeinde nach den historischen Erfahrungen des 20. Jahrhunderts guten Grund finden, ist doch die Un-überwindbarkeit gewisser fundamentaler anthropologischer Sachverhalte, etwa der menschlichen Aggressionsneigung, und damit die Notwendigkeit staatlicher Ordnung nachhaltig sichtbar geworden.

Die Zweireichelehre steht also für die Forderung nach paralleler Existenz zweier sehr verschieden gestimmter Lebenskreise. Sie steht, ins Therapeutische übersetzt, für die Entpathologisierung, für den Verzicht auf den Überlegensheitsgestus und für Koexistenz.

2. Die Zweireichelehre steht aber für eine Koexistenz, die den Akzent nicht auf die sterile Scheidung, sondern die konstitutive und qualifizierte beiderseitige Grenzüberschreitung legt. Welt wirkt auf Gemeinde, indem sie deren äußeren Rahmen bestimmt und sichert, also einer auf die Ethik der Bergpredigt festgelegten Gemeinde die zur Existenzsicherung erforderliche Nothilfe leistet und gegebenenfalls internen Machtmißbrauch verhindert. Umgekehrt wirkt Gemeinde auf Welt in Gestalt der christlichen Amtsträger. Auch im Reich zur Linken wirkt die Liebe, wenngleich in gebrochener, durch die Ordnungen der Schöpfung veränderter Form. Auch Recht, Staat und Krieg schließen es nicht aus, daß dienstliche Aufgaben im Geiste der Bergpredigt erfüllt werden.

Demgegenüber war nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg der Eindruck entstanden, die Zweireichelehre sei der in der Nachfolge von Max Weber auch von Theologen vertretenen These von der sog. Eigengesetzlichkeit verwandt. Weber hatte mit damit auf den zeitgenössischen Eindruck reagiert, mit fortlaufender Rationalisisierung schlössen sich Wirtschaft, Staat und Wissenschaft gegen die göttlichen Gesetze zunehmend autonom ab. Kulminiert war diese Sicht in dem von Friedrich Naumann vertretenen scharfen Dualismus von Christus und "Weltgott". So verstanden, hatte die Zweireichelehre in der Formulierung von Hirsch[12] es Protestanten ermöglicht, im inneren Reich fromme Christen zu mimen und sich zugleich im Reich der Welt wie Teufel zu benehmen. Aber schon zeitgenössisch war diese Deutung angefochten worden durch den Hinweis darauf, Luther selbst habe eine solche doppelte Sittlichkeit nicht

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[12] Hirsch, Emanuel. Die Reich-Gottes-Begriffe des neueren europäischen Denkens. Ein Versuch zur Geschichte der Staats- und Gesellschaftsphilosophie. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1921.

gewollt[13]. Er sei vielmehr dafür eingetreten, das Evangelium, insbeson-
dere das Liebesgebot, müsse alle Handlungen der Christen bestimmen.
Luther habe damit auch den Bereich des Staates der Herrschaft Gottes
zugeordnet.

In Anwendung auf das Problem der Jugendreligion läßt sich diese
Ausstrahlungswirkung des Reiches Gottes als eine stabilisierende und dy-
namisierende verstehen. Dies nur nachrangig in dem Sinne, wie es von
einem jugendlichen "Drängen auf entschiedenes Christentum" vielleicht
erwartet werden kann, – etwa anschliessend an Nietzsches Zuschreibung
in seiner Zweiten unzeitgemäßen Betrachtung, die Aufgabe der Jugend
liege in ihrem Beitrag zur Überwindung veralteter Lebensformen. Eher
geht es um das, was Paul Althaus als "starke und stetige Einwirkungen auf
die Rechtsordnung"[14] bezeichnet hat: die in der Gemeinde verankerten
Sittlichkeitsnormen ermöglichen und stärken eine dem Staat unverzicht-
bare sittliche Gesinnung und erweisen sich zugleich als unruhiger Faktor
in der Rechtsgeschichte.

Althaus denkt Reich Gottes und Welt in der Praxis zusammen in
Eigentum und Beruf. Erst im "sittlichen Berufsgedanken" finde sich der
Einheitspunkt von Ethik des Einzellebens und politischer Moral, der vom
Dualismus einer amoralischen Politik und von der Enge sentimentalen
und spießbürgerlichen Moralisierens gegenüber der harten Geschichte
erlöse. Dieser Effekt sei unmittelbar gegenwärtig. Auch schon bei Albert
Ritschl, dem großen Exponenten des liberalen Protestantismus, wird die
individuelle Berufstätigkeit, sofern sie eine sittliche ist, verstanden als ein
gegenwärtig wirkender, jeweiliger Beitrag zum Reiche Gottes.

3. Die Bezugnahme auf die Zweireichelehre kann schließlich noch
in einer dritten Hinsicht zu einem angemessenem Verständnis von
millenarischer Jugendreligion beitragen. Luther stellt seine Lehre von
den zwei Regimenten unter eine auflösende, chiliastische Bedingung: die

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[13] Vgl. etwa Holl, Karl. Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Kirchengeschichte, III, Der Wes-
ten, Tübingen: Mohr, 1918.

[14] Althaus, Paul. *Staatsgedanke und Reich Gottes*. Langensalza: Beyer, 1923.

Erwartung, das Regiment zur Linken werde am Ende der alten Weltzeit aufgehoben werden, und zwar von Gott und nicht durch menschlichen Eingriff. Daraus ergibt sich eine Tendenz zu einer gewissen Relativierung der Welt, eventuell zu einem "Staatsminimum" (Thielicke). Der Staat kann nicht Selbstzweck sein und keinen Höchstwert beanspruchen. Umgekehrt aber stärkt der eschatologische Vorbehalt den Staat: solange die anthropologische Sachlage so bleibt wie sie ist, muß der Staat den äußeren Rahmen millenarischer Religiosität definieren können.

Vor diesem anthropologischen Hintergrund werden Erwartungen eines grundstürzenden innerweltlich-korporativen Umschwungs fragwürdig. Jeder Wandel wird mit dem Menschen rechnen müssen, wie er ist und sich aller Anstrengung zum Trotz auch im 20. Jahrhundert nicht hat zum "neuen Menschen" umformen lassen. Millenarische Religiosität wird sich deshalb eventuell veranlaßt sehen, die Relikte einer expansiven, nach vorn drängenden Bewegung abzustreifen und den Akzent stärker auf ein präsentisch-existentiales, auf den Einzelnen zielendes Verständnis von Millenarismus zu verschieben. Sie könnte "Reich Gottes" etwa im Sinne von Dorothee Sölle verstehen als "Einladung zum Leben, zum Ganzsein, zum Glaubwürdigsein".

<div align="center">V.</div>

Aus der Anwendung von Luthers Zweireichelehre auf millenarisch gefärbte Jugendreligion ergibt damit, zusammenfassend, erstens ein Plädoyer für die Legitimität des Phänomens, sofern eine klare Sphärenbegrenzung schwärmerischem Expansionismus den Weg versperrt. Unter dieser Voraussetzung spricht zweitens nichts gegen Ausstrahlungswirkungen etwa im Sinne des von Althaus vertretenen Berufsverständnisses. Der bei Luther immer mitgedachte eschatologische Vorbehalt muß drittens in Zusammenhang mit anthropologischen Sachverhalten, die der Verlauf der jüngeren Fortschrittsgeschichte erneut ins Blickfeld gerückt hat, zu einer gewissen Mäßigung der beiderseitigen Ansprüche führen.

Joachim v. Wedel

Youth Religion and Luther's Doctrine of the Two Kingdoms

Summary

The evolution of individual religious experiences nowadays is regularly described by theories of subsequent "stages of faith" (Fowler, Oser et al.), which presuppose, generally speaking, a development from child religious heteronomy to adult religious autonomy. Descriptions based on these theories could be read as histories of gradual individual progress leaving not much space for sharp fractions or the unforseen. But these sharp fractions seem indeed to occur, and there is a significant probability for a specific youth receptiviy for ideas with messianic connotations, i.e. ideas presupposing the possibility of a "new world" achievable by and within religious communities. The "Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant" or the religious youth movements of the 1970s may serve as examples.

If we ask the question how to assess this sort of youth receptivity, we should turn not only to psychology or pedagogy, but also to theology, which has long experiences of millenarism. It emphatically, in all its main denominations, rejects millenarism, but at the same time does not ignore the problematic relationship of between "world" and millenaristic parishioners. Here Martin Luther's Doctrine of the Two Kingdoms provides us with some basic insights: a) both parts, world and millenaristic parish, have a legitimate right to existence on the premise of mutual recognition, b) not the division between them should be emphasized, but their mutual replenishment, thus encouring useful cooperation, and c) Luther's eschatological reservation slows down any dynamic of messianic religiosity, and thus supports a rather existencialist and individualistic, less harmful understanding.

Konstantinos Kornarakis

"I WAS ONLY HUMAN": PUBERTY CRISIS, SELF IDENTITY AND VAMPIRE MOVIES IN RELIGIOUS CONTEXT

National and Kapodistrian University of Athens

Puberty crisis, self identity and Religion

The exceptional significance of puberty in a person's life impelled Jean Jacques Rousseau to define it as a person's "second birth"[1]. This "second birth", doubtless, means the stage of person's transition from childhood to adulthood. More specifically, a child becomes aware, the first time in his life, of his self-identity and of his efforts to discern between those elements that define him as a unique personality and those that do not. Francoise Dolto, emphasizing the importance of self-identity, describes vividly the shaping of self, borrowing an image of Vampire culture: she compares the fetus' intrauterine life to the common idea of vampires living on human blood like a parasite, in order to emphasize that, albeit man lives at the commencement of his life "parasitically" to his social milieu, his existential perspective is to disentangle himself from what he was dependent on and develop his own, unique personality[2]. What we define as a "puberty crisis", therefore, is an outline of adolescent's period of self realization, which

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[1] Jean Jacques Rousseau, *Emile or On Education*, IV, A. Bloom (edr.), New York: Basic Books, 1979, p. 212.

[2] Cf. Elizabeth Kouki, "Francoise Dolto: Ethics of the Subject" *Ek ton ysteron* 2 (1998), 183.

depicts the adolescent's coming to maturity and the development of his ability to deeply experience new values that give meaning to his world along with his strong will to defend them against the adult's system of traditional values. C. G. Jung, emphasizing the significance of the discovery of Self-Identity, introduces the term *Individuation* to describe a lifespan process during which man develops into a self-conscious being from a psychoanalytical point of view [3]. However, within this lifespan process of Self-Knowledge an adolescent has to face a lot of difficulties. Francoise Dolto, also from a psychoanalytical point of view, comments on adults' mistakes that hamper adolescents' psychological development, construes in audacious way the Scriptural passage on the resurrection of Jairus' daughter[4] and stresses that Jairus is a "vampire"-father model who uses his love to drain his daughter of life and who, at the same time, smothers any desire of hers for individuality. Hence, while the vampires literally suck the life out of people, Jairus, according to Dolto, "sucks" his daughter's soul dry of the strength granted by her desires[5].

The adolescent, on his way to adulthood, usually experiences existential conflicts, like various kinds of phobias, insecurity issues or guilt, realizing that there is a distance between his self consciousness and the way through which peers or adults perceive the image of him, "as peer groups informally established the norms according to which teenagers behaved"[6]. On the other hand, despite the emotional and existential conflicts in adolescent's life or the swoon of late adolescence, the existential perspective of self-fulfillment is an innate feature of human nature.

In this context, we focus on Religion, since religiosity, as man's participation to religious beliefs and convictions (as *religious and ethical*

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[3] Cf. *Die Beziehungen zwischen dem Ich und dem Unbewussten*, Zürich: Rascher Verlag, 1950[5], p. 91ff.

[4] Cf. *Mark* 5:21–43, *Matthew* 9:18–26, *Luke* 8:40–56.

[5] Françoise Dolto interpellée par Gérard Sévérin, *L'evangile au risque de la Psychanalyse*, Paris: J.P. Delarge, 1979, pp. 114-115.

[6] Carole M. Cusack, "Some Recent Trends in the Study of Religion and Youth" Journal of Religious History 35.3 (2011) 412.

values in the whole system of anthropological values), plays a decisive role in the shaping of human behavior[7]. Scholarly research proves that Religion is not only positively correlated with identity formation but also "tends to be a key determinant of identity formation depending on circumstances"[8]. From a psychological point of view and according to Eduard Spranger, Religion, as a system of values, allows man to understand the world in a cohesive and not segmented way, as a whole, *sub specie aeternitatis*. Religious values open the horizons of adolescent's existential perspective and introduce him to the dialogue with his internal self. In this respect, "the strength of the linkage between religion and identity is more likely to be stronger for younger individuals compared to mature adults"[9], even if young people seem to be indifferent to Religion[10].

Vampire movies as cultural mirrors of puberty crisis

According to C. Geertz, man's capacity to deal with Chaos (the existential conflicts that disintegrate one's self identity due to man's lack of *interpretability*, as the ability to interpret his world, along with his inability to deal with suffering and morality issues) in his life depends only on his engagement to cultural patterns as "symbols and symbol systems", which are vital to such an extent in his life, that without them he is not able to confront his existential conflicts[11]. Amongst products-of-cultural expression, films acquire existential dynamic since they function as mirrors of everyday life.

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[7] Cf. E. Avdikos, "Vampire Stories in Greece and the Reinforcement of Socio-Cultural Norms" *Folklore* 124 (2013) 307.

[8] S. H. Oppong, "Religion and Identity", *American International Journal of Contemporary Research* 3.6 (2013) 15.

[9] S. H. Oppong, "Religion and Identity", p. 10.

[10] Cf. D. Voas- A. Crockett, "Religion in Britain: Neither Believing nor Belonging", *Sociology* 39.1(2005) 11–28.

[11] C. Geertz, *The interpretation of Cultures*, New York: Basic Books, 1973, p. 99-100.

In this context, there are numerous studies exploring the relation between identity formation and film-viewing during puberty. The main idea is that watching a film deemed particularly important for him, the adolescent experiences a journey "which becomes one that can be symbolic of our own transitions in life as audience members"[12]. In Pink Floyd's animated musical film *The Wall* (1982), for instance, we watch little Pink experience humiliation for writing poems in class. The depiction of diverse, puberty-crisis aspects in films really encourages young people to deal with actual problems of life. Young people either explore their own self-identity often by relating "to characters on-screen who are also dealing with hardships in their relation"[13], or under other circumstances they enjoy the "pleasure of seeing one's self, or aspects of one's self, in the glamorized portraits of the screen star"[14]. According to Catherine Driscoll, 'teen film' is considered "part of what studies of youth and youth culture understand as the 'liminal' form of adolescence"[15], or rather a *utopia*, a situation "between childhood and adulthood, between being a nobody and a somebody, when everything is in question, and anything is possible"[16]. On the other hand, some researchers argue that educators should use movies like *The Twilight Saga* as teaching tools, thus helping adolescents "to better develop an enhanced sense of identity". A film "is particularly [both] useful in helping adolescents to better understand themselves as well as essential to helping inform those that work with adolescents"[17].

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[12] John C. Lyden, *Film as Religion, Myths, Morals, and Rituals*, New York: New York University, 2003, p. 81.

[13] Jennifer Bringle, *Vampires in Film and Television*, New York: The Rosen Publishing Group, 2012, p.39.

[14] Joanne Finkelstein, *The Art of Self Invention, Image and Identity in Popular Visual Culture*, London - New York: B.Tauris & Co Ltd, 2007, p. 8.

[15] Catherine Driscoll, *Teen Film, A Critical Introduction*, Oxford-New York: Berg, 2011, p.6.

[16] A. Martin cited in Catherine Driscoll's, *Teen Film*, p. 112.

[17] Jennifer T. Tasgold-Jessica Decuir-Gunby, "Film in the College Classroom: Using Twilight to Examine Adolescent Development", *The Journal of Effective Teaching* 12.3 (2012) 87.

In the Swedish film *Lat den ratte komma in* [Let the Right one in – 2008], we are presented with a twelve year old boy called Oskar, an introspective child, whose parents are divorced and who is experiencing his transition to puberty in a painful way. Oskar has to shape his identity mostly through the bullying he faces by some of his classmates. The bullying of his classmates involves humiliation, manhandling of his possessions and physical violence. Oskar chooses to handle his predicament passively, possibly because he is too afraid or too embarrassed to talk about it, believing it will simply go away at some time. However, he keeps a knife, taking revenge on his bullies, in his private world of fantasy.

In the *Twilight* Saga – "Breaking Dawn", Bella's life is divided into two parts, the part where she is still human and the part where she has become a vampire. The first part is painted by the character in the darkest colors:

> As a human, I'd never been best at anything … I was a good student, but never the top of the class. Obviously, I could be counted out of anything athletic. Not artistic or musical, no particular talents to brag of. Nobody ever gave away a trophy for reading books. After eighteen years of mediocrity, I was pretty used to being average. I realized now that I'd long ago given up any aspirations of shining at anything. I just did the best with what I had, never quite fitting into my world[18].

Bella is an introverted teenager, occupied by her phobias, her obsession with death, insecurity issues and issues in communication. This situation suggests that she is experiencing depression of the most intense kind, thus indicating that her life is clearly inadequate for her. In the film version we see her confess bitterly "I was only human". The utterance "only human" can be found at least seven times in the novel. Bella seems convinced that while she remains human "she is nothing".

Being a teenager, the person needs to distance himself from the concept of "us" and to comprehend the concept of his/her "I". Then, he needs

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[18] Stephenie Meyer, *Breaking Dawn*, London: Atom, 2008, p. 523 (also in the end of the film *Eclipse* slightly changed)

to socialize only because he understands his identity. Of all this, Bella, on the contrary, prefers to transfer her psychological strength to death. Subsequently, it is apparent that her inability to define and to identify herself leads her to some important, crucial, in a way, decisions which become criteria for her existential choices.

In the end of the third film of the *Twilight* Saga Bella realizes that becoming the vampire was really what she was meant to be:

> I chose my life. I must start living it. This wasn't a choice between you and Jacob but between who I should be and who I am. (*Puberty and the perpetual questions: Who am I? Where am I going to?*). I always felt out of step, stumbling through my life. I never felt normal. Because I'm not normal. I don't wanna be. (*The problem of guilt: She feels insecure because she thinks that she lacks perfection*). I've had to face death and loss and pain in your world but I also never felt stronger. Like more real, more myself. Because it's my world too. It's where I belong. (*Identification from the psychoanalytical point of view: she feels stronger because she "belongs" to a world uncommon and unnatural, a perfect world untouchable by change or decay*).

In the movie *Lat den ratte komma in*, young Oskar faces the problem of self-identity through Eli's personality, a vampire in the form of a twelve-year old girl who moves to the apartment right next to Oskar's. Between Oskar and this "girl" a special friendship is created with special reference to the gender relations that implies the importance of sexuality as a part of self identity through puberty crisis. Eli advises Oskar to face fearlessly his bullies and retaliate, an advice he follows suit. When Oskar finds out about Eli's true nature he does anything he can to protect her. Eli has to feed and after a series of murders she commits, Eli decides it would be safer for Oskar if she left town. In the penultimate scene, however, Eli returns to save Oskar from drowning by the hand of his bullies and ends up killing brutally all of those bullies that participated in the attempt of Oskar's murder. In the end of the film we see Oskar travelling light on a train and, next to him, a large box that contains who is obviously his protégée,

Eli. The paradox of a twelve year boy running away from home with his vampire girlfriend seems to confirm that the shaping of his identity depends on her personality.

Religiosity and Vampire movies

Based on the fact that people in late modernity "use Religions as 'symbolic toolboxes', wherein they can select some but not all of beliefs and practices from a given faith"[19], we can claim that films with religious or spiritual background, such as Mel Gibson's *The Passion of the Christ* (2004) and Stephenie Meyer's *Twilight Saga* movies (2008-2012), despite their fundamental differences they also play the same role of a peculiar, full of symbols, religious toolbox. Audience freely chooses to open one or another toolbox and chooses the tools that will help it to perceive the world as a whole. In that case, it is logical to understand why Robert K. Johnston asserts in *Reel Spirituality*, that "viewing a personally meaningful movie may trigger a powerful individual religious experience". Johnston himself "experienced his call to ministry while watching the film *Becket*"[20]. According to Darrol Bryant, "as a popular form of the religious life, movies do what we have always asked of popular religion, namely, to provide us with archetypal forms of humanity—heroic figures—and instruct us in the basic values and myths of our society"[21].

Vampire films by definition are based on religious background, which means that they contain religious symbols, meaningful for adolescents' lives. Transformed religious traditions of centuries of mankind, taken from various corners of the world, are portrayed through the films, notwithstanding the fact that Bram Stocker "took some old pagan rural folklore and padded it over with assorted Christian implications that it never

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[19] Carolyn McNamara Barry - Larry J. Nelson, "The Role of Religion in the Transition to Adulthood", *Journal of Youth and Adolescence* 34.3 (2005) 246.

[20] Christine Hoff Kraemer, "From Theological to cinematic criticism: extricating the study of Religion and film from Theology" *Religious Studies Review* 30.4 (2004) 249.

[21] In J. Lyden's, *Film as Religion, Myths, Morals, and Rituals*, p. 12.

had"[22]. It is the blood that gives life through death and the sacrifice of the victim[23]; it is the absolute submission of men to the power of the vampire, as in the film *Dracula* (1990); it is the illusion of a dark 'savior' that seduces his victims. The moviegoers, whether they are believers or not, experience in celluloid with a feeling of awe the presence of unfamiliar power, outside the world as they know it. These powers seem to either punish man for his failures or bad deeds, or they merely represent an evil archetype, a master of a dark world. In fact to use the tool of Jungian thought, those films only depict in motion pictures of unconscious religious traditions that humanity shares in "the historical collective psyche"[24]: they present face-less, supernatural powers that try to dominate man and define his utmost right of life or death, offering at the same time religious interpretation of the world that surrounds us through values that condone or disregard human nature[25].

If watching Vampire movies expresses, to some extent, man's fear against the uncanny powers, odious threats and dire need of unconscious reconciliation with them, it is beyond any doubt that in this case, watching Vampire movies reflects the prime reason of primitive religiosity. Therefore, while exploring his Self-Identity, religious allusions in this genre of movies may open up new perspectives to the system of values of an adolescent or to 'legitimize' his existential choices. The Swedish film *Lat den ratte komma in*, for instance, emphasizes revenge as Eli, the female Vampire, decides

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[22] Mary Y. Hallab, *The Vampire God, The Allure of the Undead in Western Culture*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 2009, p. 60.

[23] Cf. Alison Milbank, "Dracula and the Via Media: Bram Stoker's ecumenical ecclesiology", *International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church*, 12. 3–4 (2012) 293–308.

[24] R. Noll (edr), "Introduction" in *Vampires, Werewolves and Demons. Twentieth Century Reports in the Psychiatric Literarure*, New York: Brunner/Mazel Publishers, 1992, p. xvii.

[25] Cf. Carole M. Cusack, "Some Recent Trends in the Study of Religion and Youth" *Journal of Religious History* 35.3 (2011) 412. Also, cf. a popular classification of contemporary vampires by Stephen Kaplan in David Keyworth, "The Socio-Religious Beliefs and Nature of the Contemporary Vampire Subculture", *Journal of Contemporary Religion*, 17.3 (2002) 358.

to dynamically interfere with Oskar's life, using her supernatural powers, reversing roles and turning the bullies into victims. In Buffy the *Vampire Slayer*, Buffy realizes that all her previous life, before meeting Merrick, the trainer and adviser of all Vampire Slayer girls through centuries, was focused on worthless values. Discovering her new role as the protector of her social milieu against the deadly Vampires, Buffy also realized the way of finding her true self - identity.

Undercurrent religiosity and Vampire movies in a glamorous life style context

Stephenie Meyer's *Twilight* series is a really intriguing case on account of the peculiar combination of a glamorous style of Vampire life, based on spiritual values. Meyer, projecting basic ideas of Mormon's teaching, such as the indissoluble ties of family's institution or Christian moral values such as premarital virginity, reconstructs this myth by inserting romance and thus introducing a love story that stands for adolescent's rebellion against traditional moral values that repress teen impulsiveness (i.e. *I am free to choose a non conventional way of life*)[26]. In this case, one could argue that Meyer did not wish to create another vampire story. She rather makes use of horror genre in order to criticize certain Mormon's moral princi-

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[26] According to Edwin B. Arnaudin (*Mormon Vampires: The Twilight Saga and Religious Literacy* (Master thesis), Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 2008, p. 91) "though Meyer admits to allowing her faith to somewhat influence her writing, her claims of having not yet written a Mormon novel are unfounded. The truth is that by remaining a faithful member of the LDS Church, she cannot help but write Mormon novels". Cf. an Evangelical answer to Stephenie Meyer: "The Twilight Saga stirs up the hopes of its many readers" (Beth Felker Jones, *Touched by a Vampire: Discovering the Hidden Messages in the Twilight Saga*, Colorado: Multnomah Books, 2009, p. 171). Also, Sandra L Gravett, *From Twilight to Breaking Dawn: Religious Themes in the Twilight Saga*, Danvers 2010 and Margaret M. Toscano's analysis "of the impact of Mormonism on the novels, focuses on how Twilight author Stephenie Meyer subverts Church of Jesus Christ of Latter - Day Saints (LDS) dogma" (Carol Stabile, "Review Essay: 'First He'll Kill Her then I'll Save Her': Vampires, Feminism, and the Twilight Franchise" *Journal of Communication* 61 (2011) 5).

ples[27]. Besides, how else can we explain that in contrast to classic Vampire movies, where heinous things are threatening human ideals and values[28], here, in Meyer's *Twilight* we rather find humanitarian values such as respect to human rights, rejection of revenge, kindness and solidarity?

In this context, the great reception of *Twilight* by teen youth signified the beginning of the pop Vampire trend of similar kind. Originally, when the mythical vampires seduced their victims and dragged them into the cursed eternity, now a glamorous depiction meeting the western lifestyle, which shapes the self-identity, is presented. In movies like *Vampire Academy,* the book (2008-) and film series (2014-), *True Blood* (2008–2014) and *The Vampire Diaries* (2009-) bloodthirsty creatures prefer to "kill" the marginal self of the teenager, creating an army of "newborn fanpires" trying to fit the challenges of their existence into the attractive version of western lifestyle. In that case we are certainly allowed to hold the argument, that "the visual mass media … influence young people's self-identity"[29], as religious beings, whether they be believers or non-believers, as "Religious Fakes"[30] play the role of religious substitutes.

In this respect, it is not a paradox that there is a whole community of "Twi-hards", that is to say, die-hard fans, whose dedication to *Twilight* "verges on the religious"[31]. Peers communities of "twilighters", based on the movies and believing in supernatural, function as a religious community. One can find many pages of *Twilight* fans in facebook, especially created by or made for women, such as "Women of Twilight" or the page

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[27] C.f. John R. May's approach on the commonalities between religion and film, in Christine Hoff Kraemer, "From Theological to cinematic criticism: extricating the study of Religion and film from Theology" p. 249.

[28] Cf. William S. Larkin - Hamish Thompson (edrs.), *Zombies, Vampires, and Philosophy: New Life for the Undead*, Chicago and La Salle: Open Court, 2010, p.348.

[29] Helen A. Berger - Douglas Ezzy, "Mass Media and Religious Identity: A Case Study of YoungWitches", *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 48.3(2009)510.

[30] Linda Kay Klein, *Virgins and Vampire Worship: The Religion of Twilight*, 11 Jan. 2013; http://religiondispatches.org/virgins-and-vampire-worship-the-religion-of-itwilighti/

[31] Ibid.

"TwilightMOMS". As Linda Kay Klein puts it, "the stories of Fanpires can shed light on what women are lacking in their religious experience—and what leads them to sacralize *Twilight*, even as many of them remain in traditional religious communities."[32].

Vampire movies and self identity within a hypnagogic world

Vampire films (in Theatres or TV), mainly the "life style" ones, provide the teens with options such as the construction of a nonexistent "reality", half real and half illusory. As David Denby stresses, regarding the mentality of the studio in relation to vampire films like *Twilight*:

> In brief, the studios are not merely servicing the tastes of the young audience; they are continuously creating the audience that they want to sell to. Which raises an inevitable question: Will these constantly created new audiences, arising from infancy with all their faculties intact but their expectations already defined—these potential moviegoers—will they ever develop a taste for narrative, for character, for suspense, for acting, for irony, for wit, for drama? Isn't it possible that they will be so hooked on sensation that anything without extreme action and fantasy will just seem lifeless and dead to them? I ask; I don't know the answer"[33].

Adolescents therefore learn to adapt their own private myth to the original vampire ones and to construct a blurred image of them founded on this nonexistent "reality" which probably helps them to deal with inner conflicts but does not in any case solve the problem of identity. Rob Latham, commenting on the film *Interview with the Vampire* (1994), reaches a very important conclusion on those self identity's issues. The film,

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[32] Ibid.

[33] D. Denby, *Do the Movies Have a Future?* New York: Simon & Schuster paperbacks, 2012, p. 10.

> perfectly crystallize the sense of "ontological absence" … as the psychological crux—and presumptive superiority—of the new consumption classes: after all, who could be more fully "unbridled from the previously fixed … social coordinates that have traditionally given meaning to an individual's experience of time and place" than a vampire, whose existential lack includes humanity itself?[34]

Here we can trace Kant's view of experiencing the world as it appears and not as it is in itself. So, man turns himself into a moral being by creating a *numenal* world, a world made by the concepts of things. "Existential absence", therefore, on one hand serves a basic principle of post-modernism in the way structuralism approaches post-modernism, which means the *disappearance* or *death of the Subject*. On the other hand, Latham's remark that "vampire's existential lack includes humanity itself" means that the Subject shelters his existential adventures under a myth with a religious background. Contrary to the secular life that repels the notion of death, vampire films present the myth of the undying entity that preserves power, authority and beauty eternally. In other words, this myth helps the Subject understand his identity as long as the myth answers the eschatological question of death and this answer is the natural adhesive that glues together all the fragments of a man's life.

The realization that "vampire's existential lack includes humanity itself" also introduces to our discussion the problem of freedom as an existential problem of our society. Jalal Toufic stresses out that we live in a virtual world where "smart" objects of everyday life acquire a kind of autonomy (e.g. "doors open on their own at one's approach") just like in Vampire films. "Smart" objects familiarizing man with a sort of vampire reality in a "hypnagogic world"[35]. Within this "hypnagogic world", when Vampire movies open limited existential perspectives to adolescents, the

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[34] R. Latham, *Consuming Youth: Vampires, Cyborgs and the culture of consumption*, London: The University of Chicago Press, Ltd., 2002, p. 79.

[35] J. Toufic, *Vampires, An Uneasy Essay on the Undead in Film*, Revised and expanded edition, California: The Post-Apollo Press, 2003², p. 14.

real question is if the teenagers have the efficiency to evaluate those perspectives. Watching, perhaps, Bella trade her mortal life for a glamorous, never-ending but lifeless life (*The Twilight Saga: Breaking Dawn*/ Part 1 - 2011) or Oskar following Eli, as a prisoner of a hopeless love, which will finally engulf his personality (*Lat den ratte komma in* – 2008), teenager *fanpires* repel the "fear of freedom". In this way though, adolescents get addicted to a kind of parasitical ethics, like the one of their idols; a vampire's ethics that eventually deters them from being conscious of their real image and real needs, thus suspending the process of self-actualization. Rosalie of *Twilight* is hostile towards Bella because she knows that Bella has everything just by being human, while even though she -Rosalie- has supernatural powers, she is deprived of the one thing she really wants- the freedom of choice over her life. Her addressing Bella could be considered as a message to adolescents, as a final comment to the existential question of freedom:

> "Don't you see, Bella?" Her voice was suddenly more passionate than before, even while she'd told her unhappy story. "You already have *everything*. You have a whole life ahead of you — everything I want. And you're going to just *throw it away*. Can't you see that I'd trade everything I have to be you? You have the choice that I didn't have, and you're choosing *wrong!*"[36]

Therefore, the answer to that existential question of freedom could be found within any Vampire movie, like *Twilight*, in terms of acknowledgment that real freedom of being is depicted only to man's everyday choices despite the complexity and difficulty of living.

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[36] Stephenie Meyer, *Eclipse*, London: Atom 2008², p. 166 (also in the film *Eclipse* in adapted form).

Konstantinos Kornarakis

"I Was Only Human": Puberty Crisis, Self Identity and Vampire Movies in Religious Context

Summary

During the past decades the thematic of vampires appears increasingly both in Literature, and the Film Industry. Nevertheless, since the publication of Lisa Jane Smith's, *The Vampire Diaries* and, later, Stephenie Meyer's, *The Twilight Saga Collection*, this subject is becoming more and more a part of teenage culture. In pre-modern communities, vampires' archaic myths were the products of the collective unconscious. In the age of late modernity, however, the vampire's thematic seems to be constructed on the basis of pop trends and conveys puberty issues of adolescents. This study, using the method of content analysis, examines the influence of those literature and artistic products on the social, psychological and spiritual development of adolescents.

Ingrida Khashab

WHERE THE FAULT LINES MEET: HOW RELIGION AND POLITICS AFFECT THE LIVES OF LEBANESE STUDENTS

Lebanese University

Lebanese students are inevitably involved in religious issues just because they live in a country with confessionalism as the system of government. As young people try to marry, find jobs, and join political parties in this setting, they discover that their opportunities and choices depend on their religious identities. In this case, religion is intertwined with politics, and both enter people's private lives with car explosions, marriage restrictions, and fighting in the streets. To understand problems that students encounter and discuss in Lebanon, it is necessary to shortly describe the current situation in the country and mention some most controversial topics that lead to nationwide debates and even violence; however, a comprehensive account would be beyond the scope of this little study. This article was an attempt to describe the situation as impartially as possible using various sources, mainly newspapers, blogs, and articles found on the Internet. Definitely, many of these publications contain partisan views; nevertheless, they are all genuine opinions of some Lebanese, so they help the reader to imagine the eclectic environment and highly-charged atmosphere of Lebanon.

First of all, military conflicts in the neighboring countries not only cause political tension but also, from time to time, lead to battles fought on the Lebanese ground; in addition, they cause continuous influx of refugees who also take part in the conflicts. For instance, "Lebanon's worst

violent episode since civil war" was fighting between Fatah-Al-Islam and Lebanese Armed Forces in Nahr al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp, which developed into a full-blown war that lasted the whole summer of 2007.[1] It should be mentioned that, at present, there are about two million refugees and asylum-seekers in Lebanon: according to UNCHR, 1.5 million are Syrians, 6000 are Iraqis, and about a thousand come from Sudan[2]; in addition, UNRWA has registered more than 54,116 Palestinians in 12 camps all over Lebanon[3]. Another consequence of the civil war in Syria is so-called "spillover" to Lebanon with 24 car explosions in 2011-2014,[4] fighting in the North and along the Syrian border between the supporters and opponents of Bashar Al-Asad,[5] clashes in Tripoli and Beirut in 2012 for the same reasons,[6] and, finally, the battle in the town of Arsal with ISIL in August 2014[7]. In addition, Lebanon is officially at war with Israel since 1948, and the current peace on the southern border is only a ceasefire.[8] All these conflicts lead quite often to interrupted

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[1] Dakroub, Hussein. "Three-Month Battle Ends as Army Takes Over Refugee Camp". *The Guardian*, September 3, 2007. Retrieved from: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/sep/03/syria.lebanon

[2] 2015 UNHCR *"Country Operations Profile – Lebanon"*. Available at: http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e486676.html

[3] *UNRWA, "Lebanon: Camp Profiles."* Available at: http://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/lebanon/camp-profiles?field=15

[4] Rowell, Alex. "Vehicle Explosions in Lebanon since 2011", NOW. June 25, 2014. Retrieved from: https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/reportsfeatures/535852-vehicle-explosions-in-lebanon-since-2011

[5] Discussed in: Mudallali, Amal. "The Syrian Refugee Crisis is Pushing Lebanon to the Brink". (2013). Retrieved from: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/syrian_refugee_crisis_pushing_lebanon_to_brink.pdf

[6] "Inside Story: What Is Driving Lebanon's Sectarian Clashes?", *Al-Jazeera*, August 24, 2012. Available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestory/2012/08/201282495030276571.html; video at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xNJxCxfAtXQ

[7] "Syrian Fighters Pull Out of Lebanon's Arsal", *Al-Jazeera*, August 7, 2014. Retrieved from: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/08/syrian-fighters-pull-out-lebanon-arsal-201487105723472949.html

[8] A concise account available at: "History of the Lebanese-Israeli Conflict", *The Washington Post*, July 17, 2006. Retrieved from: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/17/AR2006071700340.html

studies, canceled exams, and closed streets.[9] The involvement of students in these matters varies in a wide range: while most of them support certain political parties and religious movements to various extents, some do take part in action and die in battles. A recent example is a physics student of Lebanese University, Hassan Jaber, who became "a martyr of Islamic Resistance" in 2014.[10]

Furthermore, Lebanon is a small, overcrowded country with a great religious diversity and a long history of sectarian and political conflicts[11]. With the area of about 10500 km^2 and population about 4.1 million Lebanese, there are 18 officially recognized religious groups in Lebanon: "four Muslim groups, 12 Christian groups, the Druze, and Jews."[12] While the official policy of Lebanese government is the protection of religious freedom, peaceful coexistence, and mutual respect among the religious groups, there is persistent "tension and confrontation among religious groups, attributable in part to competition for political power;" the most notable sectarian conflict was the 15-year civil war (1975- 1990).[13] In fact, "Lebanese politics is essentially... confessional... in which political cooperation and competition either revolve around or are channeled through the

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[9] A characteristic description of routine street battles: Fresh Clashes in Lebanon's Tripoli Kill Boy. *Alalam*. October 22, 2013. Retrieved from: http://en.alalam.ir/news/1527107

[10] His personal page available at https://www.facebook.com/pages/صفحة-الشهيد-هاشم-محمد-جابر-حسن-لمجاهد/765660613477044; his martyrdom celebrated by students in a post on https://www.facebook.com/majlis.fere3.5?fref=nf; More information at http://www.moqawama.org/essaydetails.php?eid=32129&cid=330#.VL_MQVeIVY2

[11] A comprehensive discussion available in Wilkins, Henrietta. *The Making of Lebanese foreign policy: Understanding the 2006 Hezbollah–Israeli war*. (London: Routledge, 2013). On sectarian strife, see Corstange, Daniel M. *Institutions and ethnic politics in Lebanon and Yemen*. (2008). Available at: http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/handle/2027.42/58397 On confessionalism and political alliances, see Turkmen-Dervisoglu, Gulay. "Lebanon: Parody of a nation? A closer look at Lebanese confessionalism", *The Yale Review of International Studies*, 2012. http://yris.yira.org/essays/316

[12] "Report on International Religious Freedom – Lebanon". (United States Department of State, 2014). Available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/53d90755d.html

[13] Ibid.

religious communities and their elites."[14] Furthermore, each religious group tends to have specific foreign affiliations that have formed historically, and there is no united foreign policy in the country. Thus, currently, Lebanon is divided over the civil war in Syria, relationship with the West and Arab countries, and the situation with Israel; in general, the Shias, Sunnis, and Christians tend to disagree on these matters.[15] In Lebanese media, the struggle among the sects is often compared to tribal wars of pre-Islamic Arabian Peninsula, and sectarianism is called "an expression of communalism or group loyalties" which "is not synonymous with religiosity" but rather is, according to a Lebanese former Prime Minister Salim Al-Hoss, "the modern face of tribalism."[16] Despite the "long tradition of academic freedom and exposure to Western cultural influences dating back to the nineteenth century,"[17] inevitably, this division is transferred to the universities, "mirroring to an extent the constellation of political forces at the national level."[18] Furthermore, "the nature of Lebanese student politics varies greatly across the country's major universities, depending on the extent of government control over each school and the demographic profile of its student body."[19] It must be noted, however, that whatever the term "demographic profile" might mean to readers unfamiliar with Lebanese affairs, in this context, it is mainly about the students' religious affiliation.

No Lebanese may ignore the fact that he or she should belong to some religious group: there is an entry 'religion' on birth certificates (see an example in the picture below), national identity cards, and official registry (*ikhraaj qaid*) documents. In 2009, the Lebanese were allowed to remove references to their religion from the official records;[20] however, "Lebanese

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[14] Corstange, p. 78.

[15] See Wilkins.

[16] Corstange, p. 79.

[17] Gambill.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid.

[20] "Lebanon: Removal of Religion from IDs Positive but not Sufficient". *Human Rights Watch*, February 16, 2009. http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/02/16/lebanon-removal-religion-ids-positive-not-sufficient

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REPUBLIC OF LEBANON .                                      FOTOKOPIJA
Ministry of the Interior
Directorate-General of the Personal Status

                    CERTIFICATE OF BIRTH

Name of the new-born  :
Sex                   : M.
Place of birth        : Abbassieh , district of Tyre/Jabal Amel Hosp
Date of birth         :                                          tal/
                        -------------------------------------------------
Declarant             :                    , Address :
                                        (Signature)

The Father :
Name and surname      :
Religion              : Shiite Moslem
Date of birth         :
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The Mother :
Name and surname '    :
Religion              : Shiite Moslem
Date of birth         :
Place of residence    : Mansouri , district of Tyre
Original inscription of : Mansouri , district of Tyre
   the Parents
Register Nº           :
Kind of register & rite : Shiite Moslem
Witness(1)            : AMIN FARDUON , born in 1933 , Address:
                        Abbassieh , register Nº 62 (Signature)
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citizens who remove their religion from their national registration seriously limit their ability to hold government positions or run for political offices."[21] In this way, the division of society in numerous sects is maintained by confessionalism as the system of government, the initial purpose of which was the reconciliation of hostile religious groups and foundation of Lebanon as an independent country in 1943; while intended as a temporary solution, confessionalism has persisted for more than 80 years. With its historical roots in Mount Lebanon, divided by the Ottomans in 1843 between the Druze and Maronites,[22] confessionalism started with "The National Pact" signed a hundred years later by Maronite, Shia, and Sunni leaders who decided to distribute political power in the country

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[21] Report on International Religious Freedom – Lebanon.

[22] For an analysis of sectarianism, religiosity, and power struggles among the elite in Lebanon after the civil war, see Ofeish, Sami. "Lebanon's Second Republic: Secular Talk, Sectarian Application". *Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 1* (Winter 1999). Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41858278

'justly' among the sects.[23] Currently, there is an agreement that Christians and Muslims should "be represented equally in parliament, the cabinet and high-level civil service positions, which include the ministry ranks of secretary general and director general."[24] Furthermore, the president can be only a Maronite Christian, the Speaker of the Parliament only a Shia Moslem, and the Prime Minister - only a Sunni Moslem. Sectarian quotas were abolished in 1989 "in civil service posts, the judiciary, the army and the police with the exception of Degree One posts … where parity and rotation were to be applied."[25] However, until now, some such quotas, both official and informal, persist in public and private sectors; as the Centre for Intercultural Learning warned, "The employment process suffers from a lot of favouritism on religious grounds. A recruiter will most likely hire a person from the same confession (not to mention the same religion)."[26] Such an attitude is hard to eliminate because the mentality of most Lebanese was shaped in a confessional society; in particular, in this system, sectarian affiliation sometimes becomes a more important part of one's identity than the nationality.[27] The result is not only division of the society into autonomous religious communities but also that the deciding factor in one's career might happen to be one's religious affiliation rather than qualification, which many find disturbing.[28] For instance, a protester against sectarianism declared that it is impossible to live in a country where "they divide the chairs of the ministers according to their confessions, not their merits."[29]

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[23] In great detail described in Wilkins; on sectarian clashes, see Corstange.

[24] "Report on International Religious Freedom – Lebanon".

[25] In Turkmen-Dervisoglu.

[26] "Cultural Information – Lebanon. Centre for Intercultural Learning, 2009". Available at: http://www.intercultures.ca/cil-cai/ci-ic-eng.asp?iso=lb

[27] In Turkmen-Dervisoglu.

[28] About a conflict related to the appointment of deans at the Lebanese University according to sectarian shares, see Ofeish.

[29] Lyon, Alistair. "Civil Marriage not Civil War, Say Secular Lebanese", *Reuters*, April 25, 2010. Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/04/25/us-lebanon-secularism-idUSTRE63O0RP20100425

Another aspect of Lebanese confessionalism is that there are invisible walls dividing young men and women from different sects: interreligious marriage is impossible, while civil marriage is valid in Lebanon only if contracted abroad.[30] However, even if legally married, such couples face a whole range of problems if one of them does not convert to the sect of the other: the reason is that every religious community follows its own version of civil law.[31] There are fifteen codes of civil law for the eighteen recognized sects, as the Alawites and Isma'ilis, being basically Shia sects, follow the Ja'fari code, while Orthodox Copts – the Orthodox one.[32] Thus, the matters of marriage, divorce, inheritance, child custody, adoption, and domestic violence are handled by religious authorities and courts. Furthermore, "the civil registry is kept by the religious communities" and "the civil jurisdictions are organized by the provisions of the Code of civil procedure while the community jurisdictions fall under the laws of the different religious communities recognized by the Lebanese State."[33] As the inevitable result, in Lebanon, the various religious laws serve to the "establishing a barrier to mixed marriage to the very extreme;"[34] however, some think that they are not strict enough. Thus, in 1980, "a law professor at the Arab University of Beirut advocated the death penalty for non-Muslim men who marry Muslim women."[35] Recently, "religious leaders on all sides of the Lebanese confessional spectrum" forgot their "deep-seated animosities" as they united against the civil marriage "not only as threat to centuries-old religious edicts, but also as a symbol of moral degradation at the societal level."[36] For instance, "Cardinal Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir, the

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[30] Glioti, Andrea. "Different Banners Within the Greater Struggle for Civil Laws", *Mabisir Blog*, December 30, 2010. Available at: https://mabisir.wordpress.com/tag/civil-law/

[31] Ofeish.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Tabet, Gihane. "Women in Personal Status Laws: Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria. (2005)". *SHS Papers in Women's Studies/Gender Research, No. 4*. http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/multimedia/hq/shs/pdf/Women_in_Personal_Status_Laws.pdf (p. 15)

[34] Ibid., p. 4

[35] Ibid.

[36] Ibid.

patriarch of the Maronite Catholic church — the largest in Lebanon — made abundantly clear his disapproval for the bill based on church teachings, threatening to withhold sacraments from any constituents married in a civil ceremony."[37] Similarly, Lebanon's Grand Mufti, Sheikh Mohammed Rashid Qabbani, "issued a fatwa decrying civil marriage and calling for punishment of those who approved it." This response was triggered by the first civil marriage ceremony in Lebanon in November 2012: a Lebanese couple, Kholoud Succariyeh and Nidal Darwish, discovered the legal loophole that made them eligible for civil marriage according to Lebanese laws, as they eliminated the references to their religion in the official records and thus did not belong to any religious community.[38] On the other hand, there are young, educated Lebanese who believe that civil marriage is the most efficient step in the abolition of the sectarian system and argue for "civil marriage not civil war."[39] For instance, an organization that supports secularism and civil marriage in Lebanon claimed that more than 50% of Lebanese University students support civil marriage, according to the data of a survey "conducted all over Lebanon."[40]

Nevertheless, the first impression of Lebanon is that of religious tolerance and peaceful coexistence on the streets as well as at workplaces, schools, and universities. In some areas, churches neighbor mosques, for example, St. George Maronite Cathedral and Mohammad Al-Amin Mosque in Beirut; characteristically, the main Christmas tree of the country is also located near a mosque.[41] In other places, there might be

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[37] Mousa, Salma, "Civil Marriage in Lebanon – for Better Not Worse", *The Islamic Monthly*, September 1, 2014. Retrieved from: http://www.theislamicmonthly.com/civil-marriage-in-lebanon-for-better-not-worse/

[38] El-Husseini, "Arwa. Lebanon's First Civil Marriage", *NOW*, January 18, 2013. Retrieved from: https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/reportsfeatures/lebanons_first_civil_marriage

[39] Lyon.

[40] Glioti.

[41] Lamb, Franklin. "Lebanon's Ebenezer Scrooge", *The Palestine Chronicle*. December 18, 2007. Available at: http://72.29.89.109/~palchron/old/view_article_details.php?id=15625

some prevalent religious group that creates its distinctive environment: for instance, some Beirut suburbs have convent schools and statues of saints in the streets; others have Hezbollah flags and pictures of martyrs; still others display posters with Sunni religious leaders and name schools after the Righteous Islamic Caliphs. Similarly, political and religious affiliations of students vary greatly among universities; for instance, Antonine University, a former Maronite monastery,[42] and Saint Joseph University, founded by the Jesuits, are mainly Christian,[43] while Islamic University in Lebanon, established by Imam Moussa Sadr, is affiliated to the Supreme Islamic Shia Council.[44] There are also strictly non-sectarian universities, the most famous of which is the American University of Beirut. According to Dr. Daniel Bliss, the Founding Father of the University in 1871,

> This College is for all conditions and classes of men, without regard to color, nationality, race or religion. A man, white, black, or yellow; Christian, Jew, Muhammedan or heathen, may enter and enjoy all the advantages of this institution... and go out believing in one God, in many Gods, or in no God. But it will be impossible for any one to continue with us long without knowing what we believe to be the truth and our reasons for that belief.[45]

However, it must also be mentioned that while there are no rules against the enrolment of Christian students in Muslim universities and vice versa, those who do so and attempt to perform religious rituals are likely to face problems. For instance, a famous dispute in Lebanon is whether Muslim students in secular or Christian universities should be allowed to pray, not mentioning separate prayer rooms. Such discussions appear time and again on the Internet as well, mainly, in Lebanese blogs and

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[42] "Muslim Prayers at USJ", *A Separate State of Mind: A Lebanese Blog*, November 2, 2012. Available at: http://stateofmind13.com/tag/university/

[43] Gambill.

[44] "The Islamic University in Lebanon. (Facts about Lebanon, a website of Localiban Project)". Available at http://www.localiban.org/spip.php?article5081

[45] The website of American University in Beirut, http://www.aub.edu.lb/main/about/Pages/index.aspx

forums. For example, in the blog *A Separate State of Mind*, those against argued that Muslims are "simply seeking trouble" rather than "religious salvation"[46] because they show off their prayers to annoy Christians. Some also asked, "Would a Lebanese Muslim university open a chapel for Christians to pray in it? The answer is obviously not." To this, answers ranged from the mild "I attend university in Calgary, Alberta Canada and we have several prayer rooms for any student of any religion, of any nationality and background to feel free to pray and hold religious lectures/meetings" to the fuming "There he is, the Muslim-hating Christian fanatic, welcome back." Others tried to solve the problem by saying that religion has no place at the university: "Lebanese students in general, both Christian and Muslim, need to know that universities are not churches. They are not mosques. They are not synagogues. Universities are places where they pay in order to learn and build a future for themselves and their families."[47]

The only public university in Lebanon is the Lebanese University with its numerous branches and institutes in all parts of the country. Compared to $3,000 to $20,000 per year at the private universities, the annual tuition at the Lebanese University is only about 200$ for Lebanese students; in addition, it has low entrance requirements – only a passing grade in the baccalaureate examination. For these reasons, it gathers students from all backgrounds, especially, those from poor or rural areas[48] and foreign students, in particular, Syrian,[49] and is called sometimes "the great melting pot." In general, if a student chooses to hide political or religious views, he or she is free to do so; in particular, the university does not require information about one's sect. Thus, a version of registration form containing the usual in Lebanon item 'religion' caused uproar on social media websites and made a news article. The rector commented that the "new

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[46] "Muslim Prayers at USJ".

[47] Ibid.

[48] Gambill.

[49] Dhumieres, Marie. "Lebanese Syrian Students Clash on LU Campus", *The Daily Star*, February 23, 2011. Retrieved from: http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2011/Feb-23/61830-lebanese-syrian-students-clash-on-lu-campus.ashx

field was the result of an error, and that the actual form students will be made to fill out would not include it."[50] Nevertheless, the overall picture of the Lebanese University is eclectic; usually, in graduation pictures, at least a couple of students are wearing square hats over hijabs.[51] Every branch has its unique religious and political profile which depends on its location; furthermore, there is also a wide range in students' religious commitment. In addition to the secular-minded and moderate ones, there are observant and even very conservative students from all religious groups. For instance, one might see Christian monks and nuns, observant Druze, and ladies in black abayas and niqabs among the university students. Also, Shiite Muslim students affiliated with Hezbollah are very religious.[52]

The wide range in students' religious commitment sometimes affects teaching specific courses, for example, "Life Modelling" in Fine Arts, which, according to Lebanese University description, involves "painting three nude models in acrylic or oil."[53] While this class is taken as specified at a Beirut campus of the Lebanese University, Furn Al Chebbek, and "students enrolled in the exact same course have guest nude models come in as part of class instruction," in the more conservative Al-Hadath Branch, "this class has used fully-dressed life models, rather than nude

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[50] Abou Jaoude, Ayane, "Students Condemn New Registration Form, LU Denies Sectarian Claims", *The Daily Star*, September 17, 2013. Retrieved from: http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2013/Sep-17/231543-students-condemn-new-registration-form-lu-denies-sectarian-claims.ashx#sthash.j9dNQ1KR.dpuf

[51] A characteristic photo in the article "Topalian, Nohad. Advanced Degree Programs Proliferating in Lebanon". November 1, 2013. Available at http://www.al-fanar-media.org/2013/11/advanced-degree-programs-proliferating-in-lebanon/

[52] In a characteristic picture, "Hezbollah university graduates attend a ceremony to celebrate the graduation of some 1700 Hezbollah students from Lebanese universities in 2007." Available at http://www.oroom.org/forum/showthread.php?25184-Todays-Pics-Monday-April-9-2007&p=489377&viewfull=1. Another one (2011) showed "Lebanese university graduates listen to a speech by Hezbollah chief Hassan Nassrallah in Beirut last November"; available at: http://www.yourmiddleeast.com/media/news/images/2011/660x390photo_1313228904131-1-0.jpg

[53] Dalal, Myriam. "Lebanese University Students Protest Nudity Ban in Life Model Course", *Beirut.com*, May 16, 2013. Retrieved from: http://www.beirut.com/l/24667

individuals, since 1982." Some students at Al-Hadath Branch protested and demanded either to remove the course or teach it according to the description, arguing that drawing dressed models – even a swimming suit was not allowed – did not teach how to draw human body. This problem, too, escalated into a fight among students for and against nude models, until the police interfered. Students blamed political parties for the banning of nude models.[54] Interestingly, while the majority of protesters look rather secular, pictures on *Beirut.com* show a student wearing hijab standing with a poster requiring course teaching according to its original description.[55]

In general, it appears that tension and conflicts among the students of the Lebanese University are mainly related to religious occasions and political demonstrations, which frequently are combined; even problems that appear, at first, to be unrelated to these matters, have or acquire political or sectarian overtones. For instance, while clashes between Syrian and Lebanese students are said by some to be "usual" at the Lebanese University and related to the hostility between students of different nationalities, anonymous sources blamed an influential political party for the largest fight involving about 200 students at Al-Hadath Branch in February 2011.[56] Similarly, a fight leading to "vandalizing and even torching university property" conflicts on the same campus was said to be between students affiliated to a political party and those belonging to some Lebanese clan controlling the area.[57] To avoid conflicts, the official policy of the Lebanese University is no religious or political meetings and signs allowed on its grounds. According to the circular issued by the rector in 2007 and, repeatedly, in 2012, "Out of keenness on the proper running of all educational and university activities, raising partisan placards and slogans is prohibited, while no posters may be placed inside any Lebanese University

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[54] Dalal.

[55] Dalal.

[56] Dhumieres.

[57] Fahs, Kawthar. "Mafia Dons Rule Lebanese University Café", *Alakhbar English*, November 26, 2012.Retrieved from: http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/14115

building."[58] The famous circular is more often ignored than not, and, as a student from the UNESCO Street campus in Beirut explained, "Once there was a message for the students – a paper was put on the door of the elevator – saying all political signs should be removed. After two days, instead of removing the signs, they removed the paper."[59] There are rumors that students feel free to transgress the rules because the administration is being intimidated by political parties. However, as the university staff explained, they have "made attempts to rein in the students responsible, but to no avail."[60] Similarly, commenting on a recent violation of the circular, the rector declared, "I don't agree with what's happening, especially since no one requested official approval before proceeding... The university has already warned students against these activities, but God help us."[61]

Nevertheless, overtly political activity at the Lebanese University is obvious; a prominent example is that of the Amal Movement at Al-Hadath and UNESCO Street Branches in Beirut. Thus, in March 2013, students supporting the Amal Movement celebrated its fortieth anniversary and decorated the Law College with pictures of Nabih Berri, the party leader, and Imam Moussa Sadr, its founder; in addition, they raised the green Amal Movement flag over the dome of Law College. Characteristically, the news article about these events ended with "Lebanese University administration has declined to comment on the incident so far."[62] Likewise, in 2012, a Lebanese blog described Al-Hadath campus as "a security zone for March 8's political parties notably Hezbollah and

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[58] Shoufi, Eva. "Ashura Rituals and Amal Oaths on Lebanese University Campus", *Alakhbar English*, November 14, 2013. Retrieved from: http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/17603

[59] Rowell, Alex. "Ashura on Campus Stirs Student Complaints", *NOW*. November 13, 2013. https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/reportsfeatures/520643-ashura-on-campus-stirs-student-complaints

[60] Ibid.

[61] Ibid.

[62] "Amal Flag Flown over LU's Hadath Campus", *NOW*., March 18, 2014. Retrieved from: https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/archive/539725-amal-flag-flown-over-lus-hadath-campus

Amal" because "the entry to the university [was] filled with pictures of Hezbollah's martyrs, Hezbollah and Amal flags and banners, pictures of Hassan Nasrallah and Nabih Berri."[63] Moreover, in 2013, students affiliated with the Amal movement read the pledge of allegiance to Amal, the oath of Sayyid Moussa al-Sadr, on the grounds of the Lebanese University campus in Hadath.[64] However, an "Amal's student-affairs official," Hassan Zein al-Din, condemned the practice and commented that "reciting the oath was an individual act by enthusiastic students, but any partisan oath inside the university is unacceptable." [65]

Anyways, student councils do celebrate all kinds of religious holidays and occasions relevant to the majority of students in a given branch; for instance, in the Hadath Branch - both Christmas and Al-Ashoura, a Shiite commemoration of martyrs.[66] Al-Ashoura is a very special occasion venerated by Shia students, in particular, those related to Amal Movement and Hezbollah,[67] and the traditional Ashura black cloth banners are added to pictures of political leaders and party logos. As described by Alex Rowell in 2013,

> A visitor to the Lebanese University's UNESCO Street campus this week might be forgiven for believing they had walked into a political party's office, or, as the running joke among some students goes, a "Husseiniya" (Shiite religious center), rather than a public higher education institution.
>
> Hanging squarely above the main entrance is the flag of the Amal Movement… Only once inside, however, does the extent of the

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[63] The Lebanese University… Of March 8's Islamization. *A Separate State of Mind, November 18, 2012*. Available at: http://stateofmind13.com/2012/11/18/the-lebanese-university-of-march-8s-islamization/

[64] Shoufi.

[65] Ibid.

[66] Shoufi.

[67] On the importance of Ashoura and the concept of martyrdom for Hezbollah, see Blanford, Nicholas. *Warriors of God: Inside Hezbollah's Thirty-Year Struggle Against Israel*. Random House, 2011. (An extract available at http://www.aucegypt.edu/GAPP/CairoReview/Pages/articleDetails.aspx?aid=92)

decoration become apparent: countless Amal flags, along with posters bearing messages of religious devotion to Imam Hussein ibn Ali as well as Amal founder Imam Musa al-Sadr, are all set against a backdrop of ubiquitous black cloth. The theme continues in the campus courtyard, where speakers have been playing a steady stream of religious anthems for the past few days… The campus isn't always like this, but this week is a special one for Shiites across the world, who are preparing to commemorate Ashura, the tenth day of the month of Muharram in the Islamic calendar, marking the anniversary of the death of Imam Hussein in the Battle of Karbala in 61 AH (680 AD).[68]

The reactions of non-Shia students to Al-Ashura commemoration at the university are very different. For instance, a student explained that "This is Lebanon, all sects celebrate their festivals in public, it's not something new."[69] Another argued that people "are not forced to attend those activities… and can attend their classes without being affected," while the third pointed out that there is a Christmas tree on Al-Hadath campus every year, so it is natural to have Ashura symbols as well because "people should learn to accept and live with one another." In contrast, other students stressed that religious and political activities have their own proper places other than universities.[70] There are also radical views against Al-Ashura calling it a barbaric display.[71] Thus, while some young people ardently defend their cause and decorate the campus with posters and flags, some others feel offended; the usual reaction includes arguing or taking photos and publishing them in the proof of the transgression of university rules.[72]

While activities related to Ashura and the Amal Movement caused only disputes and angry Internet publications, such a peaceful occasion

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[68] Rowell, Alex. "Ashura on Campus Stirs Student Complaints".
[69] Shoufi.
[70] Ibid.
[71] Ibid., a comment under the nickname Hanibaal-Atheos.
[72] Ibid.

as the Christmas was the reason of a student fight at Al-Fanar Branch in December 2012. It all started, as some students from a Christian party, the Lebanese Forces, were distributing candy and cakes at the university entrance. The exact reason of the clash and the logics of events are hard to understand, but it was said that two people in a passing-by car refused to accept the candy which caused "a verbal dispute," after which "youths in a car approached the LF students and requested that they halt their activity, threatening to shoot them;" eventually, one of the passengers opened fire. After that, "a youth stabbed others with a sharp object."[73] In addition, some "source, who spoke on condition of anonymity," said that "a group of 20 student supporters of the Lebanese Forces attacked other pupils using sticks over a decision by the dean to ban Christmas ceremonies at the educational establishment."[74] Another news article reported, however, that "The head of the Fanar campus … denied in a statement that a shooting had taken place, saying students had spread rumors in a bid to stoke strife at the university.[75] Both articles agreed, however, that two LU students were wounded. Internet commenters added some vivid details to the picture; for instance, some 'Geha' threatened students supporting Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) by, "we saw today fpmers drawing weapons and shooting at LF unarmed guys. remember this day fpmers, and remember you started this, and do not forget we know your homes one by one in all regions. do not be surprised of what will happen soon."[76] Another commenter, 'OH TV,' claimed that the young man in the car was "not a student anywhere but an member of the illiterate Iranian Islamic terrorist organization in Lebanon and one of the thousand illegal

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[73] Naharnet Newsdesk, "Two Wounded in Scuffle at Lebanese University Humanities Faculty". http://m.naharnet.com/stories/en/65065-two-wounded-in-scuffle-at-lebanese-university-humanities-faculty

[74] "Two LU Students Wounded in Fanar Clash", *The Daily Star*, December 18, 2012. Retrieved from: http://dailystar.com.lb/News/Local-News/2012/Dec-18/198997-two-lu-students-wounded-in-fanar-clash.ashx#sthash.QLMrOlG1.ZZgknvW9.dpuf

[75] Ibid.

[76] Naharnet Newdesk.

Shiite settlers in the area" who "opened fire on the students" because "the illiterate member of the Fakih party in Lebanon was offended when he was offered Christmas candy by the two infidels and decided to earn his Jehadist badge by eliminating them."[77] The reaction of another commenter to this was, "The stupidity of what happened there is only exceeded by the stupidity apparent in the comments here."[78] On the other hand, a Lebanese blog reported that "several bloodied students" posed "for pictures with their favorite political sign while they sit on a gurney in the back of an ambulance;" some of these pictures were said to be posted on social websites with the "caption 'till martyrdom,'"[79] The author of the post remarked, "It seems martyrdom these days has become about fighting for Christmas candy rights" and sarcastically described the accident as typical instance of student clashes:

> Students from party X at some university in this country were of-
> fering Christmas candy. They run across students from party Y who
> refuse to take their candy…Therefore, a student from party X has a
> shouting row with another student from party Y. They start fight-
> ing. Their buddies join in. Soon enough, a bunch of students from
> party Z see the fight and join in with their political allies Y…That's
> one version of the story. Other versions exist. All versions don't
> matter. You can substitute X, Y and Z to whichever current Leba-
> nese political party that gives you peace of mind.[80]

It is clear that both quarreling because of candy on the occasion of Christmas and speaking hate language as in some above-mentioned Internet comments show tension between sects and political parties; and, definitely, people with such attitudes appear to be ready to start a fight on any occasion, if not a whole civil war. Anyways, at present, the celebration

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[77] Ibid.

[78] Ibid.

[79] "The Maturity of Lebanon's Educated Youth", *A Separate State of Mind*, December 19, 2012. Available at http://stateofmind13.com/2012/12/19/the-maturity-of-lebanons-educated-youth/

[80] Ibid.

of Christmas is officially banned at the Lebanese University, as are other religious and political festivals and ceremonies, and, obviously, for a valid reason.

It must be noted, however, that the most serious student conflict in Lebanon did not happen at the Lebanese University. In January 2007, a trivial argument, apparently, about politics at the cafeteria of Beirut Arab University developed into a battle in the neighborhood because supporters of the conflicting sides called for help. According to NBC News, "Two opposition students and two other people were shot dead and 100 were injured, many by gunfire, at Beirut's Arab University."[81] As described by The New York Sun, "Dozens of vigilantes wearing blue and red construction hats and carrying makeshift weapons - chair legs, pipes, garden tools, sticks and chains - converged on the university and clashed with the police;" the fighters "were battering each other with sticks, stones and even furniture" and burning cars. Some students said that there were snipers on the roofs of neighboring buildings; for instance, "Mohammed Abdul-Sater, a 21-year-old Shiite student, said he saw at least three people wounded by gunfire." To stop the battle, "the army was called in with armored vehicles," and the troops started "firing tear gas and live rounds in the air to try to disperse the crowd." Eventually, the political leaders of warring parties condemned the violence and asked their supporters to clear the streets."[82] While the official news provided a rather coherent version of the events, a range of Internet sources provided colorful, but contradictory partisan versions of the events, each side mainly blaming their opponents. For example, a post on some forum described the Shia as villains who attacked Sunni students;[83] at the same time, in some blog, the battle was

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[81] Report: "Clashes in Lebanon Kill At Least Four.", *NBC NEWS.com*, January 25, 2007. Available at: http://www.nbcnews.com/id/16806540/ns/world_news-mideast_n_africa/t/report-clashes-lebanon-kill-least-four/#.VMjDVVeIVY1

[82] Murphy, Brian. "Lebanese Army Imposes Curfew in Beirut; Clashes at University Leave Two Reported Dead", *The New York Sun*, January 25, 2007. Available at: http://www.nysun.com/foreign/lebanese-army-imposes-curfew-in-beirut-clashes/47401/

[83] http://www.allempires.com/forum/forum_posts.asp?TID=17367

depicted as an attack on the Shia.[84] In short, the battle at the Beirut Arab University might serve as an example of how a cafeteria quarrel might transform into military action with casualties in a country that has been balancing for decades on the brink of a new civil war – and how hard it might be to find the truth among so many subjective versions.

So, what does it mean to be a university student in Lebanon? While the Lebanese youth feel at home in the explosive atmosphere and know how not to transgress the invisible borders dividing their society, foreigners might be surprised by multitudes of perilous topics that one must mind. First of all, discussions about politics and religion are dangerous, especially, at the university; in particular, they should better be avoided with people of different or unknown affiliation. Next, young men and women, generally, may not fall in love freely, as they should first inquire about each other's sect, clan, and party. Moreover, thinking about career in politics, one should consider what prospects are possible for his or her sect; looking for job, one should take into account that it might be harder to be accepted at some workplaces for religious or political reasons. It feels sometimes that one's whole life is governed by just one entry, *religion*, in his or her official registry document. Additionally, one must be alert anytime and anyplace, listening to the news, rumors, and noises outside, as there might be a fight, suicide bombing, shelling, shooting, demonstration, or even a new episode of war. In short, the rich, eclectic Lebanese environment is shaped by a long history of disasters just like beautiful scenery over an active earthquake fault and, to continue the simile, is always threatening with new catastrophes.

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[84] "Hariri Militia Strikes!" January 25, 2007. https://meastpolitics.wordpress.com/2007/01/25/hariri-militia-strikes/ The video available at http://ref.topictimes.com/videos/news/snipers-near-arab-university-25/01/2007-full-5X4BQuoXXW4.html

Ingrīda Hašaba

Krustugunīs: Kā reliģija un politika ietekmē Libānas studentu dzīvi

Kopsavilkums

Libāna ir neliela, blīvi apdzīvota valsts Vidusjūras austrumu krastā, kuras, iespējams, raksturīgākā iezīme ir reliģiskā daudzveidība. Šī valsts atrodas Tuvo Austrumu militāro konfliktu degpunktā, kas daudzreiz bijis par iemeslu karadarbībai tās teritorijā un lielam bēgļu skaitam valstī. Libāniešu skaits šodien ir aptuveni 4 miljoni; pēc 2014. gada datiem Libānā bija oficiāli reģistrēti aptuveni 1,5 miljoni bēgļu no Sīrijas, 6 tūkstoši – no Irākas un vairāk nekā 50 tūkstoši – no Palestīnas. No daudzajām reliģiskajām organizācijām un sektām Libānā ir oficiāli deklarētas 18, katrai no tām ir valsts reliģijas statuss, to skaitā ir 12 kristietības konfesijas un četri islāma virzieni. Libānas politiskā sistēma ir konfesionālisms – tas ir, politiskā vara un amati tiek dalīti saskaņā ar kvotām, kas katrai reliģiskajai organizācijai paredzēti pēc konstitūcijas, tas, protams, ietekmē gan valsts iekšpolitiku, gan ārpolitiku. Piemēram, Valsts prezidents var būt tikai kristietis maronīts, bet premjerministrs – musulmanis sunnīts. Vēsturiski šī sistēma sāka veidoties jau 1843. gadā, kad Libānas kalnos vara tika sadalīta starp drūzēm un kristiešiem maronītiem, bet savā tagadējā veidā tika noteikta Libānas valsts dibināšanas laikā, kad kristiešu maronītu un musulmaņu – sunnītu un šiītu – pārstāvji vienojās par politiskās varas un ietekmes sadali. Tāpēc tradicionāli katra reliģiskā organizācija dzīvo it kā atsevišķā baznīcas valstī, un daudzi cilvēki ļoti nopietni izturas pret savu ticību: viņi valkā

reliģiskus simbolus un apģērbus, kas parāda reliģisko piederību, kā arī sūta bērnus reliģisku organizāciju vadītās privātskolās. Šo daudzo reliģisko denomināciju mierīga līdzāspastāvēšana Libānā ir diezgan problemātiska, jo fundamentālisti un radikālo sektu piekritēji cīnās par varu un akcentē reliģiskās atšķirības, bet nevis vispārcilvēciskās vērtības un tādējādi rada nesamierināmus konfliktus. Valsts vēsturē ir reliģiski politisku sadursmju virkne, no kuriem spilgtākais piemērs ir nesenais Libānas pilsoņu karš (1975–1990). Šo situāciju novērst ir ļoti grūti, jo katra libānieša reliģiskā piederība kopš dzimšanas ne tikai ir ierakstīta viņa dzimšanas apliecībā un izziņā par civilstāvokli, bet arī bieži vien nosaka identitāti lielākā mērā nekā tautība un ietekmē visu viņa dzīves un darba gājumu. Šis ieraksts arī nosaka, pēc kāda civillikuma varianta libānietis drīkst laulāties, šķirties, reģistrēt bērnus, saņemt mantojumu utt., un šādu kodeksu Libānā ir 15 – katrai lielākajai reliģiskajai organizācijai savs. Pāreju citā ticībā sabiedrība nosoda, tāpēc rodas nepārvarama barjera starp jauniešiem, kas pieder dažādām reliģiskām grupām, un starpreliģiju laulība ir gandrīz neiespējama. Libānā atzīst tikai reliģisku laulību, bet civillaulība Libānā tiek oficiāli atzīta vien tad, ja tā noslēgta ārzemēs, un to uzskata par grēcīgu gan mācītāji, gan šeihi. Atšķirībā no vecākās paaudzes mūslaiku jauniešiem ir grūti uzturēt šo stingro nošķirtību, jo viņi tiekas gan mācību iestādēs, gan darbavietās; tomēr viņu reakcijas, saskaroties ar citādi domājošajiem, ir visai dažādas. Ir tādi, kas ar lielu entuziasmu metas cīņā, aizstāvot vienīgo īsteno ticību, citi cenšas uzturēt mieru un neakcentēt atšķirības, vēl citi savukārt pūlas izveidot dialogu starp dažādu reliģiju pārstāvjiem. Reizēm tomēr diskusijas pārvēršas niknos strīdos vai pat kautiņos, kurus var apvaldīt tikai ar armijas un policijas palīdzību. Šī pētījuma mērķis ir parādīt reliģijas un politikas – kas Libānas gadījumā ir bieži cieši saistītas – ietekmi uz Libānas studentu dzīvi, it īpaši uz saskarsmi un saziņu, Libānas Universitātē, kas ir vienīgā valsts uzturētā augstākās izglītības iestāde Libānā.

Ibrahim Abraham

MORAL DEVELOPMENT IN A DEVELOPING ECONOMY IN MORAL CRISIS: EVANGELICAL YOUTH CULTURE IN CONTEMPORARY SOUTH AFRICA

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The Moral Landscape of Contemporary South Africa

This paper emerges from ongoing ethnographic research into contemporary Evangelical youth culture in South Africa, twenty years after the formal end of *apartheid*.[1] The specific issues addressed in this paper are the cultural values and ethical interactions underlabouring and animating Evangelical youth culture and ministry in that country. We can refer to this as the moral landscape within which young South African Evangelicals are embedded; the circulation of personal and collective beliefs and opportunities that influence the content and form of Evangelical Christianity as it is experienced by, and presented to, South Africa's "born free" generation.

The key notions here are "moral development" and "moral crisis". The latter is a particularly common concern in South Africa,[2] often associated with the "born free" generation of young people with no memory of *apartheid*. The forms of American-influenced popular culture the "born frees" create and consume are commonly critiqued, and there is widespread popular belief that their lives are emblematic of an ethical down-

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[1] Research funding was provided by the Academy of Finland.
[2] Zulu, P. *A Nation in Crisis: An Appeal for Morality*. Cape Town: Tafelberg, 2013.

turn in comparison with earlier cohorts lionised for their indefatigable youthful enthusiasm in confronting *apartheid* authorities. If these "born frees" are not characterised as a generation ungrateful for the efforts of their elders, then they are typically characterised as the victims of the failures of post-*apartheid* South Africa to provide a dignified life for all its citizens. This view undermines any simple notion of generational moral decay since many of those involved in their youth in the struggle against *apartheid* became, in adulthood, responsible for the inequities of post-*apartheid* South Africa.

The notion of moral crisis is also ubiquitous within South African religious discourse, unsurprisingly, especially within Evangelical discourse which has had a difficult time situating itself in the more liberal landscape of contemporary South Africa.[3] Within this liberal landscape, political discourse has shifted from the competing communitarian discourses of the *apartheid* era, to largely technocratic social democratic or social liberal language. On the question of public morality, for example, one policy expert used an economic metaphor in diagnosing South Africa as suffering from a "moral recession".[4] A similar economic metaphor exists in the notion of "moral capital", the accumulation of which underpins the moral development of youth, especially in religious contexts in which religious socialisation is in no small part concerned with the cultivation of specific moral subjects.

Moral capital can be seen as an extension of Pierre Bourdieu's addition of *social* capital (relationships) and *cultural* capital (knowledge) – often appearing as *symbolic* capital (respect) – to the idea of economic capital as underpinning social advantage and disadvantage.[5] Each of these forms of

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[3]   Le Bruyns, C. "Can Any Public Good Come from Evangelicals? Theological Paradigms and Possibilities Toward a Transforming South Africa". *Religion & Theology* 13(3-4) (2006): 341-358.

[4]   Mbadlanyana, T. "SA Suffers From Moral Recession". *Daily News* (Durban), 22 April, 2013.

[5]   Bourdieu, P. "The Forms of Capital". In J. Richardson (ed.) *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education*, pp. 241-258. New York: Greenwood, 1986.

capital grants "power" to those who possess it, increasing their chances of success in general and in particular fields of endeavour,[6] in part by creating circuits of mutual recognition amongst those who possess such capital.[7] Understood in this way, moral capital could be considered to function as symbolic capital; when we recognise someone possessing moral capital, we recognise someone who stands "for *something* apart from themselves", someone who wishes to achieve "*something* beyond merely private ends."[8] Because he stood for democracy, reconciliation between former enemies, and willingly limited and then surrendered power (a rare thing in Africa), few people possessed more moral capital than former South African President Nelson Mandela.[9] It has been argued that because of frequent corruption scandals, the ruling party Mandela once led, the African National Congress, has squandered its moral capital. One high profile book uses the analogy of The Fall (Gen. 3) to describe this moral descent.[10]

Cultivating Moral Capital in Contemporary South Africa

The notion of moral capital has also been employed in a different way in contemporary South Africa, in ground-breaking work by the educationalist Sharlene Swartz, to understand specific patterns of development effecting impoverished youth. Her concern is the relationship between the accumulation of moral capital, and other forms of capital – cultural, economic, social – so as to reduce or reproduce poverty.[11] Swartz defines moral capital as:

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[6] Bourdieu, P. *Language and Symbolic Power*. Cambridge: Polity, 1991, p. 230.

[7] Bourdieu, P. *Distinction*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984, pp. 30-32.

[8] Kane, J. *The Politics of Moral Capital*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 10.

[9] Ibid., pp. 118-146.

[10] Mashele, P. & Qobo, M. *The Fall of the ANC*. Johannesburg: Picador Africa, 2014.

[11] Swartz, S. *The Moral Ecology of South Africa's Township Youth*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, p. 156.

qualities, capacities, intelligences, strategies, and dispositions that young people acquire, possess, and can 'grow' in the pursuit of moral maturity, and where moral maturity (with its goal of 'being a good person') is related to educational, career, and financial success. Moral capital consists of accruing a record of moral stance, enactment, and reputation. It can be possessed, enlarged, increased, invested in, lost, gained, and transferred. It is recognized by others, creating advantages.[12]

Swartz's analysis of the morality of young people on the impoverished periphery of Cape Town reveals interesting tensions. On the one hand, they have a conventional understanding of right and wrong according to local laws and the values of the churches most were at least nominally raised in. On the other hand, there is also a strong articulation of what Swartz refers to as "self-authorization"; regardless of the extent to which they make conventional moral claims, morality is presented as autonomous, experiential and individually embodied.[13]

Although the typical late capitalist subject is ideologically conditioned to believe that s/he is not ideologically conditioned, to sincerely believe in a wholly personal and experiential morality is problematic. It is difficult to systematise and operationalise a coherent morality in this way, so it is unsurprising to find that morality is highly situational for impoverished South African youth. Where and when one is, *right now*, determines which moral system applies. Being in a bar on Saturday night requires one moral code, being in church the next morning requires another moral code, and the codes need never be reconciled. Similar approaches were encountered by Burchardt in studying religion amongst impoverished South African youth; aside from a pious minority, most youth respect the specific morality of church space, but do not expect church teachings to apply beyond that space.[14]

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[12] Ibid., p. 148.

[13] Ibid., pp. 61-65.

[14] Burchardt, M. "Challenging Pentecostal Moralism: Erotic Geographies, Religion and Sexual Practices among Township Youth in Cape Town." *Culture, Health & Sexuality* 13(6) (2013): 669-684.

It is not merely the individualistic, experiential nature of moral reasoning that hampers the accumulation of moral capital amongst many South African youth; it is also the broader nature of South African society. In applying the notion of moral capital one must avoid too linear or instrumentalised an approach. Studying the moral development of youth requires acknowledging the different forms of morality circulating within society, such as the Evangelical morality this paper is concerned with, wherein moral development cannot be wholly instrumental. One must also be weary of instrumentalising the notion of moral capital when operationalising it, because such an approach assumes an equitable and predictable society and economy in which one can make measurable moral decisions. In South Africa, the consequences of conventionally moral – or immoral – behaviour cannot be anticipated. One youth pastor told me the often inconsequential nature of unethical behaviour "just tells kids to game [cheat] the system."

The clearest example of the unpredictable nature of South African society affecting young people is in relation to education. Despite comparatively high levels of public investment and constant public scrutiny, due to the mismanagement of resources, incompetent teaching, and a lack of support, few South Africans students are able to realise their educational ambitions. Statistics on education in South Africa are inconsistent, but based on various reports,[15] it appears that only 36.4% of the cohort of students supposed to complete their secondary education in 2014 managed to do so. Amongst those who did complete their studies, approximately 30% received adequate grades to enrol in university studies – roughly 11% of the total cohort. But only half of those who enrol at university will graduate.[16] Affording university is often difficult and there have been

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[15] Nkosi, B. "Matric Pass-rate Drop Disappointing but Understandable". *Mail & Guardian* (Johannesburg), 06 January, 2015; Magubane, K. "Matrics Struggle to Find University Admission". *Business Day* (Johannesburg), 07 January, 2015; John, V. "Matric Results 2014". *Mail & Guardian* (Johannesburg), 13 January, 2015.

[16] Council for Higher Education. *Proposal for Undergraduate Curriculum Reform in South Africa*. Pretoria: Council for Higher Education, 2013, pp. 45-49.

violent protests by students who were promised financial support by the government, but who never received it.[17] This is a paradigmatic example of the impossibility of planned, linear progress in South Africa. Even when students succeed in conventional ways by completing school and entering university, the support they have earned and been promised to realise their potential may never arrive.

Between poor educational outcomes and high unemployment, the veteran journalist and political analyst Allister Sparks warns about the emergence of a "redundant generation"; a millions-strong group of young people who have no meaningful role to play in the life of the nation.[18] He invited the readers of South Africa's leading daily newspaper to "imagine what it must be like to be in your mid-twenties and realise you are probably unemployable for the rest of your life." What kind of moral worlds might be created by this situation and what kind of decisions might someone make in this situation? Swartz calls this situation the "morality of inevitability", emerging from the belief one is destined to live one's life in poverty, on the margins of society.[19]

Evangelical Youth Culture in Contemporary South Africa

Within this moral landscape, Evangelical youth culture and ministry seeks to situate its particular morality and approaches to the question of socialising moral subjects. Sometimes South African Evangelicals focus away from society and material reality, seeing the spiritual as the only relevant concern, but sometimes they focus intently on society and material reality, with spirituality a practical source of alternative morality. I will offer, in broad and critical outline, three approaches one encounters within South African Evangelical youth culture and ministry; I will refer

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[17] SAPA. "Students Protest over Shortage of NSFAS Funds". *Mail & Guardian* (Johannesburg), 28 January, 2014.

[18] Sparks, A. "How to Get Around the Big Problem of Skills Training". *Business Day* (Johannesburg), 25 April, 2012.

[19] Swartz, p. 65, *passim.*

to these as the theology of *piety*, the theology of *prosperity*, and the theology of *resilience*.

What I refer to as the theology of *piety*, is the explicit separation of spiritual from worldly matters. This is a minority position, but it remains a tempting tendency within Evangelicalism. Evangelical pietism is controversial in South Africa because it was common in the "White" Evangelical churches during the *apartheid* era, in contrast to "White" Anglican, Roman Catholic and Methodist churches which came to understand public opposition to *apartheid* as a Christian duty. In focusing on enriching the spiritual lives of individuals, seeking after personal ecstatic experience, Evangelical churches were accused of supporting *apartheid* through their inaction.[20] Today's Evangelical pietism seeks to separate the effects of material poverty and social dysfunction from individual piety. It is no longer possible for White Evangelicals to ignore the poverty most South Africans endure, as they could during the *apartheid* era, but contemporary Evangelical pietism insists that the relief of material poverty should not be prioritised above the promotion of personal religiosity at an ecclesial level, nor need poverty undermine personal religiosity on an individual level.

Only one youth pastor that I spoke with presented a pietistic position. This pietism was revealed, in part, through resistance to my attempts to translate the church's approach to youth ministry into secular language and policy, so that I could better understand and communicate it from a social scientific perspective. The youth pastor insisted that rather than engaging young people in a program with an obvious secular analogue or specific secular outcome, the emphasis was on encouraging young people to differentiate between *core* values and *peripheral* values. A Christian's core value is honouring God through maintaining Evangelical orthodoxy and orthopraxy, correct beliefs and correct behaviours; poverty is not unimportant, but it must be understood as autonomous and peripheral to one's core, spiritual concerns. I believe that the inability to instrumentalise

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[20] Balcomb, A. "Left, Right and Centre: Evangelicals and the Struggle for Democracy in South Africa". *Journal of Theology for Southern Africa* 118 (2004): 146-160.

morality in South Africa contributes to pietistic approaches. If a young person cannot predictably navigate their way into adulthood through adherence to commonly held moral values, this can exacerbate intrinsic Evangelical beliefs in the corruption of "the world" and prompt a retreat into personal piety.

The theology of *prosperity* is an approach I will mention only briefly. It has been studied a great deal in Africa and elsewhere, and it is less common in South Africa than elsewhere on the continent. Most youth pastors I interviewed heavily criticise it, with one referring to prosperity theology as promoting a view of Jesus as like "the genie in the lamp" from the *Arabian Nights*. Simply put, this controversial theology argues that certain pious individuals are divinely empowered to manipulate reality to their material advantage.[21] Faithful Christians are thus rewarded with success in their finances, careers, relationships, and so on. During the *apartheid* era, a minority of White Evangelicals were convinced their comparative prosperity was proof of their personal and collective piety, and a minority of Black South Africans were convinced that retreating into personal piety would bring prosperity faster than political change would.[22] Some South African Pentecostal churches continue to preach prosperity gospel in the post-*apartheid* era,[23] and some foreign preachers of prosperity theology have developed a following in South Africa, notably the Nigerian T.B. Joshua. Eighty one South Africans who made the pilgrimage to Joshua's church in Lagos in 2014 were killed when a building attached to the church collapsed.[24]

Again, the difficulty of instrumentalising morality in South Africa unintentionally promotes the ideological and cosmological worldview

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[21] Coleman, S. *The Globalization of Charismatic Christianity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 27-28.

[22] Ibid, pp. 31-32.

[23] Anderson, A. "Pentecostals and Apartheid in South Africa during Ninety Years 1908-1998". *Cyberjournal for Pentecostal-Charismatic Research* 9 (2000), *http://www.pctii.org/cyberj/cyberj9/anderson.html*.

[24] Agence France-Presse. "TB Joshua Holds Memorial Service for Grieving South Africans". *Business Day* (Johannesburg), 31 December, 2014.

present in prosperity Pentecostalism. If correct behaviour according to secular standards cannot produce a better life, it becomes more difficult to argue against self-appointed prophets such as T.B. Joshua. There is a pragmatic side to prosperity theology, however. Prosperity preachers can become rich from the donations of their congregations, and this money can then be invested, responsibly or otherwise. Moreover, the personal morality preached by many prosperity pastors, and the networking culture of prosperity churches produces secular advantages; abstaining from alcohol, gambling and partying increases disposable income and symbolic capital, and churches build relationships that increase social capital.

I am labelling the most common approach to Evangelical youth culture and ministry a theology of *resilience*. The focus is producing moral clarity and consistency, despite youths' inability to instrumentalise morality in the conventional way theories of moral capital suggest. This necessitates a separation between morality and material success, without retreating into a pietism that the majority of Evangelical youth workers I have interviewed reject. The focus is still individualistic – that, of course, is a feature of Evangelicalism – but there is also concern with the formation and alteration of individuals in their life-world, rather than advocating a retreat into wholly spiritual affairs. The focus is thus on individual's interaction with other individuals, with one's community, and with the broader culture of mass consumerism. The corollary is a belief that communities can be morally reformed; one can be faithful and resilient within a church community and one can and should improve one's local community. Crucially, improving one's local community is seen as improving discrete interpersonal connections on a large scale; it is not necessarily seen as a form of political engagement, which is considered problematically "worldly" by some Evangelicals (especially Pentecostals).[25]

There are two related concerns underlabouring this idea of a youth-focussed theology of resilience. Firstly the application of religious teach-

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[25] Chetty, I. 2012. "Pentecostals and Socio-political Engagement: An Overview from Azusa Street to the New Kairos Movement". *Journal of Theology for Southern Africa* 143: 23-47.

ing to the worldly lives of religious youth, secondly, the application of religious teaching to secular matters. As one assistant youth pastor in an Evangelical church in Cape Town said, "we always try to incorporate what the Bible says, but apply it to their lives … So if we look at temptation, we look at the Book of Judges. Yes, it was many, many years ago, but we can learn a lot of valuable lessons from that." Contemporary South African culture is presented to young people at this particular church, by its youth pastors, as like biblical Israel surrounded by wealthier idolatrous nations. A young person must live in this environment and negotiate its temptations, which are not just familiar Evangelical fears of sex and drugs, but also mass consumer culture. "We don't want them to be afraid to live their lives," the head youth pastor told me, making a distinction with some other forms of conservative Christian culture.

The other concern in Evangelical youth ministries and cultures promoting a theology of resilience is the application of religious morality to secular matters. I will offer two brief examples from youth sports culture and ministry. One youth pastor described the utility of the skateboarding programs that he runs, which are designed as a form of personal development for impoverished youth:

> In skating itself [there is] a lot of self-discipline. You're never going to progress in your sport if you don't choose to get up and go practice. […] There's a lot from the sport itself that can be carried over into life skills.

Promoting "self-discipline" through a religious sporting culture is particularly appropriate in South Africa, where impoverished youth typically lack consistent adult supervision and care, making self-discipline the only form of discipline they encounter short of the criminal law.[26] Religious teachings in a different Evangelical skateboarding ministry were also capable of being translated into secular good. Recognising the way young skaters are often looked upon as delinquents, this youth pastor explained that in response to this:

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[26] Swartz, pp. 103-105.

I've spoken to them about ideas of citizenship, shall we say, ideas
about caring for our town and engaging with other people in our
town. […] In Jeremiah, God talks to the former people of Judah
who are in Babylon and tells them to look to the good of the city;
they wanted to remove themselves and God said to engage with
the city because its welfare is your welfare.

These religious teachings, generally applied, seek to undermine one
of the notions this paper began with, that the "Born Frees" represent the
downwards trajectory of morality in contemporary South Africa.

Conclusion

This paper has offered an analysis of three broad approaches to the
development of moral subjects in Evangelical youth ministry in contem-
porary South Africa, twenty years after the *apartheid* system ended in the
election of Nelson Mandela as President of the country. It was argued
that, in contrast to Mandela's moral character, public morality in con-
temporary South Africa is often viewed as in deep crisis. The injustices
and unpredictability of life in today's South Africa limits the possibility
of young people accumulating and rationally applying "moral capital" to
alleviate widespread poverty. Three broad approaches within Evangelical
youth culture to cultivate moral and religious subjects were critically ana-
lysed. It was shown that a theology of piety is present among a minor-
ity of Evangelicals that seeks to differentiate between material poverty
and personal religiosity. It was further argued that a similar retreat from
social engagement is present in the theology of prosperity that seeks su-
pernatural gifts as a reward for personal piety. Finally, it was argued that a
majority of Evangelical youth pastors in South Africa reject pietistic and
prosperity-based approaches, seeking to develop religious and moral resil-
ience amongst young people that will equip them to endure the inequities
of life in contemporary South Africa.

Ibrahim Abraham

Moral Development in a Developing Economy in Moral Crisis: Evangelical Youth Culture in Contemporary South Africa

Summary

Utilising ethnographic research into contemporary Evangelical youth culture in South Africa, this paper critically analyses approaches to the development of moral subjects in Evangelical youth ministry. After introducing the moral landscape of South Africa twenty years after the formal end of the racist *apartheid* system, the paper then introduces the notion of "moral capital", making use of the work of Sharlene Swartz amongst impoverished youth in Cape Town. Arguing that the nature of contemporary South African society prevents too instrumental a view of the accumulation of moral capital amongst young people, the paper analyses three broad approaches to the development of moral subjects in Evangelical youth culture and ministry. Approaches focusing on *piety* seek to separate material poverty from spiritual practice; approaches focusing on *prosperity* seek miraculous gifts of wealth as rewards for personal piety; and approaches focusing on *resilience* seek to develop religious subjectivities capable of withstanding the inequities of contemporary South Africa without withdrawing from material reality.

Roberto F. Scalon, R. Ricucci

GROWING UP NEAR THE POPE. ITALIAN YOUNG PEOPLE AND THEIR RELIGIOUS BELONGING

From the religious point of view the Italian context is considered a peculiar case in the European scenario due to its main features[1]: the predominance of Catholicism as the majority religion (around 85%), an increase of religious pluralism[2], a small but slowly growing number of people – around 17% – who don't believe in God (atheists, agnostics and those who do not believe in a Divinity but in a superior power such as Nature, the Earth or the Universe) and finally a high level of pluralism within Catholicism itself (different ways of living the Catholic faith and belonging to the Church). In addition to this, it is important to bear in mind that "even if Italy is the nation which hosts the Vatican, it too has also become more secularized and churches are not as packed as they were. Both the decline in new vocations and the ageing of the clergy have become all too apparent, hierarchy guidelines on sexual and family

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[1] Data at 2008: Garelli, Franco *Religione all'italiana. L'anima del paese messa a nudo*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 2011.

[2] As a result of migratory flows from traditionally Islamic and Orthodox Christian countries, as well as Catholic, a small but highly visible minority of Jews and Protestants (especially Waldensian Methodists; in this regard we should remember that the total of non-Catholic believers in Italy is around 5%).

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morality mostly going unheeded. In spite of this, most people still identify with Catholicism for cultural reasons or because of their education rather than for religious or spiritual reasons"[3].

In this context, it is interesting to discuss how young people are developing their religious behaviour. In the following sections, we'll discuss youth positions on issues which are generally considered "hot issues" in the current debate on religious belonging.

In God we trust...maybe! Young people in the debate on "secularization and post-secularization"

Young people are children of their time and fully involved in two dynamics characterizing the relationship between the individual and religion. The first concerns the persistence of belonging of the youngest ones to the religion of their parents even in the presence of growing religious pluralism and an advance of the process of secularization.[4] Research carried out in several European countries, and beyond has demonstrated this fact, emphasizing the emergence among youth of a growing group that tends to develop their own set of religious experiences, in terms of

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[3] Garelli, Franco, *Religions and Civil Society in Italy and in other Latin Countries*. In: De Hart, Joepp - Dekker, Paul – Halman, Loek (Eds.) . *Religion and Civil Society in Europe*, Amsterdam: Springer, 2013, pp. 125-146.

[4] Toset, Niko *et al*. (Ed.), *Modern Society and Values: A Comparative Analysis Based on the ISSP Project*, Ljubljana: University of Ljubljana and ZUMA, 2000; Hervieu-Léger, Daniéle *et al*, *La religione degli Europei. Fede, cultura religiosa e modernità in Francia, Italia, Spagna, Gran Bretagna, Germania e Ungheria*. Torino: Edizioni Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1992, Vol. I. Among different European countries, Italy shows some unique characteristics: religiosity rates higher than the European average, low adherence to other religious denominations, enhanced presence of the Church in the public sphere. Cesareo, Vincenzo *et al*, *La religiosità in Italia*, Milano: Mondadori, 1995; Garelli, Franco. *L'Italia cattolica nell'epoca del pluralismo*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 2006.; Garelli, Franco - Guizzardi, Giuseppe - Pace, Enzo. (Ed.), *Un singolare pluralismo. Indagine sul pluralismo morale e religioso degli italiani*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 2003.

ways and times.[5] Even in the Italian context, where the level of religious practice is higher than in other European countries, there has been a more remarkable decline among young people. On the other hand, young people's basic religious socialization remains significant. It persists over time, even if it appears detached from continuous references and barely supported by experience in the family. Most of all, "there is a persistence of the recourse to rites of passage of a population that finds, in the religious level, an answer to the ultimate meaning that they are unable to grasp elsewhere".[6] Therefore, contrary to what might be expected,[7] we are not witnessing the abandonment of the religious sphere, but rather a different way of belonging and experiencing it.[8] The second dynamic, i.e. the rise of the individualism of belief, falls into this context.[9] In studies on religiosity, the drop in attendance of young people at Sunday Mass is generally considered as an indicator of the process of individualization of religious belief: faith is increasingly becoming a private matter, with a

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[5] Bellamy, John. *et al. Why People Don't Go to Church?*, Adelaide: Open Book Publisher, 2002; Mason, Michael. Singleton, Andrew. Webber, Ruth. *The Spirit of Generation Y. Young People's Spirituality in a Changing Australia*, Mulgrave: John Garratt Publishing, 2007; Smith, Christian - Snell, Patricia. *Souls in Transition: The Religious & Spiritual Lives of Emerging Adults*, New York, Oxford: University Press, 2009; Galland, Olivier - Roudet, Bernard (Ed.), *Les jeunes européens et leursvaleurs. Europe occidentale, Europe centrale et orientale*, Paris: La Découverte, 2005.

[6] Garelli, 2006, p. 5.

[7] Casanova, José. *Public Religions in the Modern World*, Chicago-London: The University of Chicago Press, 1994; Franco Garelli, Franco. Guizzardi, Giuseppe. Pace, Enzo. Ed. 2003; Koenig, Matthias. "Vitalité religieuse et mécanismes de sécularisation institutionnelle en Europe" *Social Compass*, 55, 2008, pp. 217-229; Pollack, Detlef. "Religious Change in Europe: Theoretical Considerations and Empirical Findings", *Social Compass*, 55, 2008, pp. 168-186.

[8] Bréchon, Pierre. *Religion: appartenance et identité religieuse*, in Bréchon, Pierre. Tchernia, *Jean-François (*Ed.), *La France à travers ses valeurs*, Paris: Armand Colin, 2009, pp. 227-266; Stölz, Jorge. *Explaining Religiosity: towards a Unified Theoretical Model.* «The British Journal of Sociology», 60, 2 (2009), pp. 345-376; Hoge, Dean e*t al. Young Adult Catholics: Religion in the Culture of Choice*, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001.

[9] Sciolla, Loredana. *Sociologia dei processi culturali*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 2005.

decrease in the participation in parish life and observance of the teach-ings of the Church on the subject of moral and sexual orientations.[10] This aspect, together with the difficulties of religious institutions in reading and interpreting the modern age's typical needs for guidance and answers, makes the figure of Berger's "lone believer"[11] relevant today, reinforcing the trend which Davie identified as "believing without belonging".[12]

The changes in the attitude of young people towards the faith of their fathers (and especially of their mothers) and its institutions are attributed not only to their new tastes and their new needs, which are far differ-ent from those of their parents. The proposals and offers in the religious market should also be taken into account. In other words: if the parishes are emptied of the presence of young people, the proposals that they are directing to them may not be adequate or sufficiently attractive to give an orientation to the "customer". However, the parishes are not the only ones populating the scene of religious supply: in addition to them, there is a large group of organizations, linked to movements and orders, which gathers a large share of young people through their proposals of spiritual guidance and commitment. In fact, recent research on the religiosity of Italians shows that the "sole spiritual" supply is particularly appealing to young people who prefer a relationship with the sacred unmediated by the official orders in expression of religious sentiment.[13]

Religion and the public sphere through young people's eyes

The crucial event of the Christian-Democratic party's fall, occurred in 1993, made concretely a possible for the Catholic Church in Italy (i.e. Italian Bishops Conference) to engage more directly and more intensively

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[10] Garelli, 2011.

[11] Berger, Peter. *Una gloria remota. Avere fede nell'epoca del pluralismo*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 1994.

[12] Davie, Grace. *Religion in Britain since 1945: Believing without Belonging*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1994.

[13] Garelli, 2011.

in public and political life, involving directly Catholic people – including the young – in the public sphere.

In these terms, over the last few years in Italy there has been a great deal of discussion on the question of secularity or laicity. In simple terms this refers to the balance in a democracy that must characterize the relationship between the religious and secular spheres, based on a loyal and reciprocal respect in areas of pertinence, competence and action[14]. Crossing over these established boundaries – between the religious and the secular – is considered in Western democracy a sort of mortal sin, continually referred to in the public debate by the expression 'undue intrusion'.

With reference to the Italian case we have identified four bones of contention that the debate on laicity focuses on, applying in particular to the relationship between the state and churches or religious confessions. The first, of a symbolic nature, concerns the presence of religious images in public spaces. The second is a fiscal question and refers to whether or not religious institutions should enjoy benefits of this type from the state. The third point regards the field of education and training, with specific reference to the scholastic question. The last point involves the sphere of communications and concerns the plausibility of interventions in the public debate by religious institutions on socially and politically sensitive questions, aimed at guiding people's opinions.

The consensus to leave the crucifix in public places is fairly widespread throughout the country, to the extent that also among the groups of the least favourable – younger people and those with a higher level of education – it is approved of not less than 60% of the subjects. More precisely, age and education level (more than sex) are the variables with greatest influence on this position; passing in fact from younger to older age-groups, and from higher to lower education levels, we observe a progressive increase in the tendency for people to justify the presence of the Christian symbol in public buildings.

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[14] Casanova, 1994; Willaime, Jean-Paul. *Europe et religions. Les enjeux du XXI^E siècle*, Paris : Fayard, 2004.

'In your opinion is displaying the crucifix in public places acceptable?'
according to (a) sex, age (%; No. of cases 3,160)

'In your opinion is displaying the crucifx in public places acceptable?'
according to educational level (%; No. of cases 3,160)

The geographical area of residence also influences attitudes: residents in the South of Italy are more in favour of exposition and those in the Centre harbour more doubts.

We can add information and aptitudes on other issues. Specifically, we take into account both the economic and fiscal spheres.

Two particular forms of fiscal benefits we look at are the so-called 8x1000 (a mechanism that involves allocating 0.8% or 'otto per mille' of the amount of income tax due either to the state or to different religious confessions according to the taxpayer's choice, for uses defined by the law), and the government decision to exempt religious buildings from paying property tax. Different segments of the population hold varying positions on these issues. The majority of Italians are in favour of financing churches through the 8x1000 system, an opinion more common among women and residents in the South of Italy and Islands, which notably diminishes passing gradually from the oldest age group (70%) to the youngest (45%). More than one-third of the population is opposed to this mechanism, while 7% of subjects have difficulty in taking a position on the issue, having little or no information on the subject. The young are the most uninformed, whereas among those not in favour the inhabitants of Central Italy particularly stand out, seeming to manifest also here a certain friction with the Catholic Church that dominated those regions in the past as part of the Papale States and still today maintains a concentration of charitable organizations and institutions there.

Please don't interfere with my family planning

The appeal by the Church to safeguard the family and marriage is shared by almost 90% of the elderly and subjects with a low educational level, but not more than 74% of the young and graduates. Similarly, the continual condemnation of abortion by the ecclesial leadership is approved of by about 70% of the elderly, residents in the South of Italy and those

characterized by a low cultural capital, but by half of the young, graduates and residents in the more developed regions of the country. The age difference is particularly marked when considering the Church's invitation to Italians not to marry people of a different religion (especially Muslims): two-thirds of the elderly agree but – conversely – two-thirds of the young do not.

These cultural (and lifestyle) differences can also be seen in the evaluation of the norms with which the Catholic Church regulates internal relationships within the religious field that – as has been observed – are not highly regarded by the population as a whole. The condemnation of premarital sexual relations is shared by almost half of the elderly subjects, but not accepted by 86% of the young, while the ban on the divorced receiving sacraments is contested by more than two-thirds of the elderly and 84% of the younger groups. Obviously religion is the variable playing a decisive role also on these issues, even more so than the socio-personal data of the population.

The tendencies relative to civil and social ethics observed here are largely reproduced in the field of individual and family morality, with the difference that – apart from the age and religious convictions of the subjects – other variables such as gender, education and life circumstances play important roles. Thus, the orientations most distant from traditional morality are more widespread among men and in more secularized areas of the country (Central Italy), but particularly increase with generational turnover and higher educational level, reaching their peak among the young and graduates. In this case too, then, the most liberal tendencies are seen in the 'without religion' group (and in a share of less committed Catholics), whereas the greatest opposition is among the most convinced and engaged Catholics, but also in a proportion of believers in other faiths. However, these differences emerge in a context in which the various norms and directives the Church still today insists on in this field are disregarded even by the majority of 'convinced and active' Catholics (concerning sex outside marriage,

living together, masturbation and even divorce), who consider them anachronistic or at least not applicable to people with different cultural orientations.

From the social morality point of view the fundamental values of public co-existence seem still to be solid, though not without some visible cracks indicating growing disaffection with various norms in civil life among a section of the population. It is of no small importance that a substantial number of citizens (from 20 to 30%) comprehend or tolerate or are favourable to personal choices (such as tax evasion, absenteeism from work, swindling the state) that undermine the social system and the very idea of the common good. But the biggest problem is that alienation from the norms of citizenship progressively increases with diminishing age, thus outlining a generational trend that throws a worrying light on the future. Well above national averages, today's 16–25 year olds not only accept public and private deceitfulness, be it more or less 'prankish' and limited (seeing that over 40% of this group do not condemn travelling without paying on public transport or the use of soft drugs), but also tolerate behaviour that negates fundamental social obligations.

Conclusions

Even though it is still early days to talk about a generational ethical divide, there is no doubt that a critical point emerges in the relationship between the young and society, as reflected in the climate of institutional distrust and absence of the sense of future that many of them exhibit. Age then is the variable that most divides Italians on social and public ethical issues, even though differences (of lesser entity) can be found when taking into consideration other profiles of the population. So, for example, perception of public good and values of citizenship is slightly more pronounced among women than men and among residents in the North with respect to inhabitants of other large areas of Italy.

Also on complex ethical choices (concerning bioethics, genetic engineering, the ending of life etc.)[15], the constant factor observed throughout the whole research is that socially emerging groups (the young, the higher educated, inhabitants of more dynamic contexts) are more in favour of deciding autonomously and are more open to change and receptive to new situations than groups more tied to traditional values, who manifest greater caution. This tendency can be observed not only in the field of birth control (contraception and abortion) but also genetic engineering techniques and euthanasia. Thus, for example, among 16–25 year olds and graduates, 64% of the cases are in favour (perhaps with some restrictions) of the technique of heterologous insemination (not permitted by law), over 50% accept surrogate motherhood and about 45% support recourse to euthanasia; whereas the consensus with respect to these experimentations is about 20 percentage points lower among the elderly and those who are less educated. Similar tendencies can be seen when comparing the opinions on these issues held by citizens living in Central and North Italy with those in the South and Islands.

This dual characteristic can also be verified in the analysis of the different religious convictions held by the population. Religion is confirmed as a valid reference point, also in relation to the need to evaluate particularly complex cases or those with possible dilemma-provoking implications. It is perfectly evident that the more intense the degree of affiliation and religious sentiment of the subjects, the greater the tendency to evaluate the most currently discussed ethical issues with prudence and caution (with the purpose of avoiding deviations and forging ahead at all costs that could lead to unknown and potentially risky outcomes).

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[15] On sociological analysis of Italian bioethical public debate, concerning particularly the relationships between religious and secular actors and their discourses in the public sphere, see Scalon, Roberto. *Bioetica e sfera pubblica. Un'analisi sociologica del dibattito su fecondazione assistita e eutanasia*, Milano: Franco Angeli, 2005.

Roberto F. Scalon and R. Ricucci

Growing up close to the Pope. Italian youth and their religious belonging

Summary

The debate on the relationship between young people and religion oscillates between the diffusion of religious individualization and the advancing process of secularization. These processes effect also Italian youth. In a scenario where belonging to Catholicism is still widespread among the population, the paper discusses how young people are developing their religious behaviour and their position on four specific burning issues in several societal and life areas. The first concerns the presence of the crucifix in public spaces. The second deals with a fiscal question and refers to whether or not religious institutions should enjoy benefits of this type from the State. The third point regards the role of religion (and specifically the Catholic religion) in the field of education and training, with specific reference to the teaching of only Catholic religion in all schools, from primary to upper secondary. The last point involves the sphere of communications and concerns the plausibility (desirability?) of interventions in the public debate – aimed at influencing people's opinions - by religious institutions on socially and politically sensitive questions. All these issues are debated by means of both the most recent survey data available and scientific discussion about the role of religion in the lives of young people. The findings draw a picture in which Italian young people are, on one hand, "children of their time", sharing with other international peers an independent way of managing their relationship with religion and, on the other, continue to recognize Catholicism as a point of reference of their Italian identity.

Zane Šteinmane

THE ROLE OF MIDDLE EASTERN CLASSIC SECULAR TEXTS IN FORMING NATIONAL IDENTITY AND INTERCULTURAL RELATIONS: *MU'ALLAQAT*

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'Arab people' is an umbrella-term for the Arabic-speaking people of various ancestral origins, which inhabit mostly Western Asia and Northern Africa. The unifying elements that bind these people are linguistic, cultural and political, although the Arabic identity is challenged by many factors, including religious, clan, regional and other.[1]

The word 'Arab' is closely linked to the place name "Arabia" that refers to the Arabian peninsula, and the inhabitants of said peninsula were called Arabs until the conquests of the Abbasid Caliphate, approximately from the 7th - 13th century. A version of the etymology is "passerby" or "nomad".[2] There are plenty of groups residing in the Arab world that are not Arabs, such as Berbers, Kurds, Turks, Iranians, Azeris, Shabaks, Turcomans, Romani, Mhallami, Sub-Saharan Africans, Samaritans, Jews etc.[3]

Although the specific cultural realities differ from country to country, the Arab people have gone through a mixing process, and most of the Arab

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[1] Deng, Francis Mading. *War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan*. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1995. p. 405

[2] Grunebaum, Gustave E. Von. *Classical Islam : A History, 600–1258.* Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1970. p.16.

[3] Hitti, Philip, K. *History of the Arabs: From the Earliest Times to the Present.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. p. 30-48.

countries share cultural characteristics in arts and crafts such as music, literature, calligraphy, handicrafts, carpets, woodcarvings, architecture etc.[4]

But, even though such relations exist, the true foundation of the perpetual unity is the Arabic language. The vernaculars are usually considered dialects due to political and social considerations, but the standard is based on the Qur'anic language as it has been used for education and mutual understanding. An analogy, perhaps, can be seen with the Chinese people, who speak many different varieties of Chinese, and regardless of the diversity, they are all considered dialects of the same language.

The Arabic language is the medium that carries the religious and secular messages of the civilization. It spread from the Arabian Peninsula across West Asia and North Africa. With the rise of Islam in the 7th century, and as the language of the Qur'an, Arabic became the lingua franca of the Islamic world, and its spread resulted in acculturation of different peoples as Arabs. Arabization was often, although not always, in conjunction with Islamization.[5]

Most of the pre-Islamic poetry is lost or not preserved due to the fact that writing had not yet been developed and literary works were mostly passed on orally, still, many of the ancient works are regarded unique in their eloquence and artistic value, as well as a vehicle for literary expression, providing not only a contribution to the grammar and vocabulary of the language, but also an illustration of the according political and cultural realities of the past.[6] Poetry served as the record of the Arabs' customs, habits, their wars, their virtues and vices, domestic affairs as well as social advancement, and their sentiments. As the Orientalist Francis E. Johnson puts it – 'all that would interest both a historian and a moralist'.[7]

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[4]   Rippin, Andrew (ed.) *The Islamic World.* New York: Routledge: Taylor & Francis Group, 2010. p. 261.

[5]   Chejne, Anwar G. "Arabic: Its Significance and Place in Arab-Muslim Society". *Middle East Journal*, Vol.19, N.4. Washington D.C.: The Middle East Institute. p. 447–470

[6]   Rippin, Andrew (ed.) *The Islamic World.* New York: Routledge: Taylor & Francis Group, 2010. p. 266

[7]   Johnson, Francis. E. (trans), Faizullabhau, Shaikh (ed). *The Seven Poems Suspended in the Temple ar Mecca.* Bombay: Education Society's Steam Press, 1893. p. vii

With the coming of Islam, undoubtedly, the tides changed and the Islamic Holy Scripture became the most important and influential work in Arabic language, thus, the importance of the classical poetry diminished. But, as the early poems had a historical value, and provided a basis for the linguistic studies, they were preserved as well. With the gradual spread of Islam, the Qur'an became the basis for Muslim morality, beliefs and values, judgments and decisions, that added up to the previous cultural layer.[8]

The Turkish conquest of the Arab lands and the Ottoman rule (1299-1923) marked a prolonged decadence of the Arabic literary expression, due to the rise of Turkish and Persian literature. As both Arabs and Turks were Muslims, the conquest did not affect the importance of the Qur'an, on the contrary, it served as a unifying element for the people throughout the Empire.[9]

A modern revival called al-Nahda – 'awakening' or 'renaissance' (late 19th and early 20th)[10], and with it – the political consciousness and the ideas of nationalism were brought to the Arab world from the West. The documentation of the historical evolution of political consciousness across the Arab world has proved extremely hard, and a thinness persists in such studies.[11] At the time of al-Nahda, writers sought to explore the Western styles of literary expression, alongside bringing to life once again the classical themes and forms of Arabic writing, as poets sought inspiration and a sense of historical bonding to their homeland and affirmation of belonging to a nation.

Such sentiments and values could be found best in the ancient secular literature. *Mu'allaqat*, was a well-known classic, collected and named

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[8] Long, David E. *Culture and Customs of Saudi Arabia.* Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 2005. p. 24.

[9] Hitti, Philip, K. *History of the Arabs: From the Earliest Times to the Present.* Basingstoke*:* Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. p.741-742.

[10] Meisami, Julie S., Starkey, Paule (eds). *The Routledge Encyclopaedia of Arabic Literature.* London, New York: Routledge: Taylor & Francis Group, 2010. p. 573-574.

[11] Kramer, Martin. "Arab Nationalism: Mistaken Identity." *Daedalus : journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.* Summer 1993. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. p. 171-206.

around the beginning of the 8ᵗʰ century by Ḥammād al-Rāwiyah. The anthology consists of seven poems, each by a different author, all written in the same poetic form – qasida, that maintains a single elaborate metre throughout the poem, and every line rhymes. The name – *Mu'allaqat* usually translated as 'The suspended ones' – is interpreted as a derivation of the verb "alaka" which means "to hang". One of the legends says, that these poems were so renowned throughout the Arab world, that they were written in gold on scrolls of linen, then hung in Kaaba, the sacred mosque in Mecca, although scholars question the credibility of it – no reference to such phenomena has been made in the early literature or the Qur'an.[12]

The pagan society of ancient Arabia was built on certain moral ideas even before the appearance of Islam. There was no written code, except the compelling force of traditional custom enforced by public opinion; but their moral and social ideals have been faithfully preserved in their poetry, which is the only form of literature which has come down to us from those old days. So it is that in this poetry we see the identity of the ancient Arab nomadic desert dwellers – their values, judgment and traditions.

Arab national identity is by no means an unambiguous phenomenon to describe. There are more than 20 Arab states, and these states are populated by people of different ethnicities, religious beliefs. The 'Arab' identity is defined independently of religious identity. The importance of literature in nation building can be explained by its function as a medium through which the national consciousness, sentiment, shared values, a cultural inheritance and a notion of a shared destiny can be transferred to the masses. This process is closely related to national myth-making e.g. the accentuation of a common origin, the importance of shared memories, symbols etc.[13] As Yasir Suleiman states in his book *Literature and Nation in the Middle East*:

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[12] Nicholson, Reynold A. *A Literary History of the Arabs.* London: Cambridge University Press, 1966. p. 102.

[13] Smith, Anthony D. *National Identity.* Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1991. p. 19.

> In the theories of nationalism, literature shares this communicative function with other semiologies of signification which, typically, include rituals (for example, parades, marches, processions, funerals and inauguration ceremonials) and objects of symbolic representation (for example, flags, anthems, monuments, postage stamps and coins). In fact, literature has a greater semiotic reach, because it can be used to talk about these rituals and objects of representation, but not vice versa. And for nations in the diaspora, literature is a particularly potent force because of its ability to link the members of a refugee nation across state borders and to encode their 'exilic' experience in different linguistic idioms.[14]

In the Arab world, poetry usually delivers the nationalist message, for it has a long and a respected position in the culture. And the classical poems, like elsewhere throughout the world, were used in the previously mentioned myth-making. For example, in a conference held in Baghdad in April of 1980 on the role of literature in forming and sustaining the Arab national consciousness, the nationalists declared such findings as 1) the pre-Islamic literature affirms the existence of the Arab self, 2) the literature of the early Islamic period spreads universal values of the Arabs, 3) the literature of the Abbasid period affirms Arab unity, 4) modern literature mobilizes against external forces and the forces of decline and fragmentation.[15]

This example shows how, in their nation-building attempts, Arab national activists have taken a part of literary cultural heritage and, discarding the context, mold it to become just a tool for their political purpose. Ultimately the idea of pan-Arabism was not successful, and it did not, replace the exclusive territory-based national identities.

But even though the classical secular texts have been used as propaganda in ways that alter their meaning and context, their literary value,

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[14] Suleiman, Yasir, Muhawi, Ibrahim (eds). *Literature and Nation in the Middle East.* Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006. p. 209.

[15] Suleiman, Yasir, Muhawi, Ibrahim (eds). *Literature and Nation in the Middle East.* Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006. p. 210.

which subtly interacts with the subconscious, has not changed, perhaps even been enhanced in the process. Some values, strongly underlined by *Mu'allaqat*, are obvious in their intercultural relationship-building patterns.

1. Although a large part of the Arabic-speaking people have long since deserted the nomadic lifestyle, the scarce natural resources provide hardships which push the people away from their home and towards the search for a better place to settle. Zuhair:

> There it was I stood after twenty livelong years,
> [..] When I recognized the abode, I said to the lodging-place
> 'Good morning to you, lodging-place: well may you fare!'[16]

This element is present and extensively used in the *Mu'allaqat* as well. In the context of the current geopolitical processes, we could see it as a cultural inheritance that alleviates the process of migration and adaptation to a new setting. Labīd:

> So cut off your longing for one whom you may no more attain
> The best knotters of friendship sever the bond at need-
> And bestow your gifts in plenty on him who entreats you fair;
> You can always break, when his love falters and swerves away.[17]

2. The authors of *Mu'allaqat* attribute a great significance to valor and courage in battle, and it is regarded just as highly as hospitality and kindness towards the extended family and friends of the tribe. And even though it is very prominent, the hate is seldom personal. It has the sentiment of a collective phenomenon. Antara:

> Many's the bristling knight the warriors have shunned to take on,
> One who was not in a hurry to flee or capitulate,
> My hands have been right generous to with the hasty thrust

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[16] Arberry, Arthur J. *The Seven Odes: The First Chapter in Arabic Literature.* London: Allen & Unwin, 1957. p. 114.

[17] ibid. p. 143.

Of a well-tempered, strong jointed, straightened spear [..]
I split through his accountrements with my solid lance
(for even the noblest is not sacrosanct to the spear)
And left him carrion for the wild beasts to pounce on[..].[18]

This resonates with what we've seen in the numerous recent conflicts the Middle East. This seems to be the mentality that has developed over the centuries: victory over peace. The Arab hero is boastful and defiant, his virtue is that of courage, hardness, strength.[19]

3. Another praised trait is patience in misfortune. *Mu'allaqat* illustrates it in various ways, the most obvious is grieving the loss of a loved one, which is chided by the travelling companions of the author/the poet. Imru al-Qais:

Halt, friends, both! Let us weep, recalling a love and a lodging
By the rim of the twisted sands between Ed-Dakhool and Haumal
[..] Upon the morn of seperation, the day loaded to part,
By the tribe's acacias it was like I was splitting a colocynth;
There my companions halted their beasts awhile over me
Saying 'Don't perish of sorrow; restrain yourself decently!'[20]

Some of the other misfortunes include those of being an outcast, being shunned and shamed for something by members of the tribe, having to go through the frequent challenges of living the arduous desert life etc.

4. Generosity and hospitality are some of the other virtues which were greatly extolled in the secular literature, and *Mu'allaqat*. This is an element that also goes hand in hand with the hardships of the desert life, when sharing food, water and resources was essential for the survival of the people. Antara:

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[18] ibid. p. 181-182.
[19] Nicholson, Reynold A. *A Literary History of the Arabs.* London: Cambridge University Press, 1966. p. 82.
[20] Arberry, Arthur J. *The Seven Odes: The First Chapter in Arabic Literature.* London: Allen & Unwin, 1957. p. 61

And whenever I have drunk, recklessly I squander
My substance, while my honour is abounding, unimpaired,
And whenever I have sobered up, I diminish not my bounty,
My qualities and my nobility being as you have known them.[21]

5. The tribal organization of the Arabs was then, as now, based on the principle of kinship or common blood, which served as the bond of union and social solidarity. Defending the family and the tribe, both individually and collectively, was regarded as a sacred duty. Putting the necessities of the tribe over the needs of the whims of the individual is shown to be of utmost importance. If help was demanded by someone in the tribe, doubt was out of the question. Self-sacrifice and devotion on behalf of the kinsfolk, therefore, was held up as an ideal. The idea of loyalty in the Arab tribe meant a faithful loyalty to one's equals. Tarafa:

I used our kinship as a close argument; and, by your luck,
Whenever there's anything requiring an effort, I'm always
    present;
Let me be summoned in a serious fix, and I'm there to defend,
Or let your enemies come against you sternly, I'm stern to help;
If they assault your honour with dirty cracks, I don't waste time
Threatening, but pour down their throats draughts from the pool
    of Death.[22]

But this phenomenon holds an influence over international communication, as it reinforces 'otherization', the 'us versus them' concept, that the people outside a specific group or an institution should be treated with caution and mistrust. And this might be a reason why Pan-Arabism failed. The Arabs, although many in count, are very diverse, and historically have lived in groups bound by blood, fighting other tribes. The gaps are too big to be mended by nationalist slogans and ideologies, powers incapable of

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[21] ibid. p. 181.
[22] ibid. p. 87

satisfying everyone's needs and demands. And even Islam up until now has not succeeded to overcome this political problem, based on the secular identity of the Arab people.

6. As a final trait that stands out in the poems of *Mu'allaqat,* I have chosen to ellaborate on the persistence in revenge. Courage in battle and fortitude in warfare were particularly required in a land where might was equal with authority and tribes were constantly engaged in attacking one another. Accompanying the qualities of courage and willingness to engage in battle, the Arabian sense of honour called blood for blood in case of a murder. Vengeance for the slain was an obligation that could be taken either upon the murderer or one of his tribesmen, preferrebly the closest of the relatives. Evidentaly, this could easily turn into a loop of consecutive murders, as it occasionally happened. In this situation, sometimes a truce could be reached only by paying the opposing tribe off with camels or other goods. Zuhair mentions his tribe being in the exact circumstances:

> The two conciliators from Ghaiz bin Murra labored for peace
> After the tribe's concord had been shattered by bloodshed
> [..] You alone mended the rift between Abs and Dhubyan
> After long slaughter, and much grinding of the perfume of
>   Manshim,
> [..] Various spoils of your inheritance were then driven forth
> Among the people, many young camels with ears slit:
> The wounds were healed by that offering of hundreds of beasts.[23]

The pre-Islamic tribal Arab hated his enemies with passion equivalent to that of his loyalty and love towards his friends. A man who refused to strike back when attacked was regarded as a coward.[24] The obligation of vengeance was a game of honour, courage and a single-minded devotion to a cause. 'Amr:

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[23] Ibid., p. 115.
[24] Nicholson, Reynold A. *A Literary History of the Arabs.* London: Cambridge University Press, 1966. p. 9

Ma'add knows, we are inheritors of glory
Which we defend with our spears, till all behold it;
When the tent-poles of the tribe are fallen
Upon the furniture, we defend our neighbours;
Of old, we repel their enemies from them.
And bear for them what they load upon us.[25]

Conclusions

Despite the undeniable fragmentation of the Arab people, and discarding idealist views that overemphasize the similarities, essential elements persist that form the orientation of certain people affirming their needs, interests and goals with a common reference. Since the overwhelming majority of Arabs are Muslim, the two identities – religious and secular - are linked and overlapping, but are not necessarily inseparable.

In the aftermath of colonialism, the second World War, and the growing influence of the Western philosophy, a literary movement of the local intelligence called "al-Nahda" inspired the establishment of Arab nationalism. In their attempts to form a national identity, certain elements of unity (language, common culture, sociopolitical experiences, economic interests, and a collective memory of their place and role in history) were highlighted.

The nationalists devoted their efforts not only to the introduction of new values and ideas from the Western tradition, but also the reassessment of the ways and habits of their own culture and it's literary heritage amongst other things.As a classical, secular text of an ancient tradition, *Mu'allaqat* has left an imprint on the mindset of the people, just like we could say that folk tales, epics or legends influence the reader that is subjected to them, especially from an early age and especially with a particular emphasis of the said text to be of a specific personal value to someone, as an intrinsic part of their cultural identity. The secular texts of *Mu'allaqat*

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[25] Arberry, Arthur J. *The Seven Odes: The First Chapter in Arabic Literature.* London: Allen & Unwin, 1957. p. 207.

reflect on traits, values and knowledge of the ancient Arab lifestyle, thus shaping the basic common motives for decision-making, engagement in activities and reactions in the society. The customs depicted in the verses of the poems prevail, and, the significance of the anthology should not be underestimatet both by the curious reader or the scholar, looking for an insight into the Middle Eastern cultural history.

Zane Šteinmane

Tuvo Austrumu klasisko sekulāro tekstu loma nacionālās identitātes un starptautisko attiecību veidošanā: *Muallakāt*

Kopsavilkums

Rakstā pētīta pirmsislāma dzīvesveidu, tradiciju un uzskatu kopumu reprezentējošā dzejas krājuma *Muallakāt* ietekme uz arābu tautu nacionālo identitāti un starpkultūru attiecību veidošanas modeļiem.

Par spīti nenoliedzamajai arābu tautu sadrumstalotībai, kā arī atmetot ideālistiskos uzskatus, kas pārlieku uzsver līdzīgo, ir iespējams saskatīt būtiskas iezīmes, kuras raksturo arābu pasaules iedzīvotāju kultūru, vērtības un tendences vienā kontekstā. Ņemot vērā, ka lielākā daļa arābu ir islāmticīgie, abas identitātes – reliģiskā un laicīgā – neapšaubāmi ir saistītas un pārklājas, tomēr nav uzskatāmas par sinonīmiskām un neatdalāmām.

Koloniālisma un Otrā pasaules kara norietā un pieaugošā Rietumu pasaules filosofijas ietekmē, vietējā inteliģence dibināja literāru kustību, kuru nosauca "al-Nahda" jeb "renesanse", ar kuru parādījās ideja par arābu nacionālismu. Nacionālistu centieni izveidot vienotu sekulāro identitāti izgaismoja noteiktus elementus arābu formālajā vienotībā – valoda, kultūras iezīmes, sociopolitiskās pieredzes, ekonomiskās intereses, kolektīvā atmiņa un vēsturiskās nozīmes izjūta u.c. Starp nacionālistu kustības mērķiem un uzdevumiem bija ne tikai jaunu rietumnieciskās pasaules vērtību un ideju ieviešana arābu tradīcijā, bet arī tautas kultūras, jo īpaši literārā mantojuma, apzināšana un tās prestiža atjaunošana, kas Osmaņu impē-

rijas laikā dominējošās turku un persiešu literatūras ēnā bija piedzīvojusi panīkumu.

Kā klasisks, laicīgas ievirzes teksts, Muallakāt ir atstājis 'nospiedumu' arābu tautu domāšanā, gluži tāpat kā var runāt par tautas pasaku, leģendu un eposu ietekmi uz lasītāju, kas tām pakļauts, jo īpaši no agra vecuma un nolūkā nest kādas kultūras unikālo identitāti. *Muallakāt* sekulārā lirika lasītājam sniedz priekšstatu par seno arābu dzīvesveida raksturīgākajām iezīmēm, to vērtībām un zināšanām, tātad veidojot un ietekmējot arābu domāšanas modeļus, iesaistīšanos sabiedriskajās attiecībās un kultūru dia-logā.

Rakstā meklētas vērtības un raksturīpašības, kuras slavētas arābu se-najā lirikā, nolūkā izprast, kā tās korelē ar tendencēm, kuras novērojamas arābu kultūrā joprojām. Rakstā dominē viedoklis, ka atbalsis no *Muallakāt* apdziedātā senā dzīvesveida joprojām ir aktuālas, un tajā pausta pārliecība, ka šī dzejas antoloģija varētu palīdzēt gūt izpratni par seno Tuvo Aus-trumu kultūru un tās vēsturi.

Saburo Morishita

BUILDING FAITH: A REFLECTION ON TWO FORMS OF RELIGIOUS MATERIALITY IN TENRIKYO

Tenri University

Since the mid-1990s, and some scholars insist some time before it, there appears to be a shift in emphasis in the academic study religion that focuses upon the "materiality of religion." Initiatives from various disciplines have played collaborating roles in supporting this "material turn" as it forms only part of the larger discourse on re-centering the study of religion from the abstract to the concrete, from worldviews to everyday life, from belief to practice. Studies comprise such topics as the materiality of religious life, sacred space, architecture, archaeology, popular and material culture, performance and dance, and so on.[1] One indispensable resource for this shift was Mark C. Taylor's edited volume entitled *Critical Terms for Religious Studies*, whereby an all-star line up of scholars with diverging theoretical frameworks develop their ideas on exemplary themes befitting the academic study of religion.[2] Although it could be thought of as a compelling mix of separate approaches and conflicting methodologies, the common strand connecting most of the authors together is their effort in detaching themselves from the "inescapable shadow of theology"

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[1] Manuel A. Vásquez, *More Than Belief: A Materialist Theory of Religion* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 3–4.

[2] Mark C. Taylor, ed. *Critical Terms for Religious Studies* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1998).

and "address religion as a human product, a human project, and a human problem," which could even be called "a new materialism."[3]

Another point worth mentioning is that the basic stance for which the study of religion especially in the United States grew out of has usually been taken for granted. In other words, the attention given to the materiality of religion did not arise out of nowhere but as a critical alternative to the way in which Protestant theology has long held sway. This influence not only pertains to matters defining religion but the academic study of it as well. The theology-religious studies debate, or the place of the academic study of religion in divinity schools or the role of theology in public institutions of higher education, continues in many places throughout the world today.[4] This split, of course, finds others oppositions such as the separation of church and state, the modern construction of private faith as opposed to the public sphere, or the insider/outsider debate, to name only a few. Although this is not the place to dispute one side in favour of the other, it is nevertheless important to recognize that the material turn does have much to do with loosening oneself from the strong Protestant grip of the insignificance of "things" in religion. Not only are these matters being placed into the foreground but the ways in which they are perceived in everyday life – sight, sound, hear, smell, touch, and taste of the human body – are relevant to, and highly interconnected with, the study of religion.[5] In this way, even the materiality of theorists

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[3] David Chidester, "Material Terms for the Study of Religion," *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 68, no. 2 (2000): 367–379.

[4] For a background on the debate see Russell McCutcheon, ed. *The Insider/Outsider Problem in the Study of Religion: A Reader* (London: Cassell, 1999), 15–63; 215–286. For a perspective from one side of the fence, see Donald Wiebe, *The Politics of Religious Studies: The Continuing Conflict with Theology in the Academy* (New York: Palgrave, 1999). For a perspective from the opposite side, albeit a Jesuit one based upon the assumption that the "religious" and the "academy" are intrinsically related, see Michael J. Buckley, *The Catholic University as Promise and Project: Reflections in a Jesuit Idiom* (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1998).

[5] David Morgan, *The Embodied Eye: Religious Visual Culture and the Social Life of Feeling* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2012), 111–184.

and the sensations that arise when perceiving religious objects are also being placed in the forefront so as to help redefine religion and improve ways to study it.

The New Religions in Japan

Japanese new religions are considered "new" not simply because they are a recent phenomenon but due also to their "common emergence with modernity and in contrast to traditions with millennium-old organizational histories."[6] Although the number of Japanese new religions and the sum total of followers belonging to them remain somewhat of a mystery, there is a general consensus that new religions can be categorized into different periods, or generations, each with nuanced socio-historical characteristics. These four periods are: 1) the declining years (1800-1868) of the Tokugawa period; 2) the 1920s through the 1930s; 3) the post-war period, especially the 1950s through the 1960s; and 4) the post "oil shock" period, especially the 1980s.[7] Some general characteristics of the new religions will briefly be described while knowing full well there will be many exceptions to the following features.[8] First, followers of new religions consider their founders/foundresses as possessed by some divinity or an absolute being regardless of whether they themselves say so. Founders/foundresses are creative people undergoing a deep spirituality as they have this need to urgently instruct others about it. Second, there is a spirit of reform against

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[6] Ian Reader, "Chronologies, Commonalities and Alternative Status in Japanese New Religious Movements: Defining NRMs Outside the Western Cul-de-sac," *Nova Religio* 9, no. 2 (2000): 87.

[7] Trevor Astley, "New religions," in *Nanzan Guide to Japanese Religions*, eds. Paul Swanson and Clark Chilson (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2006), 91–114. Also see Susumu Shimazono, *From Salvation to Spirituality: Popular Religious Movements in Modern Japan* (Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, 2004), 234–236.

[8] Ken Arai, "New religions," in *Religion in Japanese Culture: Where Living Traditions Meet a Changing World*, eds. David Reid and Noriyoshi Tamaru (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1996), 97–113. See also Reader, "Chronologies, Commonalities and Alternative Status in Japanese New Religious Movements: Defining NRMs Outside the Western Cul-de-sac."

the status quo with a strong camaraderie among the followers who are of the same social class, and as such, many new religions have a very strong lay formation. Third, new religions thrive on so-called magical practices – especially healing techniques and the exorcism of spirits – whereby the power and authority of these ritual practices can literally be found in the hands of lay followers. Fourth, most new religions claim a religious centre – the most sacred of the sacred – and that the location is packed with meaning not only to the adherents of the religion but purportedly to all humankind as well.

While the term "new religious movements" may have a rather negative antisocial image in Europe, Japanese new religious movements on the other hand – and therefore Japanese new religions – share many features with mainstream Japanese religiosity. Many new religious movements demonstrate features comparable to Japanese folk religion because they tend to combine and transform pre-existing cultural elements. They are seen for the most part not as deviating from the norm as some western new religious movements may suggest, but are attractive to social and cultural scientists precisely because they contain many elements of Japanese religious culture.[9] The historian of religion Helen Hardacre suggests that elements holding together such a religious culture can be pieced together with a common world view based on "a particular conceptualization of self in relation to other levels of existence coupled with regular patterns of thought, action and emotion. The kingpin of the system is the idea that the self-cultivation of the individual determines destiny."[10] The sociologist of religion Robert Kisala appears to be supporting the same view and goes a bit further when advancing the idea that Japanese new religions place an emphasis on "individual self-cultivation, centering on the virtues of thankfulness, sincerity, and harmony" and, when trying to resolve a problem in everyday life, followers of new religions are "called upon to reflect on his

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[9]   Shimazono, *From Salvation to Spirituality: Popular Religious Movements in Modern Japan*, 32.

[10]   Helen Hardarcre, *Kurozumikyō and the New Religions of Japan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 188.

or her daily life and relationships within the family, with neighbors, and with coworkers," placing emphasis on everyday human ties when incorporating a rather ancient discipline as self-cultivation might suggest.[11]

Tenrikyo: The Teaching of Divine Truth

Tenrikyo, literally "teaching of divine truth," is one of the older new religions having been founded in the nineteenth century during the first generation of new religions described above. According to its official accounts, Tenrikyo was founded on October 26, 1838 by Miki Nakayama, a wife of a village leader and mother of four living in a rural part of central Japan. This date coincides with Miki's beginning to reveal the teachings of a divinity called God the Parent. In the following concise explanation of Tenrikyo, I limit myself to what is pertinent to the aims of the essay since much has been written about Tenrikyo's history and teachings.[12] At the heart of the Tenrikyo teachings lies the belief that God the Parent conceived humankind at a place called the Jiba, situated in the middle of Tenrikyo's Main Sanctuary, and that God has inscribed upon the human spirit a natural disposition to live joyously on earth. The implementation of gratitude, moderation, and helping one another are indispensible for the innate joy to be awakened.

Miki Nakayama taught a religious ritual called the Kagura Service, performed around the Jiba, which re-enacts God the Parent's providence at the time of human creation and serves as a means to call upon those same providences to sustain human life in the present and far into the future. Using the metaphor of "dust," Miki taught that the human mind is primarily clean, pure, and docile. This means that human beings were once upon a time one and the same with divine intention; however, with

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[11] Robert Kisala, *Prophets of Peace: Pacifism and Cultural Identity in Japan's New Religions* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1999), 3.

[12] For a list of Tenrikyo publications scroll down the following official homepage: *http://online.tenrikyo.or.jp/?cat=6*. (April 1, 2015)

the lapse of time, and having derailed from primordial intentions, humans have added layers and layers of dust on the mind, blocking humanity from tapping into, and even understanding, the true and joyous intention of human existence. And in order to put a corrective on the stratified layers of dust, Miki revealed herself to the world, teaching that God will serve as "broom" to sweep all human minds clean, opening a path which enables humankind to return to a primordial state whereupon self-centered imaginations in the form of dust cannot hold sway. Thus the act of sweeping is another basic tenet for which Tenrikyo followers endeavour to implement. Besides the Kagura Service, Miki therefore taught followers a prayer to be performed both individually and communally that symbolically sweeps the dust of the mind, materializing each day the immaterial element of cleansing away metaphorical dust so as to achieve a state of mind that knows joy through and through.

The Main Sanctuary

Tenrikyo's spiritual and administrative headquarters is located in a city named after the religion called Tenri that is located in the prefecture of Nara, Japan. This city can be reached from the ancient capital of Nara in twenty minutes by train or by car, and from better-known cities such as Osaka and Kyoto, in approximately an hour via the same means of transportation. A 1.5 kilometer-long roofed shopping arcade for pedestrians called *Tenri Hondori* conveniently connects the train station with the Main Sanctuary. This direct stroll from the train station to the sanctuary takes approximately twenty minutes to complete.

Approaching Tenrikyo's main sanctuary from the south, one cannot help notice a sizable atypical *torii* – a very large gate erected at the border of a shrine indicating "sacred space." This big gateway is not a *torii* in the strict sense of the word since Tenrikyo members call it *kuromon*, "black gate," and flanking externally on both sides of the two pillars or colonnades are roofed walls with openings that serve as entryways. On special days, rectangular purple banners are raised on both sides of a road that

leads to the sanctuary with names of grand churches written on them in the vernacular. These banners extend in a straight row leading all the way up to the foreground of the Main Sanctuary and are lined up perpendicular to the closest main street that runs east/west. Hierarchically speaking, grand churches in Tenrikyo, together with a handful of branch churches that have not yet been elevated to the status of grand church, are directly supervised by Church Headquarters. Each grand church is responsible for at least fifty subordinate branch churches and the relationship between a grand church and its branch churches is a parent-child one, functioning as such through use of a vast array of administrative and spiritual idioms. According to recent statistics, there are a total of 16,677 Tenrikyo churches located throughout the world, and among them, 321 branch churches have been established outside of Japan.[13]

From the north side of the Main Sanctuary, one sees a similar façade as the south entrance and an equally familiar set of stairs leading up to the sanctuary's entrance. The area north of the Main Sanctuary is called the inner courtyard. This quadrangle courtyard is a pebbled terrain circumscribed by a corridor that connects the Main Sanctuary with the Foundress' Sanctuary, and the Foundress' Sanctuary with a Memorial Hall, and then from the Memorial Hall back to the Main Sanctuary. Thus, there are three separate edifices that are linked together by a corridor that enable followers to get from one worship area to another without having to exit any of them. The façade of the north entrance to the Main Sanctuary looks older – and smaller – than the south entrance. Approaching the Main Sanctuary from the east, there is better peripheral vision than when accessing the sanctuary from the north or south due to the broad spatiality of the area. This open space is topped with pebbles just as the inner courtyard and the other tracts surrounding the Main Sanctuary. The staircase leading to the east entrance of the sanctuary has more steps than other staircases but are similar in that they rise high above the ground: to

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[13] Chōsa jōhōka, ed. "Nenkan tokeihyo" [Annual Statistical Table], *Michinotomo* February (2015): 76–79.

enter the Main Sanctuary, one must go up a set of stairs, and upon reach-
ing the top of the staircase which functions also as a corridor, one enters
through the huge sliding doors with windows that match the rather hefty
unconventional door sizes.

Despite the fact that the front/back opposition of building structures
for many religious traditions including those in Japan not only serve prac-
tical purposes but symbolic ones as well, there is no "rear" or "back side" of
the Main Sanctuary. Theoretically, one may argue that the backside of the
north entrance is the south entrance, and that behind the east entrance
stands the west entrance, and vice versa. However, followers do not refer
to them as such as worshippers freely enter and exist from whatever di-
rection they wish. The Main Sanctuary is floored with *tatami* mats and is
propped by many round wooden colonnades that support the building. It
is also only once inside that one realizes that the four entrances serve as
an entryway to four separate worship halls that have been pieced together
to comprise one Main Sanctuary. That is, the direction from which one
enters the Main Sanctuary also designates the name of a worship hall,
i.e., the south worship hall (1934), the north worship hall (1914), the
east worship hall (1984), and the west worship hall (1981), respectively.
They have been very skillfully combined together to form one massive
building structure: the Main Sanctuary. Moreover, although the out-
side ground level and the period in which the worship halls were built
vary – the most vivid being the west worship hall owing a small slope
in the foreground – the over three thousand *tatami* mats (approximately
5114 square meters) in the Main Sanctuary are all placed on the same
level and tightly placed together side by side, extending an immaterial
feature of the "scent" of straw mats to the substantial material area for
prayer.

Bordering the opposite end of each of the four worship hall en-
trances is a raised wooden dais, and going a little further beyond the dais
is a quadrangular cleft called the inner sanctuary with stairs on all four
sides leading down to the ground level. Worshippers are prohibited to go
beyond a wooden bar that partitions the worship halls from the upper

dais: the bar serves as a marker to safeguard Tenrikyo's most sacred space from getting defiled. Precisely at the center of the inner sanctuary is where the Jiba is located. Marking the Jiba is a thirteen-tiered hexagonal wooden stand called the Kanrodai – "stand for sweet dew" – that rises approximately 2.5 meter high from ground level. The precise measurements of the Kanrodai were purportedly taught by Miki Nakayama and worshippers sitting in any of the four worship halls that make up the Main Sanctuary direct their prayers toward this stand and perform a ritual prayer: followers symbolically sweep "the dust of the mind" with "God as broom" as indicated earlier. An area of the roof of the inner sanctuary hovering above the Kanrodai has been sectioned out so that the stand shines with the natural light of the sun and gets wet when the weather calls for rain. This is in preparation of the belief that "sweet dew" (*kanro*) from the skies will fall onto the stand (*dai*) when the ultimate Joyous Life is realized the world over. Miki also taught to place a bowl on top of the stand in order to receive the *kanro* descending from the skies and that anyone who partakes of it will never become weak, taken ill, nor die. S/he who partakes in the special dew will also live to 115 years of age, or older, if need be.

The structure of the Main Sanctuary comprising the four worship halls and an inner sanctuary compels worshippers to direct their prayers in an auspicious way. If a worshipper were to sit in the east side, s/he would have to face west; and if a worshipper were to sit in the south side, s/he would have to face north, and if the worshipper were to sit in the north side, s/he would have to face south, and so on and so forth. Followers come to pray from any of the four directions with the Jiba at the center. The Kanrodai, which marks the Jiba, stands perpendicular to the open air of the sky while solidly being rooted in the natural soil of the earth. This could be interpreted here as the primary vertical axis of the Main Sanctuary. At the same time, visitors who come to worship from all directions and sit on the same-leveled *tatami* floor to sweep the dust of the mind could be interpreted as the primary horizontal axis of the Main Sanctuary. Moreover, worshippers begin the prayer by deeply bowing as if to show

utmost respect to those facing them on the opposite side with the place of human origin – God the Parent – at the center of this submissive and subtle interaction.

Oyasato-yakata Building Complex

Surrounding the four worship halls, and less than a kilometer away from the Jiba, lies parts of the Oyasato-yakata building complex that have been completed. This building project began in 1954 and will probably take several more decades, possibly even up to a hundred more years, for the project to be completed according to its far-fetching plans. The aim is to build a massive quadrangular mega-structure with sixty-eight interconnected wings that surround the Main Sanctuary and the Jiba at the center with each side of the quadrangle measuring 872 meters long. Presently, twenty-seven of those wings have been built. According to Taro Igarashi, an expert on modern Japanese religious architecture, "there exists no other building structure by a new religion in Japan that boldly tries to give shape to a world view" as this Oyasato-yakato building complex.[14] The construction began with the building of a few wings that were intended to house ten thousand people so that they could listen to the Besseki Lectures – a series of lectures that when completed certify Tenrikyo membership. I shall say more about these lectures below. Besides affording a place to hold these lectures, the completed wings of the building complex today serve as followers' dormitories, administrative offices, classrooms for spiritual training, a hospital, a museum, and educational facilities such as a seminary, an elementary school, a high school, and sections of the university. Once all the sixty-eight wings have been built, it will be possible to make a full circle of the mammoth building complex by walking the 3.5-kilometer long interconnecting hallway.

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[14] Taro Igarashi, *Shinhen shinshūkyō to kyodai kenchiku* [New Religions and Enormous Buildings – New Edition] (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo, 2007), 71.

The mastermind behind creating this building complex was none other than Shozen Nakayama (1905–1967), the second spiritual leader of Tenrikyo and founder of Tenri University. He received a degree in religious studies at the University of Tokyo and wrote a dissertation under the guidance of the professor credited as being the founder of the academic study of religion in Japan, Masaharu Anesaki (1873–1949).[15] Shozen Nakayama, great-grandson of Miki Nakayama, also came into contact with many intellectuals of his time, including several from prestigious universities across the country and abroad.[16] One person in particular, an architect, professor, and later president of his alma mater, held favorable ties with Tenrikyo. His name was Yoshikazu Uchida (1885–1972) who was responsible for designing many halls at the University of Tokyo.[17] It is no coincidence that Nakayama became friends with the architect through Anesaki, his mentor. In 1935 Nakayama came up with the idea to bring together the various schools and affiliated educational facilities that were constructed at different times and locations into one area. For the first step of this rightfully progressive project, Uchida designed the blueprint for Tenri Junior High School's main building (presently Tenri High School) that was completed in 1937.[18] This building was made of reinforced concrete, or ferroconcrete, and possessed a particular style of its own by not only being fire preventive but supported a Japanese style tiled gable roof with three windowless dormers running across the midsection of the roof. This style exists nowhere else and is worthy of being called a "Tenrikyo original." In this sense, Uchida is accredited with being the inventor of an architectural style found only in Tenrikyo.[19] During the postwar era, and

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[15] It is also worthy to note the role Masaharu Anesaki played to help "make" Japanese new religions. See Takahiko Hayashi, "Reconceptualizing the New: Anesaki Masaharu's Writings on Religion and New Religion," *Tenri Journal of Religion* 29 (2001): 109–122.

[16] See Hiroshi Sugai, "Academic and Cultural Exchanges Between Tenri University and Marburg University: Retrospect and Prospect," in *Purification*, eds. Gerhard M. Martin and Katjya Tripplet (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 1–12.

[17] Igarashi, *Shinhen shinshūkyō to kyodai kenchiku*, 46.

[18] Ibid., 64.

[19] Ibid., 65.

having become an advisor to the Oyasato-yakata building complex project, the completed 1937 ferroconcrete style building with windowless dormers was used as the prototype for the building project, infusing an immaterial "musical" sense to a material construction since the interconnecting roofs look very much like a musical score from afar. Yet it is precisely because parts of the building is complete while other parts are at the same time incomplete that makes this type of architecture all the more interesting. In other words, the notion of a religious building complex that will have room for additional parts, and that the interconnecting parts will someday be put together and combined into one, is what makes this religious edifice a rather unique one.

What do these architectural structures of the four worship halls and the unfinished building complex tell us when emphasizing their materiality? First, the Main Sanctuary is structured around a hexagonal stand that marks a very special spot and is open twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, 365 days a year, welcoming anyone who wishes to come. Worshippers enter through any of the four "front" entrances marking the four cardinal directions although there are no "rear" exists or something that lie "behind" the front: entering and existing is always through a front entrance even though they may be different. Second, entering the Main Sanctuary is the same as entering a specific worship hall, i.e., the west worship hall, and at the same time, entering a specific west worship hall is the same as entering the combination of the four worship halls – the Main Sanctuary – since the four halls though built at different times are interconnected and share the same *tatami* matted floor. There will always be a reciprocal relationship between the parts (worship hall) and the whole (the Main Sanctuary). This may demonstrate the brotherhood and equality among worshippers kneeling in humble prayer toward the focal point – the Jiba – and that before God the Parent, who is believed to dwell at the Jiba, all are impartial regardless of which direction the visitor may come from or what background or character s/he may have. Third, the Jiba is the center of all the four worship halls and the Oyasato building complex surround it. And although the worship halls may appear to

be housing the Jiba, it isn't housed at all since there is no roof hovering above the Kanrodai that marks the Jiba nor anything below it other than the earth's ground level; in this sense, then, the special hexagonal stand appears to have no restraints nor limits: there are no barriers both vertically (up/down) and horizontally (side to side) which compliments the four cardinal directions analogous to the four worship halls. Fourth, with regard to the interconnecting building complex, the material construction is never-ending in that as one wing is completed another one gets started. It is as though there is no "completion" date in that the building complex is dynamically never-ending, always in the making and ongoing, symbolizing perhaps the perpetual process toward the joyous life through material form.

The *Kakisage*

A more personal religious object is the *kakisage*, which literally signifies, "written and passed down," and for Tenrikyo followers it simply means, "transcription." The origin of this Tenrikyo transcription goes back to after the foundress "withdrew from physical life" in 1887.[20] Between 1887 and 1907, Izo Iburi, the successor to the foundress who spoke the words of God the Parent, would suddenly go into a trance-like state revealing divine intention. A few disciples who were appointed as scribes would write down what they heard, and after comparing what they wrote, they documented an official version of the sacred utterance. This official documentation of what was uttered by Izo and believed to be none other than God the Parent's intention was called the *kakisage* – written and passed down. Izo purportedly had these revelations whenever God the

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[20] According to Tenrikyo teachings, the Foundress, Miki Nakayama, did not pass away on January 26, 1887, but is "everliving," having gone nowhere and continues to dwell at the "residence of origin" though she cannot be seen: she "hid her physical being" or "withdrew from physical life." At the same time, moreover, she is believed to guide and save human beings – her dear children – throughout the world so that they can awaken to the path of the Joyous Life.

Parent deemed them necessary and often voiced them abruptly in the middle of the night. Another type of revelation was more oracular in nature in that followers made specific inquiries to God the Parent through the help of the intermediaries surrounding Izo. These inquiries were in regard to their illnesses, problems, church matters, and other day-to-day pressing issues that required divine consultation. The words uttered through Izo's mouth – words believed to be directly from God the Parent – were written down by the scribes in the same way as the sudden revelations, and after comparing what they wrote, an official version of the transcription that essentially explained how to remedy the inquirers' adverse situation was written and later handed to the inquirer. Both types of revelations – the sudden ones as well as those that were made in response to inquiries – were later collected and compiled into one of the three Tenrikyo scriptures called the Osashizu, the Divine Directions, consisting of seven volumes.

Let us fast forward to the present day. A follower is given his or her personalized "transcription" when receiving a special grant called the Sazuke, or "divine grant," which authorizes him or her to perform a healing rite also called the Sazuke to those who are afflicted with an illness.[21] In order to receive the divine grant, the candidate must listen to a set of nine lectures, each the same in length and content, called the Besseki – literally "separate seat" – Lectures. These can only be given by Tenrikyo officials in Tenri inside one of the wings of the above mentioned Oyasato-yakata building complex, and for those who have listened to nine lectures, the spiritual leader of Tenrikyo bestows divine grant upon them in a ceremony room located adjacent to the Foundress' Sanctuary.

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[21] I use the English translation "divine grant" to refer to the actual ceremony in which a candidate receives sanction from the spiritual leader of Tenrikyo upon completing the set of nine lectures, and the original word "Sazuke" to refer to the healing rite as performed on someone who prays for another bothered by an affliction. In other words, the Sazuke can only be performed by those who receive the "divine grant." For an analysis of this healing rite with regard to Tenrikyo's view of the human body, see Saburo Morishita, "A Reflection on the Body," *Tenri Journal of Religion* 30 (2002): 41–64.

As for the actual bestowal of the divine grant, the spiritual leader utters a set phrase on behalf of the foundress bequeathing her approval while the recipient sits up straight with legs folded underneath, elbows touching the *tatami* floor, and arms extended out with hands cupped in a spoon-shaped manner. The personalized material copy of the *kakisage*, with the bestowal date, the applicant's name, and age written on the first two lines, is given to the recipient during a post-bestowal lecture. This lecture is given immediately after receiving the divine grant by senior officials and explains the *kakisage* as well as conveys several practical points on how to properly administer the Sazuke, the healing prayer, on someone who has been taken ill. An applicant can only receive the divine grant once, and upon having received that grant and the *kakisage* on the same day, s/he is taught to treasure that state of mind for a lifetime.

The *kakisage* is two pages long and according to one source "teaches a basic stance of mind that ought to be maintained by those who have received the truth of the Sazuke and aspire to spread the teachings in their communities. . . . [and] emphasizes that maintaining the mind of true sincerity in the course of daily life is the key to tapping into God's free and unlimited workings."[22] The *kakisage*, moreover, is written on a rather large but thin traditional Japanese paper. Partly due to the fragility of the paper and partly due to the importance of its content, it is mandatory that the recipients fold the pages like an accordion and conserve it inside a special rectangular case. These cases come in a variety of colors and are sold in the shopping arcade that from the train station leads directly to the Main Sanctuary. The question for this essay is what does the *kakisage* as a thing do for the person who has received it and where does s/he place it after s/he returns home? Is it, if at all, ever read? How does it interact with other sacred objects and does that mediation with other object give it new meaning?

As mentioned earlier, regardless of the fact that the *kakisage* is inscribed with when the divine grant is bestowed and the recipient's name

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[22] Tenrikyo Overseas Department, ed. 2010. *A Glossary of Tenrikyo Terms* (Tenri: Tenrikyo Overseas Department, 2010), 186.

and age, and therefore quite personalized, the content of the *kakisage* itself is the same for all who receive it. Being a fixed text, then, there are many commentaries, theological articles, and even an English translation of a book dedicated to understanding the *kakisage*.[23] These sources dwell upon how to decipher and interpret the transcribed words of God and why the *kakisage* should be settled firmly in the mind. They also discuss ways in which the Sazuke will be effective. In other words, the free and unlimited blessings of God the Parent will flow through performing the Sazuke healing prayer on the condition that what is written in the *kakisage* – having already heard the Besseki lectures nine times – is firmly settled in the mind and carried out in daily life for a lifetime. As such, then, the conceptualization of the *kakisage* and the proper theological, or at least a doctrinal, understanding of the *kakisage* is the primary focus in Tenrikyo studies. However, and though the *kakisage* itself should be read and "firmly settled in the mind," is it in fact really read as a (material) text at all or does it remain "immaterial" as when the divine grant is ceremoniously bestowed upon the applicant by the spiritual leader through the utterance of a fixed formulaic expression?

Once a follower receives the divine grant, s/he will be obliged to take the *kakisage* home. Much like a photograph that recalls a fond memory, however, it is more likely than not to be placed on a bookshelf or drawer to be "treasured" because the *kakisage* is believed to contain the "words of God." As such it is more likely that people who have received their personalized *kakisage* do not read it; rather it is exhibited and praised.

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[23] See for instance Yoshikazu Terada, "Okakisage no seishin" [The Spirit of the Kakisage], *Arakitoryō* 49 (1962): 76–82; Masayuki Umeda, "Osazuke no okakisage ni tsuite" [On the Kakisage of the Sazuke], *Tenrikyogaku kenkyū* 32 (1994): 31–62; Wataru Yamaguchi, "Okakisage no tenteki" [The Kakisage Intraveneously]. *Tenrikyogaku kenkyū* 39 (2002): 91–112; Yukie Ihashi, "Okakisage ni okeru makotohitotsu no imirikai: Masui Rin "Kokoro no tsutome" ni yotte [A Semantic Understanding of "Sincerity Alone" in the Kakisage with Reference to Masui Rin's "Workings of the Mind"] *Tenrikyogaku kenkyū* 41 (2005): 55–73; Yoshikazu Nakayama and Tahichi Shiba, *Reading the Kakisage* [translated by Tenrikyo Overseas Department] (Tenri: Tenrikyo Overseas Department, 2007).

For those with a home altar, the *kakisage* will be accommodated in close proximity to it. When asked why the *kakisage* sits near the home altar, many would answer that "we've always done it like this" or that "because they are words of God, and being words of God, it should remain close to what represents God in the household." When a person, therefore, does his daily prayers before the home altar, s/he is reminded of the *kakisage* that commemorates the day s/he received the divine grant, and as such, may prompt him or her to return to the special state of mind of that day – all without opening the case that protects the *kakisage* from being mishandled.

The initial results of these rather general observations seem to indicate three tiers of meaning with regard to the materiality of the *kakisage*. On the first level, when the spiritual leader of Tenrikyo bestows upon a committed follower an "immaterial" divine grant, it becomes materialized through the *kakisage* for it serves as a visible object that proves sanction has been given to administer the Sazuke, the healing prayer, to someone who is afflicted with an illness. On the second level, the material proof is placed in a case to safeguard it from getting blemished – conserve its purity – less it would be disrespectful given that its content are personally "handed down from God" to the owner of the *kakisage*. As such, though it is placed in the home - most commonly in close proximity to the home altar – the content of the *kakisage* itself always remains somewhat of a "mystery" since it is hidden inside the case. While the case serves to safeguard it from the impurities of everyday life, the so-called "sacred" content of the *kakisage* is also kept from being "seen," and therefore, concealed from public view. That is, though Tenrikyo doctrine instructs to firmly inscribe the content of the *kakisage* onto the mind so that it can be carried out in daily life, there seems to be a contradiction between what is taught (conceptually) and what is done (materially) when the *kakisage* is for the most part conserved in a case that masks itself from being readily understood. Finally, and on the final third level of meaning, and perhaps to make up for it being "hidden" in a special case, the full text of the *kakisage* was once published in a translated book called *Yoboku*

Handbook.[24] The purpose of the book is to convey the important role of the Yoboku – literally, "useful timber," and refers to a person who has received the divine grant – and how that role ought to be played out in the daily life. But when a 2002 book with the same transliterated title appeared in Japanese, however, the *kakisage* was not part of it.[25] While the newer edition is more useful as a practical guide than a doctrinal treatise for those committed Tenrikyo members, the fact that the *kakisage* was not printed in an officially published volume leaves one wondering whether the *kakisage* – something very materially salient as it is serves as proof of God's words – is intentionally being disclosed so as to further foster a sense of mystery as well as a way to preserve its sacredness by remaining unseen. In this subtle yet pronounced way, Tenrikyo appears to be swayed more by a spiritual concept of religion than a concrete and material one – at least with regard to the dematerialization process of the *kakisage*.

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[24] See Tenrikyo Yonomotokai, ed. *Yoboku techo* [Yoboku Handbook] (Tenri: Tenrikyo Yonomotokai, 1976). It covers such points as the importance of the Tenrikyo scriptures, making pilgrimages to Jiba, and engaging in "sprinkling the fragrance of the teachings" to others. All in all, the book is a practical guide for those sanctioned to administer the Sazuke and perform their duties as a Tenrikyo missionary.

[25] Tenrikyo Doyusha Publishing Company, ed. *Yoboku handobukku* [Yoboku Handbook] (Tenri: Tenrikyo Doyusha Publishing Company, 2002). This was translated into English as Tenrikyo Overseas Department, ed. *Yoboku's Guide to Tenrikyo* (Tenri: Tenrikyo Overseas Department, 2004).

Saburo Morishita

Building Faith: A Reflection on Two Forms of Religious Materiality in Tenrikyo

Summary

It is no secret that many Japanese new religions have built massive buildings so as to adequately accommodate followers at their religious centres. It goes without saying that both the general public and the media have criticized these new religions precisely because of such eye-opening manifestations. These unfavourable assessments have largely been based on the idea that what matters in religion is not so much what is seen than what cannot be seen, i.e. the spiritual. With the "material turn" in the study of religion, however, a new set of questions deemphasizing doctrines and concepts but highlighting the materiality of a religion has led scholars to reconsider the consequences of religious objects regardless of their scale, place and time.

This essay will appropriate some of the tools circulating in the discipline of religious studies to reexamine some of the material aspects of Tenrikyo, one of the "older" Japanese new religions. It will first try to dismantle the dynamics of Tenrikyo's religious architecture, namely the Main Sanctuary and the Oyasato-yakata building complex, both located at the religion's headquarters in Tenri, Nara, Japan. These edifices will be taken here as a type of "public materiality" for they are open and visible to anyone who happens to visit the religious city. Second, an attempt will be made to clarify the meaning of the kakisage, a written document that

is given to Tenrikyo followers upon having received sanction to perform a special healing rite upon those afflicted with an illness. In line with the concocted term, "public materiality," this sacred document will be recognized here as a type of "private materiality" for it is personalized and given only to an individual who has made a commitment for the Tenrikyo mission. By so doing, areas of similarities as well as differences with Japanese religious history will be brought up along the way in this essay.

PERSONU RĀDĪTĀJS