


HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

LATVIA



Volume 29, Issue 2
(Autumn-Winter 2021)



UNIVERSITY
OF LATVIA

**HUMANITIES AND
SOCIAL SCIENCES**
LATVIA

Volume 29, Issue 2
(Autumn-Winter 2021)

Journal **Humanities and Social Sciences: Latvia**
Volume 29, Issue 2 (Autumn-Winter 2021)

Founded by the University of Latvia

Published in collaboration with:

Latvian Academy of Culture
Latvian Academy of Sciences
Latvian Association of Scientists
Latvian Writers Union
World Federation of Free Latvians

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Manuscripts are accepted only in English

Publisher: University of Latvia Press

Aspazijas 5–132, Rīga, LV-1050, Latvia

www.apgads.lu.lv

Printed by SIA "Drukātava"

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<https://doi.org/10.22364/hssl.29.2>

ISSN 1022-4483

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FROM THE EDITOR

Dear Reader,

This is the second issue for 2021 and we expect to be able to publish the next issue in spring-summer 2022.

The authors are both PhD students and established academics. The articles are a heterogeneous set and cover a number of fields in the humanities and social sciences such as management, economics, economic history, and politics. In this issue, we have articles by authors not only from Latvia, but also from Germany, Nigeria and Ukraine.

A reminder for past and future authors that the journal can be found in the EBSCO Sociology Source Ultimate database. It would be useful for you if you ensure that your university library subscribes to this particular EBSCO database.

We hope you enjoy this issue and are looking forward to the next issue.

Best wishes

Viesturs Pauls Karnups
General Editor

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS FOR DEMOCRACY IN POST-COMMUNIST SPACE: TWO REVOLUTIONS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA (1968, 1989)¹

Olena Babinova²

Abstract

This article is a comparative analysis of two revolutions in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and 1989. The main question of this article is: Why did the revolution in 1968 fail, but the revolution in 1989 succeed? In this article the main reasons, common features and differences of those two revolutions were analysed and defined. The main conclusion of this article is the fact that a necessary condition for the victory of popular resistance is the support of these manifestations by the military or their non-interference. The 1968 revolution was suppressed as a result of the invasion of the Warsaw Pact troops under the leadership of the Soviet Union, but the events of 1989 were marked by a decision by the country's military leadership on their neutrality.

Keywords: Czechoslovakia, democracy, democratic revolution, military in revolutions, social movements.

Introduction

The goal of this article is to make a comparative analysis of two democratic revolutions in communist Czechoslovakia in the period of Soviet regime.

This article intends to find an answer on important question: why some democratic revolutions fail and other are successful. The author seeks an answer to this question by analysing two democratic revolutions in communist Czechoslovakia. One of which was suppressed by the military forces of the Warsaw Pact countries, and the other became an example of the peaceful victory of democracy and the democratic aspirations of the people.

This research is guided by the following questions:

- 1) Why democratic revolution in Czechoslovakia in 1968 failed, but revolution in 1989 succeeded?

¹ This research was supported by the National Scholarship Programme of the Slovak Republic for the Support of Mobility of Students and Researchers.

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- 2) What is the state of society, its interests and aspirations just before the democratic movements for independence, freedom and human rights?
- 3) What is the role of the military in democratic revolutions? and
- 4) What are the basic conditions for a successful democratic revolution?

To answer on these questions and to implement the goal of this article, the two democratic revolutions in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and 1989 have been analysed in this article.

The results of this study are essential for the formation of the main theoretical approaches for the implementation of successful democratic transformations in a peaceful and bloodless way.

The Bloody Failure of the Prague Spring in 1968

The events of 1968 in Prague continue to arouse great interest among researchers. Significant contribution to the study and analysis of those events was made by such scholars as John Bradley (1992), Marcos Degaut (2019), Pete Dolack (2013), Julia Friday (2011), Ernest Gellner (1995), John K. Glenn (1999), Michèle Harrison (2003), Peter Hames (2013), Mary Heimann (2009), Miklos Kun (1998), William H. Luers (1990), Petr Oslzlý (1990), William A. Pelz (2016), Anna J. Stoneman (2015), Jiri Suk (2018), Marek Thee (1990, 1991), Kieran Williams (1997), and others.

The first attempt of democratisation took place more than 150 years ago in Czech and Slovak lands. According to V. Hloušek (2011), it was difficult process and by the period before the First World War, however, this goal was more or less completed. After the First World War the processes of formation of democracy in the Czech lands only started.

At the same time, the people on these lands suffered from different forms of occupation. During the twenty years from 1918 and until 1938 the country enjoyed a democratic form of governance and market economy. After the German occupation at the end of World War II, people hoped that soviet power will give a possibility to develop the country in democratic direction. However, instead of this, they received a new form of occupation.

As it was noted by A. Stoneman (2015: 103), the citizens of Czechoslovakia endured a tumultuous history of decades of occupation. After declaring its independence in October 1918 in the aftermath of the First World War and the collapse of the Habsburg Empire, Czechoslovakia was initially a thriving, autonomous, constitutional democracy. After just twenty years, however, with the signing of the Munich Agreement on September 29, 1938, the country was “sacrificed” to Nazi Germany. Czechoslovakia was occupied by Nazi forces throughout the Second World War, suffering “repression, exploitation, and extermination. After the war,

rather than having its constitutional democracy restored, a Soviet-endorsed Communist dictatorship was installed, and the citizens of Czechoslovakia fell behind the Iron Curtain and began to suffer under the most oppressive and rigid regime of any Soviet bloc country, which relied heavily on terror and all but eliminated civil rights.

The most powerful struggle for democracy in Czech Republic started in 1968. K. Williams in *The Prague Spring and its aftermath* claims that the events of 1968 in Czechoslovakia, usually referred to as the Prague Spring, remain among the most important in the political history of post-war Eastern Europe, and of Europe as a whole (1997: 1). The author analyses the factors in economic and political life of the country before 1968, and defines the main reasons of those events. He notes that “for all their virtues, the reforms of 1968, in intention and execution, amounted to only the liberalization of a Leninist regime, the gradual widening by the ruling elite of non-prohibited zone, the sphere of things permitted, the space where people can feel themselves more or less free” (1997: 3).

In 1968, for almost eight months, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic was going through a period of profound changes. These transformations were a result of the growing crisis in this relatively prosperous and developed country, in which the political culture had deeply rooted predominantly democratic traditions. All the events started in January 1968, when the reformer Alexander *Dubček* was elected on the position of First Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. He wanted to give more rights to citizens, including freedom of the media, freedom of speech and freedom of movement. Thus, he wanted to break all elements on which the soviet system was built. Understandably, Soviet Union could not allow the implementation of these changes.

L. Mlechin (2012) calls these events “a revolution” and gives it the name “a revolution of the spirit”. He defines that the changes in the country coincided with the advent of spring. This update went down in history as the Prague Spring. “It delivered the country from fear. People got the right to speak freely, censorship disappeared, and the country changed. The people believed *Dubček*. For the first time, the leader of the Communist Party became the people’s leader ... It is fair to call those events a revolution. But it was, so to speak, a revolution of the spirit”.

Many researchers of the processes of democratisation in post-communist countries pay considerable attention to the problems of the Prague spring, its role in the formation of democracy and formation of civil society in Czechoslovakia at that time. As it was defined by Lyons Pat and Bernardyová Alžběta, one of the central themes of the Prague Spring era was pluralism and the possibility through reform of developing a socialist democracy and economy that allowed inherent differences to be expressed. This pluralism was an essential characteristic of Czechoslovak society from

the First Republic (1918–1938); and attempts by the communist regime, as the opening quotation attests, did not create a monist socialist state as the orthodox Soviet model of communism demanded (2011: 107).

It should be noted, that in general, the 1960s of the twentieth century were marked by the growth of popular protests in many countries of the world. However, the most difficult situation was in the countries of the Soviet bloc. It was total censorship, a recession in the economy and, as a result, a low standard of living. Added to this was the lack of the ability to express one's opinion, the inability to read the works of the world's leading contemporaries, since many of them were banned.

By opinion of J. Suk (2018: 764), 1968 symbolises a historic shift that took place worldwide. In the countries of the Soviet bloc, conflicting processes were also underway, in which the condemnation of criminal Stalinist policies was mixed with notions of quickly catching up with and surpassing the capitalist countries.

K. McDermott and M. Stibbe (2018: 1) claim that the year 1968 has often been portrayed as a pivotal moment in post-1945 history, characterised by the emergence of a globalised, or at least transnational, youth protest movement that crossed land borders and continents, and was transmitted via television, radio and newspapers to audiences in all parts of the world.

A. Stoneman (2015: 103) describes the situation in the countries of the Soviet camp and in particular in Czechoslovakia as follows: thick barbed wire, ploughed earth, watchtowers, and sentries with shoot-to-kill orders enclosed the country's borders. Political opponents to the dictatorship were purged and executed following show trials. An atmosphere of permanent fear was established, as hidden government informants worked their way into the population to spy upon the citizens, who rapidly became reluctant to speak in public or to one another, not knowing who could be trusted.

Why exactly in 1968 in Czechoslovakia the processes of dissatisfaction with the existing situation had intensified? There were many reasons for the beginning of Prague Spring. The prerequisites of people's desire to change the situation of stagnation and total censorship have been clearly described by M. Kun (1998). In his book *Prague Spring – Prague fall* he raises some important questions about situation in Czechoslovakia in 1968: What happened in Czechoslovakia? Was there an alternative? Situation just before Prague Spring he describes as following (1998: 209):

“At the turn of the millennium, the people of East-Central Europe live in an age when parliamentary or government crises often jar only on the relatively small political elite, and, at most, affect the stock market. The situation was fundamentally different after Joseph Stalin's death, when every important changing of the guard at the pinnacle of power conveyed an indirect message for the whole of society. In the absence of pluralistic democratic institutions and a free press, even people who were

disappointed by the socialist regime or were apolitical followed closely news of “public life” about replacements released by party organs. The greater cracks became in the seemingly monolithic party leadership of a country, the greater hopes of those outside the bulwark of the regime that the rigors of dictatorship would perhaps ease a little.”

According to W. A. Pelz (2016), beginning in the mid-1960s, there was increasing uneasiness among many about Czechoslovakia’s bureaucratic government policy and its record of economic failures. Some radical socialist critics looked to Yugoslavia and argued that the party should relinquish some of its decision-making power to independent institutions, such as workers’ councils and trade unions. There was even discussion of the re-establishment of a multi-party system for elections to the Czechoslovak National Assembly. By opinion of J. Hochman (2016: 30), in Czechoslovakia, occasionally interrupted process of relative moderation in internal political and ideological controls had been going on for over five years before 1968. It was taking place in a situation generally characterised by the failure of the regime to admit honestly the crimes committed during the first several years after the takeover of 1948, and to try effectively to redress them as much as possible. The situation has been characterised by the apparent incompetence of the rules in managing the nation’s affairs, particularly the economy.

What exactly was in Czechoslovakia and how it was during the Prague Spring

A lot of citizens were not satisfied by policy of Communist Party. In June 1967, at the 4th Congress of the Writers’ Union there were many critics of Communist Party policy in direction of censorship in the field of culture and science. It is clear that any talented person cannot work in the conditions when somebody tells them what to do and what to write. As a result of the absence of any adequate reaction from the side of Communist Party on situation in the country, absence of their desire to make it better, in October 1967, the mass protest students’ action was beginning.

W. Pelz (2016: 194), argues that along with intellectuals’ protest, there were student demonstrations supported by the party’s youth newspaper. When the students accused authorities of police brutality, the trade union newspaper not only agreed with the student complaint, but also stressed the need for establishing regular channels for expressing dissent and obtaining redress of grievances on all important areas.

As it was noted by A. Stoneman (2015: 104), during this period, Czechoslovakia was led by the hard-line KSC (Communist Party of Czechoslovakia) Stalinist *Antonín Novotný*. The nation underwent major economic decline in the early 1960s, but policies remained stagnant.

Slovak politician Alexander Dubček was the greatest rival of *Novotný*, maintaining loyalty to the Soviet Union, but favouring reformed socialism through democratisation and economic reform.

One of the leading persons who criticised the approaches of Communist Party and its leader *Antonín Novotný* was the Head of Slovak Party organisation Alexander Dubček. He was sure that the motto of central Soviet Communist Party “all power to councils” should find practical implementation in his country, that citizens and their councils must have real power in the country, but not only “on the paper”. He did not want to change the communist regime, he wanted to make it better, to make it a power for citizens and society. By his opinion, it was in the context of the main declarative priorities of Soviet communist party and that last one will not be against some improvements in this direction in Czechoslovakia. He supported idea of “socialism with a human face”.

At the end of 1967, several meetings of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia were held. They were voiced by significant criticism of the current situation and activities, or rather the inaction of its leader *Antonín Novotný*. Thus, many who criticised the situation in the party and in the country were among the party members themselves. K. Williams (1997: 4) states that the power struggle that erupted in late 1967 resulted from the decision of an important faction of party and state officials to trust the population. That a growing number of politicians were ready to trust was in turn possible because of the deep social change that had taken place since the 1950s. He describes the general attitude towards what is happening both among mature functionaries and among younger ones. In particular, he defines the support of the new reform course among the representatives of the old system as follows (1997: 6–7):

“Explanation of liberalization must also factor in the role of ideas, in particular the attraction of the very idea of a principled redesign of the system. This holds true especially for the middle generation of party functionaries, those who became communists after 1938 or 1945, had vigorously served the post-war construction of a new society on the Soviet model, and who began to have second thoughts once they saw the fruits of their labour.”

The attitude of more young party functionaries to possible reforms K. Williams explains as reaction on the general revival of legal thought and as their more optimistic approach to cooperation with citizens as a whole. By his view, the younger and often more optimistic party functionaries took the line on the “all-people’s state” more seriously and concluded that it demanded a matching change in how the country was governed. This rethinking of the role of the state was accompanied by the general revival of legal thought. Some of the legal reforms enacted in the first half of the 1960s, such as the new penal code in 1961 and new civil code in 1964, were

in fact considerable deviations from Czechoslovakia's Roman-law tradition, as they glossed over the complexities of ownership rights and took a rather naïve view of relations between citizens of a socialist state (1997: 8).

On January 5, 1968, the main ideologist of the changes in the country Alexander Dubček was elected on the position of First Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. And A. *Novotný* remains in the position of the president of the Republic.

L. Mlechin (2012) thus describes the reaction of Brezhnev and the Soviet government as a whole to the ongoing changes in Czechoslovakia: "Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev for a long time could not form his attitude to the Prague Spring. He was confused, faced with an incomprehensible phenomenon. When East Germans, Hungarians or Poles revolted, they hated their power. And in Czechoslovakia, power and people were together. Eighty percent of the population support the policies of the Communist Party and unconditionally speak out for socialism. From all this, the Moscow leaders simply took a rash decision."

The main directions of the reform, proposed by A. Dubček, were the following: abolish censorship, give more power and authority to the councils of workers and peasants, divide the activities of the party and the government, strengthen the ability of citizens to participate in decision-making processes and strengthen the interaction of government representatives with the population, give the citizens more rights and freedoms, etc.

These directions have been defined in the Action Programme, which was adopted by Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in April 1968. However, this caused a very mixed reaction in the Soviet Union. McDermott and Stibbe (2018: 5) note that the Action Programme, ratified by the Communist Party Central Committee on 5 April 1968, encapsulated both the hopes and limitations of the Prague Spring. This eclectic document was riddled with ambiguities and compromises, but endeavoured to institutionalise a division of power in the communist system, projected economic de-centralisation, safeguarded democratic civil liberties, including the freedom of press, assembly, association and foreign travel, posited, uniquely for a communist government, full political and civil rehabilitation of victims of Stalinist illegalities, and recognized the autonomy of artistic and cultural organisations. As such, the Programme was broadly welcomed by the Czechoslovak public, but it did not go down well in the Kremlin, Brezhnev ominously describing it as an example of "petty-bourgeois spontaneity" and "a bad program that opens up the possibility of the restoration of capitalism".

By opinion of K. Williams (1997: 10–11), liberalisation began because it was a strategic choice consciously taken by a faction of the incumbent political elite. At the same time, of course, constraints existed on the

range of choices open to them in deciding what this liberalisation should entail. In 1968 the division of Europe automatically ruled out the restoration of large-scale private enterprise or unfettered liberal democracy in a Soviet satellite. Williams defined four reasons of why Soviet hegemony was not feared or resented by liberalisers. First, the Dubcek leadership launched its reforms in the belief that they enjoyed the tacit approval of Moscow, as the entire Soviet commonwealth would benefit from a revitalised Czechoslovakia. Second, Czechoslovak liberalisers were still under the impression that the changes wrought by Nikita Khrushchev, despite his downfall, had made the USSR a more tolerant hegemon; Leonid Brezhnev was regarded as a transitional, and transitory figure. Third, since no Soviet units were based within their borders, Czechoslovak reformers suffered from a delusion of sovereignty. Finally, membership in the Soviet sphere of influence would allow a state to pursue unconventional political and economic arrangements that in the West would be quickly overwhelmed.

Some important role in the development of the country under the new conditions was assigned by Dubček to the workers' councils. By opinion of P. Dolack (2013: 374), workers' councils became a solution to two problems – the problem of creating a structure for employees to meaningfully exercise control over their workplaces and as a way to bind together different enterprises so that economic activity would benefit the country as a whole. The state was the owner of enterprises, carrying out all the prerogatives of ownership, including decision making and appointments to managerial positions, without input from below, although the state was in theory the “owner” in the concept of the “representative of,” or “in trust for,” the people of the country as a whole. The mechanisms of activity workers' councils, their impact on the processes inside of enterprises were clearly defined. P. Dolack describes it as follow (2013: 375):

“It is only fair, the advocates of workers' councils argued, for the workers to have a large say in how their enterprise will be run if they were to shoulder the risks that would result from restructuring management. The creation of the councils would bind together the enterprises, retaining the efficiency inherent in planning as opposed to the chaos of individual enterprises or factories each making decisions in isolation from all others, because the workers' councils would be connected horizontally with regional and national federations or congresses, which would help prepare national production plans based on the needs of producer and consumer goods at the local levels.”

In general, one of the important reasons of the proposed reformation was that the power was concentrated in the hand of a small group – Presidium of the Communist Party and did not belong to the people and the councils of citizens, although this was the main slogan of the party.

The Soviets did not know what to do with Czechoslovakia, with the active processes of liberalisation, but they were sure that it needed to suspend these processes. The USSR did not believe the assurances that reforms would only strengthen the bloc. As it was defined by Pete Dolack (2013: 377), the Soviet leadership's unshakable conviction of the rightness of its political monopoly guaranteed that any attempt at loosening party control in Czechoslovakia would be an anathema. Nor would repeated assurances that there would be no break with the Soviet bloc or a withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact have any effect, despite Czechoslovak party leaders' repeatedly stated convictions that they could only achieve their goals of renewing socialism with the protection of the bloc.

The soviet totalitarian system did not use any political methods of conflict resolution. Only one appropriate and possible method of it for this totalitarian regime was utilisation of military force. In August 1968, a military operation "Danube" was started. The armies of the Warsaw Pact countries except Romania, on August 21, 1968 entered in Czechoslovakia, suppressing local communists attempt to become independent from Moscow and Soviet influence. Warsaw pact troops crossed the border of Czechoslovakia at several points. As a result of this invasion, more than a hundred people were killed and several hundred wounded. It was the end of the "Czech miracle" and "Prague Spring". The Soviet army was in Czechoslovakia till 1991.

Those events have been described as follows:

"In the morning hours of August 21, 1968, the Soviet army invaded Czechoslovakia along with troops from four other Warsaw Pact countries. The occupation was the beginning of the end for the Czechoslovak reform movement known as the Prague Spring. The reform movement had been brewing for years, fed by economic problems as well as growing demands from Communist intellectuals for more freedom and pluralism within a socialist system...Meanwhile, Communist leaders elsewhere in Central Europe began to express more and more reservations about the reforms; during the spring, Warsaw Pact troops began manoeuvres on Czechoslovak territory."³

According to K. Williams (1997: 112), during the night of 20–21 August, under the code-named Operation Danube, an invasion coalition led by the Soviet Union moved 165.000 soldiers and 4600 tanks into Czechoslovakia from southern Poland, the GDR, and northern Hungary. Within a week, after further contingents arrived, approximately half a million foreign soldiers and more than 6000 tanks were roaming over Czechoslovak

³ The Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia: August 1968. Materials from the Labadie Collection of Social Protest. https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/117511/Prague_Spring.html

territory. Although they started seizing state offices and utilities, the armies had not been dispatched to establish an occupation government. Their arrival was coordinated with Czechoslovak conservatives and neo-conservatives who had signalled their willingness to take power and fulfil all the promises made by Dubček. Knowing that they could not rely on the support of the pro-reform Czechoslovak army officer corps or of the bewildered security police, these conspirators in Prague and Bratislava needed external intervention, a *coup de main* to support their coup d'état.

J. Friday (2011: 164) analysing the events in Prague in 1968 gives some very interesting facts of citizens' resistance to Soviet troops:

"Similar to most colonial powers, the Soviet Union used the process of naming to assert its dominance in territories it possessed... One of the tactics deployed by the citizens of Prague during the first few days of the invasion capitalized precisely on this dynamic: in order to confuse the invading military and hamper their movement through the city, they decided to rewrite or erase the names of the streets and other directional markers."

She notes that the immediate impact of the military intervention in Czechoslovakia was tremendously disorienting: resounding chaos in the streets, tanks and foreign troops everywhere, gun shots heard throughout the city (2011: 165). By author's opinion, Wenceslas Square is a site closely associated with the construction of the Czech nation-state and shaping of Czech identity. Indeed, the occupying forces were aware of the site's importance, both strategic and symbolic. During the invasion, Wenceslas Square was where thousands of people mounted protest markings written either in Czech or Russian. Signs appeared on buildings, street markers, and monuments. The people of Prague not only defaced the architecture of the square; they themselves also became embodied signs of protest, carrying slogans protesting the invasion on their bodies (pp. 166–167).

V. Skutina (1988) in *The Russians Are (Really) Coming!* describes his personal emotions in the first minutes of Soviet invasion. This description is through the eyes of an eyewitness: It was after midnight, Wednesday, 21 August 1968... I was sleeping, filled with indomitable optimism that after the Czechoslovak Spring and the turbulent summer, a golden autumn of socialism with a human face would finally arrive. The telephone rang... This midnight ring on 21 August 1968 was precisely one of those important cases among thousands of useless awakenings. Boys from the *Literarni Listy* called and asked me to turn on the radio. They said we were being occupied (1988: 67)... Twice or three times armoured vehicles of the occupants passed through Gorky Square, back and forth, as if they were looking for direction, as if they were searching for something. Later they returned from somewhere around the Main Railroad Station and turned their guns against the building of the National Assembly and partly

against the building of the Czechoslovak NV. Then stupefied soldiers with loaded automatic weapons jumped out, ready for a clash. We heard them stamping their feet on the stairs and then in the studio on the first floor. We sat down in a half circle and expected the worst. Finally, with a kick, the door opened, and several fussy soldiers of the Soviet Red Army barged in with submachine guns aimed at our chests. Behind them stood an office with a gun stretched out in his hand (1988: 69–70).

The next day after invasion, Alexander Dubček and the Prime Minister Oldřich Černík were arrested by Soviet troops. Some other activists of their team were arrested as well. They were seized in the party's headquarter and sent to Moscow. As a reaction to these events, the Czechoslovak delegation immediately left for Moscow. Soviet leaders were forced to react to this and hold appropriate negotiations with them. They allowed Dubček, Černík and other arrested representatives of Czechoslovakia to participate in it. The Soviet leaders sought to sign a document with the Czechoslovak leaders, which would first of all justify the introduction of troops as a necessary measure due to the failure to fulfil the obligations of the Czechoslovak side taken as a result of negotiations in Čierna and Bratislava, and the inability to prevent a possible coup d'état of the "counter-revolutionary forces". It was also required to declare the decisions of the congress of the CPC in Vysocany invalid and postpone the convening of a new congress of the party. Negotiations took place in an atmosphere of pressure and hidden threats. Czechoslovak leaders stated that the deployment of troops was an unprovoked and unjustified step that would entail grave consequences, including internationally. They noted that the goals set by the leaders of the USSR could be achieved by other, non-military means.

It is important that all this has happened at a time when the tanks of occupants ploughed the streets of Prague and every minute there was a threat of bloodshed. At that time, there were already the first victims. According to modern data, during the invasion, 108 were killed and more than 500 citizens of Czechoslovakia were wounded, the vast majority of civilians. On the first day of the invasion alone, 58 people were killed or mortally wounded, including seven women and an eight-year-old child⁴.

As a result of negotiations in Moscow, in order to avoid further bloodshed and casualties among civilians, A. Dubček and his comrades decided to sign the Moscow Protocol (only F. Kriegel refused to sign it), having only agreed with the decisions of the January and May (1968) Plenums of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the

⁴ Ввод войск в Чехословакию. [https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Ввод_войск_в_Чехословакию\(1968\)#cite_note-rg-18](https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ввод_войск_в_Чехословакию(1968)#cite_note-rg-18)

promise to withdraw troops in the future. The result of the negotiations was a joint communiqué in which the timing of the withdrawal of the Soviet troops was made dependent on the normalisation of the situation in Czechoslovakia.

The resistance of the Czechs and Slovaks to the Soviet invasion was so strong that the Soviet power, even after the occupation, made certain concessions. Federalisation was one of the requirements of citizens of Czechoslovakia.

Many scholars call the Prague Spring the “dream”. J. Suk (2018: 767) argues that the Prague Spring had an almost messianic dimension. By author opinion, the memorable resistance to the military assault elevated “democratic socialism” to a symbol that, however, defeat rendered too lightweight. The capitulation of the political representatives and the inevitable adaptation of most of society to the “normalised” regime broke the socialist utopianism in two. The restoration of order was based on the repudiation of the collective dream in the name of cold reality. It was banal utilitarianism in politics and everyday life that crushed this dream.

Indeed, the Prague Spring was a dream which did not come true because of soviet military invasion, but it laid the foundations for future resistance. As a result of the invasion, not only in Czechoslovakia, but also in all other countries of the Soviet bloc, it was understood that 1) the Soviet power was deceiving not only its people, but the whole world, declaring that this power was built on the power of workers and peasants, but on in fact, it is built on the power of a separate group of people with an extremist attitude towards the entire civilised world; 2) Soviet power is not a friend, but an enemy of the people; and 3) given the military force of the Soviet bloc, all those who want and are ready to resist must lie low and wait for the right moment. And this moment came in the late 1990s. In Czechoslovakia that period will be called Velvet Revolution.

The Bloodless Success of the Velvet Revolution

The year 1989 was a beginning of new protests, which were called the “Velvet Revolution”. In November 17, 1989 in Czechoslovakia began street students’ protests. This day in Prague student demonstrations began, initiating a “velvet revolution” – bloodless overthrow of the communist regime in Czechoslovakia. These events have radically changed the political situation in the country. The first actions of protests in society began in 1988, but they were dispersed by police. The next series of mass demonstrations took place in November 1989. Police answered by acceleration, repression and arrests. But these events have launched the process of dismantling the socialist system. The success of the Velvet

Revolution was supported by a favourable international situation (fall of the Berlin Wall and “perestroika” in the Soviet Union).

For many of post-communist countries the processes of fighting for their democratic future were not easy and bloodless. When in 1968, the Czechoslovakia decided to go in the direction of reinforcement of human rights and freedoms, to give the citizens some democratic possibilities to have an impact on power, the soviet tanks were in Prague. Some years before, the same situation was in Hungary and Poland. However, the events in Czechoslovakia in 1989 have shown that it is possible to make bloodless changes, if representatives of the power, opposition and military leaders are thinking about their citizens and therefore can find a compromise through the process of negotiations. That is why the relevant experience of Czechoslovakia is so important.

M. Degaut (2019) in analysing the role of military in democratic revolutions concludes that the military backing is a necessary condition for a democratic revolution to succeed. He defines that in fact, it seems that the military backing of a revolution, or at least its neutrality toward it, is a necessary condition for a democratic revolution to succeed. If the armed forces protect the political establishment, the revolutionary opposition will very likely not be able to seize power; however, if the military do not protect the regime, or if they are indifferent to its fate, then the revolutionary movement will probably come to power as it removes the means and resources that a regime would have to ensure its survival (p. 81).

T. Kuran (1991) in *Now Out of Never. The Element of Surprise In The East European Revolution 1989* describes events of 1989 in Europe as an unexpected situation. He notes that many of people including politicians and scholars did not wait that the actions of protests will have some stable results and will changed the situation significantly. He quotes the statements of Vaclav Havel before the events of 1989 where V. Havel expresses the opinion that these events will serve as “the seed of something that will bear fruit in the distance future” (1991: 9). Kuran gives some extracts from the public opinion poll which was conducted by Allensbach Institute four months after the fall of communism in East Germany. The people were asked the question: “A year ago did you expect such a peaceful revolution?” The results of this opinion poll were the following: Only 5 percent answered in the affirmative, although 18 percent answered “yes, but not that fast”. Fully 76 percent indicated that the revolution had totally surprised them (p. 10). At the same time, Kuran claims that it might be said that some very knowledgeable observers of the communist bloc had predicted its disintegration before the century was out. As early as 1969, for instance, the Soviet dissident Andrei Amalrik wrote that the Russian Empire would break up within a decade and a half. Although it is tempting to credit Amalrik with exemplary foresight, a rereading of his famous essay shows

that he expected the Soviet Empire to meet its end following a protracted and devastating war with China, not through a string of popular upheavals (p. 11). However, maybe his foresight will be realised in the future. It would be difficult to agree with Kuran if he noted that the social movements of 1989 were fully unexpected as well as their results. And really, he adds that “this is not to suggest that the East European explosion came as total surprise to everyone. Though most were astonished when it happened, and though few who saw it coming expected it to be so peaceful, a small number of commentators had prophesied that the revolution would be swift and remarkably bloodless” (p. 12). He concludes that “this tally of unanticipated uprisings could be expanded, but the point has been made: the revolution of 1989 was not the first to surprise us. Time and again entrenched authority has vanished suddenly, leaving the victors astonished at their triumph and the vanquished, at their defeat” (p. 45).

M. Thee (1991) supports the notion of T. Kuran that the peaceful revolutions in many East European countries were unexpected and surprised. He states that “the abrupt collapse in 1989 of the totalitarian ‘people’s democracies’ in the outer perimeters of the Soviet empire in Central-Eastern Europe, in the arc from Eastern Germany to Bulgaria, has taken an entire world by surprise. This was a unique cataclysmic event. Indeed, we lack a proper theory of history to explain fully the phenomenon of a largely nonviolent, except for Romania, rapid overthrow and definite demise of an authoritarian socio-political system on so broad a front, combined with the breakout from the still-functioning empire that installed and protected this system” (1991: 241). He claims that the results of these events were surprised not only for political scientists, historians and politicians, but even for the actors themselves that they did not anticipate such a fast and expeditious powershift. The author analyses some prerequisites of the velvet revolution in 1989, and defines that the main of them was the crisis in political, cultural, economic, spiritual, ideological domains of the Soviet regime. He argues that the basis for the events of 1989 was created before – by mass protests’ actions in the DDR in 1953, in Poland and Hungary in 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and again in Poland in 1980/81.

The beginning of restructuring processes in USSR (“Perestroika”) prompted opposition in Czechoslovakia to more decisive action. In November 29, the Parliament of the country abolished the article of the constitution on the leading role of the Communist Party. In December 29, by the reorganised parliament was elected as its chairman Alexander Dubcek, as the president of Czechoslovakia – the head of the Civic Forum Václav Havel.

The reasons of revolution in 1989 in Czechoslovakia are clear described by John Glenn in his book *Framing Democracy. Civil Society and Civic*

Movements in Eastern Europe (1999). He claims that Czechoslovakia was one of the most repressive states in Eastern Europe before 1989, with a weak and fragmented democratic opposition; yet, strikingly, the reconstruction of the state took place faster there than in other Eastern European countries and arguable led to more radical changes (1999: 130).

P. Hames (2013: 41) in *The Czech and Slovak Republics: The Velvet Revolution and After* considers two options of velvet revolution in the context of their expectation as anticipated and sudden. He puts a question: Was the Velvet Revolution of 1989 a revolution or the links of one chain – events in other countries of the communist camp? He notes that the collapse of Communism in Czechoslovakia in 1989 was both inevitable and unexpected, and that in finding the answer to this question, much depends on definitions and perspectives. Some have argued that, since the initiatives for change came from outside the power structure, it could be seen as such, while others have claimed that it was no more than the consequence of prior events in Poland, Hungary, and East Germany. However, while it is true that the Velvet Revolution was dependent on the crisis in the Soviet system as a whole, there was also evidence of change within Czechoslovakia itself.

What was in Czechoslovakia in November 1989

The first actions of protests in society began in 1988, but they were dispersed by police. The next series of mass demonstrations took place in November 1989. Police answered by acceleration, repression and arrests, but these events have launched the process of dismantling the socialist system. In November 1989, citizens of Czechoslovakia took to the streets, demanding the end of the communist regime. The Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia began on November 17, 1989. On that day, Czechoslovak special forces brutally dispersed a student demonstration, the participants of which deviated from the route authorised by the special power authorities and went to the centre of Prague. Someone made a rumour that student was killed during the crackdown instantly became an impetus for anti-government protests. Leaders of unofficial opposition groups created the Civic Forum political movement, Prague students announced a strike on November 20, and all higher educational institutions of the country joined it on the very first day. The Velvet Revolution was gradually gaining momentum: anti-government protests are becoming more severe every day; a general strike was held in the country. The military and the police decide not to intervene. This decision has influenced the results of the popular protests. As a result of the protests, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia resigned. December 29, 1989 in the Vladislav Hall of Prague Castle, a joint meeting of both houses of

the Federal Assembly of Czechoslovakia was held, at which Vaclav Havel was elected on the post of the President. The election of Havel was the last chord to complete more than four decades of communist rule in Czechoslovakia. Velvet revolution received this name because it was bloodless social movement that led to the victory and regime change in a bloodless way.

The success of the Velvet Revolution was supported by a favourable international situation (fall of the Berlin Wall and “perestroika” in the Soviet Union). The beginning of restructuring processes in USSR (“Perestroika”) prompted opposition in Czechoslovakia to more decisive action. In November 29, the Parliament of the country abolished the article of the constitution on the leading role of the Communist Party. In December 29, by the reorganized parliament was elected as its chairman Alexander Dubcek, as the president of Czechoslovakia – the head of the Civic Forum Václav Havel.

M. Degaut (2019) pointed out that the 1989 Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia was an example of peaceful changes of authoritarian regime to democratic because of military backing in the view of neutrality, which is, by scholar opinion, important aspects for successful bloodless revolutions. He concludes that “the army’s neutrality was crucial to the success of the revolution. Without the protection of the state coercive apparatus, the entire Czechoslovak Politburo was forced to resign on November 29, paving the way for the 1989 democratic elections, won by Vaclav Havel, a former dissident playwright” (3: 91).

M. Tůma (2006: 6) in *Defence Transformation in the Czech Republic* underlined that the Czechoslovak People’s Army (CSPA) was a pillar of the Communist regime, controlled by and loyal to the Communist Party. Shifting the control and loyalties of the CSPA to the country’s new political elite and cutting old CSPA links with the Communist Party were urgent priorities for the democratic movement during and immediately following the Velvet Revolution. He added that from 1990 public-military relations benefited from the influence of newly created ‘councils for public contact’. These forums were intended to improve the transparency of military activities, raise the military’s prestige and win greater public support for the democratization, professionalization and transformation of the armed forces (2006: 10).

In 1st January 1993, Czechoslovakia ceases to exist, and on its place arose two new states – the Czech and Slovak Republics.

Division of Czechoslovakia and creation of these states have had a historical basis.

The reasons of this division were defined by Zaninovich and Brown in *Political Integration in Czechoslovakia: The Implications of the Prague Spring and Soviet Intervention* (39: 66–67). The authors claim the fact that the Czechs and Slovaks shared a related ethnic heritage was not sufficient to overcome

the cultural and economic cleavages between the two nationalities. These cleavages had their source, initially, in the tenth century Hungarian conquest, which led to the separation of Slovakia from the Czech lands for the next thousand years. Even though a longing for reunion between these related Slavic people existed through the centuries, the isolation of the Slovaks resulted in a fervent nationalism based upon their unique historical experience and a distinctly separate Slovak language. By scholars' opinion, during the half-century prior to World War I, the Czechs had been preoccupied with their conflict and competition with the Germans, while the Slovaks were energetically and successfully resisting forced assimilation by the Magyars. Because of their association with the Austrian state during this period, the Czechs in Bohemia and Moravia also experienced a steady industrial growth, while the Slovaks retained their traditional agricultural orientation and remained economically less developed. As a result, there were substantial differences between the two peoples when they joined to create the Republic of Czechoslovakia in 1918.

Rupinder K. Randhawa in *Velvet Revolution to Transition: The Czech Republic's Success Story* describe the situation with self-determination of Czech and Slovak Republics just after "Velvet Revolution" as follows (2002: 166):

"Due to the positive developments that came with the collapse of communism and victory of "Velvet Revolution" all the weaknesses of new political movement and political parties were forgotten. Both the Civic Forum and Public Against Violence were two forces which formed coalition against communism, but in reality both of these possessed contrasting perspectives and were together because of their anti-communist stance and leading role in the revolution. Soon after the elections the elements which bound both of these together, started breaking apart because their leaders possessed different outlooks and wanted to direct country's economy and politics to divergent directions. These developments were simultaneously accompanied by the fears about the continued co-existence of the Czechs and Slovaks in a viable joint state. Hence the initial euphoria following the overthrow of communist regime slowly started cooling down and the differences between the Czechs and Slovaks started emerging. In Slovakia a movement in favour of creation of an independent Slovak state began to gather increasing momentum."

By opinion of Luers (1990: 89–90, 98], Czechoslovakia's own communist government and that of the Soviet Union over the past forty years have manipulated the relations between Czechs and Slovaks for their own purposes. He argued that Slovak students and intellectuals clearly played an important role in liberation of Slovakia with their Public Against Violence organisation – the equivalent to the Czechs' Civic Forum. However, the different ways in which the Slovak and Czech peoples have dealt over the

past decade with communism will add one more complexity to the troubled relations between these two principal nations of the Czechoslovak state. He concludes that the revolution was a popular and peaceful uprising driven and controlled by spontaneity and improvisation. The Czechoslovak people had swept aside their own government and the Civic Forum, as the only alternative group left in the society with some organisational ability and moral authority, simply filled the vacuum.

In the Czech and Slovak Republics the day November 17 is recognised and declared as national holiday – the Day of the struggle for freedom and democracy.

Conclusion

The purpose of this article was to analyse two democratic revolutions in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and 1989, to define their successful and unsuccessful steps, elements, and approaches, to conclude the main reasons their failure and victory.

Thus, two revolutions in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and 1989 have shown that:

- it is impossible to crush a popular uprising when it has a truly massive character;
- democratic revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe would have happened much earlier if the Soviet military and their tanks had not taken part in the suppression of protests;
- any power must understand and remember that it is not unlimited and that abuse of it will necessarily be punished;
- reaction of military and police on popular uprisings is important aspect of their victory or defeat. There are many countries in the world where citizens are trying to force regime change during mass protests' actions without any success. In many of these cases, it will be possible to achieve this democratic goals only by backing of national military. Therefore, significant work with this group of society should precede popular democratic revolts to succeed.

In general, democracy is a basis and main element for development of open society – society in which citizens have the real power to influence on the process of decision-making in the country; in which governmental bodies are responsible and responsive to citizens' needs; where the system of public control is effectively functioning.

In any society and under any regimes, people have always sought to live in democracy, to have democratic freedoms and to have power which will be responsible and responsive to the citizens' needs. History knows many democratic movements, popular uprisings and revolutions. Some of them were successful, and some were not.

The revolutions of 1968 and 1989 in Czechoslovakia have shown that military support is an important aspect of successful revolution. The popular uprisings of 1968 had a great chance of success – the initiative came not only from the people, but also from the government itself, which in turn developed a clear program of social and democratic changes. It was a unique example when power representatives and citizens were ready to make the common positive changes in the country together. It was the situation when power and citizens wanted the same changes and they were ready to implement them. Only soviet invasion put an end to their hopes and plans.

The Velvet Revolution, unlike the Prague Spring, was not so well prepared; it did not go through the stage of development and partial implementation of the program of democratic reforms. It was spontaneous. And the decisive factor here was the fact that no military force was used against the demonstrators, not only from abroad, as was the case with the Prague Spring, but also of the local military.

Analysing the reasons of these two revolutions, it is possible to conclude the following:

1. Significant pressure on democratic freedoms, censorship and other violations of human rights in any case will lead to mass protest's social movements and/or to revolution.
2. At the moment when the discontent of the people by the incumbent regime reached its apogee, it will be enough a small event to start the popular uprisings. No political regime should bring its people to a boiling point if they do not want to get a revolution in response to this attitude.
3. The revolution can be suppressed by military force, but this will be a temporary condition. At the first opportunity, if the authorities have not changed their attitude towards the public and have not turned to democratic values and appropriate reforms, popular uprisings will continue until complete victory.
4. Any democratic revolution will be successful if there are two main conditions: 1) the readiness of society as a whole and citizens to take active steps for democratic transformations in the country, and 2) support for transformations on the part of the military, or at least their non-interference. Thus, citizens' desire alone is not enough for a successful democratic transformation in many cases. For the implementation of democratic revolutions, the main condition must be realised – military support of citizens' desire. Therefore, the corresponding preliminary work should be carried out in this direction.

Acknowledgment

Author thanks *Prof. Emília Sičáková-Beblava*, Director of Public Policy, Department of Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences of the Comenius University in Bratislava and *Dr. Lucia Mokra*, Dean of Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences of Comenius University in Bratislava for their comprehensive support of this research.

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LATVIAN-BRAZILIAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS 1918–1940¹

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Abstract

This article provides an overview of Latvian-Brazilian economic relations in the interwar period. In the interwar period, economic relations between Latvia and Brazil were mainly confined to foreign trade. Latvia declared its independence in 1918, however Latvians had been emigrating to Brazil from 1890 and establishing farming colonies. By the end of the 1930s some 8000 Latvians had settled in Brazil. Latvia's foreign trade in relation to Brazil was regulated by the 1932 Commercial Agreement. Latvia's main imports from Brazil in the interwar period were coffee, cocoa, hides and furs, tobacco, raw rubber, and cotton, whilst Latvia's main exports to Brazil were fish conserves, paper, and rubber goods. In general, trade and thus economic relations were of marginal significance to both countries in the interwar period due partly to some similarities in their economic structures, but mainly because of geographical distance.

Keywords: Latvia, Brazil, economic relations, interwar period.

Introduction

Latvians had been immigrating to Brazil since the early 1890's. They were people who hoped to find land for farming, as well as a more prosperous and freer life in the country. The first group of Latvian immigrants (25 families) arrived in Brazil in 1890 under the leadership of a then idealistic young Karlis Balodis.³ Despite the more or less failure of this first attempt, Latvians continued to emigrate to Brazil. Most of the

¹ A version of this this article was presented at the International conference: 46th Economic and Business History Society 2021 Conference, May 18–21, 2021, online.

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³ Kārlis Balodis (June 20, 1864 – January 13, 1931) was a notable Latvian economist, University professor, financier, statistician and demographer. Most notably, he was the author of civilian rationing, which was first used in Germany during the First World War and which was subsequently taken up by other nations. His attempts at colonisation failed and he returned to Germany to continue his studies at Jena University (for a detailed account of his Brazilian episode see Balabkins, Šņeps, 1993: 34–40).

immigrants up to WWII were Latvian Baptists, who established farming colonies and Baptist congregations in many areas in Southern Brazil (in the states of Santa Catarina, Paraná, São Paulo, and Rio Grande Do Sul). The Latvian immigrants had varied success, some were able to acclimatise to the unfamiliar circumstances and became wealthy, others didn't do so well.⁴ A number of the immigrants didn't stay in the colonies, but settled in the large cities (particularly in São Paulo, the most populous city in Brazil). By the end of the 1930s some 8000 Latvians had settled in Brazil.⁵

Latvia was recognised *de iure* by Western Europe on 26 January 1921. Brazil recognised Latvia *de iure* on 05 December 1921.⁶ Neither Latvia nor Brazil had official Legations in each other's countries. Nevertheless, Latvia had an honorary general-consul in Rio de Janeiro from 1930 to 1935 (when the general-consul for Brazil, Pēteris Oliņš (a career diplomat), was transferred to Argentina, where he was responsible for both Argentina and Brazil. There was also an honorary consul, Johan Gustaf Stål, in São Paulo from 1932 to 1968.

Brazil had an honorary consul in Rīga from 1922 to 1927, Alfrēds Dinbergs, a public servant (he worked for Latvian Railways) and politician (he was elected to the 4th Saeima).

Table 1. Selected economic indicators for Latvia and Brazil in the interwar period

	Latvia	Brazil
Population (millions)	2 (1939)	40.3 (1939)
Share of urban population (%)	34.6 (1935)	15 (1940)
Share of agriculture in the labour force (%)	67.8 (1935)	65 (1940)
GDP* per capita	4048 (1938)	1263 (1939)
Share of Agriculture in NI (%)	39.2 (1938)	32.7 (1930–1945 average)
Share of Manufacturing in NI (%)	20.5 (1938)	24.7 (1930–1945 average)

* GDP measured in 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars

Sources: The Development of Brazil: Report of the Joint Brazil-United States Economic Development Commission, 1954; Wagner, Ward: 1980; Madison, 2003; Gómez-León, 2015; Darbiņš, Vītiņš: 1947.

⁴ For detailed examination of one such more or less successful Latvian colony – Varpa, see Augelli, 1958: 365–387.

⁵ Krasnais, 1938: 451.

⁶ LVVA, 2570 f, 3. apr., 1148 l., p. 106.

As can be seen from Table 1, despite the large difference in population, Latvia's share of urban population was nearly twice that of Brazil in the interwar period. The share of agriculture in the labour force was more or less similar to that of Brazil, but GDP per capita in Latvia was over three times larger than in Brazil. Latvia's share of manufacturing in NI was slightly less (4%) than that of Brazil, whilst Latvia's share of agriculture in NI was some 7% higher than Brazil. Nevertheless, Latvia was classified by the League of Nations as a "less industrialised" country, whilst Brazil was seen as a country "lagging in industrial development".⁷

Latvian-Brazilian Economic Relations 1922–1939

In the interwar years, Latvian and Brazilian economic relations were mainly confined to foreign trade. Although as early as 1920, Latvians in Brazil were writing to Latvia regarding the opportunities for trade – cotton, tobacco, raw rubber, cane sugar and other products⁸, direct Latvian-Brazilian trade commenced in 1922.

Latvia's foreign trade in the 1920s was based in large measure on a system of commercial and trade treaties. In the interwar period, Latvia had concluded commercial treaties with all important European states (except Spain), including its two most important trading partners – Great Britain (22.06.1923) and Germany (28.06.1926), as well as many states outside of Europe. They provided the regulatory framework within which were stated the obligations undertaken by Latvia in its foreign trade relations with its trading partners, in many cases till the end of the 1930s. Most of these treaties contained the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) principle⁹, as well as in practically all, the Baltic and Russian clause. The Baltic and Russian Clause stipulates that the priority rights and privileges, allowed to Estonia, Finland, Lithuania, and Russia, may not be made applicable to other contracting states by virtue of the most-favoured-nation principle.

Latvia's foreign trade in relation to Brazil was finally regulated by an exchange of notes between the Brazilian and Latvian governments constituting a commercial agreement¹⁰ in Paris on 21 September 1932,¹¹

⁷ Industrialisation and Foreign Trade, 1945: 26–27.

⁸ *Baltijas Vēstnesis*, No. 44, 23.02.1920: 4.

⁹ During and after the Great Depression some of the treaties were renegotiated, for example, with Great Britain, on a different basis than the MFN principle.

¹⁰ League of Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. CXXXVII, 1933: 61–68.

¹¹ This was apparently the "normal" method by which Brazil entered into trade agreements. The exchange was between the Brazilian Embassy and the Latvian Legation in Paris, France.

and came into force on 07 January 1933. It was initially for three years and on the expiry of the three year period would remain in force by tacit consent until it had been denounced by either party. The commercial agreement contained the MFN principle, as well as the Baltic and Russian clause, but no reciprocal clause for Brazil.

There was no Latvian direct foreign investment in Brazil (apart from the funds that the Latvian immigrants brought with them and their contribution to the Brazilian economy through their farms). On the other hand, in the period 1926–1928, there was Brazilian investment in the Latvian food processing industry of some 16000 lats.¹² This had disappeared by 1929 and there were no further Brazilian investments in Latvia for the rest of the interwar period.

Latvian-Brazilian Trade 1922–1939

The value of Latvian imports from and exports to Brazil can be seen in the Figure 1.



Figure 1. Latvia-Brazil Imports and Exports 1922–1939

* The data for 1939 is for eight months only – to 31 August 1939.

Sources: Latvijas Statistiskās gada grāmatas [Latvian Statistical Yearbooks], 1921–1939; Latvijas ārējā tirdzniecība un transits. 1922–1939 [Latvian Foreign Trade and Transit. 1922–1939]; Mēneša Biļetens Nr. 10, oktobris 1939 [Monthly Bulletin, No. 10, October 1939].

¹² Latvijas Statistiskā gada grāmata, 1930: 290.

As Figure 1 shows exports to Brazil in the interwar period were very low, reaching a pre-Depression high in 1929 of some 46 thousand lats. Exports fell dramatically with Great Depression, although they recovered the fairly low level of the 1920s, reaching a post-Depression high of some 40 thousand lats in 1934. Imports, on the other hand, remained very low in the early 1920s, but increased rapidly with a pre-Depression peak in 1928 and a value of 187 thousand lats. Imports also fell with Great Depression, although they recovered fairly quickly, starting to rise from 1932 and reaching their peak in the first eight months of 1939 and a value of 1087 thousand lats. It seems possible that the 1932 commerce agreement stimulated imports from Brazil, but had little effect on exports. Generally, imports substantially exceeded exports throughout the interwar period, especially in the 1930s.

Latvian Exports to Brazil

Latvia's main exports to Brazil were Fish and Fish conserves (including "Sprotas"¹³), Plywood, Paper and paper products, Rubber goods, and Linoleum (See Table 2).

The most important Latvian export to Brazil in the interwar period both in terms of volume and value was paper and paper products. Paper and paper products exports reached an early peak in 1929. The post-Depression peak in terms of volume and value was in 1935. Plywood exports began in 1935, but disappeared after 1936. Rubber product exports were also a small, but fluctuating part of exports throughout the interwar period.

A small, but consistent export to Brazil was fish and fish conserves (including "Sprotas", with a pre-Depression peak in 1926 and a post-Depression peak in 1938. Linoleum was an important export to Brazil in the 1920s. Linoleum in Latvia was produced by the Liepāja branch of the Swedish entrepreneurial family firm of Wicander (Linoleum Aktiebolaget Forshaga), the "Liepāja Cork and Linoleum Factory", which before the First World War had produced linoleum for the Russian market. After the war the factory renewed production, but already in 1922 was subject to the control of an international linoleum cartel based in Britain. However, in 1927, the Wicander firm sold its Liepāja branch to another cartel, which was based in Germany. The factory completely ceased production in 1930 and linoleum disappeared from the foreign trade of Latvia and from exports to Brazil.

¹³ "Šprotes" or sprats are close relatives of anchovies, sardines, and herrings. The Latvian style is to smoke and/or preserve them in oil.

Table 2. Latvia's Main Exports to Brazil (1924–1939)

Year	Rubber goods		Paper and paper products		Linoleum		Fish and Fish conserves (including "Spotes")	
	tonnes	Value (1000 Ls)	tonnes	Value (1000 Ls)	tonnes	Value (1000 Ls)	tonnes	Value (1000 Ls)
1924	Less than 1 tonne	3	0	0	0	0	0	0
1925	1	16	Less than 1 tonne	2	4	5	0	0
1926	0	0	0	0	17	28	4	8
1927	0	0	0	0	12	21	Less than 1 tonne	2
1928	0	0	21	15	6	10	0	0
1929	0	0	52	32	9	11	Less than 1 tonne	1
1930	Less than 1 tonne	Less than 1000 Ls	6	3	0	0	Less than 1 tonne	1
1931	0	0	Less than 1 tonne	2	0	0	Less than 1 tonne	Less than 1000 Ls
1932	0	0	Less than 1 tonne	Less than 1000 Ls	0	0	2	2
1933	0	0	9	3	Plywood		3	3
1934	0	0	2	2	0	0	2	2
1935	0	0	24	7	50	7	1	1
1936	0	0	8	4	150	28	2	4
1937	2	7	22	8	0	0	4	9
1938	1	5	0	0	0	0	6	14
1939*	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

* January–August 1939 (with commencement of WWII, Latvia ceased publication of detailed foreign trade statistics)

Sources: Latvijas Statistiskās gada grāmatas [Latvian Statistical Yearbooks], 1921–1939; Latvijas ārējā tirdzniecība un transits. 1922–1939 [Latvian Foreign Trade and Transit. 1922–1939]; Mēneša Biļetens Nr. 10, oktobris 1939 [Monthly Bulletin, No. 10, October 1939].

Latvia also exported to Brazil small quantities of pig bristles, liquors etc (especially vodka), mushroom and cucumber conserves, jams and marmalades, potatoes, cellulose, books, and toys.

There were a number of attempts to interest Latvian exporters to export to Brazil in the interwar period both from the Latvian consuls in Brazil and from the Government, but to little avail. The most important attempt was a long article on the Brazilian economy and Latvian export possibilities in the journal published by the Ministry of Finance, *Ekonomists*, in 1934.¹⁴ The

¹⁴ *Ekonomists*, No. 21, 15.11.1934: 759–763.

article suggested that apart from the need of Latvian exporters to be more competitive, they would also need to find trading partners in Brazil or failing that, establish branches of their own firms in Brazil. Unfortunately, the geographic distance to Brazil and irregular shipping were enough to deter increasing exports to Brazil.

Latvian Imports from Brazil

Latvia's main imports from Brazil were Coffee and cocoa, Wool and cotton, Rubber, Furs and hides, Tobacco and tobacco products, and Carnauba (plant) wax. The amounts and value of Latvia's main imports imported from Brazil in the interwar period are shown in Table 3.

Table 3. Latvia's Main Imports from Brazil 1923–1939

Year	Coffee and cocoa		Wool and cotton		Rubber		Furs and hides		Tobacco and tobacco products		Carnauba (plant) wax	
	tonnes	Value (1000 Ls)	tonnes	Value (1000 Ls)	tonnes	Value (1000 Ls)	tonnes	Value (1000 Ls)	tonnes	Value (1000 Ls)	tonnes	Value (1000 Ls)
1923	1	3	0	0	0	0	1	3	0	0	0	0
1924	Less than 1 tonne	Less than 1000 Ls	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1925	16	23	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1926	14	30	1	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1927	Less than 1 tonne	Less than 1000 Ls	Less than 1 tonne	3	0	0	Less than 1 tonne	Less than 1000 Ls	0	0	0	0
1928	8	18	0	0	9	19	55	16	0	0	Less than 1 tonne	Less than 1000 Ls
1929	8	18	0	0	3	6	5	11	Less than 1 tonne	Less than 1000 Ls	Less than 1 tonne	2
1930	14	21	0	0	6	9	24	34	Less than 1 tonne	Less than 1000 Ls	Less than 1 tonne	Less than 1000 Ls
1931	10	10	0	0			16	26	2	3	0	0
1932	15	12	0	0	5	3	137	113	0	0	Less than 1 tonne	2
1933	222	152	Less than 1 tonne	2	25	22	63	38	1	2	3	5
1934	177	100	95	108	10	11	25	25	9	7	3	4
1935	177	79	54	59	Less than 1 tonne	Less than 1000 Ls	472	377	13	10	1	3
1936	193	121	0	0	8	14	288	304	16	13	2	6
1937	132	156	256	406	4	11	189	403	25	28	2	8
1938	308	273	329	415	0	0	124	224	23	26	Less than 1 tonne	1
1939*	136	104	378	511	0	0	297	448	0	0	1	4

* January–August 1939 (with commencement of WWII, Latvia ceased publication of detailed foreign trade statistics)

Sources: Latvijas Statistiskās gada grāmatas [Latvian Statistical Yearbooks]. 1921–1939; Latvijas ārējā tirdzniecība un transits. 1922–1939 [Latvian Foreign Trade and Transit. 1922–1939]; Mēneša Biļetens Nr. 10, oktobris 1939 [Monthly Bulletin, No. 10, October 1939].

Latvia's most important and consistent import from Brazil was coffee and cocoa. Although the quantities imported in 1920s were small, imports of coffee and cocoa increased dramatically after the signing of the 1932

commerce agreement, reaching a peak in 1938 with a value of 273 thousand lats. The other more or less consistent import during the interwar period was furs and hides. They also increase substantially during the 1930s with a peak in the eight months of 1939 and a value of 448 thousand lats.

Wool and cotton became a significant import in the 1930s, also reaching a peak in the eight months of 1939 and a value of 511 thousand lats. Tobacco and tobacco products were a small, but steady import in the 1930s, reaching a peak in 1937 and a value of 28 thousand lats. Another small, but steady import during the 1930s was Carnauba (plant) wax. Rubber was a small and intermittent import during the interwar years, reaching a peak in 1936 with a value of 14 thousand lats.

Latvia also imported from Brazil small quantities of fruits (oranges and bananas), medicinal plants, wheat bran, books, and jute sacks.

Conclusion

In the interwar years, Latvian and Brazilian economic relations were almost exclusively confined to foreign trade.

In 1929, when Latvian foreign trade reached its pre-Depression peak, Latvian exports to Brazil made up 0.02% of total Latvian exports, and Brazilian imports made up 0.01% of total Latvian imports. Similarly, in 1937, when Latvian foreign trade reached its post-Depression peak, Latvian imports from Brazil made up 0.4% of total Latvian imports and Latvian exports to Brazil were a negligible part of total Latvian exports. One suspects that the figures from the point of view of Brazil would be significantly less. In other words, trade and thus economic relations were of marginal significance to both countries in the interwar period.

It is interesting to note that in 2019, Latvian exports to Brazil totalled 12.2 million EUR (mainly machines, mechanisms, and electrical equipment, mineral products, and vehicles). Whilst imports from Brazil totalled 11.6 million EUR (mainly weapons and ammunition, plant products, and machines, mechanisms, and electrical equipment). Unlike the interwar period, Latvia has a positive trade balance with Brazil. Again, unlike the interwar period there are minor Latvian investments in Brazil (totalling some 1 million EUR). Similarly, there is some minor Brazilian foreign direct investments in Latvia to a value of 0.24 million EUR in 2019.¹⁵

¹⁵ Data from Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <https://www.mfa.gov.lv/arpolitika/divpusejas-attiecibas/latvijas-un-brazilijas-attiecibas#ekonomiskas-attiecibas> [Accessed 09.08.2020].

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KNOWLEDGE INTENSIVE BUSINESS SECTOR IN LATVIAN NATIONAL ECONOMY: RANDOM EFFECT FACTOR OUTLOOK

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Abstract

Global experience shows that sustainable economic development takes place in countries with economies focused on the creation and intensive use of knowledge. Entrepreneurs are interested in investing in knowledge, using obtained findings in the company's development.

Investment knowledge strengthens company's market position, thus increasing the probability of successful implementation of its new products and services. Based on the general idea of tailor-made mix of content, structure, and functioning mechanism of market relations, it can be stated that knowledge is necessary for market participants in order to reach broader market share, take business advantage from innovations, increase competitiveness and uptake new markets, as well as ensure higher satisfaction regarding both goods and services for their customers.

Investing in large-scale research projects enables opportunity to accumulate knowledge is a power for large corporations, which further determines their dominance in the global market. However, knowledge in terms of disruptive services is still more important among owners and managers of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The expansion of knowledge in the medium and especially in the small business environment promoted the emergence of a specific business niche known as the knowledge intensive business. The knowledge-based economy is gradually "displacing" the resource-based economy, stimulating entrepreneurs to put more focus on the use of information resources as a feature of the knowledge-intensive economy, thus pacing overall growth dynamics of segment.

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This article focuses on the identification and analysis of factors affecting the knowledge intensive business development business sector in Latvian national economy with random effects regression model. Random effects regression was used since it best suited for panel data. Compiled available repeated observations on the same units allowing to enrich the model by inserting an additional term in the regression, capturing individual-specific, time-invariant factors affecting the dependent variable.

Keywords: Latvia, knowledge intensive business, national economy, innovations.

Introduction

The idea of a knowledge-based economy is not simply a description of high-tech industries. It describes a range of new sources with competitive advantage that can be applied in all sectors, in all companies and in all regions, from agriculture and retail to software and biotechnology (Leadbeater et al., 1999). Economic success is increasingly based on the efficient use of intangible assets, namely knowledge, skills, and innovative potential. The term “knowledge economy” is used to describe this emerging economic structure. The knowledge society as a concept is more than just an increased focus on research and development. It covers every aspect of today’s economy, where knowledge is at the heart of added value, from high-tech manufacturing and ICT, through knowledge-intensive services to highly creative industries such as media and architecture (Kok et al., 2004). Some experts believe that the emergence of a knowledge-based economy is a major shift, a “new economy” that offers endless productivity gains, faster non-inflationary growth, and continued growth in securities markets. It has been argued that the ICT revolution has enabled companies to take advantage of scientific and technical knowledge bases, giving them an unprecedented competitive advantage through, for example, ever-falling transaction and recycling costs. In turn, the new knowledge economy would encourage the emergence of new organizational forms both within and between companies, as well as radical changes in employment relationships, with more and more knowledge workers becoming portfolio workers, franchisors or the self-employed. However, this view was hit by the crisis of the dot-com bubble and the failure to bring about the expected change in employment (for example, a reduction in the number of employees with more than one job). Consequently, the use of the term “new economy” is no longer “in vogue”. In part, in response to all the objections, the opposite view was also expressed, which questioned the existence of the knowledge economy at all.

It is also argued that, in reality, knowledge has always driven the economy, leading to innovation and technological change, and that knowledge-based institutions have helped to preserve and share knowledge over centuries.

What is happening today is nearly the same, only on a larger scale and at a higher speed. In the economic field, there has been enough discussion about whether certain sectors are particularly knowledge-intensive. Great efforts have been made to analyse the contribution of these sectors to productivity growth (Brynjolfsson, Hitt et al., 2000). As the expansion of knowledge-intensive industries and the associated productivity gains took place in the context of the unusual macroeconomic and financial market events of the 1990s, quite a large part of the popular literature argued that there was something fundamentally different in the knowledge economy. The key components of the knowledge economy include greater reliance on intellectual capacity than on physical work or natural resources, combined with actions to integrate improvements at every stage of the production process, from R&D labs to factory premises and customer interactions. The knowledge economy is often seen and sometimes defined as the production and use of ICT based on knowledge-intensive industries and/or a high proportion of highly educated workers. Sector definitions initially focused on production and often used R&D intensity as an indicator to distinguish between high, medium, and low technology sectors. The definition has been constantly expanded to include service sectors that invest little in R&D but make intensive use of ICT technologies and/or employ a highly skilled workforce, taking advantage of technological innovation.

On the other hand, considering open market competition and free workforce flow within the EU, the issues of growth factors significantly arise for both industry and policy makers. This article analyses broad scope of factors affecting the knowledge intensive business development, highlighting necessary prerequisites for its sustainable growth in Latvian national economy.

Model description

Generalized Least Squares estimators of the parameters of such a model are more efficient (Benfratello et al., 2014) than those obtained in the simpler model neglecting these unobserved factors. The random-effects regression model is also proposed for analysis of clustered data. Unlike ordinary regression analysis of clustered data, random-effects regression models do not assume that each observation is independent but do assume that data within clusters are dependent to some degree. The degree of this dependency is estimated along with estimates of the usual model parameters, thus adjusting these effects for the dependency resulting from the clustering of the data. An analysis of a dataset in which parameters are clustered within group is used to illustrate features of random-effects regression analysis, relative to both individual-level analysis that ignores

the clustering of the data, and factor-level analysis that aggregates the individual data.

For this analysis author used available STATA version 15 software; Calculations based on equation:

$$Y_{it} = \beta_1 X_{1,it} + \dots + \beta_k X_{k,it} + u_{it}$$

Where Y_{it} is a dependent variable, β_1 up — to β_k are coefficients, $X_{k,it}$ represents independent variables and u_{it} which is an idiosyncratic error term. All RHS and LHS variables are converted into natural logarithms. A log-log model allows for easy interpretation of the effect of independent variables on the dependent variables, in terms of elasticity.

Table 1. Model description

Nr.	Dependent variable	Independent variables (regressors)	Control variables
1.	Ease of doing business	Institutional environment	GDP
2.	Innovation	Infrastructure	Population
3.	Business sophistication	Macroeconomic environment	Year dummies
4.	Labour market efficiency	Healthy workforce	Country category
5.	Technological readiness		

Source: Table made by authors based on author's datasets using custom query from available data from Doing Business, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund.

Description of the variables

Dependent variables

The ease of doing business score captures the gap between an economy's performance and a measure of best practice across the entire sample of 41 indicators for 10 Doing Business topics (the labour market regulation indicators are excluded). Calculating the ease of doing business score for each economy involves two main steps.

In the first step individual component indicators are normalized to a common unit where each of the 41 component indicators y (except for the total tax and contribution rate) is rescaled using the linear transformation $(\text{worst} - y) / (\text{worst} - \text{best})$. In this formulation the highest score represents the best regulatory performance on the indicator across all economies since 2005 or the third year in which data for the indicator were collected. Both the best regulatory performance and the worst regulatory performance are

established every five years based on the Doing Business data for the year in which they are established and remain at that level for the five years regardless of any changes in data in interim years. Thus, an economy may establish the best regulatory performance for an indicator even though it may not have the highest score in a subsequent year. Conversely, an economy may score higher than the best regulatory performance if the economy reforms after the best regulatory performance is set.

In the second step for calculating the ease of doing business score, the scores obtained for individual indicators for each economy are aggregated through simple averaging into one score, first for each topic and then across all 10 topics: starting a business, dealing with construction permits, getting electricity, registering property, getting credit, protecting minority investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts and resolving insolvency. More complex aggregation methods – such as principal components and unobserved components – yield a ranking nearly identical to the simple average used by Doing Business. Thus, Doing Business uses the simplest method: weighting all topics equally and, within each topic, giving equal weight to each of the topic components. An economy's score is indicated on a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 represents the worst regulatory performance and 100 the best regulatory performance. All score calculations are based on a maximum of five decimals. However, topic ranking calculations and the ease of doing business ranking calculations are based on two decimals.

Innovation is particularly important for economies as they approach the frontiers of knowledge, and the possibility of generating more value by merely integrating and adapting exogenous technologies tends to disappear. In these economies, firms must design and develop cutting-edge products and processes to maintain a competitive edge and move toward even higher value-added activities. This progression requires an environment that is conducive to innovative activity and supported by both the public and the private sectors. In particular, it means sufficient investment in research and development (R&D), especially by the private sector; the presence of high-quality scientific research institutions that can generate the basic knowledge needed to build the new technologies; extensive collaboration in research and technological developments between universities and industry; and the protection of intellectual property.

Business sophistication concerns two elements that are intricately linked: the quality of a country's overall business networks and the quality of individual firms' operations and strategies. These factors are especially important for countries at an advanced stage of development when, to a large extent, the more basic sources of productivity improvements have been exhausted. The quality of a country's business networks and supporting industries, as measured by the quantity and

quality of local suppliers and the extent of their interaction, is important for a variety of reasons. When companies and suppliers from a particular sector are interconnected in geographically proximate groups, called clusters, efficiency is heightened, greater opportunities for innovation in processes and products are created, and barriers to entry for new firms are reduced.

The efficiency and flexibility of the labour market are critical for ensuring that workers are allocated to their most effective use in the economy and provided with incentives to give their best effort in their jobs. Labour markets must therefore have the flexibility to shift workers from one economic activity to another rapidly and at low cost, and to allow for wage fluctuations without much social disruption. Efficient labour markets must also ensure clear strong incentives for employees and promote meritocracy at the workplace, and they must provide equity in the business environment between women and men. Taken together these factors have a positive effect on worker performance and the attractiveness of the country for talent, two aspects of the labour market that are growing more important as talent shortages loom on the horizon.

The technological readiness measures the agility with which an economy adopts existing technologies to enhance the productivity of its industries, with specific emphasis on its capacity to fully leverage information and communication technologies (ICTs) in daily activities and production processes for increased efficiency and enabling innovation for competitiveness. Whether the technology used has or has not been developed within national borders is irrelevant for its ability to enhance productivity. The central point is that the firms operating in the country need to have access to advanced products and blueprints and the ability to absorb and use them. Among the main sources of foreign technology, foreign direct investment (FDI) often plays a key role, especially for countries at a less advanced stage of technological development.

Independent variables (regressors)

The institutional environment of a country depends on the efficiency and the behaviour of both public and private stakeholders. The legal and administrative framework within which individuals, firms, and governments interact determines the quality of the public institutions of a country and has a strong bearing on competitiveness and growth. It influences investment decisions and the organization of production and plays a key role in the ways in which societies distribute the benefits and bear the costs of development strategies and policies. Good

private institutions are also important for the sound and sustainable development of an economy. The 2007–08 global financial crisis, along with numerous corporate scandals, has highlighted the relevance of accounting and reporting standards and transparency for preventing fraud and mismanagement, ensuring good governance, and maintaining investor and consumer confidence.

Extensive and efficient infrastructure is critical for ensuring the effective functioning of the economy. Effective modes of transport—including high-quality roads, railroads, ports, and air transport—enable entrepreneurs to get their goods and services to market in a secure and timely manner and facilitate the movement of workers to the most suitable jobs. Economies also depend on electricity supplies that are free from interruptions and shortages so that businesses and factories can work unimpeded. Finally, a solid and extensive telecommunications network allows for a rapid and free flow of information, which increases overall economic efficiency by helping to ensure that businesses can communicate and decisions are made by economic actors taking into account all available relevant information.

The stability of the macroeconomic environment is important for business and, therefore, is significant for the overall competitiveness of a country. Although it is certainly true that macroeconomic stability alone cannot increase the productivity of a nation, it is also recognized that macroeconomic disarray harms the economy, as we have seen in recent years, conspicuously in the European context. The government cannot provide services efficiently if it has to make high-interest payments on its past debts. Running fiscal deficits limits the government's future ability to react to business cycles. Firms cannot operate efficiently when inflation rates are out of hand. In sum, the economy cannot grow in a sustainable manner unless the macro environment is stable.

A health and primary education (healthy workforce) are vital to a country's competitiveness and productivity. Workers who are ill cannot function to their potential and will be less productive. Poor health leads to significant costs to business, as sick workers are often absent or operate at lower levels of efficiency. Investment in the provision of health services is thus critical for clear economic, as well as moral, considerations. In addition to health, this pillar takes into account the quantity and quality of the basic education received by the population, which is fundamental in today's economy. Basic education increases the efficiency of each individual worker.

Control variables includes GDP, Population, Year dummies and categories of countries by income level and geographical location.

Countries are divided into 6 groups based both on income level and geographical location:

Table 2. Country Groups

Nr.	Geographical scope	Countries	Level of income
1	Baltic states	Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia	High-income
2	Scandinavian countries	Finland, Denmark, Sweden	High-income
3	Western Europe	Germany, France, United Kingdom	High-income
4	World, high-income	United States, Japan, Israel	High-income
5	World, upper-middle income	Brazil, China	Upper-middle income
6	Europe, lower-middle income	Armenia, Ukraine	Lower-middle income

Source: Table made by authors based on World Bank data.

Values are based upon GDP in national currency converted to U.S. dollars using market exchange rates (yearly average). Exchange rate projections are provided by country economists for the group of other emerging market and developing countries.

Descriptive statistics

In order to summarize data and provide general overview author provides table describing the relationship between variables below. Descriptive statistics include number of observations, standard deviation, mean as well as minimal and maximum values for each variable.

Table 3. Descriptive statistics

Variable	Number of observations	Mean	Standard deviation	Min	Max
Ease of doing business	112	74.6804	9.3368	40.8	84.7
Innovation	176	4.4954	1.0100	2.6322	5.8381
Business sophistication	176	4.8528	0.7579	3.2553	5.9346
Labour market efficiency	176	4.7367	0.4239	3.6661	5.7918
Technological readiness	176	5.0497	0.9979	2.5535	6.3294

Source: Table made by authors based on author's calculations.


Overall number of observations used in model per each variable is not higher than number of observations provided in descriptive statistics. Ease of doing business has less observation due to the lack of data. Detailed evaluation of each variable is provided below. each section is supplied with chart visualizing changes of impacts made by regressors on variable within the set time period.

Analysis of the results

Ease of doing business

Due to the lack of data, for this variable there were 115 observations done in 15 countries divided into 6 groups.

Figure 1. Impact on Easy of Doing Business, %, 2011–2017



Source: Author's conclusion is based on author's calculations.

Based on calculations it might be concluded that the most important regressor affecting Ease of doing business is the workforce with 1.220 per cent impact. Infrastructure has 0,868 per cent impacts and institutions reaches 0.558. All three are very significant for both Baltic states as well other groups (2, 3, 4) with high income. Macroeconomics in terms of Ease of doing business is less significant with overall 0.071 per cent impact rate.

It should be noticed that all the above mentioned regressor have a negative impact in Group 5 and Group 6 on the variable, which might be explained by the influence of other regressors that are not included in this model. This observation might be evaluated within different research.

In terms of control variables, it might be observed that GDP is very significant for all the variables used, and have a negative impact with average -0.3125 point per 1% change. Despite that generally, economic growth is good for the welfare of an economy, such negative impact might be explained with Schumpeter's term 'creative destruction' (Caballero et al., 2010) which highlights how the progress brought on by economic growth could lead to a destruction of an old economic structure, in the process of creating a new one, thus growth is brought by the introduction of new technologies and creation of new firms, and these replace firms and technologies currently in existence. Population is also very significant for the Ease of doing business, but unlike the GDP, have a positive impact on all variables with average of 0.3083 point per 1% change.

There is strong relationship between the model and the dependent variable shown by R^2 value regarding both between and within variables. Within, the highest for health and primary education (0.571), and average R^2 value of 0.5195 . Between, the highest for Institutions (0.809), and average R^2 value of 0.7123 . Overall, there is a 0.476 variance within separate panel units and 0.859 variance between the units' model accounts for, thus, indicating a high fit for the model.

Innovations

For this variable there were 165 observations done in 15 countries divided into 6 groups.

Based on calculation it might be concluded that the most important regressor Innovation is the same as for the Ease of doing business – workforce with 0.66 per cent impact. Institutional capacity has 0.369 per cent impact and less significant macroeconomics reaches 0.066 , and non-significant infrastructure regressor has only 0.049 change impact on Innovation. Workforce and Institutions are very significant for both Baltic states as well other groups (2, 3, 4) with high income.

It should be noticed that all the above mentioned regressor have a negative impact in Group 5 and Group 6 on the variable, which might be explained by the influence of other regressors that are not included in this model. This observation might be evaluated within different research.

Neither GDP nor Population have significant impact on Innovation or any of variables, still the overall impact is positive.

There is strong relationship between the model and the dependent variable shown by R^2 value regarding both between and within variables. Within, the highest for health and primary education (0.571), and average R^2 value of 0.5195 . Between, the highest for Institutions (0.809), and average R^2 value of 0.7123 . Thus, indicating a high fit for the model.




Figure 2. Impact on Innovations, %, 2008–2017

Source: Author's conclusion is based on author's calculations.

There is strong relationship between the model and the dependent variable shown by R^2 value regarding both between and within variables. Within, the highest for Institutions (0.425), and average R^2 value of 0.3618. Same situations might be evaluated in between with the highest for Institutions (0.968), and average R^2 value of 0.9623. Overall, there is a 0.496 variance within separate panel units and 0.975 variance between the units' model accounts for, thus, indicating a high fit for the model.

Business sophistication

For this variable there were 165 observations done in 15 countries divided into 6 groups.

Based on calculation it might be concluded that the most important regressor affecting Business sophistications are the workforce with 0.664 per cent impact. Institutions has 0.525 per cent impacts and infrastructure reaches 0.197. All three are very significant for both Baltic states, but have spread among other groups, e.g. Institutions are significant only for Baltic States and Group 4, other regressor has the same importance only for group 2. Macroeconomics in terms of Business sophistications is not significant for the Baltic States with overall 0.031 per cent impact rate, but has high significance for groups 2 and 4.

It should be noticed that all the above mentioned regressor have a negative impact in Group 5 and Group 6 on the variable, which might be explained by the influence of other regressors that are not included in this model. This observation might be evaluated within different research.

In terms of Business sophistication, GDP have significant to very significant (macroeconomics and health) positive impact on all the regressors with average 0.0342 point per 1% change. Unlike the GDP, Population do not provide any significant impacts regarding Business sophistication.




Figure 3. Impact on Business sophistication, %, 2008–2017

Source: Author's conclusion is based on author's calculations.

There is strong relationship between the model and the dependent variable shown by R^2 value regarding both between and within variables. Within, the highest for Institutions (0.538), and average R^2 value of 0.2976. In between the highest for Infrastructure (0.972), and average R^2 value of 0.9618. Overall, there is a 0.581 variance within separate panel units and 0.938 variance between the units' model accounts for, thus, indicating a high fit for the model.

Labour market efficiency

For this variable there were 165 observations done in 15 countries divided into 6 groups.

Based on calculation it might be concluded that the most important regressor affecting Labour market efficiency are the workforce with 0.293 per cent impact. Institutions has 0.195 per cent impact and macroeconomics reaches 0.166. Both Workforce and Institutions are very significant for the Baltic states group, Macroeconomics is less significant comparing to others, but still has a positive rate of 0.166. Infrastructure capacity is significant, but has a negative impact rate for all the groups.

It should be noticed that all the above mentioned regressor have a negative impact on the variable among all other groups, which might be

explained by larger labour market capacity and economies in general. This might be discussed within a specific research paper.

Neither GDP nor Population have significant impact on Labour market efficiency or any of variables, still the overall impact is positive. This might be explained with knowledge intensive business specifics as well as EU border free market.




Figure 4. Impact on Labour market efficiency, %, 2008–2017

Source: Author's conclusion is based on author's calculations.

Comparing to the other dependent variable evaluation, there is slightly less strong relationship between the model and the dependent variable shown by R^2 value regarding both between and within variables. Within, the highest for Macroeconomic environment (0.283), and average R^2 value of 0.2243. In between the highest for Institutions (0.631), and average R^2 value of 0.5495. Overall, there is a 0.397 variance within separate panel units and 0.634 variance between the units' model accounts for, thus, indicating a high enough fit for the model.

Technological readiness

For this variable there were 165 observations done in 15 countries divided into 6 groups.

Based on calculation it might be concluded that the most important regressor affecting Technological readiness are the workforce with 0.644 per cent impact. Infrastructure has 0.411 per cent impact and Institutions reaches 0.293. All three indicators are very significant for the Baltic states group, but not significant for other Groups except Group 6, where whose regressors have negative impact.

Macroeconomics is less significant comparing to others, and has a negative rate of -0.01 per cent, which might be related to the amounts of co-financing from EU structural funds allocated based on economic development of the region.

It should be noticed that all the above mentioned regressor have a negative impact on the variable among all other groups, which might be explained by larger labour market capacity and economies in general. This might be discussed within specific research paper.

In terms of Technological readiness both GDP and Population have significant impact. GDP brings positive response from all of the regressor with average change of 0.051 point per 1% change, especially important for the macroeconomics (0.0602) and, health and primary education (0.0614).

Technological readiness has the highest R^2 values comparing to the other dependent variable evaluation, there is a very strong relationship between the model and the dependent variable shown by R^2 value regarding both between and within variables Within the highest for Infrastructure (0.778), and average R^2 value of 0.743. In between the highest for Macroeconomic environment (0.968), and average R^2 value of 0.5495. Overall, there is a 0.791 variance within separate panel units and 0.949 variance between the units' model accounts for, thus, indicating a high enough fit for the model.




Figure 5. Impact on Technological readiness, %, 2008–2017

Source: Author's conclusion is based on author's calculations

Conclusions

Based on results obtained from the developed random effects regression model, it might be concluded that Workforce is the most important and significant regressor, followed by Institutional capacity and Infrastructure, as for the Macroeconomic environment it remains less important for the knowledge intensive business development in national economies across the Baltic States.

Evaluating difference between various country groups it should be stated, that the Baltic States have more similar trends in common with High developed countries with High income, thus leading to the conclusion that in order to boost the capacity of knowledge intensive sector in national economy, Latvia should keep to the EU common strategy in terms of sustainable development, with special focus on enhancing existing workforce and major infrastructure.

In addition, it should be mentioned that within the selected time period, there were no significant annual changes noticed in terms of significance or importance of the analysed regressors.

Thus, it might be concluded that the prerequisites for the knowledge intensive business development is no directly linked to the macroeconomics factors, which lead to the confirmation of the formulated hypothesis that the expansion of the innovative business segment in the Latvian economy depends more on internal political factors than on market conditions and external financing.

The Technological readiness, comparing to the other dependent variables, has the highest R^2 values (71.9% within and 94.9% between), the lowest R^2 values are observed for the Labour market efficiency (39.7% within and 63.4% between). The average R -square is above the 54% in all regression (total number of columns per dependent variable) which means that more than 54% of variation on dependent variable can be explained by the independent variables.

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THE INFLUENCE OF DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES ON EMPIRICAL STUDIES CONCERNING CIO GENDER¹

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Abstract

Companies are more and more dependent on information technology (IT) and the buzzword digitization is present everywhere. Some companies are inventing new business models based on disruptive innovation supported by information technology. Others adapt these business models as followers. All these new business processes and underlying information technology need to be managed, serviced, and supported by IT organizations to ensure business continuity. Traditionally heads of the IT department have been fully responsible for all aspects of IT usage in the company – including IT cost, IT governance, IT & process planning and implementation and IT operation. This results in the fact that there is a need of more intensive business-IT alignment to ensure the adequacy of the overall IT architecture in a company and ensure the economic value contribution of IT as a whole. In the last two decades researchers have investigated the area of CIO effectiveness by doing empirical research looking at IT roles/tasks, interaction and strategic importance of IT, personal background of CIOs. As a side effect some researchers have constructed and used demographic variables both as control and causal variables. This article looks on the comparability and the source of such demographic data especially on the case of Gender information and highest academic title. It also discusses the question if survey results could be compared with representative datasets to evaluate validity of the sample and responses of empirical studies.

¹ A version of this article was prepared for and presented at the 3rd International Conference on Applied Research in Management, Business and Economics (ICARBME) online, 5–7 March 2021, Berlin, Germany.

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Keywords: Germany, Chief Information Officer (CIO), IT Organization, Gender, academic title, diversity.

Introduction

Synnott defined in 1981 the role of the chief information officer (CIO) as the “senior executive responsible for establishing corporate information policy, standards, and management control over all corporate information resources” (Synnott & Gruber, 1981).

Many studies have shown that the role of a CIO is essential for an organization. A CIO can positively influence the company performance not only by fostering IT efficiency, which means lowering cost and by this increase the profit, but also increase the IT effectivity through improved IT use (Durst, 2007).

Measures to drive IT efficiency include introducing tailored internal IT management systems (Schweda & Schmidt, 2014) efficient IT service management [ITSM] frameworks (Marrone & Kolbe, 2011) and the right organizational setup (Hodgkinson, 1992). An efficient budgeting and controlling process, which ensures that investments in technology deliver the planned results (Chan, Sabherwal & Thatcher, 2006) is essential. Measures to improve IT effectivity are supporting business processes with appropriate information technology (Tallon, 2014).

But ultimately a CIOs main task is to ensure “Business-IT-Alignment” (BITA). This results in strategic information technology initiatives driving business performance (Peppard, 2010).

Searching the Internet about the Keywords “CIO”, “Chief Information Officer”, “Gender”, “Woman” and “Diversity” result in many findings under the headline “Smashing the Glass Ceiling”⁴. Several publications can be found regarding the share of women in CIO positions (Prabhakar et al., 2018; Statista, 2018), about advantages of gender diversity in IT (Prabhakar et al., 2018) and reasons why only a small share of women climb the IT career ladder to the highest possible position (Fitzsimmons, Callan & Paulsen, 2014). Business Researchers like Harvey Nash & KPMG and Deloitte conduct global surveys frequently. The respondents are CIO and participant numbers are usually high ($N > 3000$). One aspect of these surveys is the share of women in CIO positions.

Also, Scientific research approaches Chief Information Officers. Yet the research scope usually is limited depending on the definition of the

⁴ The metaphor “Glass Ceiling” describes the invisible barrier which prevent minorities from rising to the highest level of hierarchy. In this context it describes the need for female candidates to work towards the highest hierarchy in IT which is the CIO position.

research object, the industry, or the regional scope. Another issue for scientific researchers is the availability of contact data and addresses. Not to forget the limited interest of business executives to answer surveys for scientific researchers as the results usually are not published in media which is freely or easily accessible for CIOs. And even if the data is freely available it sometimes takes month or years until the results are published by Journals or in monographs. By then the interest regarding the results is vanished in the fast-running business world.

Research Question


Are available data on CIO gender distribution – from scientific research, business research, company databases or statistics – a appropriate source for validating the representativeness of own survey based empirical research?

Methods

The main Methods for this research have been literature review of scientific, business and internet sources and Database analysis.

Literature Review

For scientific literature, Science Direct base been searched for the keywords “CIO”, Chief Information Officer” and only empirical quantitative research has been selected with a focus on effectivity and efficiency. After analysing the references for further relevant research a total of $n = 11$ articles where identified. The Literature review was done in line with the Prisma-P Method (Moher et al., 2015) and is illustrated in Figure 1.



¹ Data collection, review and selection process for Articles on: “CIO OR chief information officer” on Science Direct. Selection criteria: Subject areas: Business, Management and Accounting (110), Computer Science (56), Economics, Econometrics and Finance (31); Article type: Research articles (144), Review articles (3); No limitation on publication date; collected on 10.02.2021.

² Impact of the CIO role on the IT and Company performance.

Figure 1. Process of literature selection and used criteria of literature review to determine quantitative CIO effectiveness research

Source: Authors' literature review, displayed according to the PRISMA-P method (Moher et al., 2015).

The identified articles have been analysed for variables indicating Gender, Age and Education/Degree. Table 1 shows the appearance of variables in the papers.

Table 1. Overview of literature review regarding response rate of identified articles and inclusion of variables

First Autor	Year	Sampling frame	Responses	Response rate	Usable responses	Gender	Age	Education/Degree	Reference
Enns	2003	460		16%	75	yes	yes	yes	(Enns, Huff & Golden, 2003)
Schmaltz	2006	642	188	29%	185	no	no	no	(Smaltz, Sambamurthy & Agarwal, 2006)
Li	2006					no	yes	yes	(Li et al., 2006)
Chen	2007	3700			pre-test	no	yes	yes	(Chen & Preston, 2007)
Preston	2008	3763	451	12%		yes	no	yes	(Preston, Chen & Leidner, 2008)
Sobol	2009		123			yes	yes	yes	(Sobol & Klein, 2009)
Cohen	2010	421	114	27%	111	no	no	yes	(COHEN & DENNIS, 2010)
Chen	2011		218	23%		no	no	no	(Chen & Wu, 2011)
Li	2013	318	95	30%		no	yes	yes	(Li & Tan, 2013)
Ding	2014	2136	412	19%		no	yes	yes	(Ding, Li & George, 2014)
Pare	2020				72	no	no	no	(Paré, Guillemette & Raymond, 2020)

Source: Own results of literature review.

The additional information in Table 1 like the Sampling frame, Responses, Response rate and usable responses have been extracted from the research as they have been available.

For Business Research two consulting companies, which frequently publish CIO Survey results, have been chosen: Harvey Nash in cooperation with KPMG and Deloitte. Their reports have been analysed for information about female CIOs.

Database analysis

In addition to literature and internet-based information, a second method was used to generate alternative numbers for Germany. The company Bisnode maintains the former “Hoppenstedt Firmendatenbank”. This database consists of information about German companies with financial numbers, addresses and names of 1st and 2nd level managers. For this research, a selection of companies with the criteria of >125 Mio. € /a turnover was acquired (Table 2).

Table 2. Data of population and sample for database analysis

Population (Companies > 125 Mio. € Turnover per year in Germany)	7471	
Companies with available CIO Name	3021	40.44%

Source: Own results of data analysis.


The data was analysed with pivot tables to get valid information about Gender and doctoral degree in relation to industry and regional location.

Results and Discussion

Literature Review results on CIO Gender development

The data collected through literature review are shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Share of female CIOs from different data sources period 1995–2020



Source: Own results of data analysis. Data extracted from following sources: *[number in chart] region/area, (published by):* [1] US, (Enns, Huff & Golden, 2003); [2] US, (Sobol & Klein, 2009); [3] US/academic, (van Ness, 2017); [4] Germany, (Termer, 2015); [5] US/State, (Martineau, 2020); [6] Global, 2012–2015: (Harvey Nash and KPMG International, 2015), 2016, 2017: (Harvey Nash / KPMG, 2017), 2018: (Harvey Nash / KPMG, 2018), 2019: (Harvey Nash / KPMG, 2019), 2020: (White & Bates, 2020); [7] US, (Statista, 2018).

As can be seen in Figure 2, the share of female CIOs within one year can vary from study to study in a very wide range. The reason for this is the scope of these surveys (e.g. size of the company, region of the survey, industry/government, method of defining the population etc.) and very importantly the response behaviour of the participants. As no central repository of CIOs is available the problem of wide variations within one year will most likely remain.

Therefore, all these surveys with limited statistical significance on the gender distribution might therefor not be the right choice to determine if an own survey-based dataset is representative in terms of gender distribution.

Other approaches and sources to gain reliable data

Due to the limitations of using survey based public available data or statistics for comparison with own datasets, a different approach would be obtaining viable data of CIOs from other organizations. One approach would be to ask interest groups, professional associations, or online networks like cio.com for data. Yet, as all these organizations rely on voluntary membership associated with cost and/or journalistic research the data will be far from complete and reliable.

Company databases as source for reliable data

In the current data driven economy companies which collect, structure, and sell company and consumer information are important for a variety of business functions within a company like market research and direct marketing. The quality of this data is usually appropriate, as these companies earn their money with the information.

The following approach relies on such a dataset which contains information about the company, address, turnover and most importantly 1st and 2nd line managers and their functions.

The dataset described contains information about CIO Name, CIO Gender, CIO PhD Title, and the kind of management position (top or middle management) and if available further responsibilities within the company.

This data was analysed in two dimensions:

1st regarding the share of female CIOs in different industries (Table 3).

2nd regarding the share of female CIOs in different German federal states (Table 4).

Table 3. Share of female CIOs in different industries

	Very high	High	Medium	Low	Zero
Share of female CIOs	50–25%	24.9–10%	9.9–5%	4.9–0.1%	0%
in industries	2	6	14	15	33
Number of Companies	19	91	894	1804	213
industries:	-education -public transport	-publishing -telecommunication -textile and accessories -leather -air transport -agriculture (animal)	-construction -oil and petrol -furniture -electricity and gas supply -commercial services -real estate -leisure & recreation -technical & management services -chemicals -transport -food & beverage	-health services -metal processing -holding & investment -whole sale consumer goods -paper and pulp -whole sale investment goods -metalware -car dealers -electric & elektronik devices -transport facilities -mechanical engineering & computer -test instruments -banks -stone, glas and concrete -rubber & plastics	remaining industries

Source: Own calculations based on Hoppenstedt Firmendatenbank delivery from January 2021.

Table 4. Share of female CIOs in German federal states

Federal State	Ranking: Federal State gross domestic product	Rankings: number of companies with > 125 Mio. € turnover	Companies (N =)	Female CIO in %
Nordhein-Wesfahlen	1	1	743	4.7
Bayern	2	2	518	4.8
Baden-Württemberg	3	2	539	5.4
Niedersachsen	4	5	260	3.8
Hessen	5	4	312	3.8

Federal State	Ranking: Federal State gross domestic productt	Rankings: number of companies with >125 Mio. € turnover	Companies (N =)	Female CIO in %
Berlin	6	9	77	5.2
Rheinland Pfalz	7	7	105	1.0
Sachsen	8	10	57	10.5
Hamburg	9	6	160	6.9
Schleswig-Holstein	10	8	83	0.0
Brandenburg	11	12	32	6.3
Thüringen	12	15	18	11.1
Sachsen-Anhalt	13	13	32	3.1
Macklenburg-Vorpommern	14	16	16	6.3
Saarland	15	14	30	3.3
Bremen	16	11	39	5.1
Sum			3021	

Source: Own calculations based on Hoppenstedt Firmendatenbank delivery from January 2021 (gross domestic ranking based on published data from 2019 Statista, 2019).

The presented analysis of company databases is as diverse as the data extracted from scientific research and business surveys. The result of the share of female CIOs is highly dependent from the dimensions of analysis like regional location or industry branch affiliation of the companies. The finding that the highest share of female CIOs is – except for one case (Hamburg 6.9%) – found in former eastern Germany (11.1% Thüringen, 10.5% Sachsen, 6.3% Brandenburg and 6.3% Mecklenburg-Vorpommern). This shows that cultural differences resulting from former political systems might have long term impacts on gender demography.

Comparison of survey and database results

Volker Nissen and Frank Termer from the Technical University of Ilmenau showed 2013 in an internal, not published research Report (Termer & Nissen, 2013) for the University, that the share of female CIOs is highly diverse in different branches. The research based on the same address database from Bisnode and selection criteria was the same.

After further investigation of the results from Nissen and Termer (Nissen & Termer, 2014) a major deviation was found which does not allow direct

comparison of the results. The reason for this is that the Bisnode database classifies companies according to the well-established SIC Code⁵ (Standard Industrial Classification). Surveys from scholars (like the mentioned one from Nissen and Termer) often use other industry classification systematics which reflect industries which are important for a specific reason. One example for such a specialty is the “Automotive industry” category. Trying to match this category with the SIC Codes would require extracting certain companies from the Division D “Manufacturing” (SIC Codes 20-39). As the Bisnode database only uses the 2-digit code, an automated extraction of Automotive companies is not possible and therefore not part of this research.

Figure 3 shows the results from the analysis side-by-side for the distribution of companies in industries and the share of female CIOs in the industries in percent. I. is based on the survey results from Nissen and Termer and II. on the analysis of the 2021 Bisnode database extraction.




Figure 3. Comparison of results from survey 2013 ($n = 216$) and company database extract ($n = 3016$) from 2021. Charts on companies per industry and share of female CIO in percent for both datasets

Source: Own calculations based on unpublished data from the Technical University of Ilmenau (Termer & Nissen, 2013) and new analysis on an extract of the Bisnode Firmendatenbank (Companies with > 125 Mil. € Turnover).

⁵ The SIC Code (Standard Industrial Classification) was first established in 1937 and it is still in use by U.S. government departments and agencies. sicode.com Industry classification experts.

Conclusions

This methodological work shows that demographic data might vary depending on the dimensions of analysis, which are limited by the research object and the chosen population. It has a great influence on the comparability with other data sources. Great deviations can be observed within one year (see Figure 1 depending on the regional scope or the selection of companies). The next factors are sample size and response rate. While the response rate compared with the overall population for survey data is sometimes quite small (overall population ($n = 6602$), used responses ($n = 216$) = 3.27% in the case of Nissen/Termer (Nissen & Termer, 2014)) the “response rate” for the used company database is, with 40.44%, quite high as all complete datasets could be used for the calculations – See Table 2.

For this reason, researchers, which intend to test if their survey data is a representative sample in terms of a specific demographic variable, should thoroughly think and decide about the public available data which they want to compare their own data with to ensure statistic valid conclusions.

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SECULARISM AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA'S FOURTH REPUBLIC: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY

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Abstract

Nigeria is a plural state with diverse culture, ethnic and religious institutions. These portray the beauty of the country to the outside world and successive Nigerian governments have not ceased to preach the nation's desire to forge unity in diversity. However, the reality on the ground is that ethnic chauvinism, ethnic politics, ethnic consciousness, ethnic factionalization, religious fanaticism and extremism have overshadowed the desire for unity, which is a basic ingredient for national development. These are manifested in political and constitutional instabilities, ethnic and religious violence, bad leadership and governance, political competition for power, insecurity of lives and property, corruption, tribalism and nepotism, injustice, immoral acts, bloodshed, and intolerance. The challenges of national development in Nigeria assume such an awful proportion that seems to defy any kind of antidote; this is the stage at which the concept of secularism becomes most apt. This study therefore explored the effect of secularism on national development in Nigeria's fourth republic. A descriptive method was adopted and data was collected via a survey of 900 respondents comprises of Christian leaders, Muslim leaders, Traditional leaders, leaders of Civil Society groups and Youth leaders. Data collected were analysed using Pearson product moment correlation and linear regression analysis. The result of the study revealed that there is a positive and significant relationship between secularism and national development. The result also showed that secularism does have a significant effect on national development in Nigeria's fourth republic. Requisite recommendations and conclusion were provided in the light of theoretical and empirical findings.

Keywords: Nigeria, Secularism, National Development, Religion, Ethnicity, Unity.

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Introduction

Nigeria is a plural state with diverse ethnic and religious institutions. The country has over 350 ethnic groups and plethora of religious beliefs. Nigeria's societal base comprises indigenous societies ranging in scale from smallest autonomous village tribes to the largest kingdoms and empires of pre-colonial Africa. Within Nigeria, there are varieties of sects ranging from the Christian and Islamic sects, to those of African traditional religions (Ogoloma, 1996) which had threatened the unity of the country from time to time. The consequences of these cultural and traditional diversities are too many. That is why Nigerian unity and secular ideals has been threatened by the absence of strong feelings of patriotism and national integration (Ogolom, 2012) which are the basic ingredients for national development. These are manifested in political and constitutional instabilities, ethnic and religious violence, insecurity of lives and property, bad leadership and governance, political competition for power, intense local parochialism, tribalism and nepotism, sectionalism, injustice, corruption, immoral acts, bloodshed, intolerance, and other fissiparous tendencies. These situations ushered liminary coup and counter-coups in 1966 and the civil war that followed from June, 1967 to January 12, 1970. The recurrent competition for control of political power between the North and South, the fear of domination of the minority by the majority, regional greed, and the porous foundations of the country, became the main causes of the many coups and the long tenure of military rule in our short history as a nation (Azaiki, 2003 cited in Ogoloma, 2012).

The challenges of national development in Nigeria assume such an awful proportion that seems to defy any kind of antidote because of ethnic chauvinism, ethnic politics, ethnic consciousness, ethnic factionalization, religious fanaticism and extremism. This makes the concept of secularism to become most apt. According to BBC English Dictionary (1993), secularism is the belief that religion should have no influence on or connection with the running of a country. For example, in the educational or political system. Today, the philosophy that was called secularism tends to be labelled humanism or secular humanism and the concept of secularism, at least in the social sciences, is much more restricted. The first and perhaps most common understanding of "secular" today stand in opposition to "religious". According to this usage something is secular when it can be categorised with the worldly, civil, non-religious sphere of human life. A secondary understanding of "secular" is contrasted with anything that is regarded as holy, sacred, and inviolable. According to this usage something is secular when it is not worshipped, when it is not venerated and when it is open for critique, judgement, and replacement (Cline, 2008). This study therefore explored the effect of secularism on national development in Nigeria's fourth republic.

Statement of Problem

The extremity of religious practices in Nigeria created more problems than a blessing in the development of the nation. This has contributed to societal menaces such as ethno-religious conflicts, fusion of politics and religion, integration of ethnicity and religion. This has been a serious problem to the Nigerian constitution and the leaders of the country; past and present, military, civilian, among others uses resources from the government treasury to support pilgrimage to Mecca, Rome, and Jerusalem. A lot of billions were abused and still being abused to finance these functions while more than half of the country's population is wallowing in abject poverty and hardship yet the country, braggart its head as a secular state (Chentu, 2013). The birth of extreme practice of Islam and Christianity ushered in a serious problem to the act of governance. The issue of who constituted the majority group and the preference of their interest has long been a problem to the country. Ethnicity and religion move hand in hand in Nigeria but religion is more of a unifier of groups than ethnicity (Cinjel & Chujor, 2017). Religion generates sympathy, mass participation/involvement and also transcends ethnicity, but tends to compete with the state in its act of governance (Cinjel & Kachi, 2015). This can be seen in the violent conflicts in the country, the showcase of religious politics and the discrimination among citizens on the ground of religion (Sampson, 2014). The essence of secularism in the Nigerian constitution is to promote unity, balances, and the superiority of the state over all other institutions in the state (Bello, 2013). Therefore, the combination of governance and religious practices constituted a serious threat to the Nigerian constitution, national integration, and national development. In Nigeria, religious zealotry often equates secularisms to atheism and some blamed the problem to the fusion of governance or politics with religion in the country. It is against this backdrop that the following research questions were posited to guide the study.

1. Does secularism mean atheism as it is being peddled?
2. Is there any significant relationship between secularism and national development in Nigeria's fourth republic?
3. Does secularism have any effect on national development in Nigeria's fourth republic?

Objectives of the Study

1. To examine the concept of secularism and ascertain if secularism mean atheism as it is being peddled.
2. To examine the relationship between secularism and national development in Nigeria's fourth republic.
3. To determine the effect of secularism on national development in Nigeria's fourth republic.

Research Hypotheses

The null hypotheses were formulated to guide the researchers in finding answers to the second and third research questions:

H₁: There is no significant relationship between secularism and national development in Nigeria's fourth republic.

H₂: secularism has no significant effect on national development in Nigeria's fourth republic.

Literature review

Concept of Secularism

Secularism draws its intellectual roots from Greek and Roman philosophers such as Marcus Aurelius and Epicurus, Medieval Muslim polymaths such as Ibn Rushd, enlightenment thinkers like Denis Diderot, Voltaire Benedict Spinoza, John Locke, James Madison, Thomas Jefferson and Thomas Paine, and modern freethinkers, agnostic and atheists such as Bertrand Russell and Robert Ingersoll. Moreover, in Nigeria, secularism drew its root and strength from chapter one and article 10 of the 1999 constitution which states that, "the Government of the Federation or of a state shall not adopt any religion as state religion" (Ogoloma, 2012). The word "secular" is the coinage of the Latin word "saeculum" which denote an age of time, non-involvement in religious or spiritual affair and exclusion of religious from public affairs. It is the process by which religious element and dimension are being removed from a thing. A secular state on the other hand is a state in which the constitution transcends all persons and groups. It is a kind of state at which the state surpasses and also has power over all other institutions (Cinjel & Chujor, 2017). According to Galtung (2014), a secular state is a state that removes religious colours in its act of governance. It is usually practice among pluralist and heterogeneous society and the essence is to give group her sense of self-expression, freedom, and unity.

In the words of Holyoake (1846), secularism is a way of promoting a social order separate from religion, without actively dismissing or criticising religious belief. Secularism is the religion of humanity; it embraces the affairs of this world; it is interested in everything that touches the welfare of a sentient being; it advocates attention to the particular planet on which we happen to live; it mean that each individual counts for something; it is a declaration of intellectual independence; it means the pew is superior to the pulpit, that those who bear the burdens shall have the profits and that they who fill the purse shall hold the strings (Ingersoll, 1853 cited in Ademowo, 2014). Ingersoll further claims that secularism is a protest against ecclesiastical tyranny, against being a serf, subject or slave of any

phantom, or of the priest of any phantom. It is a protest against wasting this life for the sake of one we know not of. It proposes to let the gods take care of themselves. It means living for ourselves and each other for the present instead of the past, for this world instead of another. In political terms, secularism is a movement towards the separation of religion and government. This refers to reducing ties between a government and a state religion, replacing laws based on scripture (such as the Ten Commandments in Christianity and Sharia law in Islam) with civil laws, and eliminating discrimination on the basis of religion. This is said to add to democracy by protecting the rights of religious minorities (Suleiman, 2008).

According to Gbadegesin (1988), the contemporary usage of the word "secularism" can be of two forms, namely, hard secularism, according to Gbadegesin, considers religious propositions to be epistemologically illegitimate, warranted by neither reason nor experience. While in the view of soft secularism, the attainment of absolute truth was impossible and therefore scepticism and tolerance should be the guiding principle and overriding values soft secularism is therefore more receptive as it appreciates certain 'truism' or truth in all religious and/or even unbelief. In the context of this study, secularism is defined as the political principle or philosophy that there must exist some sphere of knowledge, values, institutions, and action that is independent of religious authority. If there is no such secular sphere, then everything is under ecclesiastical control and this undermines the possibility for liberty and autonomy.

Secularism and the Nigerian Nation

The Nigerian constitution pre-supposes that an individual has freedom to practice religion of his or her choice without government interference. This is where secularism comes into play. Secularism is a legal position in the supreme law of Nigeria, stating that religious belief should not influence any public and/or government decisions. In other words, secularism is a documented position in a constitution relating to political belief in the separation of religion and state. While people are allowed to practice whatever they believe in as their religion, the government must not allow that to influence public policy. Religion is the service and worship of God or gods. The word "religion", which was first used in the 13th century, is Latin in its origin. From a sociologist perspective, the society creates religion as an instrument in moulding, controlling, and directing societal thinking and behaviour (Durkheim, 1915). Therefore, in a secular state, citizenry is allowed to practice whatever kind of religion of their kind but the law of the state which is enforceable through the constitution exceeds and transcends all other laws (Ghali, 2008).

Nigeria is a heterogeneous state with different groups practicing diverse religion. The only emblem that gave the nation power over the diverse groups is the secular outlook which empowered the constitution over every institution. It also created a sense of balance and harmony among the diverse groups (Gofwen, 2010). However, the place and position of religion has continued to compete with the state in Nigeria and the aftermath of their clash is violent conflict (Igwere, 2007). Reasoning along similar line, Sampson (2014) posits that anyone saying Nigeria is a secular nation does not understand the meaning of the word “secular”. There is nothing secular about Nigerian nation since whatever we do will always put Islam and Christianity in the fore front. A statement by Archbishop Olunmi Okogie, the Catholic Bishop of Lagos Diocese, represents the Christian community’s perception on the relationship between the state and religion: ‘when you are in a position of trust, forget about your religion because it is a private affair between you and your God. If you want to bring religion in, let it be after office hours’. On the other hand, Northern Muslims have consistently maintained a hostile view of secularism since independence in 1960, describing the concept as atheism or irreligion, a perception consistently expressed whenever reference is made to Nigeria as a secular state. The *Jamma’atu Nasril Islam (JNI)* the society for the victory of Islam for example, argued that ‘secularism is a system of social teachings or organisation which allows no part of religion’, while Sheik Abubakar Gummi, the late pillar of Islamic activism in Nigeria, said ‘a secular state is an atheistic state’. Another Muslim intellectual, Ibrahim Suleiman, argued that ‘secularism is hostile to Islam. It seeks to undermine Islamic values, supplant the Islamic laws with those of its own and deface the sanctity of the Muslim society’. With this divergent view of secularism by the two dominant religious groups, it was only a matter of time before the contradictions inherent in the seemingly secular Nigerian state bequeathed by the British colonialists would manifest themselves (Sampson, 2014).

Regardless of the popular misconceptions that surround it, secularism is not a principle of anarchy (even though there are many religious people who would give it this interpretation to condemn it). Secularism is a principle of tolerance. A secular society that is established on the principle of secularism does not force beliefs (or unbelief) on its citizens; neither does it limit the expression of people’s beliefs, and even unbelief (Ademowo, 2014). A secular state is therefore any state or country purports to be officially neutral in matters of religion, supporting neither religion nor irreligion; a state that treats all its citizens equally regardless of religion or non-religiosity; and claims not to or ceases to give preferential treatment(s) to a citizen (or citizens) of a particular religion over another with different religions or non-religious affiliation(s).

Historically, the process of secularising states typically involves the following:

1. Granting religious freedom.
2. Disestablishing state religions.
3. Stopping public funds to be used for a religion.
4. Freeing the legal system from religious control.
5. Freeing up the education system.
6. Tolerating citizens who change religion or abstain from religion.
7. Allowing political leadership to come to power regardless of religious beliefs.

These ideals are so endearing, hence Wing and Varol (2007) exhaustively as follows:

First, in secular regimes, sovereignty belongs to the nation and not a divine body. Second, religion is separate from state in a secular government. Religion does not affect the government's affairs, meaning that laws and regulations are not based on religion. Third, a secular government is neutral towards all religions. As such, the regime cannot have an official religion and does not protect one religion over another. Likewise, all individuals, irrespective of their religion, are equal before the law. Fourth, a secular regime requires the education and the legal systems to be secular. The legal system does not contain laws based on religion, and the education system is based on logic and science, not religion or dogmas. Fifth, a secular government requires freedom of religion and conscience. Thus, secularism does not mean the absence of religion from society. Individuals are free to exercise their religions and manifest their religious beliefs in both the private and the public sphere. Finally, a secular regime is based on pluralism, which requires the government's respect for all religions and religious beliefs.

On the basis of these characteristics, therefore, the following queries are appropriate: where does sovereignty reside in Nigeria – in the state or in a divine body? To what extent are Nigerian laws insulated from religious dogmas? Is the Nigerian state neutral and fair in its dealings with all religions? Are Nigerian legal and educational systems independent? Does the Nigeria constitution guarantee freedom of religion and conscience? Does the Nigerian state adhere to the principle of religious pluralism (respect for all religions)?

In the preamble of the Nigerian constitution, the state is secular and it enthused:

We the people of the Federal Republic of Nigeria have solemnly resolved to live in unity and harmony as one indivisible, indissoluble, democratic, and sovereign nation under God, to provide for our self a constitution for the purpose of promoting the good government and welfare of all persons in our country on the principle of freedom, equality, and justice.

And in section 14(1) (a), the constitution enthused:

Sovereignty belongs to the people of Nigeria from whom government through this constitution derives all its powers and authority.

The important of this provision is that where as sovereignty resides in the state, the state in itself derives its sovereignty ultimately from the people who had collectively yielded sovereignty to the state via the constitution. However, most leaders of the country, both liminary and civilian have incorporated this practice in the country, but with some certain modifications from what secularism entail (Jibrin, 2009) created the weaker and has worsen the foundation for secularism in Nigeria. This is as a result of the involvement of the country in the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the preference bestowed on one religion over the other, a position of non-delicate balance in which some religious groups live in fear and at a state of marginalisation (Cinjel & Chujor, 2017). Most government in Nigeria often claimed and pronounces secularism whereas, it is only applicable in written and is not being practice. As Sampson (2014) has observed concerning Nigeria's respect for religious inclusiveness. For instance, Muslim and Christian holidays are observed. Nobody respects the wishes of traditionalists. Politicians want power to rotate between Christians and Muslims as if every Nigerian must be either a Christian or a Muslim. Pilgrimages are sponsored by the state. The billions of Naira that is often channelled for pilgrimage in Saudi Arabia, Israel and Italy suggest the opposite of secularism (Jibrin, 2009). But no one gives a thought about traditional religious adherents.

In addition, there are an unofficial tradition of making Christian and Muslim prayers at every official and state function in disregard to animists and other religious adherents. The Presidential State House has a church and mosque in it, while states' government houses have either churches or mosques, depending on the religious predominance of a religion in the state (Sampson, 2014). The challenges from different angle like the movement and the establishment of sharia law among northern states during the second tenure and reign of Olusegun Obasanjo is a prototypical example, the clash of the Islamic movement in Nigeria with the Nigerian military in the recent times, the homage of the country's leaders to religious leaders and the incorporation of the place of Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) and Importers Association of Nigeria (IAN) in Nigeria is a visible feature of the confusion. What seem sympathetic is that plethora of the country population are wallowing in abject poverty while Government is busy channelling funds to support religious institution which has continue to be a threat to state cohesion and peaceful co-existence of the country. Reasoning along similar line, Igwara (2007) and Yesufu (2016) affirmed that Nigeria is a confused and a fail state with a constitution that is loose and only applicable to the poor. Secularism is merely in a written from than in practice and if care is not taken, religious apparatus would one day

dominate the state. In 2015, *Yarim Sanni*, a former governor of *Zamfara State* marry an underage and it was the place of religion that transcend, also, in 2011 during the post-election violence, religion dominate the scene. In most societal conflict in Nigeria, it is religion that often raises its ugly head above other institutions. Where is the power of the state and the constitution in Nigeria? (Cinjel & Chujor, 2017).

Also, at the national level, the cultural and traditional diversities equally manifested itself especially in the way issues were tackled in the parliament. Legislative activity in the National Assembly and its outcomes demonstrate a strong deference to religious bias. For example, the attempt by the senate to enact a law legalizing prostitution was condemned by legislators who cited religious reasons to delegitimise it. In the same vein, some Nigerian laws are laden with religious substance. The Penal Code Act, which is modelled after the Sudan criminal code, has significant sharia flavour, while the enactment of laws like Same Sex Marriage (prohibited) Act 2006, where influenced by religious arguments. The English laws, runs concurrently with customary and Islamic laws, and there is a strong religious influence on the Nigeria legal system generally. In addition, there are laws establishing religious institutions which are wholly funded by government. For instance, the Muslim National HAJJ Commission of Nigeria, and the Nigeria Christian Pilgrims Commission (Sampson, 2014). Therefore, one can assert that Nigeria falls short of the characteristics of secularity which requires laws devoid of religious bias. From the foregoing, one can argue, therefore, that whereas religious pluralism is guaranteed in the constitution, the religious neutrality requisite for characterizing a state as secular is absolutely lacking in Nigeria.

National Development

The concept of national development has been defined from different perspectives. Development means different things to different people. For some, it means making a better life for all. To others, development means economic growth (increase in GDP). Development is also equated with progress and modernity (Willis, 2005). According to Martinussen (1997), the various conceptions of national development include economic growth, increased welfare and human development, modernization, elimination of dependency, dialectical transformation, and capacity building. The growth rate of a country's per capital income compared to those of other countries can be used to describe its level of national development (Lucas, 1988). This increase in per capital income must however be accompanied by an unprecedented shift of the society from a condition considered to be unacceptable to a more acceptable one in terms of poverty level, employment, creativity, efficiency, productivity, and quality.

In the words of Arndt (1987), national development is a process of total improvement of human behaviours, values, language, cultures, institutions, and physical structures. It is about political stability, economic viability, and educational and intellectual sustainability. It borders on the sovereignty of the nation, the welfare of the people, the reign of peace and the rule of law. In short national development signifies total progress. Specifically, it connotes among other conceptions, the process of economic growth, normally reflected in the gross domestic product (GDP) per capital ranking of economies, provided annually by the World Bank. The United Nation Development Programme (UNDP) report 2002 cited in Oladosu (2015), identified the key attributes of national development to include:

- a. Regard for fundamental human rights and freedom.
- b. Citizen's involvement in taking decisions that affects them.
- c. All inclusive rules, practices and institutions governing social interaction that is fair to all.
- d. A system that enables citizens to hold accountable their decision makers
- e. Equal opportunities for all irrespective of gender, race, nationality, ethnic background, etc.
- f. Secured future.
- g. Sound socio-economic policies aimed at addressing the needs and aspirations of the citizenry.
- h. Improved standard of living guaranteed by poverty reduction strategies.

Also, in a related World Bank's World Development Report (WB-WDR) 1991 cited in Akingbola (2009), national development attributes include:

1. Better and qualitative education.
2. Clean environment.
3. Effective and efficient utilities.
4. Adequate and functional social and economic infrastructures.
5. High quality of Health and nutrition.
6. Increased and equality of opportunities.

National development as argues by Cainen (2009) means the extent to which people are free from forced labour, child labour, compulsory work permits and censorship. It also measures the extent to which women and ethnic minorities enjoy political, legal, social, and economic equality, as well as the extent to which trade unions enjoy freedom of operation. Cainen's thoughts are in line with the Human Freedom Index (HFI) which brings to fore the removal of major sources of unfreedom: poverty as well as tyranny, poor economic opportunities as well as a systematic social deprivation, neglect of social facilities as well as intolerance or overactivity of repressive states. As observed from the foregoing, ensuring human welfare is the ultimate goal of national development. Thus, an

overwhelming improvement in the quality of life occasioned by a rise in productivity, energy, employment, etc., indicates national development.

In the light of the various national development indices, no country can be described as 'developed' except that which enjoys remarkable calm, harmony, tranquillity and whatever it takes genuine peace to reign. A good percentage of its citizens must be economically buoyant, socially amiable, and culturally well exposed. They must have a sound educational background, acceptable political system, increased industrial output, a democratically elected government, and a very high standard of living. A developed nation would have minimal cases of poverty, ignorance, diseases, accidents and all forms of artificial mishaps and abnormal behaviours, zero tolerance for corruption and all forms of abominable acts (Oladosu, 2015). Going by these criteria, Nigeria does not seem to comfortably satisfy the essential practical requirements for national development, particularly from the perspective of the reign of peace and religious tolerance.

Secularism and National Development

The return of multiparty democracy raised hopes as to the arrival of the solution of Nigeria's crises of governance – good governance, the rule of law, freedom as well as institutional, infrastructural, and national development. However, some religious activities have deterred the spate of political development in Nigeria, negative religious fundamentalists in the northern region of the country have been discovered to be a threat to sustainable national development (Iwuoha, 2014). Religion in Nigeria functions as a means for the perpetration of violence, fuelling ethnic preciousness and solidarity, acquisition of political power and socio-economic gains, massive killings and the wanton destruction of lives and vandalising of property of those considered infidels or who pay allegiance to other religions. This is traced to the acrimony between the two dominant religions – Islam and Christianity which had often resulted in the struggle for power and supremacy, bitter feud and wanton destruction of lives and properties. This religious madness had like a cataclysmic vortex devastated the ground for sustainable socio-economic development of Nigeria (Ngele, 2008). This argument is still forceable today. The emergence of Boko Haram in northern Nigeria has affected negatively the political, economic, social, and environmental situation of the region and in extension Nigerian economy. The continuous killing and destruction of lives and properties in northern Nigeria in the name of Islam has a negative effect on the economy of northern states and Nigeria at large. Economic activities have almost been grounded by series of terrorist attacks in Borno, Yobe, Sokoto and Benue States, living people stranded, jobless and some refuges in their home land. Many businessmen, companies both local and foreign

have left some of these 'worst hit' states depriving government millions of tax revenue that would have been collected if economic activities are booming. The government is only left with diversion of money meant for development of the country and improvement of living standard of people to heavy spending on security (Ajaegbu, 2012). This is a clear negative influence of religion on national development in Nigeria.

The apparent linkage between religion and national development attracts criticism. According to Cohen (2002), there is either no logical reason to link religion to economic development or insufficient empirical evidence of any actual linkage. Wallerstein (1974) expressed high scepticism of seeing capitalist development as guided by religion. He argued that any complex system of ideas can be manipulated to serve any particular social or political objective. Any connection between religion and economics is likely the one in which the latter is cause and the former effect. Religion is a source not only of intolerance, human rights violations, and extremist violence, but also of non-violent conflict transformation, the defence of human rights, integrity in government and reconciliation and stability in divided societies (Appleby, 1996 cited in Ajaegbu, 2012). Therefore, if there must be development in Africa generally and in Nigeria in particular, finding common ground between Muslims and Christians is not simply a matter for polite ecumenical dialogue between selected religious leaders. This is because if Muslims and Christians are not at peace as we are presently witnessing, there cannot be any meaningful development. Development in Africa in general and Nigeria in particular is at stake if these two major world religions refuse to cooperate with one another. Both of these religions (Islam and Christianity) in turn should also be ready to accommodate other religious faiths especially the African Traditional religions instead of denigrating and demonising them (Gbadegesin & Adeyemi-Adejolu, 2016).

The analysis above reveals that, though opposition to secularism is ostensibly founded on its apparent anti-religiosity, the concept does not necessarily connote agnosticism or atheism. Instead, the cultural basis of religion as a fulcrum for political mobilization has been exploited by politicians to portray secularism as promoting atheism and moral degeneracy. This perception has served to degrade the utility of secularism while reinforcing an unholy matrimony between religion and politics at the expense of national security and development. Nigerian politicians have historically leveraged religion and religious identity to gain political advantages for themselves. The elite have used religion as a tool of exploitation to achieve selfish socio-economic ends, while politically deploying religious fanaticism and favouritism to polarise the people and sustain unhealthy tension in the country. To date, public officials use public funds as a tool for political patronage, thereby generating resentment and outrage from rival religious groups (Sampson, 2014).

In view of Nigeria's extant multi-religiosity, and having advertence to the unsavoury inter-religious relations that are created by the blurred relationship between religion and politics, subscription to concessional secularism is strongly advocated. Secularism and national development are seemingly inseparable. Secularism promotes pluralism and dispersal of governmental powers, which is good for a multi-ethnic society like Nigeria. Secularism and national development are implicitly related and mutually complementary and compatible. Indeed it would be difficult, if not impossible, to conceive of national development if Nigeria failed to subscribe to the tenet of secularism as advocated in the Nigerian constitution. National development, says Cinjel and Chujor (2017), can exist only where there is subscription to moderate secularism; the absence of national development is, ipso facto, the absence of secularism as advocated in the Nigerian constitution. It can be gleaned from the constitutional provisions examined above that there is an understanding, in principle, among all Nigerians that state affairs should be separated from religious affairs. This could be achieved through intellectual development in the province of secularism and religious pluralism. The establishment of an institute for secularism and religious pluralism is advocated. The institute should be charge with the onus of research and publication as well as advocacy in these fields of study. Once sufficient awareness has been developed of the shared values of religion, the desired values of religious pluralism and the fundamental principles of secularism, a constitutional recognition of secularism would be made easier (Sampson, 2014). As long as the religious adherents are largely ignorant or at most ill-informed concerning what secularism represents, the religious power blocs would continue to present their self-seeking conception of secularism, with the clandestine aim preserving the status quo which benefits them (Sampson, 2014) at the expense of national development.

Forces Threatening the Growth of Secularism and National Development in Nigeria

Ethnicity

Like any other terminology employed by social scientists, the concept of ethnicism is a term that does not lend itself to easy definition. To fully understand this, some related concept like 'ethnic group' and 'ethnicity' needs to be defined. Ethnic group is an informal interest group whose members are distinct from the members of other ethnic groups with the larger society because they share kinship, religious and linguistics ties (Cohen, 1974). This means that an ethnic group consists of those who are themselves alike by virtue of their common ancestry, language, and

culture, and who are so regarded by others (Salawu & Hassan, 2011). Ethnicity on the other hand, means the interactions among members of diverse groups (Nnoli, 1978). According to Achebe (1983: 8), Ethnicity is “discrimination against a citizen because of his place of birth”. In Nigeria, the word ‘ethnicity and tribalism’ are used interchangeably. In all political activities in Nigeria, the factor of ethnicity is reflected. It is particularly obvious in areas like voting, distribution of political offices, employment, and government general patronage of the citizens (Salawu & Hassan, 2011). The experience in Nigeria so far, is that as the nation aspires for socio-economic transformation, growth and development, parochial considerations based on ethnic colorations tend to impede the quest for unity which is a basic ingredient for national development. However, Ajayi and Owumi (2013) affirm that it would not be easy to identify a country that is not affected by issues triggered by ethnicity but some countries’ situations are particularly striking because of the lessons they provide regarding the impact of ethnicity on national development. While ethnicity is a politically neutral concept and does not pose any danger to democracy or development but rather could positively engender development where interactions and interrelationships are healthy, it is the politicization and manipulation of ethnicity that poses a problem (Salawu & Hassan, 2011). This aspect of ethnicism in Nigerian situation has set one ethnic group against another with immeasurable consequences, mostly hostility in the form of interethnic violence.

Religion

Religion as the oldest discipline in human society is the most difficult concept to define. This is because religion has passed through many critical stages from the medieval period to the modern times. It has suffered great deal in the hands of the rationalists, enlightenment and modern thinkers who have shown how irrelevant it is to societal development (Gbadegesin & Adeyemi-Adejolu, 2016). According to Gilbert (1980: 5), religion is “any system of values, beliefs, norms and related symbols and rituals, arising from attempts by individuals and social groups to effect certain ends, whether in this world or any further world, by means wholly or partly supernatural”. Similarly, Vernon (1962) defined religion as that part of culture composed of share beliefs and practices which not only identify or define the supernatural and the sacred and man’s relationship thereto, but which also relate them to the known world in such a way that the group is provided with moral definitions as to what is good (in harmony with or approved by the supernatural) and what is bad (contrary to out of harmony with the supernatural). By Religion, Obilor (2003) cited in Iwuoha (2014) interprets it as a capacity

or a power which enables man to observe the laws of his nature, the natural law and/or of the divine law. According to Obiefuna and Uzoigwe (2012), religion reflects, sustains, and legitimises social order. Iwuoha (2014) believes that religion occupies a distinctive place in the enterprise of world-building. The effort to build a developed nation could advance dramatically if religious people advocate national development. Religious traditions in Nigeria enjoy moral authority and broad grassroots presence that out them in a powerful position to shape the worldviews and lifestyles of millions of people within the nation. As it has been rightly observed, all religions possess one or more of five sources of power: They shape people's worldviews; wield moral authority; have the ear of multitudes of adherents; often possess strong financial and institutional assets and are strong generators of social capital, an asset in community building (Gbadegesin & Adeyemi-Adejolu, 2016).

However, based on the increasing rise of religious bigots and extremists, one may be tempted to suggest that religion is not relevant to societal development and hence should be extricated from human social life. Religion has been used, abused, and misused by political elites, and unfortunately by the so-called clerics of Christianity and Islam, so much that it has continued to cause conflagrations all over the world. Even in the so-called secular societies, religion has not only penetrated but has also continued to be a source of concern as a result of its damaging nature in those societies. Nigerian experience is one among many of the countries witnessing Islamic extremists' senseless killings and maiming of innocent lives (sadly women and children are not spared) all over the world (Gbadegesin & Adeyemi-Adejolu, 2016). Religious riot orchestrated by Maitatsine and the Shiite sects holding tenaciously to their religious dogma including sacrificing anything including their own lives and those of other persons in pursuits of their heinous objectives, have in no small measure disturbed the relative peace and security of lives and properties of the inhabitants of this country (Iwuoha, 2014). In addition, the Nigerian constitution stipulates that we are Nigerians first and then Christians and Muslims second. However, some fanatics from the north who are elected officials are insisting that Muslims are Muslims first and Nigerians second. By this, they are entitled to live by the sharia Islamic Law. These Muslims' leaders always want the constitution to be subordinate to sharia law. Ogoloma (2012) posits that sharia law is subordinate to the constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria. There should be no circumventing of the constitution. Sharia can never be superior to the constitution and absolutely wrong to operate two sets of contradictory laws in any state.

Competition for Political Power

The sudden and apparent emergence of the Boko Haram sect in the history of the country was meant to destabilise the Jonathan's Administration as well as the equilibrium the country has been brought to by the government. Nevertheless, the emergence of Boko Haram sect has been attributed to the political rivalry between the north and the South towards controlling the political power in the country. Poverty of the majority of the Muslim people too has been attributed to it. But how could that be explained when we realize that for most of the independence years, the northerners have been at the helm of affairs of this country if this is to be accepted (Ogoloma, 2012). Reasoning along similar line, Adigwe (2004) affirmed that Nigerian politicians have found it very useful, even more in recent times, to cling to one religious group or the other as if that group were the driving force or sources of their political power, while at the same time wanting all of the people to believe that they strive to govern them, or are governing them in the name of God. As a result of competition for political power, political aspirants now have "prophet", "Imams" and "native doctors and seers" whom they consult regularly, especially in times of crises. In Nigeria, almost all politically motivated riots and crises have religious overtones while all religiously motivated crises have political implications. While some religious crises, are engineered either by politicians or the government in power to achieve political goal or interest.

Tribalism

According to Ogolomo (2012), tribalism is the twin broth of ethnicity and has been the major cause of the domestic political instability in the country immediately after independence and until the early 1990s. This is noticeable in the utterances of the leaders from Igbo), made from time to time especially when they are not in power such as the marginalisation of the North and their interests or the marginalisation of the Igbos and their interests, without any damper and whimper for the feelings of the minorities from where the bulk of the federal revenue comes from. The surprising aspects of these statements and words are that, sometimes, it comes out from former heads of state, federal ministers, or other high government functionaries. Tribalism has been a thorn in the flesh of the country like every other African country. It has been against development of the country and the continent as a whole. Tribalism has led to ethnic politics and the issue of marginalisation. In the process, this has led equally to ethnic mistrust and under development (Ogoloma, 2012).

Other Forces

Corruption, nepotism, injustice, immoral acts, political and institutional instabilities, bloodshed, and tolerance are other forces that threaten the growth of secularism and national development in Nigeria's fourth republic. From the foregoing, it is obvious that secularism does not mean irreligion or disregard of the sacred as some have attempted to assert. Consistent with the Muslim perspective on secularism discussed above, Sampson (2014) affirmed that a nation is secular only if it is concerned with temporal, worldly matters to the exclusion of religion or the profane in disregard of the sacred. In this view, Nigeria is not a secular state, to the extent that it is concerned with both temporal and religious matters. This is the general illogic that pervades Islamic literature on secularism in Nigeria. In reality, secularism does not detract from religious devotion; instead, it reinforces it. This is because a secular state guarantees freedom of religion and conscience, thereby enabling all religious adherents to practice their faiths uninhibitedly.

Theoretical Framework

The theoretical bedrock of this study are the demand-side theory and supply-side theory by Norris and Inglehart (2004). The demand-side and supply-side theory was developed to explain how a state can construct its attitude to religious. The demand-side theory focus 'bottom-up' on the mass public suggesting that as societies industrialise, religious habits will gradually erode, and the public will become indifferent to spiritual appeals. The supply-side theory, on the other hand, focuses 'top-down' on religious organisations as it emphasises that public demand for religion is constant and any cross-national variations in the vitality of spiritual life are the product of its supply in religious market (Norris & Inglehart, 2004). The supply-side theory therefore suggests that the more churches or mosques or/and other religious centre established, the more people will become attracted to religion. However, whichever of the two is explored, the buck stops on the table of the state actors; the state can decide which path it wishes to take to institute secularism and channel its path to secularisation.

According to Gbadegesin (1988), there are currently four ways in which a state can construct its attitude to religions: (1) *Secular Attitude of Indifference (SAI)* – This means an attitude to religion whereby the state exhibits lack of concern about religions and religious matters. The state with this attitude is expected to be indifferent to the existence or non existence of religions. But the truth is that there is hardly any state that can afford to be unconcerned about religious matters since they have the tendency of being relatively dangerous and volatile or affect the social

order (2) *Secular Attitude of Rejection (SAR)* – The state that operates this attitude is secular if it rejects all religious considerations; including overt or covert relationship with religions. The secular state that operates on this assumption rejects religious considerations an anti-development. One however needs to take a second look to understand how it is possible for a state to adopt and operate based on this mantra (Ademowo, 2014). (3) *Secular Attitude of Exclusion (SAE)* – This is the total omission of religious considerations in the plans of the state. Religion and religious groups are not recognised as religious but as social group. However, the possibility of a state operating with this attitude is very low because no state (Secular or otherwise) can afford to exclude (omit) religious considerations (in general) from its calculations, if only because of the prudential need to arm itself against subversive activities of religious adherents. (4) *Secular Attitude of Accommodation (SAA)* – This means that the secular state will seek to treat all religious equally in recognition, supports and funding. None of the religions and religious groups will be taken or recognised as higher than the others.

All the four attitudes outlined above have implications on the nature of secularity of the state. However, to Gbadegesin (1988) and Yesufu (2016), the main focus of secularism is the separation of religion from politics, and state actors must never lose sight of this. Therefore, an adequate interpretation of the principle of secularism that guides the secularisation of processes must essentially include at least four related elements with respect to the separation of religion from politics. These elements are:

- 1) Refusal of the state to adopt an official religion.
- 2) Non-encouragement of the incursions of institutionalized religions into the affairs of the state or into matters which are best handled by the state.
- 3) Neutrality of the state to religion and religious matters unless they are subversive or threaten the existence of the state or are in other ways harmful to human interest.
- 4) Non-sponsorship and non-patronage of religious programmes or events by the state (Gbadegesin, 1988).

Methodology

The study assessed the impact of secularism on national development in Nigeria's fourth republic. The descriptive approach was adopted and data was collected via a survey of 900 respondents comprises of Christian leaders, Muslim leaders, Traditional leaders, leaders of Civil Society Groups and Youth leaders randomly selected in each geopolitical zone as shown below.

Table 1. Population of the Study

Geopolitical Zones	Christian Leaders	Muslim Leaders	Traditional Leaders	Civil Societies	Youth Leaders	Total
South-South	Delta (30)	Bayelsa (30)	Edo (30)	Rivers (30)	Akwa-Ubom (30)	150
South-West	Lagos (30)	Osun (30)	Ekiti (30)	Ogun (30)	Oyo (30)	150
South-East	Anambra (30)	Abia (30)	Ebonyi (30)	Enugu (30)	Imo (30)	150
North-West	Kaduna (30)	Kano (30)	Sokoto (30)	Zamfara (30)	Kebbi (30)	150
North-Central	Kwara (30)	Plateau (30)	Kogi (30)	FCT (30)	Niger (30)	150
North-East	Bauchi (30)	Borno (30)	Yobe (30)	Taraba (30)	Adamawa (30)	150
Total	180	180	180	180	180	900

Source: Researchers' Fieldwork, 2018.

Sampling Technique

The non-probabilistic method was adopted to target respondents with knowledge about the specific issues in the study. Sample was drawn from the six geopolitical zones to elicit views on the relationship between secularism and national development and the impact of secularism on national development in Nigeria's fourth republic.

Reliability and Validity of the Instrument

Structure questionnaire were design to elicit needed information. The reliability was established through a trial test conducted on 100 respondents in South-South who also took part in the study. Cronbach Alpha method was used to establish the internal consistency of the instrument as shown in the table below.

Table 2. Reliability Statistics of Variable

Scale	Number of Items	Cronbach's Alpha
Secularism	13	0.834
National development	16	0.783

The results yielded a coefficient of 0.834 and 0.783, which satisfied the general recommended level of 0.70 for the research indicators (Cronbach, 1951). Experts also judged the face and content validity of the questionnaire as adequate. Hence, researchers satisfied both reliability and validity of the scale.

Data presentation, analysis, and interpretation

Distribution of Questionnaire and Response Rate

The study examined the impact of secularism on national development in Nigeria's fourth republic. To achieve this, nine hundred (900) questionnaires were administered across the six geopolitical zones. Of the 900 questionnaires distributed out of which 523 questionnaires representing 58.1% were retrieved as shown in the table below.

Table 3. Distribution of Questionnaire and Response Rate

S/N	Geopolitical Zones	Questionnaire Distributed	Questionnaire Retrieved	Percentage (%)
1	South-South	150	109	12.1
2	South-West	150	97	10.8
3	South-East	150	101	11.2
4	North-West	150	88	9.8
5	North-Central	150	62	6.9
6	North-East	150	66	7.3
	Total	900	523	58.1

Source: Researchers' Fieldwork, 2018.

Table 4. Correlation Matrix

Variables		Secularism	National Development
Secularism	Pearson correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N	1 523	.786 .000 523
National Development	Pearson correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N	.786 .000 523	1

**Correlation is significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Source: Field Survey, 2018.

Table 4 shows the correlation between secularism and national development in Nigeria's fourth republic. There exists a significant positive high correlation between secularism and national development in Nigeria ($r = .786$, $n = 523$, $p < 0.01$). This implies that secularism has a strong and positive relationship with national development in Nigeria's fourth republic. This is widely supported by the previous findings

of Maritain (1951); Berger (1997) Mosad and Valaintisna (2010); and Sampson (2014).

Regression Analysis

Table 5. Model Summary^b

Model	R	R square	Adjusted R square	Std. Error of the estimate
1	.0293	0.547	0.813	0.721

Predictors: (Constant), secularism

Dependent variable: national development

Table 6. ANOVA^a

Model	Sum of square	Df	Mean	Ff	Sig
Regression	7.283	1	7.283	23.189	.000 ^b
1 Residual	87.238	521	.342		
Total	94.521	522			

Dependent variable: national development

Predictors: (constant), secularism

Source: Field survey, 2018.

The simple linear regression shows (R^2) value of 0.547 which reveals that secularism independently account for 54.7% of the variation in national development in Nigeria's fourth republic. The F statistics of 23.189 revealed that the model is statistically significant at 0.05 significant levels.

Discussion of Findings

With respect to the second objective of this study, it was found that secularism has a significant and positive relationship with national development in Nigeria's fourth republic. This is in agreement with the previous studies of Maritain (1951); Berger (1997); Mosad and Valaintisna (2010); and Sampson (2014). Also, based on the results of the statistical analysis, secularism has significantly explained 54.7% of variance in national development in Nigeria's fourth republic. This finding is in agreement with the views of Ogoloma (2012); Sampson (2014); Yesufu (2016) that stressed the ability of secularism to engender national development in Nigeria.

Recommendations

Based on the empirical and theoretical findings of this study, the following recommendations were made:

The Nigerian state should adhere to the principle of secularism and religious pluralism (respect for all religions). Also there is need for a clear constitutional definition of the attributes of secularism, a proper delineation of its scope and extent, and most significantly, a consensual home-grown designation or appellation of the concept that is agreeable to all religious stakeholders without derogating the essence and reverence attributed to their respective religions.

The Nigerian state should desist from interfering and incorporating religion activities in the act of governance.

The establishment of an institute for secularism and religious pluralism is advocated. This institution should be charged with the onus of research and publication as well as advocacy in these fields of study.

The content and dictates of Nigerian constitution should strictly be applied practiced and utilized as provided. This will go a long way to strengthen and empowered the potency of government in the act of governance.

The Nigerian state should remain steadfast with the tenet of democracy and should always adhere to the spirit and principle of secularism enshrined in the constitution in its day to day activities. This will make the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to transcend and surpasses all belief, customs, values, and religious institution in the country.

If there must be national development in Nigeria, finding common ground between Muslims and Christians is not simply a matter for polite ecumenical dialogue between selected religious leaders. This is because if Muslims and Christians are not at peace, as we are presently witnessing, there cannot be any meaningful development in Nigeria. Therefore, national development in Africa in general and Nigeria in particular is at stake if these major world religions refuse to cooperate with one another.

As Nigeria progresses in her democratisation journey, adherence to the rule of law, building strong and inclusive institutions (political and economic) will increase investor confidence in the Nigerian economy and attract foreign direct investment as well as strengthen the private sector.

Religious leaders should give proper orientation to their followers and should emphasize that religion pursues peace and not violence.

Nigerian should see their pluralism in terms of diverse religion, political and ethnic affinities as a blessing that would make her a multicoloured nation with diver's potentialities to give leadership to Africa, the third world and the world at large.

Nigerian government should desist from sponsoring Muslims and Christian's pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Italy on the expense of national development.

Conclusion

Secularism is not the absence of religions in the state. Rather, it is the absence of state sponsored religion so that everyone will be free to choose a religion of their choice. Regardless of the popular misconceptions that surround it, secularism is not a principle of anarchy even though there are many religious people who would give it this interpretation to condemn it. Secularism is a principle of tolerance. The impact of religion in a secular state seems to have played out negatively in Nigeria, as politics and religion are mixed in the attempt to gain political power. The Nigerian state has variously been characterised as a patrimonial, prebendal and rentier state. These characteristics of the state have implication for state civil/society relations and consequently, inter-ethnic and religious relations. The study has revealed through its perceived findings that secularism has a positive impact on national development in Nigeria's fourth republic. The study therefore concludes that if there must be national development in Nigeria, the major religions in Nigeria especially Islam and Christianity must live in harmony. Their identity would be respected while mutually respecting each other. This is the only way the country can achieve a meaningful development in terms of providing security, and social amenities which include quality education, transportation infrastructure, youth employment, portable water, and medical care.

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THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP AS A MECHANISM FOR SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC GROWTH IN NIGERIA

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Abstract

The focus of this paper is on the importance of entrepreneurship as a mechanism for sustainable economic growth in Nigeria considering the experiences of developed nations like the United States, Europe, India, and China. Entrepreneurship has been instrumental in economic growth, balanced regional development, and job creation in most dynamic economies, where technology is changing at a faster rate and the product lifetime cycle is shrinking. Research in entrepreneurship development indicates that there is a lack of a theoretical model to examine rural entrepreneurship development particularly in the developing countries. The methodology adopted in this paper is the narrative – textual case study (NTCS); it is a social science research method that relies on the information and data from several sources for problem-solving. It is undeniable fact that entrepreneurship development plays a vital role in economic development of any nation including the developing countries like Nigeria. However, despite this, most entrepreneurial policies and programs seems to favour the urban cities except recently when efforts are geared towards the rural areas. Thus, this paper examines the role of entrepreneurship in the development of the rural areas in the developing economy. The study reveals that the right business environment for entrepreneurship is lacking in Nigeria on account of bad and inadequate infrastructural facilities, political instability, terrorism, multiple taxes, all stand as barriers to entrepreneurship and economic growth. The paper concludes that government should focus on adequate security, improve infrastructural facilities and enabling environment that will lead to economic growth.

Keywords: Nigeria, entrepreneurship, sustainable development, mechanism, and economic growth.

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Introduction

Entrepreneurship in Nigeria started when people in the villages and farming communities produced more products than they needed, as such; they had to exchange these surpluses with those who needed them within their immediate and neighbouring communities. The exchange of goods for goods or services was based on trade by barter initially, until commodity money was developed and used. Exchange encouraged specialisation among producers, and the communities came to realise that they can concentrate on the areas of production they are best fitted for. Consequent on the above, the culture of entrepreneurship started in Nigeria (Nicks, 2008; Raimi & Towobola, 2011).

The developed countries have long before now regard entrepreneurship and small scale enterprise as the best means of reducing poverty and sustaining their economy while the developing countries have just turned to these sectors (SME) as a strategy to reduce poverty and increase economic growth because entrepreneurship is a seed bed of innovations, inventions, and employment. The socio-economic impact of entrepreneurship on the sustainable economic growth of the Nigerian economy is difficult to accurately measure or estimate, but it is believed to be highly dynamic and significant (Chu, Kara, Benzing, & Cynthia, 2010).

On account of encouraging entrepreneurial initiatives, the country has experienced growth in the number of private enterprises. However, majority of these businesses are very small when their operations are measured in terms of capital, employment, and revenues (Attahir & Minet, 2000). Added to the above is difficulty confronted by small businesses in accessing bank credits, but the most serious and damaging problem threatening the state of entrepreneurship in Nigeria is a lack of government interest and support for micro, small enterprises (Ariyo, 2005; Chu et al., 2008). In addition, entrepreneurship and small and medium enterprises development is hampered by many challenges like bad roads, bribes by government officials, multiple taxes, epileptic power supply, rising overhead cost, the global economic meltdown and global pandemic. All these challenges and similar others have attracted global attention. The informal sector, which largely comprises the small scale enterprises in trade, services, agricultural and non-agricultural business, is estimated to provide 80% of jobs in rural and urban centres. Unfortunately this sector, remain at the subsistence level due to poor motivation, non-availability of basic infrastructural facilities and poor enabling environments.

This article, therefore, discusses how Nigeria can attain a sustainable economic growth through the effort of the entrepreneurs and the government. The broad objective of this paper is to highlight the challenges facing entrepreneurship and sustainable economic growth in Nigeria using

NTCS Analysis. With the challenges highlighted, realistic recommendations would be proffered for the nation to move forward.

Literature review

Theoretical evolution, many believe that entrepreneurship is the driving force behind organisation since it coordinates other factors of production. Many economists accept the idea that entrepreneur is, since the time of Marshal, the concept of entrepreneurship has continued to undergo innovators, this theory however is not applicable to less developed countries because entrepreneurs in less developed countries rarely produces brand new product rather they imitate the product and production process that have been invented in mostly developed countries.

There is no adequate literature that explores entrepreneurship and economic growth in Nigeria, hence reliance is on materials from developed and developing countries for a deep insight into the impact of entrepreneurship on sustainable economic growth and development. Entrepreneurship is the creation and management of a new organisation designed to pursue a unique, innovative opportunity and achieve rapid, profitable growth (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). Kanothi (2009) as cited by Vale (1990) defines entrepreneurship as “an unrehearsed combination of economic resources instigated by the uncertain prospect of temporary monopoly profit”. Entrepreneurship also entails the act of risk-taking, innovation, arbitrage and co-ordination of factors of production in the creation of new products or services for new and existing users in human society (Acs & Storey, 2004; Minniti & Lévesque, 2008; Naudé, 2007; Kanothi, 2009). The deliverable of entrepreneurship is making or doing things differently; making or providing innovative products or services; or organizing how the products are made or supplied

Awodun (2008) adopted the same approach in his effort to describe entrepreneurship; he saw entrepreneurship as an act of the recognizing opportunities in one’s environment. Mobilising resources to take advantage of such opportunities, Ensuring the provision of new or improved goods and services to consumers; and obtaining profit in return for the risk to dare. Ogundele Ojk (2007), views entrepreneurship as a process of performing the entrepreneurial functions overtime in a given environment. Lawal, Kio, Sulaimon and Adebayo (2006) refer, to entrepreneurship as the act or process of identifying business opportunities and organizing to initiate a successful business activity. From the above definitions it can be seen that entrepreneurship is the process of initiating a business enterprise using available resources within the immediate environment and nurturing it to a successful end. Initiating an enterprise is best done through Nano, micro-small medium enterprise.

According to Kindleberger (1977) as cited by Akosile, Adesanya, Ajani (2012) economic growth is defined as an increase in the macroeconomic variables like increase in the nation per-capita income, expansion in labour force, consumption pattern and volume of trade. Economic growth is the increase in the value of the goods and services produced by an economy. It is conventionally measured as the percent rate of increase in real gross domestic product, or GDP (Jones, 2002). Growth is usually calculated in real terms, i.e. inflation-adjusted terms, in order to net out the effect of inflation on the price of the goods and services produced. In economics “economic growth” or “economic growth theory” typically refers to growth of potential output, i.e., production at “full employment,” which is caused by growth in aggregate demand or observed output (Erbee & Hagemann, 2002). The link between entrepreneurship as a catalyst for sustainable economic growth has been over discussed in the literature.

During the days of the British Empire, the UK economy was the largest in the world and the first to industrialise, though this led to industrial revolution and it has declined in significance, but the UK is still the sixth largest economy in the world by purchasing power parity. GDP growth was 1.1 per cent in 2008, but it is expected to contract in coming years, with GDP growth forecasts of -3.2 per cent in 2009 and -1.1 per cent in 2010. The UK has a population of 61m and a GDP per capita is US\$ 37.4k, which makes it the 30th richest country in the world, above the European Union average of US\$ 33.8k (Economy Watch, 2010). Market liberalisation in the Chinese Economy has brought its huge economy forward by leaps and bounds. China’s economy is huge and expanding rapidly. In the last 30 years the rate of Chinese economic growth has been almost miraculous, averaging 8% growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per annum. The economy has grown more than 10 times during that period, with Chinese GDP reaching 3.42 trillion US dollars by 2007. In Purchasing Power Parity GDP, China already has the biggest economy after the United States. Most analysts project China to become the largest economy in the world this century using all measures of GDP (Economy Watch, 2010). The smaller public sector is dominated by about 200 large state enterprises concentrated mostly in utilities, heavy industries, and energy resources (China Daily, 2006).

India, an emerging economy, has witnessed unprecedented levels of economic expansion, along with countries like China, Russia, Mexico, and Brazil. India, being a cost effective and labour intensive economy, has benefited immensely from outsourcing of work from developed countries, and a strong manufacturing and export oriented industrial framework. With the economic pace picking up, global commodity prices have staged a comeback from their lows and global trade has also seen

healthy growth over the last two years (Economy Watch, 2010). Indian economy has been predicted to grow at a level of 6.9%. Growth in the Indian economy has steadily increased since 1979, averaging 5.7% per year in the 23-year growth record. In fact, the Indian economy has posted an excellent average GDP growth of 6.8% since 1994 (the period when India's external crisis was brought under control). Many factors are behind this robust performance of the Indian economy in 2004–05. High growth rates in Industry & service sector and a benign world economic environment provided a backdrop conducive to the Indian economy. Another positive feature was that the growth was accompanied by continued maintenance of relative stability of prices (Economy Watch, 2007).

Studies indicate that small enterprises are the leading force in the development of African economies and are essential for economic growth in many developing countries (Chu, Kara, & Benzing, 2010). Entrepreneurial initiatives especially innovation, risk bearing, employment creation, new opportunities identification and the commercialisation of results of inventions have indeed contributed to the prosperity in many regions of the world (Schumpeter, 1950; Ukaegbu, 2000; Chu, Kara, & Benzing, 2008). In Africa, the contribution of entrepreneurship cannot be underscored. For instance, Ghanaian micro-enterprises employ less than 5 people, yet accounted for 70 percent of country's workforce (Government of Ghana, 2003; World Bank, 2006). Similarly, Kenya's private SMEs sector employed 3.2 million people and contributed 18 percent to the nation's GDP (OECD, 2005).

Nigeria has not been able to experience accelerated growth because it is a mono-product economy with the large proportion of government revenue coming from oil wealth, while numerous other solid minerals remain unexploited and untapped. The economy has disproportionately relied on the primary sector (subsistence agriculture and the extractive industry) without any meaningful value addition to growth and development. Consequently, the little growth recorded in the economy, so far, has been without commensurate employment, positive attitudinal change, value reorientation, and equitable income distribution, among others. These bleak growth indicators could be attributed to poor leadership, poor implementation of economic policies, weak institutions, poor corporate governance, endemic corruption, et cetera (Sanusi, 2001).

The challenge, therefore, is how will Nigeria get out of the economic mess considering the bulk of challenges and it seems no solution in sight, however the support given to the entrepreneurs of small medium enterprises by the Central Bank of Nigeria may go a long way if properly implemented to cause a gradual economic growth.

Entrepreneurship development

In an attempt to defined entrepreneurship development, Darren & Conrad (2009) described entrepreneurship as a process where an individual discovers, evaluates opportunities independently. In a similar manner, Ogundele (2007) sees entrepreneurship as a process involving recognising opportunities in the environment, mobilising resources to take advantage of such opportunities in order to provide improved goods and services for consumers and making as a reward for risk taken. Therefore, entrepreneurship is all about environmental opportunities that are waiting to be tapped. Accordingly. It is a process of creating something new and assuming the risks and rewards (Hisrich & Peters, 2002). There are four essential elements used in those definitions: creative process, risk taken, rewards, time, and effort.

Robert et al. (2008) as cited by Esuh Ossai-Igwe Lucky (2012) noted that entrepreneurship is the creation of something new and assuming the risk and rewards. Entrepreneurship is therefore all about learning the skills needed to assume the risk of establishing a business and developing the winning strategies and executing them with all vigour, persistence and passion needed to win any win any game (Rebecca et al., 2009). The authors stressed the need for entrepreneurs/firm owners to learn new skills that would aid the firm performance. Therefore, an entrepreneur must possess some skills if he or she is to achieve a significant firm performance. Rebecca et al. (2008) Esuh Ossai-Igwe Lucky (2012) further concluded that entrepreneurship is simply concerned with what an entrepreneur actually does – the utilisation of resources in managing an enterprise and assuming the risks and maximising profit from the business venture. They affirmed that entrepreneurship is a dynamic process of creating wealth for the well-being of both the entrepreneurs and individuals in the society. Therefore, successful entrepreneurship requires the entrepreneur to possess certain managerial skills. These skills according to Rebecca and Benjamin (2009) among others are ability to learn new techniques in handling business operation, ability to adopt to change and to handle changes in the environment.

From the above, it could be observed that authors have used one or more criteria to define the concept of entrepreneurship. Many stressed the need for learning new skills and techniques, recognising opportunities, mobilising resources, an act or process, rewards, taken of risk and creation of wealth. However, none has recognised the importance of nurturing entrepreneurship. Therefore, entrepreneurship definition can be better appreciated if the word “nurturing” was included. It can be seen as the process of nurturing entrepreneurship, as well as the entrepreneur from the grassroots to recognise opportunities in the environment so as to mobilise resources, by taking risk in order to create wealth and at the same time making profit through effective and efficient management of the business.

In the light of this, Arowomole (2000) defined entrepreneurship as the coming into existence in the society or country of the class of individuals, who are not timid to face odds and ready to achieve a significant performance. Accordingly, Amit, Glisten and Muller (1993) defined entrepreneurship development as the process of extracting profit (firm performance) from new, unique, and valuable combination of resource in an uncertain and ambiguous environment.

Considering this definition, entrepreneurship development, could equally be seen as a gradual process in which an individual takes in establishing a business or creating wealth for the purpose of making profit. This may be in line with Amit et al. (1993)'s submission as both definitions is concern with the issue of profit, wealth creation and firm performance.

Therefore, entrepreneurship involves the process of nurturing the actual or potential entrepreneurs to become effective in running their own organisations ensuring how well the firm performs in its business operations and this has to be done at various stages and in various institutions. From the ongoing, it is clear that entrepreneurship is a process and not SMEs. Thus, it is a process to the establishment and creation of SMEs or business ventures. Entrepreneurship process leads to the birth of SMEs and business ventures in many sectors being it manufacturing, services, wholesale, or retail.

Economic growth in Nigeria

The Nigerian economy is one of the most developed economies in Africa. According to the UN classification, Nigeria is a middle-income nation with developed financial, communication and transport sectors. It has the second largest stock exchange in the continent. The petroleum industry is central to the Nigerian economic profile. It is the 12th largest producer of petroleum products in the world. The industry accounts for almost 80% of the GDP share and above 90% of the total exports. Outside the petroleum sector, the Nigerian economy is highly amorphous and lacks basic infrastructure. Several failed efforts have been made after 1990 to develop other industrial sectors (Economy Watch, 2010) Nigeria has great potentials for economic growth and development, given her vast natural resources in agricultural lands and minerals, as well as abundant manpower. In the last two decades, economic growth rate has been very low and in many years less than the population growth rate.

The general macroeconomic outcome has been poor, resulting to high poverty level (Wikipedia, 2010). GDP per capita of Nigeria expanded 132% in the 1960s reaching a peak growth of 283% in the 1970s. But this proved unsustainable and it consequently shrank by 66% in the

1980s. In the 1990s, diversification initiatives finally took effect and decadal growth was restored to 10%. Due to inflation, per capita GDP today remains lower than in 1960 when Nigeria declared independence. About 57 percent of the population lives on less than US\$ 1 per day. In 2005 the GDP real growth rate was 6.90% composed of the following sectors: agriculture, 26.8 percent; industry, 48.8 percent and services, 24.4 percent. Compare to 2009 GDP of 3.80%, composed of agriculture, 33.4 percent; industry, 34.1 percent; and services, 32.5 percent (CIA World Fact book, 2010). The low growth rate deals with downsizing of the industrial sector in Nigeria.

One factor that impacted negatively on growth was high lending interest rates which promoted savings, but discouraged the flow of credit and investments to the real sector. Another economic phenomenon that affected growth was large budget deficits that were financed by the banking sector. Deficit/GDP ratio averaged 4.7 per cent in the last decade. The high level of deficit financing meant that the bulk of credit available to the economy was diverted to funding government, thus crowding out the private sector in the credit market. The most serious problem was inflationary pressure that devalued the currency and induced uncertainty that made entrepreneurs to postpone investment decisions. Inflation promoted the diversion of resources from productive to speculative activities with serious consequences for employment and growth (United Nations, 2003). The following are the most recent data on the growth rates of major sectors in Nigeria for period 2008–2009.

Table 1. Growth Rates of Major Sectors in Nigeria, 2019

Sector	2018 (%)	2019 (%)
Agriculture	6.3	6.2
Mining and Quarrying	-5.9	-1.0
Manufacturing	8.9	8.5
Electricity, Gas and Water	4.0	3.6
Construction	13.1	12.9
Wholesale and Retail trade, Restaurants, Hotels	14.0	11.6
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate etc	6.8	6.4
Transport and Communication	19.3	20.9
Public Administration and Defence	4.4	4.5
Other Services	10.3	10.0

Source: African Statistical Yearbook 2019 by African Development Bank.

Table 2 below gives more insights into the nation's economic performance from 2010–2019. The real GDP in 2010, 2011, 2014, 2017 and 2019 were 3.8, 3.5, 7.1 and 5.3 respectively. This indicates a zigzag and inconsistent economic growth in Nigeria. The dividend of real GDP growth even when there is an increase has not been judiciously used for sustainable economic programme like entrepreneurship development and small business promotion. Consequently, the capacity utilisation of the economy from 2010 to 2019 fluctuated between 36% and 50%. This has been blamed largely on frequent power outages, multiple taxes and other challenges to entrepreneurship development (BEEPS, 2020).

Table 2. Nigeria: Performance of the Economy, 2010–2019

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2019
Real GDP Growth (%)	3.8	3.5	3.5	3	7.1	6.2	6.9	5.3	6.4	5.3	6.8
Population Growth (%)	2.67	2.61	2.54	2.53	2.45	2.37	2.38	2.379	2.025	1.99	2.0
Unemployment Rate (%)	3.6	28.0	28.0	28.0	28.0	4.9	2.90	5.80	4.9	4.9	4.9
Manufacturing Capacity Utilization	36.1	42.7	54.9	56.05	55.7	55.88	53.3	4.6	NA	NA	NA
Inflation Rate (%)	6.9	16.6	12.9	14.20	13.80	16.50	13.50	10.50	5.40	11.60	11.50

Source: The Central Bank of Nigeria, 2010–2019.

Methodology

The methodology employed in this article is the narrative-textual case study (NTCS) method, which is preferred because of the absence of sequential data related to entrepreneurship and sustainable economic growth in Nigeria. NTCS is a social science research method that employs intensively, the information, data and academic materials made available and easily accessible by information and communication technology facilities such as intranet, internet, World Wide Web, online databases, e-libraries et cetera (Abou Zeedan & Leijon, 2007).

The choice of this method is informed by the fact that NTCS combines the use of quantitative and qualitative observation, text content analysis and available official statistics in different proportions for problem-solving or problem-identification depending on the objectives of the research (ibid).

Findings

Challenges Affecting Economic and Entrepreneurship Development

Nigeria despite its abundant natural and human resources is unfortunately faced with some challenges which in the recent years have surged appreciably cause serious set-backs to entrepreneurship development. With specific reference to the SMEs, they are faced frequently harassment from the government officials who extorted money from their businesses. In addition, there is paucity of infrastructure including bad roads, water shortage, erratic supply of electricity, and poor telecommunication system (Mambula, 2002; Chu, Kara, & Benzing, 2008). Added to the above discouraging challenge is difficulty accessing bank credits, but the most serious and damaging problem threatening the state of entrepreneurship in Nigeria is a lack of government interest and support for micro, small enterprises (Ariyo, 2005; Chu et al., 2008). Furthermore, the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys (2007) identified fifteen (15) critical challenges facing businesses in Nigeria. These include: access to finance, access to licenses/permit, corruption, courts, crime/theft/disorder, customs & trade registration, electricity, inadequately educated workforce, labour regulations, political stability, practices informal sector, tax administration, tax rates and transportation. The responses of the firms have also been clearly analysed according to operational sizes (small, medium, and large) as shown below.

Table 3. Critical Challenges Facing Businesses in Nigeria

Challenges of SMEs in Nigeria	Nigerian (%)	Small (%)	Medium (%)	Large (%)
Access to Finance	15.55	17.01	11.52	3.90
Access to Land	2.85	2.70	3.38	2.85
Licenses and Permit	0.57	0.58	0.60	0.00
Corruption	1.87	2.13	1.12	0.00
Courts	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Crime, Thefts and Disorder	2.07	1.64	3.40	4.33
Customs & Trade Registration	1.31	1.09	2.23	0.00
Electricity	63.63	62.66	65.50	78.78
Inadequately educated work force	0.31	0.32	0.32	0.00
Labour Regulation	0.09	0.07	0.20	0.00
Political Instability	0.70	0.79	0.45	0.00
Practices Informal Sector	1.05	0.92	1.66	0.00

Challenges of SMEs in Nigeria	Nigerian (%)	Small (%)	Medium (%)	Large (%)
Tax administration	0.28	0.12	0.49	3.47
Tax Rates	2.24	2.11	2.70	2.49
Transportation	7.49	7.88	6.42	4.16

Source: Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys (BEEPS)/World Bank, 2020.

More importantly, a survey conducted by the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (MAN) lends credence to BEEPS/World Bank 2007 survey. The recent MAN survey reveals that a total of 834 manufacturing companies closed down their operations in 2019. This is consequent upon the companies' inability to cope with the challenges high overhead cost and unfriendly business environment (Punch, 2017; The Nation, 2018). The closed down of 834 companies in Nigeria was attributable to epileptic power supply, high cost of alternative sources of electricity and multiple taxes, which resulted in huge cost of doing business. The closure of these companies has further compounded the already bad state of unemployment in the nation (The Nations, 2018). Typical taxes payable in Nigeria include: public convenience fee, sewage and refuse disposal fees, customary burial ground permit fees, religious places establishment permit fees, signboard and advertisement fees and radio, television license fees other than radio and television transmitter (Daily Triumph, 2018). The total figures of 834 closed down companies represent the cumulative aggregate of firms that shut down their operations in 2009 across the country. The geographical breakdown of companies during the period is as follows: 176 firms collapsed in the Northern zone covering the Kano and Kaduna states manufacturing axis; 178 companies closed down in the south-east zone; 46 companies shut down operations in the south-south zone consisting of Rivers, Cross River and Akwa Ibom states; 225 companies closed down in the south-west area, which comprises Oyo, Ogun, Osun, Ondo, Ekiti, Kogi and Kwara states; and 214 manufacturing firms closed down in Lagos zone covering Ikeja, Apapa, Ikorodu and other industrial divisions in the "Centre of Excellence".

Conclusion/recommendations

Economic growth is the key to higher living standards. According to Onipede (2003), economic theory suggests several key institutions and policy factors that are important for the achievement of maximum economic growth. It is therefore recommended that the following institutions and policies be enhanced in order to make way for sustainable economic and entrepreneurship development in Nigeria:

1. There is the need for security of property right and political stability in the country. A volatile political, religious, and ethnic climate undermines security of property rights.
2. Stable money and prices are essential for development. A stable monetary environment provides the foundation for the efficient operation of a market economy. In contrast, monetary and price instability generate uncertainty and undermine the security of contracts.
3. The market and enabling environment must be competitive. In a competition, producers must woo consumers away from other suppliers. To do so, they must offer quality and cheaper alternatives. Sellers who cannot provide quality products at competitive prices have no place in a competitive market economy and thus would be driven from the market (Gwartney et al., 1999).
4. There must be in place policy and regulations that guarantee freedom of trade, within or without. Trade is very important for growth and prosperity. When the citizens are allowed unfettered right albeit within the permissible confines of the law to buy from suppliers offering the best deal and sell to purchasers willing to pay the most attractive prices, this way, they would be able to concentrate on the things they do well, while trading for those they do poorly (Gwartney et al., 1999). Theoretically Nigeria is an open economy, which is on the face value; however, the opposite is the reality as there are many legal barriers in place, which make free trade next to impossible. These barriers should, as a matter of utmost importance be reviewed and where possible, expunged totally (Onipede, 2003).
5. Information communication technology (ICT) must be optimally utilised. ICT is a term that encompasses all forms of technology used to create, store, exchange and use information in its various forms (Business Data, Voice, Conversation, still images, Motion Pictures, Multimedia presentations and other forms, including those not yet conceived). It is the technology that is driving – “information revolution”. It is an enabler as e-Business e-Commerce and e-Service.
6. Right-sizing of government. Government can meaningfully enhance economic growth by providing an infrastructure for the smooth operation of markets. A legal system that provides price stability is the central elements in this area (Gartney et al., 1999). However, a government that grows too large as the case is in Nigeria, retards economic growth in a number of ways. First, as government grows, relative to the market sector, the returns to government activities diminish. The larger the government, the greater is its involvement in activities it does poorly. Second, more government means higher taxes, as the government fails to provide basic essential infrastructures for a better standard of living of its citizens. However, as taxes take

more earnings from citizens, the incentive to invest declines. Third, compared to the market sector, government is less innovative and less responsive to change (Onipede, 2003). Innovation is one of the major ways of creating job for people in Nigeria.

Most of the researches from educational and research institutions in developed countries are to solve problems of industries. This is done by Partnership among the elements in the national innovation system (NIS). The major elements in the national innovation system are: Education Institution: This is to generate knowledge-economy. Research and development Institution: generates research results for technology adaptation, and for commercial purposes. Firms and Industries Institution: the commercialisation of the industrial products. Government and financial institution: are to give incentive and fund the other elements. Development of entrepreneurial skills married with excellent knowledge of information and communication technology (ICT) as additional key to technological and entrepreneurial development is important.

Nigeria's vision of achieving sustainable economic growth and social development will remain unrealised if the nation's infrastructural needs are not addressed. The provision of infrastructure such as power, transport and water are vital. Without adequate, cheap, constant and reliable electric power supply, no technological development will be successively achieved. New innovation is lacking in Nigeria, most entrepreneurs prefer to import goods and package for sales because of high cost of production. In order to reverse this trend, it is pertinent that government gives priority to capacity building for technological innovation, good infrastructure and provide environment conducive for business that will lead to sustainable economic growth. Additionally, since entrepreneurs are vital to economic growth, legislators and other leaders who develop economic policies should strive to encourage the innovation and risk taking of entrepreneurs. Enforcing property rights through contract, patent, and copyright laws; encouraging competition through free trade, deregulation and antitrust legislation and promoting a healthy economic climate. Any country that lacks capacity for production of goods will become a consuming nation instead of an industrial nation. Finally, the Nigerian government needs to shift from over-dependence on oil and place more attention on the development of small & medium sized enterprises for sustainable economic growth in Nigeria. Economic prosperity in Nigeria, as in the rest of the world, depends on strong and empowered private sector to lead MSEs to a higher level of growth which would significantly contribute to the country's economic well-being.

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ETHNIC POLITICS AND ELECTORAL VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA: A STUDY OF THE SOUTH-SOUTH GEOPOLITICAL ZONE

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Abstract

The Nigerian state since political independence in 1960 has been basking in the euphoria of ethnic politics and electoral violence. Each ethnic nationality in Nigeria has its own culture, interest, aspiration, language and faith and these factors seem to affect the socio-economic and political fate of each group, make identification with the nation a problematic task and exacerbate the difficulty in attaining credible elections a true democracy in the society. Against this backdrop, this study examined the relationship and the effect of ethnic politics on electoral violence in the south-south geopolitical zone of Nigeria. A cross sectional research designed was adopted and data was collected via a survey of six hundred (600) respondents. Data collected were analysed using simple percentages, correlation, and linear regression analysis with the aid of statistical package for social sciences (SPSS) version 23. The results of the study revealed that there is a significant relationship between ethnic politics and electoral violence in the south-south geopolitical zone of Nigeria. The study also showed that ethnic politics exerts a positive and statistically significant impact on electoral violence in the south-south geopolitical zone of Nigeria. Based on these findings, the study concludes that ethnic politics has significant influence on electoral violence in Nigeria. The study therefore recommends, among other things, that Nigerian political leaders should place Nigerian citizens at the centre of their political project without recourse to ethnic chauvinism and the acquisition of political power as a means for serving the collective interest of the citizens irrespective of their ethnic origin. This will go a long way to reduce electoral violence in Nigeria, especially in the south-south geopolitical zone.

Keywords: Nigeria, Ethnicity, Politics, Election, Violence, Democratic Consolidation.

Introduction

Ethnicity stands very tall in Nigeria's national life and has become a major factor that determine who gets what, how and when. The Nigerian state is a good example of a multi-ethnic society beset with the issues of ethnic inclination. A close look at the society reveals a range in types of social system, language, diet, tribal marks, cultures, and dressing. The Nigerian

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diverse social structure in terms of her heterogeneity has not changed since Nigeria gained political independence. Ethnicism denotes attachments, nationalistic mind, feelings, and the level of vindictiveness demonstrated by persons or groups as a show of loyalty, obligation, solidarity, love, and the desire to propel group aspirations over and above opposing views and similar aspirations. For instance, since the late 1950s when oil was discovered in the Niger-Delta region several discordant and intolerable behaviours, especially among the political elite representing major and minor ethnic nationalities has played itself out.

In Nigeria today, identification is easier at both the ethnic and family levels. Ethnic factors have “Largely become parameters for allocation of political offices, assessment of group representation in Government, federal character principles, indigeneship and residency rights, ethno-religious conflicts and wild protest and even the tendency to win the sympathies of persons or groups, as well as, given direct and unperturbed access to Aso Rock Villa” (Erunke, 2012: 28). According to Salawu and Hassan (2011: 28), the “diversity nature of the Nigerian state has made identification with the nation a difficult task. The consequence of this is that many of the citizens may never develop a proper concept of nation. This kind of ethnic group relation signifies a negative dimension and which may mean much for the Nigerian political system”. Thus, a study on the impact of ethnic politics on electoral violence seems to be highly desirable.

A great deal has been written about ethnic politics and its effect on democratic consolidation in Nigeria (Nnoli, 1978; Edoh, 2001; Osaghae, 2001; Aluko, 2003; Salawu & Hassan, 2011; Uwakwe, 2011; Erunke, 2012; Edewor, Aluko & Folarin, 2014; Tandu & Etta, 2018). Despite this number of studies, no empirical studies exist on ethnic politics and electoral violence in Nigeria. To bridge this gap, this study examines the impact of ethnic political on electoral violence in Nigeria with a focus on the south-south geopolitical zone.

Statement of the Problem

The challenges occasioned by the idolisation of ethnicity cannot be overemphasised. This is evident in the many intractable conflicts in the world today that are believed to be ethnically induced. Among the numerous examples of deadly ethnic conflicts in recent times are the Hutus against Tutsi, Croats against Serb; Kurds against Iraqis; Arab against Jew; Irish against British; Bosque against Spaniard; Tamil Nadir against Sri Lankans; Ukrainians against Russians, etc. All these make the headlines every day, yet they are only the tip of the iceberg. The heterogeneous nature of groups in every nation seems to be trouble waiting to happen (Jacobs, 2012).

In Nigeria, ethnic and cultural conflicts are rooted in the 1914 amalgamation of the Northern and Southern protectorates by the colonial administration of Lord Frederick Lugard. The amalgamation brought about the involuntary unification of culturally and historically, diverse ethnic groups, some of which had been rivals and overlapping imperialists in the pre-colonial times. For example, Benin, at the height of its power from the 15th century had established imperial control over some states in the fringes of present-day Northern Nigeria, including Igala and Nupe-speaking areas, which by virtue of their vassalage were compelled to pay tolls and tributes as vassals to the Benin Monarch. Benin had also extended control to the South and enjoyed suzerainty over several Yoruba states including, Eko (now Lagos), Ekiti and Ondo. This overbearing influence of Benin over the Yoruba states pitted Benin against the declining Oyo Empire before British colonisation (Ajayi & Akintoye, 1980; Ajayi & Alagoa, 1980).

Today, the string that holds Nigeria together is getting slimmer by the day with the conflicting juxta-positioning of ethnic groups on issues that concern the survival of the nation. With the present strength of ethnic militias to fight the course of their kinsmen against perceived outsiders, Nigeria could be sunk within a twinkling of an eye. Examples include the herdsmen militancy in the Northeast, the MASSOB in the Southeast, Oodua People Congress in the Southwest, and ever-aggressive Niger Delta Militants in the South-South region of Nigeria. In addition, Ashindorbe (2018: 92) posits that “the conduct of elections in a plural society like Nigeria is often fraught with animosities, ethnic factors and violence”. It is against this background that this study examines the impact of ethnic politics on electoral violence in the South-South geopolitical zone of Nigeria.

Conceptual Discourse

Ethnic Politics

The term “ethnic” originated from the Greek work “ethnos” which is translated as nation (Chambers, 449 cited in Tandu & Etta, 2018: 115). Ethnic in the context of this study refers to people thought to be homogenous in terms of language, race, culture and having the same ancestry. Thus, the concept of ethnicity has attracted several connotations among political science scholars. This is because like another terminology employed by social scientists; the concept of ethnicity is a term that does not lend itself to easy definition. To fully understand this, a related concept like ethnic group needs to be conceptualised. According to Cohen, 1974, cited in Salawau and Hassan (2011: 28), an ethnic group is “an informal interest

group, whose members are distinct from the members of other ethnic groups within the larger society because they share kinship, religious and linguistic ties”. Ethnicity according to Osaghae (1995), is “the employment or mobilisation of ethnic identity and influence to gain advantage in situations of competition, conflict or cooperation”. This definition is preferred because it identifies two issues that are central to the discussion of ethnicity. First, ethnicity is neither natural nor accidental but, it is the product of a conscious effort by social actors. Second, ethnicity is not only manifest in conflictive or competitive relations, but also in the context of cooperation. A corollary to the second point is that ethnic conflict manifest itself in various forms, including voting, community services and violence (Edewor *et al.*, 2014: 71).

In the context of this study, ethnicity is conceptualised as a human group having distinctive religious, certain cultural traits in common; linguistic and racial that tends to cut across continental boundaries. In Nigeria, the Arthur Richard constitution of 1946 encouraged ethnicism and hinders national integration. Thus, the colonial rule engendered factionalism which resulted into ethnic nationalism. Ethnic nationalism refers to “the tendency to see one’s self as a member of an ethnic group rather than as a member of a nation” (Salawu & Hassan, 2011: 30). This manifestation of strong allegiance to ethnic group encourages primordial sentiments among Nigerians. Therefore, ethnic politics refers to the struggle among various ethnic groups for the sharing of national resources. Since 1960 to date, the political elite in Nigeria are concerned with political and socio-economic development of their own ethnic group and not the nation as a whole. At this point, it is necessary to posit that ethnic politics breeds hate, insecurity, suspicion, tension, group agitations and socio-political uprising (Onyibor, 2016).

From whichever angle one looks at ethnicity, it is clear that the political trajectory in Nigeria since 1960 has been those of very serious ethnic arithmetic either in terms of struggle and competition for space, mobilisation of support for those in power, creation and making of artificial violence in Nigeria and even war of words. All these according to Erunke (2012: 33), have “propelled the Nigerian state into peaceful oblivion and things are really falling apart on daily basis which the centre seem not to be strong enough to forestall emerging trends of insecurity and the vociferous separatist agitations in the country. This happening is a pointer to the politics of self, egotism and sectionalism which has been part of the Nigerian project since the colonial masters left the shores of Nigeria to date”. Similarly, Odeyemi (2014: 10) asserts that “the elites keep themselves in political office by playing and preying on the ignorance and the fears of the poverty stricken majority of their people. The elites use the ethnic factor to retain themselves in office as political leaders,

directors or managers of national corporations and parastatals by making false claims of representing their ethnic groups. Even when they do not perform well in political office, they deceive the people by whipping up ethnic sentiments, raising fears and tensions of the threats that would be posed to their ethnic group if other groups should gain political ascendancy". The resultant effect of ethnic politics is indifference toward national concerns.

In addition, Peil (1976) identifies three major factors responsible for the inclination of the political elites to ethnic antics. Firstly, "ethnicity may be more important to them than to people with lesser opportunities. The society is believed to function as a series of ethnic power groups and potential elite feel the need to join one of these in order to succeed. Secondly, politicians find it difficult to win votes by universalistic appeals to ideology rather communal war crises were popular and successful. Thirdly, there were many things which went wrong in the system and ethnic 'scape-goat' was a useful way of easing pressure for reform". In fact, tribalism and marginalisation by some ethnic groups is seen to be part of the mechanism through which the political élites maintain themselves in power and exercises their influence. Thus, ethnic manipulation is an attitude of political elite's behaviour. In Nigeria today, political leaders are chief proponents and purveyors of parochialism and particularistic values. They believed that a strong inclination to ethnic chauvinism would avail them of most of the opportunities they want. Also, Aluko (2003: 254) identifies the legacy of colonialism and monopoly of power by the major ethnic groups and their consequent marginalisation of the minority groups as major factors promoting ethnic nationalism in Nigeria. Indeed, colonialism left behind for Nigeria a non-hegemonic state that further aggravated the crisis of ethnicism in the country. This is succinctly captured by Osaghee (2001: 24) when he posits that:

"The pervasiveness of ethnic politics in the country is taken to be symptomatic of aggravated crisis of legitimacy that has engulfed the state, and is explained in terms of the proven efficacy of the ethnic strategy, the weakness of alternative identities and political units, the prevailing milieu of lawlessness that has enveloped the country's political landscape, and the inability of the state to act as an effective agency of distributive justice".

Another factor responsible for inclination elites to ethnic antics is called "cultural imperialism which is often described as the infiltration of western culture into the Nigerian state. According to Onyibor (2016: 7), "this is done through the use of foreign educational materials like books, films, internet and other publications and programmes from the print and electronic media which profess the Western/American attitude to life as the original and modern, and therefore, the best. The worst aspect is that

the youth pick the negative ones that exposes and promotes selfishness, violence, immoral and individualistic attitudes. These behavioural attitude and orientations are not acceptable to most Nigerian cultures. In fact, those who live in cities today suffer from cultural confusion. They now prefer foreign goods to Nigerian made ones. The clothes they put on, the food they eat and even the value they prefer are very much foreign". Thus, a people who do not respect their culture and values are a people without identity. Ethnicism is therefore used as a tool for the determination of power shifts, agitations and counter agitations, public official responsibility, executive propaganda, resource allocation and control, blackmail, award of contracts, appointment of persons into political offices (whether one is qualified for the job or not), religious uprising, terrorism, and electoral violence among others.

Electoral Violence

Elections are central to the effective functioning of modern representative democracy. Elections serve as instrument of political choice, accountability, and mobilisation; elections according to Powell, 2000 cited in Ighodalo (2012: 165), "are the means of selecting those to represent the people in different public positions within the polity". Election is critical aspect of the democratic framework that if properly put to use, will engender political and socio-economic development. Apart from election being one of the cardinal principles of democracy, credible, free, and fair elections put the right people in government, allocate resources efficiently and manage conflicts effectively. In the views of Adeosun (2014: 7), elections in Nigeria since 1999 "have been characterised by monumental irregularities, violence and malpractices which magnitude increases with every election. Institutions of the state such as the police, the military and the electoral body (INEC) collude to manipulate the electoral process in favour of certain candidate, especially on account of ethnic nationalism". The Nigerian experience with the 2011, 2015 and 2019 general elections has shown that the political elites have not fully come to terms with the referents of elections for democratic sustenance and enduring national security. Elections have become warfare where it is a sign to lose. This dominant pattern of elections threatens to tear the nation apart and put its tenuous peace at great risk (Ighodalo, 2012; Okereka & Okolie, 2019).

At this point, it is necessary to conceptualise electoral violence. Albert, 2007 cited in Ashindorbe (2018: 95) posits that electoral violence's are all forms of organised acts or threats – physical, psychological and structural aimed at intimidating, harming, blackmailing, delaying, or otherwise influencing and electoral process". Similarly, Balogun, 2009

cited Ebiziem (2015: 40) defines electoral violence as “all forms of violence (Physical, psychological, administrative, legal, and structural) at different stages engaged in by participants, their supporters, and sympathizers, including security agents and election management body in the electoral process. These forms of violence take place before elections, during elections and after elections”. In the same vein, Orji and Uzodi (2012: 15) affirm that electoral violence takes any of the three dimensions: physical electoral violence according to them includes “the bodily attacks on politicians or their ardent conventions, during political campaigns, during elections and when election results are released most which culminate in fatalities”. Physical election violence has remained a recurring theme in Nigeria since the reintroduction of multiparty politics in 1999. The 2011 presidential election witnessed the height of physical violence with more than 800 fatalities beside properties that were destroyed mainly in the core northern states. Psychological electoral violence, manifest in the forms of climate of siege and uncertainty that is created in the psyche of citizens of what could possibly happen to them as a result of their participation in electoral process. Election seasons since 1999 are the periods of uncertainty where due to the rhetoric and utterances of politicians, a climate of fear usually envelops the polity. It is also a period when a cocktail of grievances by rival ethnic blocs are rehearsed and deployed in the public domain. Thus, it is common during preparations for general elections to see Nigerians relocate to areas considered as safe havens away from violence prone zones, and these safe havens are usually among their Kith and Kin (Ashindorbe, 2018). Structural electoral violence manifests in the forms of exclusionary or discriminatory policies and practice prevalent in the electoral process. For instance, the exorbitant fees require aspirants within a political party or parties shuts the door against candidates without the financial muscle or a money bag ready to bankroll the electoral expenses of such candidate (Orji & Uzodi, 2012).

Ethnic Politics and Electoral Violence

Ethnic politics remains a threat to the institutionalisation of democracy in Nigeria. Among its resultant negative consequences as observed by Babangida, 2002 cited in Salawu and Hassan (2011: 32) are “wastage of enormous human and material resources in ethnically inspired violence, encounters, clashes and even battle, heightening of fragility of the economy and political process, threat to security of life and property and disinvestments of local and foreign components with continuous capital flight and loss of confidence in the economy; and increasing gaps in social relations among ethnic nationalities including structural suspicions and hate

for one another”. The current surge of political violence caused by ethnic politics in Nigeria is a very disturbing trend towards social progress and prosperity. In Nigeria, today, political violence “has become highly disruptive to social life, thereby causing divisions in families and communities as well as causing antagonisms among and within social groups. Nigerian have witnessed several cases of electoral violence in the form of assassination, bomb-blasts, intimidations, murders, and destruction of properties in time past and now on the increase. The effect of the menace in Nigeria is tending in some respects towards social disaggregation into its constituent ethnic and sub-ethnic groups divisions. Killing, harming, and intimidating persons trying to vote during elections in order to destroy ballot boxes in areas where the perpetrators lack supporters or in order to snatch ballot boxes so as to stuff them with ballot papers illegally obtained and thumb printed creates a social division in Nigeria” (Aver *et al.*, 2013: 264). Today, social activities such as inter-marriages, sports and worship among others are often disrupted as a result of electoral violence predispose by ethnic politics.

Salawu and Hassan (2011) noted that ethnic politics increase the gap in social relationships, create suspicious and hatred among ethnic nationalities and create room for antagonisms and electoral violence. Aver *et al.* (2013) argued that the major cause of political violence in Nigeria is ethnic politics, which plays a major role in electoral malpractice, corruption, incidence of political thuggery, insecurity in the country and electoral violence.

Similarly, Bello (2013) argues that one major causes of electoral violence in Nigeria is ethnic political struggle. Also, Edewor *et al.* (2014: 70) argues that ethnicity and cultural diversity “created more conflict (political violence) and posed obstacles to unity, peaceful co-existence, progress and stable development”. Ikechukwu and Onyibor (2016) argued that ethnic politics strengthens electoral violence; undermine justice, peace, security equality and development. In line with the literature review, the following research objectives and hypotheses were formulated for this study.

Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework of analysis adopted in this study is the Marxist theory. The theory is essential because of its relative proficiency in analysing post-colonial political economy. According to this theory, the state is the product and a manifestation of the irreconcilability of class antagonisms (Lenin, 1984). According to Ekekwe (1986: 12), “the state emerged so that antagonistic groups will not consume themselves in fruitless struggle in advanced bourgeoisie states unlike in neo-colonial

states where state are parts and parcels of class antagonisms it was supposed to moderate. Thus, post-colonial states rather than maintains or moderate economic relations; they become an instrument of exploitation, domination and intimidation of the subjects". The Nigerian state as a post-colonial state is characterised by these factors mentioned above. Like other colonial states, Nigeria lacks the capability to moderate the struggle, which is pronounced between or among the various ethnic groups and state that make up Nigeria. Hence, political, and economic imbalances exist among and between the various state and ethnic groups in Nigeria. These imbalances exist in almost every sector of the economic; hence, most people feel marginalised – a situation which predisposes various ethnic groups to endless electoral violence. Therefore, the legacy of colonialism and monopoly of power by the major ethnic groups and their consequent marginalisation of the minority groups are the major factors responsible for electoral violence in Nigeria.

Objectives of the Study

The specific objectives of this study are:

1. To examine the relationship between ethnic politics and electoral violence in the South-South geopolitical zone of Nigeria.
2. To determine the effect of ethnic politics on electoral violence in the South-South geopolitical zone of Nigeria.

Hypotheses of the Study

The following null hypotheses were formulated to guide the researcher in finding answers to the research objectives.

H₁: There is no significant relationship between ethnic politics and electoral violence in the South-South geopolitical zone of Nigeria.

H₂: Ethnic politics does not influence electoral violence in South-South geopolitical zone of Nigeria.

Methodology

A cross sectional research design was adopted and data were collected via a survey of 300 respondents in the South-South geopolitical zone of Nigeria. Out of the 300 copies of the questionnaire administered, 241 were retrieved and analysed, giving a response rate of 80.33% as shown in the table below.

Table 1. Distribution of Questionnaire and Response Rate

S/N	South-South States	Questionnaire Distributed	Questionnaire Retrieved	Percentage of Total Retrieved
1.	Delta	50	45	18
2.	Edo	50	44	14.7
3.	Rivers	50	37	12.3
4.	Cross River	50	40	13.3
5.	Akwa Ibom	50	43	14.3
6.	Bayelsa	50	32	10.7
7.	Total	300	241	80.33

Source: Field Research, 2021.

The items of measurement were rated on 5-point Likert type scale which ranks respondents on a scale of 1 (strongly disagreed) to 5 (strongly agreed). Cronbach Alpha method was used to establish the internal consistency of the instrument as shown in the table below.

Table 2. Reliability Results

Scale	No. of Items	Cronbach Alpha
Ethnic Politics	7	0.803
Political Violence	9	0.792

Source: Field Research, 2021.

The results yielded a coefficient of 0.803 and 0.792, which satisfies the general recommended bench mark of 0.70 for the research indicators (Cronbach, 1951). The questionnaire was also validated by experts in the department of political science. Hence, the research satisfies both reliability and validity of the instrument used for the study.

Data collected were analysed using Correlation coefficient and linear regression analysis with the aid of Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) version 23.

Research Results

Table 3. Correlation Coefficients

Variables		Ethnic Politics	Political Violence
Ethnic Politics	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed)	1	0.774**
			0.000
	N	241	241
Political Violence	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed)	0.774**	1
		0.00	
	N	241	241

**Correlation is significant at 0.05 levels (2-tailed)

Source: Field Research, 2021.

Linear Regression Analysis

Table 4. Model Summary^b

Model	<i>R</i>	<i>R</i> ²	<i>Adj - R</i> ²	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	0.532	0.471	0.438	0.211

a. Predictors (constant): Ethnic politics

b. Dependent variable: Political violence

Source: Field Research, 2021.

Table 5. ANOVA^a

Model	Sum of Square	Mean	Df	F	Sig.	Rank
1 Regression	7.533	3.666	2	15.317	0.000b	Sig.
Residual	4.801	0.402	237			
Total	12.334		239			

a. Dependent variable: Political violence

b. Predictors (Constant): Ethnic politics

Source: Field Research, 2021.

Discussion of Results

Table 3 shows the correlation coefficient between ethnic politics and political violence. There exists a significant positive high correlation between the independent (ethnic politics) and the dependent (political violence) variables ($r = 0.774$, $n = 241$, $p < 0.05$). This implies that ethnic politics has a positive and strong relationship with electoral violence in the South-South geopolitical zone of Nigeria. Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected. The linear regression results show value of 0.471 which revealed that ethnic politics independently accounted for 47.1% of the variation in electoral violence in South-South geopolitical zone of Nigeria. The F. statistics of 15.317 revealed that the model is statistically significant at 0.05 significant levels. Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected. Thus ethnic politics has a significant influence on electoral violence in Nigeria.

With respect to the first hypothesis, the study found that ethnic politics have strong and positive relationship with electoral violence in the South-South geopolitical zone of Nigeria. This finding is in agreement with previous studies (Salawu & Hassan, 2011; Aver *et al.*, 2013; Bello, 2013; Edewor *et al.*, 2014; Ikechukwu & Onyibor, 2016). As predicted, the linear regression analysis results show that ethnic politics has significantly explained 47.1% of variation in electoral violence in the South-South geopolitical zone of Nigeria. Thus, the study has shown that ethnic politics exerts a positive and statistically significant impact on electoral violence. This finding is in agreement with the views of Aver *et al.* (2013); Bello (2013); Edewor *et al.* (2014) and Ikechukwu and Onyibor (2016), that ethnic politics promotes political violence in Nigeria's fourth republic.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The study has revealed through its perceived findings that ethnic politics have a strong and positive relationship with electoral violence and that ethnic politics has a positive impact on electoral violence in the South-South geopolitical zone of Nigeria. Based on the findings of the study, the author concludes that ethnic politics has a significant positive influence on electoral violence. From the findings and conclusion reached, the study makes the following recommendations:

1. Nigerian political leaders should place the citizens at the centre of their political project without recourse to ethnic chauvinism.
2. Nigerian political leaders should see acquisition of power as a means of serving the collective interest of the people irrespective of ethnic origin.
3. Nigeria political leaders should desist from harassing people who criticise their activities. Political victimization of people should be

discouraged so that the government can enjoy the support across the diverse ethnic groups.

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Humanities and Social Sciences: Latvia
Volume 29, Issue 2 (Autumn-Winter 2021)

University of Latvia Press

HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES LATVIA

ISSN 1022-4483



9 771022 448002