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Jacek Kurczewski

PATTERNS OF DISPUTE AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION AS ELEMENTS OF POPULAR LEGAL CULTURE

The article shows the peculiarities of legal culture in the various countries of Central and Eastern Europe (Poland, Ukraine, Latvia, Romania and Bulgaria). Special attention is paid to differences in attitude to this social phenomenon in the minds and behavior of ethnic groups in these countries. The article implements the purpose and objectives of the research project "Patterns of Dispute and Dispute Resolution as Elements of Popular Legal Culture" (Grant of Polish Ministry of Higher Education and Science. No. 2012/07/B/HS6/02496), in which the author was the head. The article is based on empirical data of sociological studies conducted in these countries in 2014.

Key words: dispute patterns, nationality, minority, identity, court experience

The role of ethnic differences in the dispute settlement patterns

Apart from checking the continuity over time and the structure in dispute patterns, the third main purpose of our research was to check the role of ethnic differences in the dispute settlement patterns. In the Polish context the issue seems of marginal importance as is the minorities issue as such. It is obvious that Poland is an unusually difficult place

for such a test as during World War Two and afterwards due to the Holocaust and forced ethnic resettlements, being the pre-war country in which ethnic Poles constituted over a 60% majority it became an almost homogeneous country. Suffice it to say that until dual ethnic identity was introduced in the census in 2002 ca. 96% declared themselves as Poles, 1,23% (471,000 people) gave their nationality different from Polish and 2,03% (774,900 people) did not identify their nationality at all. Once the opportunity to declare dual nationality by choice was inserted into the interview schedule in the latest National Census of 2011 run by the Main Statistical Office, Polish nationality was declared by 97.09% of those interviewed, of whom 871,500 people (2.26% of the total) declared two nationalities – including Polish, and other nationalities by 596,000 people (1,55% of the total).

The Polish Law on National and Ethnic Minorities and Regional Language of January 6, 2005 enumerates the national and ethnic minorities that are granted several rights, and above all securing the right to education in their own language. Interestingly, the ethnic group of Cassubians was not recognized as minority but still was granted the right to cultivate Cassubian language as their own "regional language". Nevertheless, the Law granted all the ethnic minorities the cultural rights that enable them to apply for State funds and sponsorship of cultural and educational activities. A special case, however, is that of the "Silesians", who before World War Two were designated as Upper Silesians (Górnoslazaki, Oberschlesier) but under German rule were characterized as a German ethnic minority with their own regional language (Wasserpolnisch) combining old Polish dialect with German intrusions. Silesians had lived in the area since late Middle Ages, first under the rule of the Czechs, then Luxemburg, Habsburgs and in the mid-18th century mostly under Prussian rule and due to the fact that their history was not part of the Old Polish-Lithuanian Rzeczpospolita (Commonwealth) that flourished in Central-Eastern Europe until the partitions at the end of the 18th century. The National Polish movement started to influence the natives of Upper Silesia in the mid-19th century and when with the end of the First World War the German empire started do disintegrate, fierce battles between the armed partisans of the unification of Upper Silesia with the reborn Poland and the German state loyalists erupted which ended in 1920 with a plebiscite under the rule of the League of Nations. This Plebiscite divided Upper Silesia into Polish and German parts until World War Two which brought an end to German rule over the whole of Silesia and the resettlement of the Germans to Germany with its new borders. But due to the history of

the organized Polish minority in Upper Silesia that survived the plebiscite the Silesians in the former contested territory – in contrast to Lower Silesia unequivocally Germanized throughout the centuries – the native population was given the choice whether to opt for Polish nationality and remain or to opt for German nationality and leave.

It is not difficult to imagine the complexity of the individual identities and social relations under such critical conditions even though the religious factor so characteristic of many other "ethnic" conflictse.g.as the one in Northern Ireland was not important here as the Upper Silesians were and are mostly Roman Catholic independent of their national creed. The national divide was cutting through families and other primary groups. The use of the local Silesian vernacular was also prevalent in both warring sides. Inevitably, a group of separatists emerged who tried to keep themselves apart from the division, proclaiming their own Silesian identity distinct from both the German and the Polish ones. This separatist movement administratively persecuted (as well as the German national movement) under the Communist rule burst out on a previously unprecedented scale after the political emancipation of Polish society in 1989. Interestingly, separatists felt relatively well in this part of Upper Silesia which was Polish between the wars, while in the part that was annexed in 1945 the native population in 1989 identified themselves as a German minority.

The fear of Silesian separatism is at the heart of the refusal to recognize officially the "Silesians" as an "ethnic minority" despite numerous attempts by the Movement for Silesian Autonomy.(RAŚ). The "autonomists", on the other hand, refuse to recognize Silesian as the regional language as they consider it to be a fully-fledged language providing the basis for the ethnic independence or autonomy. Paradoxically, the "Silesians" though not listed in the law came to the fore in 2012 National Census with 846,719 people. So the largest Polish ethnic (?) minority totaling almost one million people (and more than one million if 375,635 Polish-Silesian bi-nationals are added) has no recognized legal status at all.

Interestingly, despite several attempts to develop ethnic identity across the country, only two groups were large enough to enter the Census statistics – Kociewiaks, the native group of Polish-speaking inhabitants of Pomorze area and "Gorole", Tatra Highlanders among whom a minority separatist movement was supported as "Goralenvolk" by the Nazi Germany occupation administration during World War Two. Both of these identities attracted about 3,000 people each, certainly not much for the Silesians.

Our study of disputes (Kurczewski 1977) began in a small town in Upper Silesia that belonged to Germany until 1945. In the 1970s it was officially forbidden to speak of an ethnic difference. The division between Silesians and people who arrived here after 1945 was expressed in terms of the "autochthones" and the "newcomers". We have twice asked the representative sample of Olesno people about their identity, offering up to four options between regional, ethnic and national identities and the results are naturally complex as Polish identity very often coincides with Silesian or even German identity (Kurczewski 2007; 2014). In the common stereotype Silesians characterize themselves as law abiding citizens accustomed to German (read: Prussian) strict order. The attachment to traditional values of patriarchal domestic culture is also mentioned. Above all, however, to be 'Silesian' means attachment to "Silesian culture". So the question arises, is there something like Silesian legal culture? One could expect that being a minority, Silesians would tend to keep their disputes to themselves and to use court less often than the Polish "newcomers". One should keep in mind, however, that being in a minority Silesians have been heard to complain about the "Silesian trauma" of being exploited by outsiders ruling them from Berlin and then from Warsaw and neglecting their peculiar identity, but in the late 20th century their position was already economically privileged thanks to the right to a German passport and to participate in the German labor market. Having a hundred thousand relatives who had been gradually leaving Silesia (mostly West), Germany was also the reason for feelings of inferiority for Polish newcomers arriving in the region witnessing the relative wealth of their neighbors.

Quite the opposite was the position of another minority included in our study, namely the Polish Ukrainians. To tell their story we would need another lengthy chapter but as this is not the focus of our book we will limit ourselves to the basic facts. The Ukrainian population in pre-war Poland was large and in the South-East it formed a majority in the countryside but not in the cities and towns where Jews and Poles jointly outnumbered the Ukrainians. Polish-Ukrainian antagonism has a social background, as Ukrainian peasants had been subject to Polish or Polonized gentry of Ukrainian origin for centuries. There was a religious divide as Ukrainians belonged the East Orthodox Church while the union with Rome effected in the 17th century was persecuted by the Russian authorities on a par with embryonic Ukrainian nationalism once the Eastern part of former Polish-Lithuanian Rzeczpospolita was taken under their rule. A part of the Polish-Ukrainian lands were

however taken through partitions of Rzeczpospolita by the Catholic Austrian monarchy and the Habsburgs protected the Ukrainian Uniate church. The Polish-Ukrainian antagonism in the Austrian-held part of Poland called Galicia continued and was reinforced as in the late 19th century relative freedom of speech and press gave fertile conditions to the development of the Ukrainian nationalism that soon entered into open conflict with Polish nationalism. The area with its capital of Lwów (Lviv) became contested by two nationalisms, Polish and Ukrainian. At the end of World War 1 independent Ukraine in Galicia was proclaimed, but the Poles won militarily and Ukrainian irredentism went into the underground until World War 2. The German Nazi occupation of Poland allowed Ukrainians to consolidate their military power and when the Holocaust of Jews was ending, the next bloody ethnic cleansing broke out in 1943 starting with the genocide of Poles by Ukrainian nationalists in the Volhynia region. This provoked a spiral of bloody revenge as Ukrainian nationalists were forcing Poles to leave the whole area defined by them as Ukraine and the Polish national underground army was fighting to keep Poland within the pre-war borders. Whatever the wishes of both sides, the new Soviet-Polish border in 1945 shifted Poland several hundred miles west and the mass ethnic resettlement in both directions - East to Soviet Ukraine and West to communist Poland followed - but tens of thousands of Ukrainians remained in their homes in Poland to the west of the new border and because of the assumed collaboration with the Ukrainian nationalist insurgent army (UPA) they were forcefully resettled in 1947 into the new Northern and Western territories acquired by Poland from Germany as a compensation for territorial losses in the East. The resettlement policy deliberately aimed at dispersing the Ukrainians in their new locations so they would never outnumber the designated proportion, education in Ukrainian was forbidden, the Uniate (Greek-Catholic) church service was forbidden as well as any forms of even cultural self-organization until 1956 when with the general liberalization the Ukrainian minority was administratively recognized and it gained some rights allowing it to cultivate their own culture (Wojakowski 2014).

The lasting effect of this policy is that until today the open acknowledgement of Ukrainian identity has been rare despite the fact that about 300,000 people were re-settled in 1947. In the 2011 National Census only 51,000 Ukrainians were recorded declaring their nationality as the only one with 27,630 declaring themselves both Poles and Ukrainians. It is also rare to find compact Ukrainian settlement areas except for dispersed

villages. One of the few exceptions is Górowo Ilaweckie in North-East Poland (former East Prussia) where Ukrainians are a minority in the town populated also by Poles resettled after World War II from Byelorussia and Lithuania. The small town is surrounded by villages in which Ukrainians often form the majority of inhabitants. Górowo Iławeckie is one of the few cultural centres of the Ukrainian community dispersed throughout Poland as it is the seat of one of three Ukrainian secondary educational institutions in Poland. Even such a brief history provides the argument for our hypothesis that as a repressed minority Ukrainians will refrain from using a (Polish) court as the dispute settlement mechanism. The technical difficulty in collecting mass interviews with a dispersed minority is obvious, we had to use the snow-ball mechanism asking the first Ukrainian respondents to contact the student interviewers with further Ukrainian respondents constantly checking the age and gender parameters in order to construct the approximate quota sample. With all these shortcoming this is the first research into the legal beliefs and practices of the Polish Ukrainian minority and we feel right in presenting the results with a warning to readers that it should be treated as pilot reconnaissance and not the final solid knowledge.

Olesno and Górowo Ilaweckie (Poland) studies

Results of the Olesno and Górowo Ilaweckie studies are presented in two ways. First, the means of the variables already discussed in the preceding chapters will be checked as for the statistical significance of differences between Polish and (Polish) Silesian and Polish Ukrainian groups in each of the bi-ethnic towns made by P. Orzechowski. This is a rough way of treating the data and we do it only in order to have something to move to the proper statistical analysis using the hierarchical regression analysis model prepared for us by Z. Karpiński.

Table 1. Student's t test values for significance of difference between ethnic groups in Olesno and Górowo-Iławeckie

City	Górov	vo Ilawecki	e	Olesno		
Ethnicity	Poles	Ukrainians	(1 - Ukra- inians, 2 - Poles)	Other ethnicity	Poles	(1 – Po- les, 2 – Other)
Ideal dispute settlement (1 - court, 2 - mediation)	1.51 (0.50)	1.74 (0.44)	t(163) = -2.21 *	1.55 (0.50)	1.55 (0.50)	t (147) = 0.04
Dispute experience in last 3 years (0 - none, 13 – in all cases	5.56 (3.72)	5.29 (0.91)	t (165) = -2.12 *	1.02 (1.48)	0.90 (1.42)	t (150) = 0.49
Lifelong court experience (0 - none, 1 - at least once)	0.63 (0.48)	0,52 (0.50)	t(164) = 1.43	0.42 (0.50)	0.39 (0.49)	t (150) = 0.43
Court experience in last 3 years (0 - none, 1 - at least once)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)	t (165= -0.07	0.16 (0.52)	0.10 (0.35)	t (150) = 0.78
Court chosen in case scripts (0 - never, 7/8 - in all cases)	2.21 (2.07)	1.58 (1.47)	t(165) = 2.30	3.07 (2.17)	3.06 (2.18)	t (150) = 0.01
Compromise chosen in all script cases (0 - never, 7/8 - in all cases)	4.92 (2.50)	5.82 (2.73)	t(165) = -1.62	5.84 (2.69)	5.90 (2.41)	t (150) = -0.14
Court chosen in private case scripts (0 - never, 4/5 - in all cases)	0.63 (1.03)	0.37 (0.73)	t(165) = 1.93 *	1.00 (1.15)	0.90 (1.13)	t (150) = 0.51
Court chosen in public script cases (0 - never, 3/4 - in all cases)	1.59 (1.35)	1.23 (1.08)	t(165)= 1.97 *	2.11 (1.42)	2.18 (1.24)	t (150) = - 0.27
Compromise chosen in private script cases (0 - never, 4/5 - in all cases)	4.30 (1.90)	4.97 (2.10)	t(165) = -1.69	4.63 (2.13)	4.82 (1.81)	t (150) = -0.57
Compromise chosen in public script cases (0 - never, 3/4 - in all cases)	1.26 (1.16)	1.40 (1.30)	t(165) = - 0.36	1.84 (1.41)	1.79 (1.24)	t (150) = 0.24

-						
Withdrawal chosen in all case scripts (0 - 0 - never, 7/8 - in all cases)	2.68 (2.30)	2.60 (1.97)	t(153) = 0.21	1.96 (2.36)	2.53 (2.18)	t (123) = -1.37
Private pursuit chosen in all case scripts (0 - 0 - nev- er, 7/8 - in all cases)	2.74 (2.29)	2.92 (2.46)	t(153) = - 0.49	2.15 (1.90)	1.63 (2.05)	t (123) = 1.46
Other official institutions chosen in all case scripts (0 - 0 - never, 7/8 - in all cases)	4.02 (2.50)	3.11 (2.24)	t(153) = 2.29 *	4.19 (2.39)	4.12 (2.25)	t (123) = 0.17
Withdrawal chosen in private case scripts (0 - never, 4/5 - in all cases)	1.48 (1.43)	1.26 (1.21)	t(156) = 0.81	1.16 (1.65)	1.55 (1.56)	t (130) = -1.37
Withdrawal chosen in public case scripts(0 - never, 3/4 - in all cases)	1.20 (1.21)	1.34 (1.17)	t(159) = - 0.66	0.88 (0.99)	0.96 (1.04)	t (134) = - 0.51
Private pursuit chosen in private case scripts (0 - never, 4/5 - in all cases)	1.76 (1.58)	1.89 (1.79)	t(156) = -0.49	0.64 (1.00)	0.45 (0.78)	t (134) = 1.20
Private pursuit chosen in public case scripts(0 - never, 3/4 - in all cases)	1.06 (1.07)	1.03 (1.14)	t(159) = 0.07	1.51 (1.45)	1.18 (1.55)	t (130) = 1.23
Other official institutions chosen in private case scripts (0 - never, 4/5 - in all cases)	1.53 (1.33)	0.89 (1.09)	t(156) = 2.69 **	1.57 (1.43)	1.36 (1.16)	t (130) = 0.89
Other official institutions chosen in public case scripts(0 - never, 3/4 - in all cases)	2.49 (1.53)	2.23 (1.51)	t(159) = 0.86	2.59 (1.51)	2.82 (1.58	t (134) = -0.87

Listing all statistically significant diffeences in Górowo Iławeckie:

Poles less often than Ukrainians declared having a dispute in the last three years;

Poles more often chose court and Ukrainians mediation as the ideal dispute settlement pattern;

Poles also more often than Ukrainians chose another official agency to settle a dispute in general and in private disputes.

We also checked the significance of religious denomination findings with the help of the student's test in Górowo Ilaweckie (cf. Appendix B). Roman Catholics compared with Greek Catholics (Ukrainian church) less often reported any dispute in the last 3 years, more often chose court in general disputes and other official agencies in general and in private disputes, while Greek Catholics more often chose compromise in private disputes.

In Olesno the findings are quite different as there were no statistically significant differences between Poles not declaring any other ethnic identity and all other people (Silesians and/or Germans). Here, however, the minute community of Protestants differed significantly by choosing court and other official agencies in general and in public disputes more often than Roman Catholics and was more in favour of private pursuit of one's claims in public disputes.

Moving now to the results of the multilevel logistic regression analysis (Appendix A to this chapter) we see the differences and similarities of the minorities as compared with the Polish majority in both (Olesno and Górowo Iławeckie) local studies made in Poland. The results about the choice of the ideal dispute settlement pattern are in both cases statistically insignificant. The same was true of the outcome of the simple Multivariate Logistic Regression (MLR) analysis made with the indices of preference for court and for compromise in both localities. To sum up, except for the difference in means between Poles and Ukrainians in Górowo Ilaweckie we cannot support the theory of ethnic differentiation in dispute settlement patterns. But the above mentioned exception is important, as it shows that the underprivileged minority (Polish Ukrainians) is more reluctant to use courts.

Studies in Poland, Latvia, Romania, Ukraine and Bulgaria

We will now check the ethnic dimension theory in three multi-ethnic localities we studied abroad not far from Poland – Daugavpils in Latvia, Cluj-Napoca in Romania and Razgrad in Bulgaria. As comparative context we shall add the data from two Ukrainian cities – Drohobych, the middle sized town in Western Ukraine that before the World War 2 was part of Poland and Mariupol, a large industrial port in the East of Ukraine close to Russia and in the Donbass region torn by the civil war. Daugavpils under the name of Dueneburg (Dynaburg in Polish) had been the historical capital of Polish Livonia, part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (Rzeczpospolita) until 1772 when it was annexed by Catherine the Great. Russia started to build up here the frontier bastion with Prussia and later in

the mid-19th century the main railway hub. As part of independent Latvia since 1914 Daugavpils has remained its second largest city with 112, 837 inhabitants (История Даугавпилса 2015) of whom there are 58% Russian, 17% Latvian and 15% Polish. This is the site of the Educational University, judicial and administrative centre of the province without any important industry after the fall of Soviet economy. Daugavpils was annexed by the Soviet Union in 1940, then occupied by Germans and taken back after the WW 2 by the Soviet Union until 1990, when Latvia regained independence. The three main ethnic groups had the long history of changing position in the city that until World War II and the Holocaust had been mainly Jewish - local Poles (sf. Fuszara and Kurczewski 2009) may refer to days when the whole region was under Polish sovereignty, Russians remember they dominated politically from 1772 to 1918 and returned with Soviet occupation in 1940 that led to the wide re-Russification of the city, while Latvians came to the fore in the period between the wars. The local people are fierce however that the major ethnic/political conflict takes place on the Latvian national forum and in the capital Riga while Daugavpils remains a quiet place of co-habitation despite complaints made by Latvians who are numerically overwhelmed and by Slavs who are forced to learn and to use Latvian as the official national language (cf. Volkov and Kurczewski 2013).

Cluj-Napoca until 1918 had been the judicial, administrative and cultural centre of Transylvania as part of the dual Austrian/Hungarian monarchy. After the Trianon Treaty it was taken by Romania though in the years of 1941-1944 the Hitler-Mussolini arbitration assigned it back to Hungary. It is a large city with 324,000 inhabitants in 2012 of whom 79% are Romanians and 19% Hungarians. Re-named as Cluj-Napoca during the large industrialization project by the Ceauseascu government it has, aside from its steel industry, the 2nd largest academic centre in Romania holding numerous university-level and cultural Romanian and Hungarian institutions, and Romanian and Hungarian operas and theatres. The historical conflict between two national groups did not end after 1989. Long standing Romanian nationalist city mayor Funar, busy with remodelling the public space, left Hungarian minority in disgust (Mica). Cluj-Napoca/Kolszvar is the city of ethnically distinct historical narrative and spatial arrangement as perceived by its residents but they co-habit in everyday life except for public festivals and social gatherings. As in Olesno the case with German language in Cluj-Napoca Hungarians also lost their right to use their own language in the official transactions as according to the Law of Public Administration No. 215/2001 the 20% threshold was introduced and between the two censuses the percentage of Hungarians fell below the requested level from 23% in 1992 to 19% in 2002 (Botea 2005).

Razgrad in 2014 had 33,568 inhabitants of whom 79% are Bulgarians and 19% Turks. The city is known for its pharmaceutical industry and the best Bulgarian football team - Ludogorets. The dramatic history of the relations between two national groups does not need to be retold here. Suffice to recall that while Razgrad was retaken by Bulgarians after Russian-Ottoman war of 1877-78, the process of Bulgarian repopulation ensured with the surrounding countryside remaining in majority Muslim and Turkish. The ethnic identity of the Muslim population is not totally unambiguous as apart from converts from the native inhabitants into Islam, the largely deserted area was repopulated by the semi-nomadic groups from Anatolia. The monumental structure of now unused mosque built by Ibrahim Pasha in 1530s witnessed the days when Razgrad was the vital centre of the Ottoman rule in Eastern Balkans. The Bulgarian re-settlers added quickly the Orthodox temples and modern municipal architecture as Razgrad became an important administrative outpost in the predominantly Muslim countryside from which part of the population resettled into the areas under Turkish rule. The situation continued until the 1980s when Bulgarian communist leader Todor Zhivkov launched the anti-Turkish campaign forcing the Bulgarian Turks to change names or to leave for Turkey. Turks were not allowed to attend Muslim religious ceremonies, speak Turkish in public places or wear traditional Turkish clothing. This led to the depopulation of the area with ca. 359,000 people suddenly leaving Bulgaria on tourist visa to Turkey, only a part (ca 150,000 people) of whom returned home after the fall of communist rule in 1990.

Before we start the description of our findings, a note of warning is necessary. A methodologically sound comparison is possible only within a given community where the construction of a sample and interviewing took place. The details are presented in the Appendix A at the end of the book. The research teams understood the task differently, we were not able to monitor in situ the process of interviewing, etc. After all, the legal, political and cultural context in each locality under study was different as well. But as for a given locality these factors are put under control, however, again, the context might have been different for different ethnic groups within a given community. Taking all this into account, we begin with the most risky part which is the comparison of the similarities and differences across the localities and countries. More conscientious readers would be advised to skip this part of the description and move immediately to the results of statistical analysis comparing Latvians, Russians and Poles in Daugavpils, Romanians and Hungarians in Cluj-Napoca and Bulgarians and Turks in Razgrad.

For those inclined to accept (as ourselves) the collected data as a kind of pilot reconnaissance to direct the more detailed and systematic research in the future we commence with the presentation of the selected indicators of what we label as "popular (folk) legal culture" in the region. These socio-legal indicators include reported experience with the use of courts, the respective assessment of court performance as well as some general beliefs about justice and law.

Table 2. Selected indicators of local legal culture in the region (in %)

	Cities in Poland	Ukr	aine	Da	ugav	nils		uj - oca	Razg	rad
	Totaliu	D	M	Lv	Ru	Pl	Ro	Hu	Bg/R	Т
Without court experience	48	74	77	90	80	82	73	82	46	41
Civil court experience	36	18	15	7	13	12	21	12	25	30
Criminal court experience	16	4	4	2	5	4	5	4	15	17
Other court experience	7	1	×	1	1	1	1	2	13	12
Verdict known from experience considered just	64	65	60	83	64	67	72	53	44	51
Approached the court on their own	65	19	18	9	20	14	21	16	44	37
Satisfaction with the effects of contact with court	55	36	43	69	68	50	67	60	39	43
Court in general unpleasant	69	60	62	86	71	73	52	71	48	42
Know an expert in law	8	17	16	16	21	14	10	27	54	33
Local people abide by law	50	36	42	61	69	63	50	45	41	47
Should one obey the law even if unjust	45	71	59	57	43	51	59	62	27	24
100% = N =	480	361	270	222	200	180	300	200	300	200

Note: In the above and the following tables D means Drohobych, M – Mariupol, Lv – Latvians, Ru – Russians, Pl – Poles, Ro – Romanians, Hu – Hungarians, Bg – Bulgarians and T – Turks.

Urban Polish and Razgrad respondents are the most experienced in court proceedings, but this applies specifically to the criminal justice while urban Poles are the most experienced in civil justice taking into consideration all the groups interviewed, and Bulgarians and Turks from Razgrad in other types of justice (here we must rely on our respondents classification of their judicial experience). The lowest frequency of the court experience of all types is to be found amongst Latvians of Daugavpils. Poles are leading in terms of frequency of ever approaching the court for any reason (65%), the next closest groups being from Razgrad (44% of Bulgarians and 37% of Turks).

Interestingly, the assessment of the verdict that was pronounced in the case a respondent had personally experienced is rather similar across the groups interviewed. Latvians who had such experience the least often, would most often (83%) assess the judgment as just. They are followed by Romanians (72%) and Poles from Daugavpils (67%). The worst assessment was given by Razgrad respondents independent of ethnicity (42% of Bulgarian participants in a court case and 51% of Turks) and Hungarians in Cluj-Napoca (53%). In general, across the cities and ethnic groups a majority of localities gave the positive assessment of the justness of court's decisions. As for the satisfaction with the court as approached by the respondents for any reason (not necessarily to bring a suit) the respondents from Ukraine (36 – 43%) and from Razgrad (39 – 43%) in Bulgaria are markedly less often satisfied while Latvians (69%) and Russians (68%) from Daugavpils and Romanians (67%) from Cluj-Napoca gave the best notes. These two assessments differ in details but in general there is congruency as for good notes given to courts among Latvians and Romanians (more often positive) and among Razgrad respondents (more often negative).

Latvian respondents from Daugavpils (86%) most often perceived the court experience as unpleasant whereas Razgrad respondents (48 – 42%) were at the other end of the spectrum. This is a remarkably wide distance and calling for investigation even if the quality of the collected data is different in different localities where the study was made. The safest thing and the same time treating the said methodological problem respectfully is to compare the rank order of groups as to the proportion of those expressing their unpleasantness with rankings concerning other variables such as personal acquaintance with court proceedings. In this particular case the Spearman's rho rank correlation equals 0.918 and the two-tailed value of P is 0.00018, which is highly significant.

This arouses curiosity as to the other correlations within the above table and the total effect is presented in the table 2 below:

General experience with courts	Approaching the courts		Satisfaction with court performance	Unpleasantness of courts
Experience	.912+++	549	628	-,.918 +++
Approaching		480	322	912+++
Justness			.560	.551
Satisfaction				.628

Table 3. Rank order (Spearmsn's Rho) correlations between variables related to court experience

+++ Rho significant at .001 level

The paradox of a negative stereotype of court about which we shall write more in the concluding chapter appears here in form of a significant negative correlation between a feeling of unpleasantness associated with court and two different (but inter-correlated) measures of personal experience. The group that at the aggregate level is better acquainted with the work of court has also a better emotional association with it. The simple test could be done comparing the panel data on the clients of court, which is a project we leave for further students of the social psychology of justice and dispute settlement. This finding is of great importance when combined with the lack of significant correlation between two measures of evaluating court performance and court-related experience. Even though our samples differ as to the perceived unpleasantness of court experience, there is an overall majority agreement that courts are not a proper place to debate family matters.

As for the perceived conformity to law at the local level the respondents from Ukrainian cities and Bulgarians from Razgrad in Bulgaria (36 – 41 %) are of a worse opinion than people living in the other areas. But when asked about their own opinion related to law abidance no straight relationship emerges (rho = -.332, non-significant) – in Drohobych people think the worst about law abidance in practice but at the same time have the highest expectations as for the legalism, but the two variables are largely independent of each other.

In the following part of the chapter we will focus on the patterns of dispute settlement advocated in reaction to the eight case scripts of disputes described earlier in the book. The order of presentation of findings will be from the detailed description of the distribution of answers in all the ethnic samples studied in cities outside Poland using also the Polish data from a sub-sample of respondents being residents in cities with at least 20,000 inhabitants. Then we shall move to the more sophisticated statistical analysis on the aggregate indices of dispute settlement patterns also known already from the two preceding chapters.

	Poland	Ukr	aine]	Latvia	ı	Rom	ania	Bulg	garia
Better:		D	M	Lv	Ru	Pl	Ro	Н	Bg	T
A.1. Full satisfaction	12	31	30	33	30	37	21	27	42	26
of one party's claims										
A.2. Mutual agreement	86	69	69	66	69	62	79	74	58	73
A.3. DK	2		1	1	1	1				1
B.1. Strictly according	43	63	58	57	48	53	47	40	49	30
to law										
B.2. Compromise	50	36	39	42	51	47	53	60	51	70
B.3. DK	7	1	3	1	1					
C.1. By court	55	72	68	57	59	56	64	67	57	49
C.2. By mediators	35	27	31	43	41	44	36	34	43	50
C.3. DK	10		1	1						
Total = N = 100%	480	361	270	222	200	180	300	200	300	200

Table 4. Ideal patterns of dispute settlement (in %)

The Polish national urban sample is surprisingly low (12%) when it comes to full satisfaction of a legitimate party's claims in contrast to all other groups (including Poles from Daugavpils) amongst whom 21-42% support such zero-one approach. But in this large category the inter-ethnic differences are also marked: mutual agreement against the law but accommodating conflicting expectations as supported mostly by respondents from Cluj-Napoca independent of the ethnic affiliation (79 – 74%) and Turks from Razgrad (73%).

As for the next question that puts emphasis on the following scripture of the law, the positivist approach is the most popular in Drohobych (63%) and the least popular among Razgrad Turks (30%), the other groups being relatively close to each other (40-58%).

The inhabitants of Ukrainian cities (72 - 68%) and of Romanian Cluj-Napoca independent of ethnic affiliation (64 - 67%) are leading in terms of support for the authoritative dispute settlement. The respondents from Polish cities (55%) and from Daugavpils (56 - 59%) and Razgrad (49 - 57%) are more skeptical about the use of courts and other official authoritative bodies, with Turks at the bottom of the ranking (49%).

As those three questions are in the centre of our attention throughout the book we need to look at another possible way of arranging the findings. Until now the difference in the frequency of a hesitant lack of answer in different samples has been neglected but the fact of such a difference may be taken into consideration by counting the simple acceptance ratios where AR = %

of answer 1 - % of answer 2/% of answer 1 + % of answer 2. Such re-counting of the variables would allow us to escape the difference in the technique of interviewing that might be responsible for differences in the lack of answers.

Table 5 below gives the figures for the re-calculated three variables measured by the questions about the ideal dispute settlement patterns:

Ideal patterns of dis-	Poland	Ukra	aine	Latv	ia		Rom	ania	Bulg	aria
pute settlement		D	M	Lv	Ru	Pl	Ro	Н	Bg	T
A. Full satisfaction	75	38	39	33	39	35	58	53	16	53
of one party's claims/										
Mutual agreement										
B. Strictly according	07	.27	.20	.15	.00	.06	06	20	02	40
to law/Compromise										
C. By court/by medi-	.20	.55	.37	.14	.18	.12	.28	.33	.14	.01
ators										
Total = N = 100%	480	361	270	222	200	180	300	200	300	200

Table 5. Acceptance ratios (AR) of ideal patterns of dispute settlement

After Don't Know answers have been put aside, the differences are more clear though the basic findings are in principle the same: Poles are extremely high when it comes to mutual agreement in opposition to Razgrad Bulgarians who are the least in favour of the negotiated mutual compromise; the settlements that strictly follow the letter of law are favoured least by Turks and court or another authoritative body that may impose a settlement are most often chosen by Ukrainians, especially from Drohobych in contrast to Razgrad Turks who mostly favour informal mediation.

We shall now move to the aggregate responses to the question about the preferred choice of finding a way out of the conflict as described in our eight hypothetical case scripts. The detailed tables of frequencies are in the Appendix C to this chapter, here we shall present a very simple aggregation of particular cases divided into three types: a) three (in Cluj-Napoca two) private disputes with neighbor or a friend as an opponent; b) two family disputes between two spouses and c) three "public disputes" by which we mean the disputes between a natural person and hospital, police or municipal authorities as an opponent. For each of these types the simple arithmetic means has been calculated as in the Tables 6 – 8 below.

	Poland	Ukra	ine	Latvi	ia		Rom	ania	Bulga	aria
		D	M	Lv	Ru	Pl	Ro	Н	Bg	T
Withdrawal	5	4	4	5	5	6	15	11	18	7
Compromise	58	55	28	48	47	40	58	47	29	24
Private pursuit	11	21	33	5	13	18	5	16	17	39
Court	12	11	28	22	24	19	16	22	12	7
Other public	8	3	3	13	10	16	5	2	24	21
DK	6	6	4	2	1	1	1	2		2
All public	20	14	31	35	34	35	21	24	36	28
Total = N = 100%	480	361	270	222	200	180	300	200	300	200

Table 6. Means (%) for private disputes outside family (in %)

In Polish cities, Drohobych and Cluj-Napoca people are less prone to approach public bodies in private disputes. Poles and Romanians are equally attached to the idea of compromise informally negotiated with an opponent. Compromise is the least popular in Razgrad and Mariupol. Turks are most prone to pursue their claims privately on their own.

Table 7. Means (%) for family disputes (in %)

	Poland	Ukra	ine	Latv	ia		Roma	nia	Bulga	ria
		D	M	Lv	Ru	Pl	Ro	Н	Bg	T
Withdrawal	14	9	7	19	23	31	17	16	18	16
Compromise	59	60	30	63	63	56	47	39	29	40
Private pursuit	3	9	30	8	8	9	5	15	17	13
Court	14	9	7	19	23	31	17	16	18	16
Other public	59	60	30	63	63	56	47	39	29	40
DK	3	9	30	8	8	9	5	15	17	13
All public	16	14	30	9	4	2	29	24	36	29
Total = N = 100%	480	361	270	222	200	180	300	200	300	200

As for family disputes public agencies are more likely to be approached in Mariupol, Razgrad and Cluj-Napoca while Poles, Ukrainians from Drohobych and Daugavpils inhabitants independent of ethnicity would prefer a direct compromise.

Poland Ukraine Latvia Romania Bulgaria D M Lv Ru Ρl Ro Η Bg T Withdrawal Compromise Private pursuit Court Other public DK All public Total = N = 100%

Table 8. Means for disputes with a public opponent (in %)

In a dispute with a public body another public body should be most likely approached but there are differences as this is less likely in Mariupol. One cannot exclude the idea that this reflects the politicization of a local public life in the Ukraine that in Mariupol entered the stage of the civil war. In Razgrad court will be approached less often than other public bodies (municipality, police), in other localities court is almost a single instrument in making claims against other public agencies.

At the next stage we compare the means of the various socio-legal variables checking the statistical significance with Student's t test and all the means, values and significance are given in the Table 9 below:

Table 9. Student's and Fisher's test values for significance of differences between ethnic groups in Cluj-Napoca, Razgrad and Daugavpils

City		Cluj -	Cluj - Napoca		Raz	Razgrad			Daugavpils	pils
Ethnicity	Ro	Hu	(1 - Hu, 2 - Ro)	Bg	T	(1 - T, 2 - Bg)	Lv	Ru	Pl	(1 - Lv, 2 - Ru, 3 - Pl)
Ideal dispute settlement (1 - court, 2 - mediation))	1.36 (0.48)	1.34 (0.47)	t (492) = 0.64	1.45 (0.50)	1.45 1.48 (0.50)	t (488) = -1.63	1.42 (0.49)	$ \begin{array}{c c} 1.42 & 1.45 \\ (0.49) & (0.50) \end{array} $	1.45 (0.50)	F (2,589) = 0.16
Dispute experience in last 3 years (0 - none, 2 - at least once	2.36 (3.65)	0.00	t (498) = 9.14 ***	9.10 9.22 (1.43) (1.39)	9.22 (1.39)	t $(429) = -2.65$ 0.76	0.76 (2.35)	0.94 0.75 (2.31)	0.75 (2.31)	F (2,599) = 0.32
Lifelong court experience (0 - none, 1 - at least once)	0.28 (0.45)	0.17 (0.38)	t(498) = 2.64 **	0.54 (0.50)	0.54 0.63 (0.50) (0.48)	t (483) = -1.27	0.10 (0.30)	0.18 (0.39)	0.18 (0.38)	F (2,589) = 3.55 *
Court experience in last 3 years (0 - none, 1 - at least once)	0.24 (0.37)	0.00	(498) = 9.14 ***	1.48 1.24 (1.52)	1.24 (1.52)	t (498) = 2.70 0.54 0.60 ** (3.13) (3.34)	0.54 (3.13)		1.14 (4.43)	F (2,599) = 3.50 *
Court chosen in case scripts (0 - never, 7/8 - in all cases)	1.85 (1.30)	2.02 (1.39)	t (498) = -1.34	1.08 (0.86)	0.91 (1.20)	t (498) = 2.69	1.89 (1.27)	2.04 (1.28)	1.73 (1.22)	F (2,599) = 2.63
Compromise chosen in all script cases (0 - never, 7/8 - in all cases)	2.81 (1.31)	2.30 (1.66)	t (498) = 3.88 ***	2.19 (0.86)	2.26 (0.83)	t (498) = -0.94	3.30 (1.55)	3.30 3.22 2.90 (1.55) (1.56) (1.63)	2.90 (1.63)	F (2,599) = 3.79 *
Court chosen in private case scripts (0 - never, 3/4 - in all cases)	0.80 (0.89)	0.82 (0.94)	t (498) = -0.20	0.58 (0.86)	0.39	t (498) = 3.39	0.82 (0.99)	0.79 0.66 (0.94) (0.85)	0.66 (0.85)	F (2,599) = 1.43
Court chosen in public script cases (0 - never, 3/4 - in all cases)	1.85 (0.89)	1.93 (1.02)	t (498) = -0.82	0.91 (0.99)	0.86 (1.04)	t (498) = 1.44	1.64 (1.03)	1.86 1.69 (0.83) (0.96)	1.69 (0.96)	F (2,599) = 2.79
Compromise chosen in private script cases (0 - never, 4/5 - in all cases)	2.12 1.73 (1.28)	1.73 (1.28)	t (498) = 3.78 ***	1.48 (1.23)	1.56 (1.03)	$\begin{vmatrix} 1.56 \\ (1.03) \end{vmatrix} t (498) = -0.30$	2.72 (1.27)	2.72 2.69 2.35 (1.27) (1.29) (1.33)	2.35 (1.33)	F (2,599) = 5.07

Compromise chosen in public script cases (0 - never, 3/4 - in all cases)	0.78 (0.79)	0.68 (0.89)	t (498) = 1.37	0.34 (0.60)	0.38	$ \begin{array}{c c} 0.34 & 0.38 \\ (0.60) & (0.60) \end{array} \text{ t } (498) = -0.92 $	0.77	0.77 0.71 (0.75)	0.68 (0.74)	F (2,599) = 0.55
Withdrawal chosen in all case scripts (0 - 0 - never, 7/8 - in all cases)	0.86 (0.98)	0.71 (0.83)	t(494) = 1.75	1.15 (1.38)	0.90 (0.98)	(0.98) $t (480) = 2.22 *$	0.73	0.76 (1.02)	0.96 (1.11)	F (2,594) = 2.48
Private pursuit chosen in all case scripts (0 - 0 - never, 7/8 - in all cases)	0.30 (0.74)	0.86 (1.11)	0.86 t (494) = -6.73 ***	1.03 (1.27)	1.73 (1.38)	t (480) = -5.76	0.75 (0.96)	0.83 (1.13)	1.10 (1.35)	F (2,592) = 4.97
Other official institutions chosen in all case scripts (0 - 0 - never, 7/8 - in all cases)	2.95 (1.46)	3.01 (1.71)	t (494) = -0.41	3.96 (1.71)	3.41 (1.69)	t (480) = 3.50	3.04 (1.58)	2.99 (1.40)	2.94 (1.51)	F (2,592) = 0.23
Withdrawal chosen in private case scripts (0 - never, 4/5 - in all cases)	0.63 (0.78)	0.65 (0.78)	t(496) = -0.25	0.97 (1.22)	0.54 (0.74)	t(481) = 4.31	0.55 (0.83)	0.63 (0.84)	0.79	F (2,598) = 4.15 *
Withdrawal chosen in public case scripts(0 - never, 3/4 - in all cases)	0.22 (0.46)	0.06 (0.23)	t(494) = 4.83 ***	0.19 (0.45)	0.35 (0.50)	t (496) = - 3.87 ***	0.18 (0.47)	0.14 (0.37)	0.17 (0.43)	F (2,595) = 0.67
Private pursuit chosen in private case scripts (0 - never, 4/5 - in all cases)	0.22 (0.57)	0.65 (0.83)	t (496) = -6.66 ***	0.70 (0.99)	1.44 (1.19)	1.44 $t (496) = -7.43$ (1.19)	0.48 (0.74)	0.48 0.59 (0.74) (0.88)	0.75	F (2,596) = 4.50
Private pursuit chosen in public case scripts (0 - never, 3/4 - in all cases)	0.08 (0.31)	0.21 (0.53)	t (494) = -3.50 ***	0.23 0.29 (0.66) (0.55)	0.29 (0.55)	t(496) = 0.93	0.27 (0.54)	0.27 0.24 (0.54) (0.48)	0.35 (0.62)	F (2,595) = 1.70
Other official institutions chosen in private case scripts (0 - never, 4/5 - in all cases)	1.04 (0.94)	0.96 (1.03)	t(496) = 0.83	1.82 (1.29)	1.46 (1.16)	t (481) = 3.12	1.24 (1.02)	1.24 1.08 1.12 (1.02) (0.98) (1.03)	1.12 (1.03)	F (2,596) = 1.16
Other official institutions chosen in public case scripts(0 - never, 3/4 - in all cases)	1.91 (0.86)	2.05 (0.99)	t (494) = -1.63	2.14 (0.89)	1.95 (0.84)	2.14 1.95 $t (496) = 1.99 *$ $t (496) = 1.99 *$	1.80 (1.00)	1.91 (0.82)	1.82 (0.94)	F (2,595) = 1.00

As we see in Table 9 above there are a lot of the significant differences. There are, however, no significant inter-ethnic differences as to the general ideal pattern of dispute settlement.

Starting with Daugavpils the Latvians here are the least likely group to have had personal experience of court. They are also significantly more often in favour of seeking settlements in private disputes and in all disputes taken together, and the least interested in private pursuit of their claims and withdrawal from private disputes. Poles, on the contrary, have most experience with the court, and they also have the lowest inclination to compromise in private disputes in contrast to Poles in Poland) and they most frequently support private pursuit of claims .

In Cluj-Napoca Hungarians have significantly less dispute and court experience than Romanians. Hungarians also less frequently choose compromise in general and in private disputes, and less often choose to withdraw from public disputes and more often to make a private pursuit of the claims.

In Razgrad Turks reported more disputes than Bulgarians and have had more court experience over their lifetime but less court experience in the last three years, which might be related to the turbulent history of this minority in the last decades of the 20th century. Turks choose court less often in private cases and other public agencies in all types of cases, they opt more frequently for private pursuit of claims, and withdrawal in all types of cases.

This rather chaotic picture becomes more clear when the answers are dichotomized into two variables: (1) the choice of court versus all other advocated reactions and (b) the choice of compromise versus all other reactions. In Daugavpils Latvians were significantly less in favour of court settlement in the case of demolition of the house order (Phi = -.09, p = .0028) and more in the wife's battery case (Phi = .09, p = .030) while more respondents were for compromise in the case of slapping someone in the face (Phi = .10, p = .017) and the house demolition order case (Phi = .08, p = ,048). Daugavpils Russians are in turn significantly more in favour of court in that last case (Phi = .12, p = .002) and in the wife's legacy case (Phi = .10, p = .017) and less for compromise in the friends dispute over the debt case (Phi = -.10, p = .01) while Daugapils Poles are more in favour of court in the battered kids case (Phi = .16, p < .000) and less for compromise in that case (Phi = -.14, p < .000).

In two of the eight case scripts the Hungarians were significantly more in favour of the choice of court than Romanians (pledge taken by a friend from the debtor Phi = .13, p = .003; house demolition ordered by authori-

ties Phi = .10, p = .0025). Compromise was significantly more often chosen by Romanians in the pledge case (Phi = .14, p = .002), in the wife's legacy case (Phi = .17, p = .000) and in the case of the breach of confidentiality by hospital (Phi = .11, p = .019). In Razgrad Bulgarians were significantly more in favour of court in the pledge case (Phi = .12, p = .006) and in the wife's battery case (Phi = .14, p = .002) while less for a compromise in the house demolition order case (Phi = .01, p = .030) and wife's battery case (Phi = .15, p = .393) as compared to Turks.

The details of these differences are of limited interest to us as we do not have a sufficient possibility to study the legal anthropology of these minorities. We leave this task to other researchers from these countries. This simple analysis shows clearly that in some circumstances ethnic differences matter. As sociologists we are inclined to explain these differences by making a reference to their minority status. If, however, the working theory behind our research holds that minorities in an underprivileged position refrain from the use of court and prefer informal ways of dealing with conflict situations, we cannot claim conclusive results. Certainly Turks keep themselves at a distance from the official Bulgarian state machinery of law and justice. The opposite has appeared to be true for the Hungarian minority in Romanian Cluj-Napoca. But in Daugavpils the official majority - Latvians - keep themselves out of court in some cases and in others they prefer court the most. This may be explained by the fact that they are a ruling minority in a city dominated by Russian-speaking Slavs of Russian, Polish and other origins.

The patterns of reaction to conflict with public bodies (hospital, police, municipality) are the most important indicator of the actual political status of the minority. It is edifying that nowhere in our research have we found significant differences between ethnic groups as to willingness to go to court for help in such a case. But what is of concern is the significant difference between the Bulgarians and Turks as to withdrawal from conflict situations. Here Turks declare a pattern which is typical of minorities that feel at risk when entering the world of power and authority. On the other hand, in Cluj-Napoca such a reaction is more frequent among the politically dominant Romanians and might be related to the difference in an average social status (education) of the two groups. Romanians are often newcomers from the rural areas, while Hungarians represent the old elite and the middle class of the Transylvanian society.

We finally move to the Multilevel or Hierarchical Logistic Regression analysis as made for us by Z. Karpiński (see Appendix E). The tables there show the estimates of parameters in a series of hierarchical logistic regres-

sion models. The first two columns show the results for the models with a "court dummy" as the dependent variable, and the two right-most columns – for the models with an "agreement dummy" as the dependent. The dummies represent subjects' responses to a series of the case scripts featuring a dispute, or conflict, between

- (a) two unrelated individuals (type I situation of "private dispute"), or
- (b) a citizen and an institution (type II situation of "public dispute"), or
- (*c*) two related individuals (spouses, to be more specific; these are type III situations of "family dispute").

For each case script, the subjects were asked to choose one of the following responses:

Don't react, do nothing

Arrive at an agreement and compromise with a friend

Use self-help to achieve in private what one considers due

Go to court

Go to some other institution

The court dummy was obtained by coding response 4 as 1 and all other responses as zero. Similarly, the agreement dummy assigns 1 to response 2 and 0 to all other responses.

The main reason for the use of the hierarchical, or multilevel, model in the present study.is connected with the fact that each respondent responded to a series of case scripts. Because of this, a particular individual's responses are not stochastically independent since a response to the first case script is likely to affect the individual's responses to subsequent case scripts. In other words, the individual could respond to a case script in this way rather than another because he or she had responded in that way to a previous case script. The lack of stochastic independence of individual observations (e.g. case script–respondent combinations) violates a fundamental assumption of the "standard" logistic regression model, which makes it therefore unsuitable. The multilevel model solves the problem of the lack of independence by allowing for the individual responses to be "nested within" the respondents, so that the variability in the dependent variable has two sources: (a) differences between respondents and (b) different responses of a particular subject to different case scripts.

For each type of a dependent variable, two models were estimated – with the variable representing the subject's assessment of the justness of a court ruling, and without it. The questionnaire item asking the subject to assess the justness was asked only to those who declared they had participated in a trial as a witness or a party or in some other capacity. This is why the number of observations in the model including the assessment is

much smaller than in a model without it, since the latter comprises all the participants in the study.

As regards the results presented in the tables in Appendix E, we will focus here only on the effects of a nationality. As we can see, the models include interactions between nationality and the type of situation (dispute). They were added to check the possibility whether a nationality affects responses differently depending on the type of a situation. Some of these interactions are significant at the (p=0.05) level.

In Daugavpils, being Polish had a significant effect on choosing court in situations of type 1 (see Model 2) and on the informal compromise with an opponent in the private disputes (see Model 3), although the effects had different significance. This is to say that, relatives to Latvians (the reference category for the Daugavpils survey), Poles are more likely to indicate court as the preferred way of settling disputes in situations of type 1 and less likely to choose an agreement in these situations. It is important to keep in mind, however, that Model 2 is restricted to subjects who declared to have had some court experience in the sense of participating in a court trial in some capacity or another. In turn, Model 3 applies to all the survey participants.

As for situations of Type II and III, we see that their main effects are positive and significant in all the models with the court dummy as the dependent variable. This is to say that, in comparison with situations of Type I, Latvians are more likely to indicate court as the preferred way of settling disputes in situations of Type II and III. We also see that the type of situation interacts statistically significantly with the Polish dummy, which is to say that being Polish reduces the odds of selecting court in these situations.

In Cluj-Napoca, Hungarians are significantly more likely to propose the use of the courts and less likely to opt for an agreement than Romanians. Interestingly, in the latter case the effect reverses if the analysis is restricted to subjects with court experience (see columns 2 and 4 in the Table for the agreement dummy). In other words, Hungarian subjects who said they had participated in a trial as witnesses, suspects, or in some other capacity, were more likely to opt for an agreement as compared with Romanians.

In Razgrad, after including both nationality and religion in the model, it turned out that not being Turkish, but being a Muslim is what matters. More specifically, the Turkish do not differ substantially from the Bulgarian when it comes to their preference for court as a way to settle disputes in situations of Type 1. On the other hand, Muslim respondents do differ from non-Muslim ones in this regards, but only when an analysis is restricted to those who declared they had some court experience (see Models 2 and 4). Further, both Turkish and Muslim respondents are significant in

some models predicting an informal agreement. This opens the discussion of what the reality of minority is in different social contexts. Many Muslims in Bulgaria identify themselves as Bulgarians and not as the Turks, to be a Turk and a Christian as we have learnt is also an option. The religious and not the ethnic border seems thus a significant factor in the approach to State law and justice, not surprising result in view of what is widely known about different concept of the law of Islam.

Appendix A. Student's Test of Significance of Means for Denominational Groups in Multi-ethnic Polish Towns

RELIGION

	Gór	owo Iławec	kie		Olesno	
Religion	Roman Catholics	Greek Catholics	(1 - GC, 2 - RC)	Roman Catholics	Prote- stants	(1 - Protestants, 2 - Catholics)
Ideal dispute settle- ment (1 - court, 2 - mediation))	1.56 (0.50)	1.69 (0.47)	t(166)= -1.12	1.57 (0.50)	1.25 (0.50)	t (138) = 1.29
Dispute experience in last 3 years (0 - none, 13 – all types	2.23 (3.81)	2.33 (0.78)	t(168) = -2.18 *	0.96 (1.83)	0.25 (0.50)	t (141) = 1.03
Lifelong court experience (0 - none, 1 - at least once)	0.63 (0.49)	0.51 (0.50)	t(167) = 1.49	0.40 (0.49)	0.25 (0.50)	t (141) = 0.61
Court experience in last 3 years (0 - none, 1 - at least once)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)	t(168)= 0.22	0.12 (0.44)	0.00 (0.00)	t (141) = 0.55
Court chosen in case scripts (0 - never, 7/8 - in all cases)	2.17 (2.05)	1.65 (1.78)	t(168) = 2.00 *	2.91 (2.11)	5.75 (1.89)	t (141) = -2.67 **
Compromise chosen in all script cases (0 - never, 7/8 - in all cases)	4.83 (2.51)	5.71 (2.68)	t(168) = -1.75	6.07 (2.53)	4.00 (1.63)	t (141) = 1.63
Court chosen in private case scripts (0 - never, 3/4 - in all cases)	0.63 (1.01)	0.41 (0.80)	t(168) = 1.82	0.89 (1.07)	1.50 (1.00)	t (141) = -1.12
Court chosen in public script cases (0 - never, 3/4 - in all cases)	1.55 (1.36)	1.25 (1.10)	t(168) = 1.62	2.04 (1.41)	4.25 (2.06)	t (141) = -3.05 **

Compromise chosen in private script cases (0 - never, 4/5 - in all cases)0.50)	4.16 (1.55)	4.93 (1.25)	t(168) = -2.05 *	4.86 (1.90)	3.75 (2.50)	t (141) = 1.15
Compromise chosen in public script cases (0 - never, 3/4 - in all cases)	1.29 (4.16)	1.40 (4.93)	t(168) = -0.11	1.90 (1.36)	0.75 (0.96)	t (141) = 1.70
Withdrawal chosen in all case scripts (0 - 0 - never, 7/8 - in all cases)	2.69 (1.29)	2.72 (1.40)	t(156) = -0.19	2.17 (2.11)	1.25 (1.89)	t (114) = 0.86
Private pursuit chosen in all case scripts (0 - 0 - never, 7/8 - in all cases)	2.84 (2.69)	2.78 (2.72)	t(156) = 0.16	1.81 (1.86)	3.50 (1.73)	t (114) = -1.78
Other official institutions chosen in all case scripts (0 - 0 - never, 7/8 - in all cases)	4,02 (2.84)	3.18 (2.78)	t(156) = 2.27 *	4.00 (2.29)	5.75 (1.89)	t (114) = -1.51
Withdrawal chosen in private case scripts (0 - never, 4/5 - in all cases)	1.52 (4.02)	1.32 (3.18)	t(159) = 0.75	1.32 (1.51)	0.50 (1.00)	t (121) = 1.07
Withdrawal chosen in public case scripts(0 - never, 3/4 - in all cases)	1.17 (1.52)	1.40 (1.32)	t(162) = -1.31	0.89 (0.93)	0.75 (0.96)	t (125) = 0.31
Private pursuit chosen in all case scripts (0 - never, 4/5 - in all cases)	1.76 (1.17)	1.78 (1.40)	t(159) = -0.01	0.58 (0.94)	0.25 (0.50)	t (125) = 0.71
Private pursuit chosen in public case scripts(0 - never, 3/4 - in all cases)	1.08 (1.76)	1.00 (1.78)	t(162) = 0.53	0.89 (1.34)	3.25 (2.06)	t (121) = -2.93 **
Other official insti- tutions chosen in private case scripts (0 - never, 4/5 - in all cases)	1.56 (1.08)	0.97 (1.00)	t(159) = 2.52 **	0.58 (1.28)	1.50 (1.00)	t (121) = -0.10
Other official institutions chosen in public case scripts(0 - never, 3/4 - in all cases)	2.46 (1.56)	2.21 (0.98)	t(162) = 0.98	1.23 (1.49)	4.25 (2.06)	t (125) = -2.18 **

Appendix B. Multilevel Logistic Regression Analysis with Choice of Court and Choice of Compromise as Dependent Variables in Polish Multi-Ethnic Towns (Olesno and Górowo-Ilaweckie)

Multi-level logistic regression Estimates and (Standard Error) values

	Dependent vo	ariable:
	Court	Agreement
	(1)	(2)
Type of the dispute or conflict si		
Type II situation	4.460***	-2.160***
	(0.808)	(0.244)
Type III situation	1.940**	-0.108
	(0.821)	(0.174)
	((((((((((((((((((((
Nationality (reference: Polish)	•	•
Silesian	-0.309	0.287
	(0.611)	(0.260)
Ukrainian	-1.170	0.321
	(0.813)	(0.318)
Gender (reference: male)		
Female	-0.428**	0.269**
	(0.201)	(0.133)
Age (reference: up to 34 years of	age)	
Age 35 - 50	-0.454	0.347*
	(0.288)	(0.201)
Age 51 - 64	-0.910***	0.474**
	(0.297)	(0.202)
Age 65 and more	-0.983***	0.215
	(0.326)	(0.223)
Degree of education (reference:		Lagra
Vocational	-0.024	-0.369
	(0.360)	(0.233)

Secondary	0.062	-0.280
,	(0.325)	(0.206)
Higher	0.294	-0.262
8	(0.343)	(0.223)
Religious denomination (reference: Ro	oman – Catholic)	
Other or no religion	-0.482	0.057
ether of no rengion	(0.319)	(0.220)
Work situation (reference: working ful	1 time)	
Part time	0.154	0.368
rait time	(0.528)	(0.362)
т 1	0.026	0.257
Irregular	0.026	-0.357
	(0.478)	(0.339)
No job	-0.075	0.186
210)00	(0.255)	(0.173)
Subjective assessment of socio-econon	nic standing (reference: h	polovy avorago)
Average or above average	0.050	-0.252
Tiverage of above average	(0.287)	(0.183)
City (reference: Górowo Ilaweckie)	lo 472*	lo 410**
Olesno	0.473 [*] (0.283)	0.419 ^{**} (0.190)
Responses to the item "Law should alw	vays be obeyed" (referen	ce: Response 1)
Response 2	0.088	-0.191
	(0.238)	(0.160)
Response 3	0.022	-0.023
•	(0.242)	(0.158)
Response 4	0.231	-0.277
•	(0.439)	(0.300)
Responses to the item "Which is better	r?" (reference: Resolving	the dispute by a court)
Resolving a dispute by impartial indivi		-0.081
	(0.196)	(0.130)

Have you ever taken part in a trial as a witness,	suspect or in so	me other capacity? (refe-
rence: Never)		
At least once	-0.332	-0.097
	(0.207)	(0.137)
	L,	
Responses to the item: "How many people are th ion you care about?" (reference: Many)		ghbourhood whose opin-
Few people in the neighbourhood whose opinion I care about	0.522*	-0.021
	(0.297)	(0.191)
No people in the neighbourhood whose opinion I care about	0.252	-0.075
	(0.245)	(0.157)
Interactions		
Silesian × Type II situation	0.157	-0.160
	(0.568)	(0.337)
Silesian × Type III situation	0.118	-0.221
	(0.615)	(0.291)
Ukrainian × Type II situation	0.034	0.050
	(0.722)	(0.357)
Ukrainian × Type III situation	0.398	0.387
	(0.805)	(0.307)
Constant	-3.550***	-0.143
	(0.919)	(0.432)
Observations	2,192	2,192
Log Likelihood	-922.000	-1,233.000
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,913.000	2,537.000
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	2,113.000	2,736.000
Note:	p<0.1; p<0.05	· n<0.01
11016.	$1p \times 0.1$, $p \times 0.03$	h/0.01

Appendix C. The Eight Dispute Case Scripts Across the Cities and Ethnic Groups

Table 10. Somebody's children were beaten by a neighbour as he could not rest after work due to their noisy behaviour. In your opinion, what should the parents of the beaten children do? (in %)

	Poland	Ukrai	ine	Latvia			Roma	nia	Bulga	ria
		D	M	Lv	Ru	Pl	Ro	Н	Bg	T
Withdrawal	2	3	1	2	3	1	X	X	15	4
Compromise	51	45	17	38	33	27	X	X	32	18
Private pursuit	7	17	28	6	10	15	X	X	17	41
Court	21	29	47	29	33	29	X	X	5	3
Other public	15	5	7	25	20	27	X	X	29	30
DK	4	1			1	1	X	X	2	4
All public	36	34	54	54	53	56	X	X	34	33
Total = N = 100%	480	361	270	222	200	180	300	200	300	200

Table 11. An acquaintance of Mr K. was gossiping about him among their friends, so Mr K. slapped him in the presence of others. In your opinion, what should the acquaintance do? (in %)

	Poland	Ukra	ine	Latvi	a		Romai	nia	Bulga	ıria
		D	M	Lv	Ru	Pl	Ro	Н	Bg	T
Withdrawal	7	5	7	6	6	13	16	9	20	11
Compromise	61	52	36	51	57	43	55	47	22	23
Private pursuit	17	25	41	18	20	22	6	24	18	28
Court	4	16	14	11	12	11	16	16	16	11
Other public	2	1	1	10	4	11	7	3	24	27
DK	9	1	2	2	1			1		
All public	6	17	15	21	16	22	23	19	40	38
Total = N = 100%	480	361	270	222	200	180	300	200	300	200

Table 12. A friend borrowed 250 euros and failed to repay the debt despite repeated demis. The lender came to the debtor's house and took something of the same value.

In your opinion, what should the borrower (from whose house the item was taken) do? (in %)

	Poland	Ukra	ine	Latvia	1		Roma	ınia	Bulgaria	
		D	M	Lv	Ru	Pl	Ro	Н	Bg	T
Withdrawal	5	3	3	6	7	5	13	13	18	6
Compromise	63	67	42	55	51	50	61	47	34	32
Private pursuit	10	20	29	9	10	18	5	9	17	47
Court	12	7	24	25	26	17	17	29	14	6
Other public	6	2		5	5	10	4	2	18	8
DK	4		1		1					
All public	18	9	24	30	31	27	21	31	32	14
Total = N = 100%	480	361	270	222	200	180	300	200	300	200

Table 13. A husband battered a wife suspecting her of secretly meeting with another man. In your opinion, what should the woman do? (in %)

	Poland	Ukra	ine	Latvi	a		Rom	ania	Bulgaria	
		D	M	Lv	Ru	Pl	Ro	Н	Bg	T
Withdrawal	5	5	7	22	22	34	5	4	17	15
Compromise	48	51	25	61	67	54	34	36	23	26
Private pursuit	6	17	19	10	8	10	8	19	3	6
Court	15	22	39	6	3	1	41	33	23	12
Other public	17	4	8			1	11	8	34	40
DK	9	1	2	1			1			1
All public	32	26	47	6	3	2	12	41	57	52
Total = N = 100%	480	361	270	222	200	180	300	200	300	200

Table 14. A dispute arose between the spouses when the wife inherited 10 000 euros and placed the funds on her own account, rather than contributing it to the family budget. In your opinion, what should her husband do? (in %)

	Poland	Ukrai	ne	Latvia	ı		Roma	nia	Bulga	ria
		D	M	Lv	Ru	Pl	Ro	Н	Bg	T
Withdrawal	23	14	21	16	25	29	30	38	26	17
Compromise	70	70	58	66	60	59	61	43	39	54
Private pursuit	1	12	13	6	9	8	2	12	17	20
Court	2	3	7	12	6	3	6	5	2	3
Other public							1	1	16	6
DK	4	1	1	1	2			1		
All public	2	3	7	12	6	3	7	6	18	9
Total = N =	480									
100%		361	270	222	200	180	300	200	300	200

Table 15. An employer asked the hospital for information about the illness for which one of his employees was treated. The hospital provided the information which was then used against the patient. In your opinion, what should the patient do? (in %)

	Poland	Ukra	ine	Latvia	l		Roma	ania	Bulgaria	
		D	M	Lv	Ru	Pl	Ro	Н	Bg	T
Withdrawal	2	1	7	5	3	7	5	1	2	1
Compromise	19	7	36	20	8	13	23	15	6	6
Private pursuit	6	11	41	11	8	12	2	7	16	18
Court	58	77	14	60	78	67	68	73	35	34
Other public	9	4	1	3	2	1	2	3	40	41
DK	6		1	1	1			1	1	
All public	67	81	15	63	80	68	70	76	75	75
Total = N = 100%	480	361	270	222	200	180	300	200	300	200

Table 16. Somebody built a house but due to a change in the local area development plan, the authorities ordered him to demolish it. In your opinion, what should the person who built the house do? (in %)

	Poland	Ukrai	ine	Latvi	a		Rom	ania	Bulg	aria
		D	M	Lv	Ru	Pl	Ro	Н	Bg	T
Withdrawal	1	2	2	4	3	1	15	1	15	32
Compromise	28	7	17	38	44	41	46	42	21	30
Private pursuit	2	3	14	6	5	10	2	7	5	3
Court	60	80	64	46	47	41	36	46	19	15
Other public	3	8	2	6	1	6	1	3	41	20
DK	6		1			1				
All public	63	88	66	52	48	47	37	49	60	35
Total = N = 100%	480	361	270	222	200	180	300	200	300	200

Table 17. In the evening, a brawl started close to a restaurant.

A police patrol was called in to calm the situation.

Police officers used batons not only against the brawlers but against innocent bystanders as well.

In your opinion, what should those bystanders do? (in %)

	Poland	Ukrai	ine	Latv	ia		Rom	ania	Bulg	aria
		D	M	Lv	Ru	Pl	Ro	Н	Bg	T
Withdrawal	4	3	6	9	7	6	2	2	1	1
Compromise	27	19	10	18	18	13	9	12	8	4
Private pursuit	4	8	22	11	10	9	4	7	13	6
Court	50	69	59	56	60	67	81	73	39	31
Other public	6		3	6	3	4	3	5	39	56
DK	8	1			2		1	1		2
All public	56	69	62	62	63	71	84	78	78	87
Total = N = 100%	480	361	270	222	200	180	300	200	300	200

Appendix D . Student's Test of Significance of Means for Denominational Groups in Multi-ethnic Cities Outside Poland

		Clu	Cluj-Napoca	-		Razgrad	-			Daug	Daugavpils		
Religion	Or- tho- dox	Prote-stants	Catho- lics	(1 -Orthodox, 2 - Protestants, 3 - Catholics)	Ortho- Mus- dox lims		(1 – Mu- slims2 – Ortho- dox)	Prote-stants	Catholics	Ortho-	Old Belie- versy	IOher	(1 -Protes- tants, 2 -Catholics, 3 -Ortho- dox, 4 - Old Believers, 5 - others)
Ideal dispute settlement (1 - court, 2 - mediation))	1.31 (0.46)	1.37 1.29 (0.48) (0.46)		F (3,415) = 0.81	1.44 (0.50)	1.46 t(420) (0.50) -1.58	t(420) = -1.58	1.37 1.43 (0.50)	1.43 (0.50)	1.42 (0.50)	1.41 1.45 (0.50) (0.52)	1.45 (0.52)	F (5,572) = 0.06
Dispute experience in last 3 years (0 - none, 2 - at least once	2.46 (3.69)	0.15 (1.19)	0.35 (1.73)	F (3,421) = 22.22 ***	9.01 (1.49)	9.42 (1.34)	9.42 t(368) = (1.34) -2.95 **	0.76 0.72 (2.44) (2.23)		1.14 (2.90)	0.93 (2.62)	0.00	F (5,582) = 0.75
Lifelong court experience (0 - none, 1 - at least once)	0.28 (0.45)	0.13 (0.34)	0.31 (0.47)	0.13 0.31 F (3,421) = (0.34) (0.47) 4.17 **	0.48	0.61 t(414) = (0.49) -2.06 *	п	0.11 0.15 (0.36)		0.19 (0.40)	0.09 0.18 (0.28) (0.40)	0.18 (0.40)	F (5,572) = 0.98
Court experience in last 3 years (0 - none, 1 - at least once)	0.24 (0.37)	0.15 (0.12)	0.04 (0.17)	F (3,421) = 22.22 ***	1.76 (1.65)	1.11 (1.36)	(1.36) $t (428) = 0.09$ $(1.36) 5.19 *** (0.42)$			0.35 (2.11)	0.50 (2.15)	0.00	F (5,582) = 1.19
Court chosen in case scripts (0 - never, 7/8 - in all cases)	1.88 (1.33)	1.94 (1.29)		F (3,421) = 0.58	1.29 (1.35)	0.76 (1.04)	$ \begin{array}{c cccc} 0.76 & t (428) = & 1.67 & 1.87 \\ (1.04) & 5.18 *** & (1.36) & (1.25) \end{array} $	1.67 (1.36)		1.83 (1.06)	2.45 1.00 (1.26)	1.00 (1.26)	F (5,582) = 3.64 **

Compromise													
chosen in all script cases (0 - never, 7/8 - in all cases)	2.81 (1.36)	2.36 (1.43)	2.22 (1.75)	(1.36) (1.43) (1.75) (1.75) (1.75) (1.75) (1.75)	2.21 (0.93)	2.21 2.19 t (428 (0.93) (0.78) 1.22	=	2.96 3.12 (1.70) (1.59)	3.12 (1.59)	3.39 2.83 4.00 F (5, (1.50) (1.79) 1.87	2.83 (1.55)	4.00 (1.79)	F (5,582) = 1.87
Court chosen in private case scripts (0 - never, 3/4 - in all cases)	0.82 (0.90)	0.78 (0.91)	0.78 0.90 F (3, (0.91) (0.96) 0.39	421) =		0.35 (0.66)	0.35 $t (428) = 0.74$ 0.78 (0.66) 4.41 *** (0.94) (0.93)	0.74 (0.94)	0.78 (0.93)	0.58 1.10 0.27 F (5,58) (0.76) (1.10) (0.65) 3.50 **	1.10 0.27 (1.10) (0.65)	0.27 (0.65)	F (5,582) = 3.50 **
Court chosen in public script cases (0 - never, 3/4 - in all cases)		1.94 (0.92)	1.97	1.86 1.94 1.97 $F(3,421) = 1.11$ (0.93) (0.92) (1.05) 0.56 (1.08)		0.75 (0.94)	$\begin{array}{c cccc} 0.75 & t (428) = 1.59 & 1.67 \\ (0.94) & 4.33 *** & (1.08) & (0.98) \end{array}$	1.59 1.67 (1.08) (0.98)	()	1.83 1.97 1.45 F (5, (0.80) (0.90) (1.04) 1.58	1.97 1.45 (0.90) (1.04)	1.45 (1.04)	F (5,582) = 1.58
Compromise chosen in private script cases (0 - never, 4/5 - in all cases)	2.12 (1.06)	1.76 (1.20)	1.73 (1.27)	(1.06) (1.27) F (3,421) = (1.06) (1.27) 4.41**		1.48 (1.04)	$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	2.33 (1.44)	2.54 (1.28)	2.90 2.34 3.27 (1.23) (1.33) (1.35)	2.34 (1.33)	3.27 (1.35)	F (5,582) = 2.93 **
Compromise chosen in public script cases (0 - never, 3/4 - in all cases)	0.79 (0.83)	0.68 (0.77)	0.79 0.68 0.60 F (3, (0.83) (0.77) (0.95) 1.44	F(3,421) = 0.38 1.44 (0.68)	0.38 (0.68)	0.38 0.31 t (428) = (0.68) (0.53) 1.45		0.78 0.74 (0.93) (0.79)	0.74 (0.79)	0.67 0.69 0.81 (0.73) (0.84) (0.87)	0.69	0.81 (0.87)	F (5,582) = 0.17
Withdrawal chosen in all case scripts (0 - 0 - never, 7/8 - in all cases)	0.85 (1.02)	0.75 (0.88)	0.85 0.75 0.69 F (3, (1.02) (0.88) (0.74) 1.03	F(3,417) = 1.05 1.03 (1.36)	1.05 (1.36)	1.11 (1.22)	1.05 1.11 $t(416) = 1.14$ 0.82 (1.36) (1.22) -0.53 (1.65) (1.05)	1.14 (1.65)	0.82 (1.05)	0.71 0.78 0.72 F (5, (0.96) (1.18) (1.19) 0.69	0.78 (1.18)	0.72 (1.19)	F (5,590) = 0.69

Private pursuit chosen in all case scripts (0 - 0 - never, 7/8 - in all cases)	0.27		0.86 0.78 (1.10) (1.12)	F (3,417) = 13.48 ***	0.95 (1.25)	1.47	t(416) = -3.82 ***	0.86 0.89 (1.04) (1.14)	0.89 (1.14)	0.91 (1.23)	0.80 1.18 (0.98)	1.18 (0.98)	F (5,588) = 0.32
Other official institutions chosen in all case scripts (0 - 0 - never, 7/8 - in all cases)	2.97 (1.54)	2.92 (1.52)	3.19 (1.87)	(1.54) (1.52) (1.87) F (3,417) =	4.02 (1.80)	3.61 (1.63)	3.61 $t(416) = 2.89$ (1.63) $2.37 *$ (1.69)		3.02 (1.52)	2.79 (1.25)	3.42 (1.50)	2.00 (1.67)	3.42 2.00 F (5,588) = (1.50) (1.67) 2.15 *
Withdrawal chosen in pri- vate case scripts (0 - never, 4/5 - in all cases)	0.63 (0.80)	0.68 (0.84)	0.57	0.68 0.57 F (3,419) = (0.84) (0.63) 1.10	0.91 (1.14)	0.77 (1.08)	$ \begin{array}{c cccc} 0.91 & 0.77 & t (417) = 0.93 \\ (1.14) & (1.08) & 1.25 & (1.18) \end{array} $		0.64	0.59 (0.78)	0.60 0.59 (0.93)		F (5,594) = 0.89
Withdrawal chosen in public case scripts(0 - nev-er, 3/4 - in all cases)	0.22 (0.45)		0.12 (0.41)	0.06 0.12 F (1,417) = (0.24) (0.41) 5.02 **	0.14 (0.43)	0.34 (0.51)	t (427) = -4.33 ***	0.21 0.18 (0.63) (0.44)	0.18	0.12 (0.35)	0.18 0.18 (0.60) (0.60)		F (5,591) = 0.75
Private pursuit chosen in all case scripts (0 - never, 4/5 - in all cases)	0.20 (0.54)	0.65 (0.88)	0.59	F (3,419) = 13.46 ***	0.55 (0.85)	1.20 (1.19)	t (417) = -5.96 ***	0.50 0.60 (0.79)	0.60	0.63 (0.96)	0.68 (1.05)	0.64 (0.81)	F (5,592) = 0.41
Private pursuit chosen in all case scripts- publicznych (0 - never, 3/4 - in all cases)	0.08 (0.30)	0.21 (0.51)		F (1,417) = 3.18 **	0.41 (0.71)	0.27 (0.59)	t (427) = 2.31 *		0.29 (0.55)	0.29 (0.53)	0.12 (0.37)	0.55 (0.69)	F (5,591) = 1.61

Other official institutions 0.88 1.10 F (3,419) = 1.54 chosen in pri- chosen in pri- chosen in pri- de case scripts (0.94) (0.97) (1.09) 1.25 (1.33) (0 - never, 4/5 - in all cases) (1.09) 1.25 (1.33)	1.06 (0.94)	0.88	1.10 (1.09)	F (3,419) = 1.25	1.54 (1.33)	1.41 (1.16)	$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	0.36 (0.84)		1.21 0.88 1.38 F (5,592) (1.01) (0.88) (1.06) 3.15 **	0.88	1.38	1.21 0.88 1.38 F (5,592) = (1.01) (0.88) (1.06) 3.15 **
Other official institutions chosen in public case scripts(0 - never, 3/4 - in all cases)	1.91 (0.91)	2.04 (0.88)	2.09 (1.06)	$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	2.06 (0.93)	2.06 (0.85)	t (427) = -0.34	1.68 (1.06)	(0.94)	0.92 2.03 1.45 F (5,5) (0.80) (0.92) (1.04) 1.32	2.03 (0.92)	1.45 (1.04)	(0.80) (0.92) (1.04) F (5.591) =

Appendix E. Results of Multilevel Logistic Regression on Choice of Court and Choice of Compromise as Dependent Variables In Cities Outside Poland

Results for Daugavpils

	Dependen	t variable:		
	Court		Agreeme	nt
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
The type of dispute or conflict situation)	ation (refere	ence categoi	ry: Type AN	ID situa-
Type II situation	0.856***	2.400**	0.028	0.045
	(0.190)	(1.010)	(0.137)	(0.468)
Type III situation	0.735***	1.980*	0.389**	-0.004
	(0.203)	(1.060)	(0.152)	(0.514)
Nationality (reference category: La	tvian)			
Russian	0.269	1.610	0.044	0.510
	(0.225)	(0.985)	(0.189)	(0.517)
Polish	0.282	2.310**	-0.520***	-0.637
	(0.217)	(0.990)	(0.182)	(0.522)
Gender (reference category: male)				
Female	0.075	-0.248	0.236***	0.353*
	(0.083)	(0.259)	(0.086)	(0.213)
Age (reference category: up to 34 years old)				
Age 35 - 50	-0.128	-0.610*	0.021	0.678**
	(0.108)	(0.336)	(0.111)	(0.285)
Age 51 - 64	-0.040	-0.275	-0.057	0.387
	(0.117)	(0.446)	(0.122)	(0.379)
	(0.117)	(0.446)	(0.122)	(0

Age 65 or more	0.017	-0.468	-0.026	0.688
	(0.141)	(0.597)	(0.149)	(0.526)
Degree of education (reference	e category: prim	nary)		
Vocational	-0.283	0.966	0.239	-0.830
	(0.238)	(0.725)	(0.246)	(0.627)
Secondary	-0.210	0.785	0.190	-0.680
	(0.172)	(0.673)	(0.180)	(0.520)
Higher	-0.075	0.501	0.185	-0.227
	(0.169)	(0.656)	(0.177)	(0.499)
Religious denomination (refer	ence category: I	Lutheran)		
Roman – Catholic	0.254	-0.079	0.222	0.191
	(0.206)	(0.939)	(0.208)	(0.704)
Orthodox	0.102	0.162	0.361	0.088
	(0.237)	(0.965)	(0.240)	(0.737)
Old believers	0.451*	0.632	0.002	-0.276
	(0.246)	(1.170)	(0.254)	(0.928)
Other or no religion	-0.007	-1.800	0.620**	1.030
	(0.294)	(1.530)	(0.292)	(0.956)
Work situation (reference cate				
Part time	-0.231	-0.532	-0.152	-0.291
	(0.174)	(0.567)	(0.174)	(0.431)
Irregular	0.402*	0.758	-0.746***	-1.910**
	(0.218)	(0.749)	(0.242)	(0.786)
No job	0.068	0.250	-0.193	-0.578
	(0.123)	(0.544)	(0.129)	(0.474)
Subjective assessment of one's below average)	socio-economic	standing (1	reference cat	tegory:
Average or above average	0.116	-0.075	-0.015	0.279
	(0.102)	(0.307)	(0.104)	(0.256)

	1			1
Response to the item: "Law should	always be o	 beved" (ref	erence: Res	ponse 1)
Response 2	0.008	-0.535*	-0.113	0.018
•	(0.087)	(0.314)	(0.090)	(0.259)
Response 3	-0.371*	-1.120**	0.185	0.633
	(0.190)	(0.566)	(0.183)	(0.441)
Response 4	-0.206	-1.260	0.032	0.720
	(0.202)	(0.809)	(0.202)	(0.600)
Responses to the questionnaire iter dispute by a court or other instituti		is better?" (1	reference: R	esolving a
Resolving a dispute by impartial individuals	-0.149*	-0.242	-0.071	0.269
	(0.084)	(0.287)	(0.086)	(0.235)
Responses to the item "How many whose opinion you care about?" (re Few people in the neighbourhood			r neighbou	0.090
whose opinion I care about		1	1	1
	(0.113)	(0.439)	(0.118)	(0.363)
No people in the neighbourhood whose opinion I care about	-0.132	0.067	-0.034	-0.103
•	(0.120)	(0.393)	(0.124)	(0.344)
T	11		ļ	ļ
Trust in others (reference: You show	ald trust no	one)	1	
You can only trust those you know well	0.020	0.064	-0.018	0.126
	(0.100)	(0.343)	(0.102)	(0.279)
You should trust everyone unless they take advantage of you	0.171	0.503	-0.089	-0.496*
	(0.123)	(0.354)	(0.128)	(0.298)
Have you ever taken part in a court capacity? (reference: Never)	trial as a v	l vitness, susp	ect, or in so	ome other
. , , ,				

At least once	-0.152		0.061	
	(0.118)		(0.119)	
Court experience in the past 3 years	0.203	0.296	-0.197	-0.543
	(0.152)	(0.384)	(0.163)	(0.338)
	1 1.	<u> </u>		
How fair do you think the court's	ruling in this		eference: uni	
Fair		0.379	ļ	0.407
		(0.436)		(0.351)
Fair in some respects, unfair in others		-0.014		0.419
		(0.535)		(0.437)
Interactions		<u> </u>	<u> </u>	
Russian × Type II situation	-0.011	-1.320	-0.194	-0.246
Russian × Type II situation	(0.236)		(0.198)	
	(0.236)	(1.020)	(0.198)	(0.566)
Russian × Type II situation	-0.376	-1.720	-0.092	0.569
	(0.259)	(1.100)	(0.219)	(0.628)
Polish × Type II situation	-0.425*	-2.290**	0.345*	0.624
,,	(0.244)	(1.050)	(0.209)	(0.615)
Polish × Type II situation	-0.595**	-2.280**	0.399*	0.962
1 onsii × 1ype ii situation	(0.269)	(1.130)	(0.229)	(0.670)
Constant	-1.760***	-3.670**	-0.625*	-1.320
	(0.340)	(1.620)	(0.324)	(1.090)
		l .	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
Observations	3,946	567	3,946	567
Log Likelihood	-2,252.000	-282.000	-2,639.000	-357.000
Akaike Inf. Crit.	4,585.000	647.000	5,357.000	796.000
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	4,836.000	825.000	5,608.000	974.000
N. (1010	05		
Note:	<i>p</i> <0.1; <i>p</i> <0.	υɔ; p<0.01		

Results for Cluj-Napoca

	Depender	ıt variable:		
	Court			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Type of situation (reference			1	T
Type 2 Situations	3.520***	6.320***	3.550***	6.300***
	(0.369)	(1.980)	(0.373)	(1.990)
Type 3 Situations	1.700***	4.330**	1.730***	4.300**
-/ -/	(0.378)	(1.980)	(0.381)	(2.000)
Nationality (reference: Ro				
Hungarian	0.829**	-0.377	0.892**	-0.304
	(0.400)	(1.420)	(0.405)	(1.430)
Condon (nofonom accumala)				
Gender (reference: male) Female	0.027	-0.300	0.032	-0.262
remaie	(0.121)	(0.246)	(0.121)	(0.249)
	(0.121)	(0.240)	(0.121)	(0.249)
Age (reference: up to 34 y	ears of age)			
Age 35 - 50	-0.104	0.293	-0.111	0.297
	(0.156)	(0.335)	(0.155)	(0.334)
Age 51 - 64	-0.278	-0.038	-0.299*	-0.071
	(0.179)	(0.331)	(0.179)	(0.332)
A 65	0.220	0.401	0.220	0.405
Age 65 or more	-0.228	0.481	-0.230	0.485
	(0.211)	(0.397)	(0.211)	(0.394)
Degree of education (refer	rence: primary)			
Vocational	0.139	-0.058	0.122	0.012
	(0.233)	(0.430)	(0.233)	(0.439)
C 1	0.514**	1.010**	0.504**	0.002**
Secondary	0.514**	1.010**	0.504**	0.992**
	(0.225)	(0.399)	(0.225)	(0.397)
Higher	0.246	1.220***	0.237	1.200***
<u> </u>	,			

	(0.225)	(0.410)	1(0.225)	(0.415)
	(0.237)	(0.419)	(0.237)	(0.415)
D 1: : 1 : (: /	C 0 (1 1			
Religious denomination (re			10052	0.70*
Evangelical Reformed	-0.082	0.902*	-0.053	0.870*
	(0.237)	(0.475)	(0.237)	(0.474)
Roman-Catholic	0.018	0.426	0.034	0.407
	(0.259)	(0.468)	(0.258)	(0.466)
Other	-0.214	-0.632	-0.169	-0.631
	(0.217)	(0.474)	(0.217)	(0.473)
None	0.187	0.449	0.182	0.474
	(0.251)	(0.555)	(0.250)	(0.554)
Work situation (reference:		- t	1	
Part time	0.334	0.895*	0.321	0.867*
	(0.258)	(0.496)	(0.257)	(0.494)
· 1		0.500		
Irregular	-0.035	0.599	-0.097	0.597
	(0.255)	(1.170)	(0.257)	(1.170)
No job	-0.165	-0.005	-0.183	-0.031
,	(0.146)	(0.270)	(0.146)	(0.271)
Subjective assessment of or low average)			(reference o	
Average or above	0.079	-0.682**	0.080	-0.667**
	(0.146)	(0.301)	(0.145)	(0.297)
Response to the item: "L (reference: Response 1)		·		
Response 2	-0.459***	-0.760**	-0.438***	-0.765**
	(0.162)	(0.321)	(0.162)	(0.318)
Response 3	0.109	-0.040	0.112	-0.027
r	(0.180)	(0.373)	(0.179)	(0.371)
	(31233)	(3.37.5)	(2.7.7.)	(3.2, -)
Response 4	0.042	0.949**	0.057	0.917**

	(0.242)	(0.396)	(0.241)	(0.394)
	(0.242)	(0.396)	(0.241)	(0.394)
			<u> </u>	
Responses to the questionnaire is (reference: Resolving a dispute b stitution.)				
Dispute settled by impartial observers	-0.253**	-0.454*	-0.272**	-0.447*
	(0.127)	(0.267)	(0.127)	(0.266)
Responses to the item "How ma bourhood whose opinion you ca				
Only a few such people in my neighbourhood	0.393**	-0.028	0.403**	-0.0002
	(0.195)	(0.407)	(0.195)	(0.407)
No such people in my neighbour- hood	0.412**	-0.014	0.408**	0.009
	(0.190)	(0.406)	(0.190)	(0.406)
Trust in others (reference: You sk	nould trust	no one)		1
Trust only those you know	0.187	-0.160	0.181	-0.163
	(0.150)	(0.299)	(0.150)	(0.298)
Trust everyone unless they betray your trust	0.289*	-0.285	0.269	-0.288
	(0.167)	(0.330)	(0.167)	(0.328)
Have you ever taken part in a c suspect, or in some other capacit				
At least once	-0.059		-0.040	
	(0.144)	1	(0.144)	
How fair do you think the court's (reference: unfair)	ruling in t	nis case was		I
The ruling was unfair		0.223		0.190
		(0.313)		(0.315)

The multiper vive felicity					\neg		1
The ruling was unfair in som spects, and fair in others	ne re-			-0.142			-0.125
				(0.414)			(0.413)
Court experience past three	years					0.347*	0.310
						(0.198)	(0.401)
Interactions							
Type 2 situations × Hungaria	an	-0.474		-0.198		-0.479	-0.198
		(0.340)		(1.370)		(0.343)	(1.370)
Type 3 situations × Hungaria	an	-0.965**	*	-1.520		-0.965***	-1.500
		(0.370)		(1.460)		(0.373)	(1.460)
Constant		-3.570**	*	-5.890** [*]	* .	-3.660***	-5.930***
		(0.490)		(2.090)		(0.495)	(2.110)
		-					
Observations		3,225		762	:	3,225	762
Log Likelihood		-1,743.0	000	-383.00	0 -	-1,742.000	-382.000
Akaike Inf. Crit. 3,558.000 839.000 3,557.000 841.000						841.000	
						1,017.000	
Note: p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01							
Note: p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01 Dependent variable:							
	Depe	ondicini vi		····			
	Agre	ement					
	(1)	CHICH	(2)		(3)		(4)
	(1)		(4)		(3)		(4)
The type of dispute or confl	ict sit	uation (1	refe	rence cat	egor	y:	
Type AND situation)							
Type 2 Situations	-1.57	70***	-0.9	981***	-1.5	560***	-1.330***
	(0.13		_	293)	_		(0.002)
	Ì		,	,	`		` /
Type 3 Situations	-0.53	33***	0.3	07	-0.5	532***	-0.080***
/1	(0.13			308)		133)	(0.002)
	(0.12	, ,	(0		(0.1	((3.302)

Nationality (reference ca	tegory: Roma	nian)			
Hungarian	-0.584**	1.740**	-0.565**	1.150***	
	(0.263)	(0.747)	(0.265)	(0.002)	
Gender (reference catego	ory: male)				
Female	-0.189*	0.184	-0.188*	0.167***	
	(0.111)	(0.273)	(0.111)	(0.002)	
Age (reference category:	up to 34 years	s old)			
Age 35 - 50	-0.024	0.459	-0.026	0.075***	
	(0.144)	(0.368)	(0.144)	(0.002)	
Age 51 - 64	0.114	0.212	0.108	-0.195***	
	(0.163)	(0.372)	(0.163)	(0.002)	
Age 65 or more	0.101	0.314	0.102	0.005***	
	(0.190)	(0.435)	(0.190)	(0.002)	
Degree of education (ref	erence categor	y: primary)			
Vocational	0.133	0.446	0.129	0.396***	
	(0.209)	(0.471)	(0.209)	(0.002)	
Secondary	-0.112	0.215	-0.115	-0.227***	
	(0.204)	(0.432)	(0.204)	(0.002)	
Higher	-0.099	-0.081	-0.102	-0.505***	
	(0.215)	(0.450)	(0.215)	(0.002)	
Religious denomination	(reference cat	egory: Luther	ran)		
Evangelical Reformed	-0.011	-0.623	-0.003	-0.975***	
	(0.216)	(0.532)	(0.216)	(0.002)	
Roman-Catholic	-0.187	0.099	-0.181	-0.415***	
	(0.238)	(0.527)	(0.238)	(0.002)	

Other	0.138	0.747	0.152	0.513***
	(0.195)	(0.486)	(0.197)	(0.002)
None	-0.302	0.373	-0.303	-0.018***
	(0.236)	(0.628)	(0.236)	(0.002)
Work situation (reworking full time)	ference category	:		
Part time	-0.084	-0.202	-0.088	-0.483***
	(0.238)	(0.543)	(0.238)	(0.002)
Irregular	-0.295	0.685	-0.313	0.997***
	(0.236)	(1.300)	(0.238)	(0.002)
No job	0.041	0.287	0.035	0.099***
	(0.133)	(0.298)	(0.134)	(0.002)
Subjective assessmen (reference category: b		conomic star	nding	
Average or above	0.100	0.828**	0.100	0.792***
	(0.133)	(0.336)	(0.133)	(0.002)
	(0.133)	[(0.330)	(0.133)	(0.002)
	(0.133)	(0.336)	(0.133)	(0.002)
Response to the item (reference: Response	n: "Law should a		yed"	
	n: "Law should a			0.283***
(reference: Response	n: "Law should a	lways be obe	yed"	
(reference: Response	n: "Law should a 1) 0.289"	lways be obe	yed" 0.294**	0.283*** (0.002)
(reference: Response	n: "Law should a 1) 0.289"	lways be obe	yed" 0.294**	0.283***
(reference: Response Response 2	0.289** (0.145)	0.374 (0.345)	0.294** (0.145)	0.283*** (0.002)
(reference: Response Response 2	0.289** (0.145)	0.374 (0.345) -0.914**	0.294** (0.145) -0.029	0.283*** (0.002) -0.504***
(reference: Response Response 2	0.289** (0.145)	0.374 (0.345) -0.914**	0.294** (0.145) -0.029	0.283*** (0.002) -0.504***
Response 2 Response 3	0.289** (0.145) -0.029 (0.166)	0.374 (0.345) -0.914** (0.439)	0.294** (0.145) -0.029 (0.166)	0.283*** (0.002) -0.504*** (0.002)

Responses to the questionn Resolving a dispute by a co				:	
Dispute settled by impartial observers	0.157	0.217	0.151	0.234***	
	(0.116)	(0.290)	(0.116)	(0.002)	
Responses to the item "How many people are there in your neighbourhood whose opinion you care about?" (reference: Many).					
Only a few such people in my neighbourhood	-0.208	0.324	-0.204	0.502***	
	(0.175)	(0.467)	(0.175)	(0.002)	
No such people in my neighbourhood	-0.256	0.486	-0.257	0.507***	
	(0.171)	(0.471)	(0.171)	(0.002)	
			<u> </u>		
Trust in others (reference: Y	You should tru	ust no one)			
Trust only those you know	-0.003	-0.130	-0.006	-0.014***	
	(0.137)	(0.327)	(0.137)	(0.002)	
Trust everyone unless they betray your trust	-0.054	-0.034	-0.061	0.129***	
	(0.152)	(0.362)	(0.152)	(0.002)	
Have you ever taken part in suspect, or in some other ca					
At least once	0.070		0.076		
	(0.131)		(0.131)		
How fair do you think the was (reference: unfair)	court's ruling	in this case		l	
The ruling was unfair		-0.475		-0.520***	
		(0.342)		(0.002)	

The ruling was unfair in some respects, and fair in others		0.148		0.092***
		(0.446)		(0.002)
Court experience past three years			0.109	0.882***
			(0.181)	(0.002)
Interactions			<u> </u>	ļ
Type 2 situations × Hungarian	0.244	-1.300**	0.244	-0.120***
	(0.220)	(0.637)	(0.220)	(0.002)
Type 3 situations × Hungarian	0.233	-1.470**	0.232	-0.242***
	(0.227)	(0.663)	(0.227)	(0.002)
Constant	0.615**	-1.440*	0.596*	-0.594***
	(0.312)	(0.822)	(0.313)	(0.002)
Observations	3,225	762	3,225	762
Log Likelihood	-1,975.000	-463.000	-1,975.000	-454.000
Akaike Inf. Crit.	4,023.000	1,000.000	4,024.000	984.000
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	4,242.000	1,171.000	4,249.000	1,160.000
		,		
Note:	p<0.1; p<0.0	05; p<0.01		

Results for Razgrad

	Dependen	ıt variable:		
	Court	(2)	(3)	(4)
T. 26'4 4'	2.040***		2.250***	
Type 2 Situations	(0.233)	1.300*** (0.212)	2.250*** (0.301)	1.500*** (0.277)

Type 3 Situations	0.293	-0.055	0.454	0.265
	(0.263)	(0.256)	(0.391)	(0.344)
Turkish	-0.287	-0.319	-0.144	-0.103
Tarkion	(0.303)	(0.244)	(0.426)	(0.354)
Female	-0.080	0.347**	-0.009	0.350
	(0.131)	(0.162)	(0.200)	(0.247)
Age 35 - 50	0.043	0.332	0.140	0.425
	(0.169)	(0.212)	(0.302)	(0.360)
Age 51 - 64	0.109	0.357	0.170	0.220
	(0.193)	(0.246)	(0.340)	(0.403)
Aga 65 or mara	0.023	0.357	0.204	0.880
Age 65 or more	(0.255)	(0.319)	(0.480)	(0.557)
Vocational	-0.138	0.379	-0.174	0.737
	(0.243)	(0.298)	(0.401)	(0.479)
Secondary	-0.059	0.595**	-0.044	0.670*
•	(0.197)	(0.241)	(0.359)	(0.407)
Higher	0.034	0.790***	0.031	0.947**
8	(0.233)	(0.289)	(0.416)	(0.480)
Muslim	0.049	-0.522***	-0.0001	-0.449*
iviusiiiii	(0.149)	(0.182)	(0.226)	(0.273)
0.1	0.105	0.463	0.1.5.5	
Other	0.103	0.400	-0.166	-0.575
	(0.454)	(0.552)	(0.889)	(1.090)
Atheist	-0.164	0.069	-0.208	0.398
	(0.235)	(0.284)	(0.310)	(0.368)
Part time	-0.107	-0.012	-0.004	-0.650*

	(0.211)	(0.254)	(0.331)	(0.384)
Irregular	0.114	-0.011	-0.002	0.118
	(0.268)	(0.333)	(0.416)	(0.500)
No job	0.049	0.077	-0.019	-0.408
	(0.202)	(0.253)	(0.348)	(0.403)
Average or above	0.078	0.283	0.021	0.047
	(0.175)	(0.212)	(0.288)	(0.329)
Response 2	0.180	-0.315	0.244	0.038
	(0.200)	(0.249)	(0.305)	(0.374)
Response 3	0.055	-0.595***	0.091	-0.520
	(0.172)	(0.212)	(0.279)	(0.329)
			1	
Response 4	-0.010	-0.914***	0.148	-0.610*
	(0.193)	(0.239)	(0.284)	(0.344)
D: ((1.1.1) (1.1.1				1
Dispute settled by impartial observers	-0.201	-1.250***	-0.326	-1.490***
	(0.160)	(0.192)	(0.281)	(0.313)
	(**************************************	(3)	(11)	
At least once	-0.041	-0.386**		†
	(0.139)	(0.169)		1
				İ
Only few such people in my neighbourhood	-0.017	0.410*	-0.150	0.302
	(0.179)	(0.221)	(0.273)	(0.322)
No such people in my neighbourhood	-0.065	0.300	-0.132	0.239
	(0.178)	(0.223)	(0.296)	(0.352)
Trust only those you know	-0.014	-0.690***	-0.032	-0.594**
	(0.153)	(0.188)	(0.234)	(0.280)

Trust everyone unless they betray your trust	-0.200	-0.719***	-0.297	-0.832**
	(0.186)	(0.227)	(0.312)	(0.368)
Court experience past three years	1.070***		1.110***	
	(0.060)		(0.080)	
Tl1:			0.006	0.601
The ruling was unfair			-0.086	0.601
			(0.350)	(0.398)
The ruling was unfair in some respects, and fair in others			0.146	0.907**
			(0.339)	(0.397)
Type 2 situations X Turkish	0.484	0.380	0.386	0.303
17,50 2 010001011 10111011	(0.357)	(0.289)	(0.481)	(0.411)
Type 3 situations by Turkish	-0.051	-0.022	-0.541	-0.284
,	(0.447)	(0.356)	(0.678)	(0.498)
Constant	-4.760***	-1.960***	-4.980***	-3.140***
	(0.428)	(0.428)	(0.684)	(0.767)
Observations	3,231	3,231	1,650	1,650
Log Likelihood	-959.000	-1,218.000	-451.000	-573.000
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,990.000	2,507.000	976.000	1,217.000
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	2,209.000	2,720.000	1,176.000	1,412.000
Nota	0 1 0 1	05, n < 0.01		
Note:	<i>p</i> <0.1; <i>p</i> <0.05; p<0.01			

	Dependen	t variable:		
	Agreemer	nt		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
H - 201			1 = 0 0 ***	
Type 2 Situations	-1.340***	-1.400***	-1.500***	-1.620***
	(0.225)	(0.225)	(0.001)	(0.397)
Type 3 Situations	0.247	0.233	0.254***	0.358
Type 5 Situations	(0.163)	(0.162)	(0.001)	(0.244)
Turkish	-0.316*	-0.304*	-0.495***	-0.527*
14111411	(0.182)	(0.179)	(0.001)	(0.276)
Female	-0.223*	-0.244**	-0.567***	-0.604***
Temate	(0.122)	(0.122)	(0.001)	(0.187)
Age 35 - 50	0.076	0.042	-0.290***	-0.304
Age 33 - 30	(0.156)	(0.156)	(0.001)	(0.262)
Age 51 - 64	0.228	0.195	-0.020***	-0.023
Age 31 - 04	(0.172)	(0.172)	(0.001)	(0.279)
A 65	0.242	0.204	0.010***	0.011
Age 65 or more	0.243 (0.228)	(0.228)	0.019*** (0.001)	-0.011 (0.387)
** . 1	0.150	0.100	0.250***	0.202
Vocational	0.173 (0.194)	(0.132	-0.359*** (0.001)	-0.382 (0.319)
	(3,2,2)	(0.27-2)	(33332)	(33227)
Secondary	0.165	0.120	-0.014***	-0.010
	(0.165)	(0.164)	(0.001)	(0.274)
Higher	0.162	0.108	0.006***	-0.002
	(0.205)	(0.204)	(0.001)	(0.332)
Muslim	-0.014	0.037	-0.107***	-0.073
-	(0.141)	(0.140)	(0.001)	(0.220)

Other	0.593	0.569	1.980***	2.080***
	(0.369)	(0.371)	(0.001)	(0.715)
Atheist	0.170	0.171	0.110***	0.114
	(0.218)	(0.219)	(0.001)	(0.298)
Part time	-0.466***	-0.472***	-0.148***	-0.169
rait time	(0.180)	(0.181)	(0.001)	(0.273)
	(0.100)	(0.101)	(0.001)	(0.273)
Irregular	-0.222	-0.237	0.598***	0.640*
	(0.224)	(0.225)	(0.001)	(0.352)
No ich	-0.178	-0.173	0.146***	0.187
No job		+		+
	(0.180)	(0.180)	(0.001)	(0.283)
Average or above	-0.256*	-0.283*	-0.137***	-0.148
0	(0.150)	(0.150)	(0.001)	(0.228)
Response 2	-0.188	-0.154	-0.344***	-0.388
	(0.189)	(0.189)	(0.001)	(0.306)
Response 3	-0.410**	-0.359**	-0.781***	-0.827***
Response 5	(0.165)	(0.163)	(0.001)	(0.261)
	, ,	<u> </u>		
Response 4	-0.591***	-0.529***	-0.846***	-0.910***
	(0.182)	(0.180)	(0.001)	(0.278)
		1		1
Dispute settled by impartial observers	-0.003	0.077	0.055***	0.075
	(0.141)	(0.136)	(0.001)	(0.238)
				<u> </u>
At least once	-0.322***	-0.289**	1	
	(0.124)	(0.123)		-
Only form such moonle :		+	1	1
Only few such people in my neighbourhood	-0.068	-0.089	-0.391***	-0.417*
	(0.149)	(0.149)	(0.001)	(0.225)

No such people in my neighbourhood	-0.098	-0.110	-0.437***	-0.455*
	(0.153)	(0.154)	(0.001)	(0.250)
Trust only those you know	0.145	0.189	0.111***	0.137
	(0.140)	(0.139)	(0.001)	(0.215)
Trust everyone unless they betray your trust	0.017	0.066	-0.229***	-0.227
	(0.165)	(0.164)	(0.001)	(0.269)
Court experience past three years	-0.092**		-0.030***	
	(0.045)		(0.001)	
The ruling was unfair			0.378***	0.411
			(0.001)	(0.285)
The ruling was unfair in some respects, and fair in others			0.530***	0.573**
opecis, and fair in other			(0.001)	(0.279)
Type 2 situations X Turkish	0.366	0.366	0.573***	0.623
	(0.266)	(0.267)	(0.001)	(0.408)
Type 3 situations by Turkish	0.752***	0.750***	0.566***	0.608*
	(0.240)	(0.238)	(0.001)	(0.348)
Constant	-0.338	-0.509	-0.158***	-0.247
	(0.324)	(0.313)	(0.001)	(0.532)
		1		
Observations	3,231	3,231	1,650	1,650
Log Likelihood	-1,594.000	-1,596.000	-741.000	-741.000
Akaike Inf. Crit.	3,259.000	3,261.000	1,556.000	1,554.000
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	3,478.000	3,474.000	1,757.000	1,748.000
Note:	<i>p</i> <0.1; <i>p</i> <0.	05; p<0.01		
νοιε. [p \ 0.1, p \ 0.00, p \ 0.01				

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Paweł Orzechowski

METHODOLOGY OF RESEARCH "PATTERNS OF DISPUTE AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION AS ELEMENTS OF POPULAR LEGAL CULTURE" AS COMMON APPROACH ON ETHNIC-STUDIES IN POLAND

The all-Polish survey of 1059 people was carried out during the period from 22.04 to 4.05.2014 by the professional part-time staff of the Centre for Research of Social Opinion (CBOS) being the only public polling agency in Poland functioning as the public foundation. The survey was funded by the NCN research grant No. DEC-2012/07/B/HS6/02496: "Dispute and dispute settlement patterns as element of popular legal culture" and the questionnaire was prepared by J. Kurczewski and M. Fuszara. The standard method used by the CBOS was the CAPI (computer assisted personal interview) supported individual face-to-face interview with respondents randomly taken from the all-Polish address base.

On a representative random sample for the total adult population in the country enlarged to about 1500 respondents, conducted 1059 interviews, because of the research specificity – a low fraction of people involved in disputes (see N collected). During the sets preparation of data for statistical processing in the program SPSS, an adjustment sample size, so that it has reduced (see N corrected). The reduction of the number of interviews conducted for the analysis was necessary, because of maximum approximation of the respondents characteristics in the country sample and the population. Three main socio-demographic variables were adopted as a criterion for eliminating differences: gender, age and education. To attempt to give a more representative character, adapted them to the percentage of gender, age and education, actually occurring in the population.

Samples in the all-Polish survey carried out by Centre for Research of Social Opinion (CBOS):

GENDER

	CBOS		
Gender [%]	collected	corrected	
Male	48.0%	49.0%	
Female	52.0%	51.0%	
Total N=100%	1059	1036	

AGE

	CBOS			
Age [%]	collected	corrected		
Until 34 yrs	31.5%	31.4%		
35 – 50	25.8%	25.5%		
51 – 64	24.9%	25.0%		
65 yrs and under	17.7%	18.1%		
Total N=100%	1059	1036		

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EDUCATION

	CBOS		
Education [%]	collected correcte		
Elementary	53.7%	54,2%	
Secondary certificated	23.3%	23.1%	
Post-secondary	8.2%	7.9%	
University level	14.9%	14.9%	
Total N=100%	1059	1036	

The local surveys sponsored by the NCN research grant No. DEC-2012/07/B/HS6/02496: "Dispute and dispute settlement patterns as element of popular legal culture" were conducted in Lesko (23-30.06.2014), Olesno (20-28.09.2014), Warszawa – Ursynów (1.07 – 21.12.2015) and Węgrów (13-15.05.2016) with the students of the Institute of Applied Social Sciences University of Warsaw as interviewers. Each of the survey was made as part of the week-long field research workshop. Data from each cities were collected by individual face-to-face interview in conjunction with participant observation. The interviewers were obliged to write down the original answers of the interviewed persons on the paper or as a computer questionnaire and to make notes during home visits.

In each of the towns the assumption was to interview 200 people and this was almost fulfilled as in Lesko 200 interviews were made, in Olesno – 189, in Wegrów - 178 and in Warsaw - Ursynów - 210 interviews (see N collected). Before statistical data analysis in the SPSS program, the size of the sample had to be corrected in order to fit the socio-demographic characteristics of each of the towns. Due to that the final number of interviews subject to the further statistical analysis was lowered in Lesko to 175 people, in Olesno to 152, in Węgrów to 162 and in Warsaw - Ursynów to 192 people (see N corrected). Reduction number of interviews, conducted for analysis, has been necessary due to the maximum approximation of the respondents characteristics in the sample and the population in this cities. The correction brought back the distribution of three variables - gender, age and education - in the samples to the actual one as in the official statistical data available. To attempt to give a more representative character of the samples, we adapted them to the percentage of gender, age and education, which are actually occurring in the population.

In order to select respondents for the research, a mixed scheme (randomly and non-randomly) was adopted in each city. In Lesko recruitment

of participants took place in two stages: using the random address lists (138 interviews) and non-random – purposeful in whole city, using a snowball method (62 interviews). In Olesno, before the transition an address sample (57) and purposeful (95), a panel sample was used also (37), which consist of the households addresses located in the town, where interviews were conducted in a previous wave of research from 2009. In Węgrów at the random stage of respondents selection (using also an address list – 108 interviews) included the random route method, which involved the division city into several sectors, for which each of the interviewers was responsible. In the final stage, target selection was made using the snowball method (70). In Ursynów, in addition to the random and non-random stage of participants recruitment in the administrative boundaries of this Warsaw district, extended sample of one settlement from another organizational unit. This was done due to the existence of specific types of dispute, detected by other survey research, carried out several years ago in this part of the capital city.

Implementation a scheme random selection of respondents was made possible thanks to prepared lists of addresses urban residents, included in a questionnaire survey by employees from the Civil Affairs Department of the Interior and Administration Ministry in Poland. Supervisors of scientific research possessed: 1000 addresses of adult inhabitants from Lesko, 750 addresses of adult inhabitants from Olesno, 800 addresses of adult inhabitants from Węgrów and 2000 addresses of adults from one of Warsaw district's – Ursynów. Lists were the basis for drawing participants into questionnaire surveys.

Samples in Polish localities (Lesko, Olesno, Węgrów, Warszawa – Ursynów):

GENDER

	Les	Lesko Olesno		Węgrów		Warszawa – Ursynów		
Gender [%]	collected	corrected	collected	corrected	collected	corrected	collected	corrected
Male	49.8	49.7	45.5	50.0	46.6	50.0	50.5	50.0
Female	50.2	50.3	54.5	50.0	53.4	50.0	49.5	50.0
Total N=100%	200	175	189	152	178	162	210	192

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AGE

	Lesko		Ole	Olesno		Węgrów		Warszawa – Ursynów	
Age [%]	collected	corrected	collected	corrected	collected	corrected	collected	corrected	
Until 34 yrs	20.4	23.4	25.4	30.3	39.9	38.3	37.1	32.3	
35 – 50	25.4	27.4	24.3	30.3	27.5	25.9	19.0	20.8	
51 – 64	27.9	29.7	23.3	22.4	21.3	23.5	21.0	22.9	
65 yrs and under	26.4	19.4	27.0	17.1	11.2	12.3	22.9	24.0	
Total N=100%	200	175	189	252	178	162	210	192	

EDUCATION

	Lesko		Ole	lesno Węş		Węgrów		Warszawa – Ursynów	
Education [%]	collected	corrected	collected	corrected	collected	corrected	collected	corrected	
Elementary	21.5	20.7	11.6	11.8	15.7	17.3	1.9	1.0	
Secondary certificated	41.0	39.7	41.3	39.5	52.2	52.5	23.8	25.0	
Post-secondary	11.5	11.5	24.3	22.4	10.7	9.3	28.1	27.1	
University level	26.0	28.2	22.8	26.3	21.3	21.0	46.2	46.9	
Total N=100%	200	175	189	152	178	162	210	192	

Survey of the same type have also been carried out in Górowo Iławeckie. A venture was carried out within the framework of an annual field-based research for students from paths of specialization conducted by Chair in Sociology and Anthropology of Customs and Law at the Institute of Applied Social Sciences in University of Warsaw within the period from 30.06 to 8.07 2013. Data from the local towns was collected by individual faceto-face interview combined with participant observation. The task of the student-interviewers was to write literally the respondents' answers in the survey questionnaire and making separate notes for home visits.

A sample of about 200 people was established in Górowo Iławeckie. In fact, this condition was met, and even managed to gather eight complete

questionnaires more (208) (see N collected). During the preparation of data sets for statistical processing, the sample size was adjusted in the SPSS program, so it was reduced (see N corrected). The reduction of the number of interviews conducted for the analysis was necessary due to the maximum approximation of the respondents characteristics in the sample and the population of the city. Three main socio-demographic variables were adopted as the criterion for eliminating differences: gender, age and education. To attempt to give a more representative character, adapted them to the percentage of gender, age and education, which actually occurring in the population.

Sampling in Górowo Iławeckie was made in the specific way as this township with bi-ethnic composition of population was meant to be the testing site for the influence of ethnicity upon the dispute settlement patterns. Respondents were collected in 2 ways: random address list (130 people), and snowball quota sampling of Ukrainians in town (40) and in four adjacent Ukrainian villages (38): Żywkowo, Toprzyny, Kandyty and Sagnity.

The random selection scheme of the respondents was possible thanks to prepared lists of addresses of urban residents, included in the question-naire survey by employees from the Civil Affairs Department of the Interior and Administration Ministry in Poland. Supervisors of scientific research possessed: 1000 addresses, names and surnames of adult inhabitants from Górowo Iławeckie.

The varied sample selection during the research, resulted from the following factors:

- The inability to perform full research according to guidelines 1 and 2 (for the reason that we have non-existent addresses randomly selected people and errors in personal data).
- The strive for a possible balance nationality or confession samples, because of the ability to compare both groups.
- The necessity to balance the sample according to the basic criteria of selection (age, nationality, confession).

Based on respondents' gender, age and education, obtained the following statistical frequency distributions:

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Samples in Górowo Iławeckie in Poland:

GENDER

	Górowo Iławeckie		
Gender [%]	collected	corrected	
Male	46.6%	49.4%	
Female	53.4%	50.6%	
Total N=100%	208	174	

AGE

	Górowo Iławeckie		
Age [%]	collected	corrected	
Until 34 yrs	25.0%	21.3%	
35 – 50	19.2%	23.0%	
51 - 64	32.2%	27.6%	
65 yrs and under	23.6%	28.2%	
Total N=100%	208	174	

EDUCATION

	Górowo Iławeckie		
Education [%]	collected	corrected	
Elementary	17.5%	17.9%	
Secondary certificated	48.5%	49.7%	
Post-secondary	16.5%	16.2%	
University level	17.5%	16.2%	
Total N=100%	208	174	

CONFESSION

	Górowo Iławeckie		
Wyznanie [%]	collected	corrected	
Roman-Catholic	54.8%	52.9%	
Greek-Catholic	43.2%	44.8%	
Other confession	2.0%	2.3%	
Total N=100%	208	174	

NATIONALITY

	Górowo Iławeckie		
Narodowość [%]	collected	corrected	
Poles	58.7%	55.7%	
Ukrainians	36.5%	44.3%	
Other/mixed	4.3%	×	
N/A	0.5%	×	
Total N=100%	208	174	

Vladislav Volkov

ETHNIC GROUPS IN PUBLIC SPACE IN DAUGAVPILS: INTER-ETHNIC COMMUNICATION AND ATTITUDE TOWARDS LEGAL SYSTEM

The purpose of the article is to show the attitude of different ethnic groups in Latvia (Latvians and part of ethnic minorities) to the parameters of the space of public communication and towards legal system that can be used for resolving ethno-political issues. The opinions of respondents from multiethnic Daugavpils, the second largest city in Latvia, have been used as the object of analysis. The sociological research was part of a project "Patterns of Dispute and Dispute Resolution as Elements of Popular Legal Culture" (2014) by Professor Jacek Kurczewski (Warsaw University).

Key words: ethnic groups, ethnic identity, public communication, ethno-political life.

Formulation of scientific problems of the research

Interethnic communication is viewed as a form of social communication that happens "between people of different cultures". Researchers associate the importance of studying such communication with the need to analyze the possibilities for mutual understanding for effective interaction between people of different cultures. (Rogers, Hart, Miike 2002, p. 5, 7) Communication between people of different cultures can occur over a wide

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Dr.sc.soc., senior researcher, The Institute of Philosophy and Sociology (the University of Latvia) range of characteristics and goals – from the desire to put forward the legitimate claims of ethnic identity to the bias against other groups, from the establishment of associative relationships between groups prior to their dissociation (Kim 2006, p. 284, 291), from imposing the dominant culture's standards and exclusion of non-dominant cultures from public life to the positive recognition of ethno-cultural minorities in the common cultural space (Young 1996, p. 29).

For Latvia, as a traditional multi-ethnic country, the question of influence of different ethnic groups' identities on the common sphere of public communication, including disputes about the issues of the state ethnic policy, is extremely relevant. Interethnic communication is a very complex social phenomenon. On the one hand, it is an important way of achieving mutual understanding between ethnic groups, when these groups communicate as equal partners. In order to ensure such equal dialogue, ethnic groups are guided by the principles of political equality and universal moral norms (Anderson 1999, p 302 – 310; Gordon 2017; Rawls 2005, p. 60 – 61, 84, 126 – 134). Moreover, the appeal to universal moral norms in interethnic communication reflects the interests of the socially less protected groups. (Rawls 2005, p. 395-396)

But on the other hand, interethnic communication expresses the status differences between ethnic groups and institutionalized differences between the ethno-national majority and ethnic minorities. The expressed ethno-social stratification stimulates the fragmentation of civic culture and enhances the relativity of morality depending on the evaluation of "us" and "they" (Gert 2016; Freeman, Littlejohn, Pearce 1992, p. 311–329; Harman 1975, p. 3 – 22; Waldront 1989, p 561; Wong 1984, p 23 – 36). However, interethnic communication does not fully reflect these fixed statuses of various ethnic groups. It is dynamic and selective, facilitating only part of the content of the institutional differences between ethnic groups (Barth 1996, p. 75 – 82).

This article presents some data on the reproduction of status differences between Latvians and ethnic minorities at the level of interethnic communication between these groups.

Inter-ethnic communication

The purpose of the article is to show the attitude of different ethnic groups in Latvia (Latvians and part of ethnic minorities) to the parameters of the space of public communication that can be used for resolving ethno-political issues. The opinions of respondents from multiethnic Daugavpils, the second largest city in Latvia, have been used as the object of

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analysis. The sociological research was part of a project "Patterns of Dispute and Dispute Resolution as Elements of Popular Legal Culture" (2014) by Professor Jacek Kurczewski (Warsaw University).

The number of respondents is 602. The research has aimed at the three largest ethnic groups in Daugavpils - Latvians, Russians, and Poles. It should be taken into consideration that the respondents could indicate more than one of their ethnic identities. As a result, 220 respondents indicated "Latvian" as their only ethnic identity; 202 respondents indicated "Russian" as their only ethnic identity; 180 respondents indicated "Pole" as their only ethnic identity. In 2014 in Daugavpils lived 87.5 thousand (Russians - 43.9 thousand (50.2 % of population), Latvians - 16.5 thousand (18.9 %), Poles - 12.2 thousand (13.9 %). (Centrālas ... 2016) The overlapping of the ethnic and linguistic identities is typical of Latvians and Russians, which is revealed in the absolute dominance of their ethnic group's mother tongue as a spoken language within the respondents' families: 85% of Latvians speak Latvian at home on a daily basis, 89.6% of Russians in Russian. 67.5% of Poles speak mainly Russian at home, 13.5% – in Latvian and Polish. (Table 1) The overall majority of the respondents in all groups are Latvia's citizens (Latvians – 97.7%, Russians – 88.6%, Poles – 88.5%).

Table 1. The language of daily communication in the family. (%) (Respondents could choose no more than two languages).

language	All	Latvians	Russians	Poles
Latvian	36.2	85.0	9.9	13.5
Russian	58.2	12.7	89.6	67.5
Polish	4.0	_	1.5	13.5
Belarusian	0.5	-	1.0	0.5
Other	0.0	1.4	_	_

The people in Daugavpils really value their ethnic identities. Among the types of identities such as territorial (Daugavpils and Latgale resident), ethnic, ethno-linguistic (Slavs), state (a Soviet citizen), and territorial-political (Europeans) offered to the respondents, the ethnic identity has been ranked as the most important one for all ethnic groups. It was ranked the highest for Latvians (52.3%); ethnic minorities ranked it at approximately the same level (Russians – 44.6%, Poles – 42.5%) (Table 2). The data on a higher level of ethnic identification of Latvians as compared to ethnic mi-

norities' identification correlate with the data obtained by other researchers in Latvia in general. It is also important that territorial and ethnic identities of all groups of people in Daugavpils in total comprise from 70% (Poles) and 80% (Russians) to 90% (Latvians). It provides the evidence of the strongest degree of dependence of the collective ethnic identity of the citizens on the spheres of their direct daily contacts. However, the identification with the ethno-linguistic identity (Slavs for Russians and Poles), with the former type state identity (a Soviet citizen), or with the modern type of the territorial and political community (Europeans) almost do not play any significant role.

resident Russian Latvian Soviet citizen Pole Slav Latvians 20.5 52.3 3.6 0 3.2 16.8 0 1.4 Russians 35.2 1.0 1.5 44.6 2.5 3.0 2.0 7.9 Poles 22.0 4.5 3.5 5.5 42.5 3.5 1.5 7.5

Table 2. Identification of respondents (in the first place). (%)

Positive emotions towards people of different nationalities absolutely dominate in relations of people to each other. It refers to all groups under survey in relation to many other nationalities (Table 3).

Table 3. Emotions to	owards peop	le of differen	t nationaliti	es. (%)

Emotions	All	Latvians	Russians	Poles		
Towards Latvians						
Antipathy, hostility	3.6	1.8	5.5	3.5		
Anxiety	4.6	2.3	8.9	2.0		
Shame, guilt	3.1	3.6	2.5	3.0		
Sympathy, benevolence	67.2	70.9	64.9	68.0		
Indifference	12.8	11.8	11.9	15.5		
Towards Russians						
Antipathy, hostility	1.7	4.1	0.5	0.5		
Anxiety	4.2	7.3	0.5	4.5		
Shame, guilt	0.6	1.4	0.5	0		
Sympathy, benevolence	74.6	63.2	87.6	75.0		

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Indifference	11.5	15.9	5.0	12.5			
Towards Belarusians							
Antipathy, hostility	0.5	1.0	0	0.5			
Anxiety	1.2	1.8	0	1.5			
Shame, guilt	0.3	0	1.0	0			
Sympathy, benevolence	72.0	61.4	79.7	76.0			
Indifference	18.0	26.8	12.9	14.0			
Towards Poles							
Antipathy, hostility	0.9	1.4	1.0	0.5			
Anxiety	1.1	1.4	1.0	1.0			
Shame, guilt	0.5	0	0.5	1.0			
Sympathy, benevolence	67.3	58.2	69.8	78.0			
Indifference	21.8	30.0	20.8	11.5			
	Toward	ds Jews					
Antipathy, hostility	1.4	2.3	1.5	0.5			
Anxiety	2.6	2.7	1.5	4.0			
Shame, guilt	0.8	1.0	0.5	1.0			
Sympathy, benevolence	57.7	48.6	64.9	62.5			
Indifference	28.6	35.5	25.2	23.0			
Towards Lithuanians							
Antipathy, hostility	1.1	2.3	0.5	1.0			
Anxiety	1.2	1.8	0.0	2.0			
Shame, guilt	0.6	0.5	1.0	0.5			
Sympathy, benevolence	63.6	59.1	67.3	66.5			
Indifference	24.9	27.7	23.8	21.5			
Towards Estonians							
Antipathy, hostility	0.6	1.0	0.5	0.5			
Anxiety	1.2	1.8	0.5	1.5			
Shame, guilt	0.7	0	0.5	0.5			
Sympathy, benevolence	59.8	55.0	64.4	62.5			
Indifference	29.6	33.6	26.7	26.5			

The research revealed a rather high degree of the respondents' interest in the use of public communication for emphasizing and resolving ethno-political issues. Latvians as well as ethnic minorities expressed this kind of interest. The majority of respondents (from a half to three quarters) expressed the desire for this kind of discussion in a public sphere (for example, within the discussions with representatives of different ethnicities, or politicians) as well as a private sphere (for example, with their

relatives, or friends). This desire seems more explicit among Russian respondents than among Latvian ones. Especially big differences can be observed in the desire to discuss inter-ethnic issues with representatives of the government and politicians (74.5% of Russians and 50.5% of Latvians consider it important); in the media (74.5% and 58.2% respectively); with members of the parties the respondents voted for at the election (66.3% and 46.4% respectively) and even among their friends (73.9% and 58.6% respectively) (Table 4).

Table 4. The most desirable kind of discussions of ethno-political issues of the Latvian society (%).

Kind of discussions and participants	All	Latvians	Russians	Poles
within the discussions with representatives of different ethnicities	73.8	75.9	77.2	68.5
with relatives	68.9	67.3	72.8	70.5
with friends	66.7	58.6	73.9	70.5
in the media	66.1	58.2	74.5	66.0
with representatives of the government and politicians	59.8	50.5	74.5	57.0
with members of the parties the respondents voted for at the election	55.0	46.4	66.3	54.0
in anonymous comments on the Internet	30.7	25.9	31.0	32.0
not worth to discuss all these issues with anybody	10.7	9.5	7.1	14.0

However, the respondents' expressed desires for public communication on the issues of ethnic policy turned out to be more explicit than the real practice of this kind of discussions. Less than a half of the respondents have a personal experience of discussing the outcomes of the referendum on providing the Russian language the status of the second official language and the initiative of transition of all education in Latvia to the Latvian language as the only language of instruction (Tables 5 and 6). Nevertheless, the index of 30-40% for those who discussed extremely acute issues of Latvia's ethno-political life in their private as well as public lives, in general reflects the level of political involvement in Latvia and in the EU. According to the Eurobarometer data, the share of population who publicly express their opinions on socially significant topics comprises 30% in Latvia and the EU. Eurobarometer recorded these expressions on the Internet and social networks (Flash Eurobarometer 2013,

p. 27 – 29). Latvian political scientists mention contradictory tendencies in the citizens' political participation: its low level and since the mid-2000s the increased need for mechanisms of direct democracy with the explicit distrust to politicians at the same time. It is especially important that more than a third of the respondents took part in discussions of these issues with Latvians as well as with Russians, taking into consideration that the mass media discussed these problems only either with the Latvian-speaking or Russian speaking audiences separately. (Ijabs 2014, p. 213-214; Ņikišins et al. 2014, p. 241; Zepa 1999, p. 8 – 10) Therefore, the level of recognition of the need for communication between Latvians and ethnic minorities is similar to the level of discussions on significant social issues in Europe.

Table 5. A personal experience of discussing the outcomes of the referendum on providing the Russian language the status of the second official language (%).

A personal experience of discussing	All	Latvians	Russians	Poles
with relatives only	47.2	51.8	47.3	42.5
with friends only	39.0	41.4	39.1	35.5
with Latvians and Russians	38.9	36.8	34.8	40.0
with different people, also with colleagues at work	37.3	28.6	42.9	38.0
only within ethnic group of respondent	13.0	13.6	13.0	11.5
have not discussed with anyone	36.1	38.2	30.0	42.5

Table 6. A personal experience of discussing the outcomes of the initiative of transition of all education in Latvia to the Latvian language as the only language of instruction (%).

A personal experience of discussing	All	Latvians	Russians	Poles
with relatives only	35.5	37.7	34.2	35.0
with friends only	34.1	30.0	41.8	31.0
with Latvians and Russians	32.4	29.1	33.2	32.5
with different people, also with colleagues at work	32.2	33.2	34.2	30.5
only within ethnic group of respondent	13.3	11.8	11.4	17.0
have not discussed with anyone	42.0	45.5	34.2	47.0

These data in general correlate to the respondents' attitude towards the manifestations of xenophobia in relation to their ethnic group that are exposed in mass media. A half of the respondents (50.6%) stated that when they come across these facts they just ignore them. This, definitely, is a kind of habit to the state of ethnic hate exaggerated by some mass media. Discussion on this topic in a narrow circle of relatives and friends is characteristic of less than two thirds of respondents (61.8%). Less than a third of the respondents (28.5%) dare to openly debate over this issue with the representatives of the nationality who often express negative assessments of a national group the respondent belongs to. The share of Russian respondents is even smaller - 23.3%. The respondents tend to sub-delegate these issues to the political parties they are going to vote for at the next election (58.5%). The Russian respondents tend to do it even more often (in 66.8% of cases). What is especially unpleasant is that the negative ethno-political background of part of Latvia's mass media directly deteriorates interethnic relations, and provokes a self-isolation of ethno-linguistic communities from each other. The position "I try not to communicate with the people of the nationality that express negative assessments towards the national group I belong to" was supported by more than a third of all respondents (36.8%), including more than two fifth of Poles (42.5%) and Russians (41.1%) (Table 7). These figures also make significant adjustments to the real level of interethnic feelings in Latvia.

Table 7. Attitudes towards the manifestations of xenophobia in relation to their ethnic group that are exposed in mass media (answer "yes") (%).

Attitudes	All	Latvians	Russians	Poles
discussing with friends and relatives	61.8	57.7	67.3	62.0
I will vote for the party that protects my nationality	58.5	58.6	66.8	49.5
I try not to communicate with the people of the nationality that express negative assessments towards the national group I belong to	36.8	28.6	41.1	42.5
debate with the representatives of the nationality who often express nega- tive assessments of a national group the respondent belongs to	28.5	31.4	23.3	29.0

Comparing the data from Tables 5, 6 and 7 shows that about one third of the respondents participate in all debates between Latvians and ethnic minorities on the issues of the referendum, transition of education to the Latvian language as the only language of instruction, and xenophobia in the mass media. Apparently, this is the part of Latvia's population who find the issues of preserving and protection of the collective ethnic identity really significant in their behavioural practices. Moreover, this kind of emphasis on ethnic identity within this part of the population has remained unchanged for a long time.

These data speak not only about the fact that the society in general (both ethnic minorities and Latvians) is concerned about the state of interethnic relations (despite the authorities' rhetoric) but also about the fact that the beliefs about the need for public debates on these issues are incorporated into the respondents' beliefs about the level of the existing fairness of ethno-political values and institutions towards Latvians and ethnic mi-The attitude towards the opportunity to use the public sphere norities. of communication between Latvians and ethnic minorities, between them and the state, the main subject of ethnic policy, depends on the fact to what extent these groups consider such public communication to be the prerequisite for the achievement of a fair consensus on ethno-political issues. The research made an assumption that the attitude of the representatives of ethno-national majority and ethnic minorities towards the issues of ethnic policy reflects their beliefs about the degree of fairness of the existing legal and political institutions, and first of all, the legal system. The survey data proved this hypothesis.

The respondents from ethnic minorities for the most part perceive the Latvian public environment as open for realization of their collective ethnic identities. It refers not only to the real assessment of the existing rights for realization of collective ethnic identity in general. A significant number of the respondents attribute their collective rights more possibilities than they have in reality. A really bulky part of the respondents (78.9%) is well aware of the issue of the guaranteed right for the existence of mass media in the ethnic minorities' languages. There is approximately the same level of awareness of the existence of private education in the ethnic minorities' languages (76.0%). The level of awareness of the right of part of basic education financed by the state to function in the ethnic minorities' languages turns out to be lower (68.2%). However, a relatively large share of the respondents (approximately 20-30%) was not able to provide a positive answer on these questions. This points at the underestimation of real possibilities that ethnic minorities

have for preservation of their identity in Latvia. On the other hand, a relatively large share of the respondents is almost sure that "higher education financed by the state can function" in the ethnic minorities' languages (38.4%), and among the Russian respondents – almost a half (48.0%). Or that "the names of places where national minorities reside can be duplicated" in these languages (37.9%), and almost a half of the Russian respondents (48.0%). A half of all respondents (50.0%) is sure that "it is possible to make complaints and applications to local authorities" in ethnic minorities' languages, but more than a third (38.2%) – that "it is possible to make complaints and applications to state authorities" in ethnic minorities' languages (Table 8).

Table 8. The rights of national minorities' languages in Latvia (answer "yes") (%).

The rights	All	Latvians	Russians	Poles
the existence of mass media	78.9	80.0	82.7	74.0
the existence of part of basic education financed by the state	68.2	64.6	76.7	61.5
the existence of private education	76.0	75.5	78.2	75.0
higher education financed by the state can function	38.4	39.6	48.0	25,0
the names of places where national minorities reside can be duplicated	37.9	35.0	48.0	32.5
it is possible to make complaints and applications to local authorities	50.0	48,2	60.9	40.5
it is possible to make complaints and applications to state authorities	38.2	34.1	51.5	30.0
if officials do not answer to requests in the languages of national minorities, with these officials you can sue	19.7	17.7	22.2	18.0

People in Daugavpils apparently overestimate the framework of ethnic minorities' rights. However, it is impossible to evaluate this situation without any additional research. Yet, a more optimistic view on the capabilities of ethnic minorities in Latvia than what they are in reality encourages the decrease in the potential for ethno-political conflict and stabilization of ethno-political situation. This fact might be interpreted as an approval by a significant share of respondents of the enhancement

of the role of ethnic minorities' languages in Latvia's society, as a content of legitimate expectations of part of Latvia's society. The existing misinterpretations of real ethnic minorities' rights in Latvia that occur in public consciousness, apparently, reflect the situation within the society where there have not been almost any discussions on the issues concerning these groups of people over recent years. Moreover, even the political party "Harmony", which the majority of ethnic minorities' representatives usually vote for in the election, distances itself from this type of discussions.

Attitude towards the legal system

The respondents think that the issues which directly affect the institutionalization of their collective ethnic identities should be resolved by such a mechanism of direct democracy as referendum. The mechanism of referendum turned out to be far more important than the authority of court or parliament. For example, answering the question on what way of resolving the collision is more acceptable when the people's opinions on the issue of providing the mother tongue of one of the ethnic groups with the status of the second official language alongside with the Latvian language, the majority of the respondents (59.5%) find it important to hold a referendum (Table 9). The data for this research were obtained after the referendum in 2012 on the providing the Russian language with the status of the second official language. Although, the outcomes of the referendum resulted in a considerable split between the Latvian part of the society and ethnic minorities, Latvia's population still find this way for resolving ethno-political issues the most important. A symbolic presentation of their collective identity by means of the mechanisms of direct democracy is much more important for different ethnic groups than the ability of authorities to resolve ethno-political issues. It is also specific that this opinion was expressed by Latvians in Daugavpils who comprise about one fifth of the city's population; hence recognizing the possible outcomes of the opinions of the majority that they do not belong to.

Table 9. A way of resolving the collision is more acceptable when the people's opinions on the issue of providing the mother tongue of one of the ethnic groups with the status of the second official language alongside with the Latvian language. (%)

A way of resolving the collision	All	Latvians	Russians	Poles
the issue should be resolved by the court	5.6	3.2	8.9	6.5
to find a compromise between parties of collision	16.1	17.7	16.3	16.5
we must wait for new elections for the changing the powers	2.9	1.8	5.4	2.0
the Parliament should decide it	8.7	15.0	4.5	5.5
local authorities should resolve the collision	2.5	1.8	1.5	4.0
to hold a referendum in the region	23.4	21.4	24.3	23.0
to hold a referendum in the territory	36.1	36.8	39.1	29.5

Ethnic minorities as compared to Latvians more often mention the imperfection of a legal system. 48.4% of Russians and 38.5% of Poles as compared to 27.7% of Latvians think that "Latvia's legal system requires dramatic changes". Statist beliefs about the purposes of the existing legal system are more typical of Latvians than ethnic minorities. 55.9% of Latvians, 44.6% of Russian and 38.5% of Poles recognized such primary purpose of the legal system as "the law must provide order and discipline within the state". And vice versa, among Latvians there was a smaller group of the respondents as compared to Russian and Poles who considers that the primary purpose of the legal system is "to provide people with the opportunity to realize their needs and interests" (12.3%, 22.8 and 28.5% respectively) (Tables 10 and 11).

Table 10. The assessment of the legal system in Latvia (%).

The assessment	All	Latvians	Russians	Poles
legal system requires dramatic changes	38.2	27.7	47.5	38.5
mostly good, but not actually used	20.6	21.8	17.8	20.5
the situation with the law and its application is good	17.6	21.8	14.9	17.0
It's hard to say	23.4	28.6	19.3	11.5

Primary purpose	All	Latvians	Russians	Poles
to ensure the change and development of our society	20.3	18.2	19.8	21.0
to resolve quarrels and conflicts between people	12.4	13.6	11.4	12.0
to provide order and discipline within the state	46.1	55.9	45.5	38.5
to provide people with the opportunity to realize their needs and interests	20.9	12.3	22.3	28.5

Table 11. Primary purpose of the legal system (%).

Parties to the conflict in Daugavpils were generally close knit informal environment. Most often these parties were either "somebody home" or "distant acquaintance" (in general, approximately half of all of the parties to the conflict). But the colleague, boss, subordinate, private company, local or public authorities as parties of the conflicts was from 2 to 9%. It also shows that inhabitants of Daugavpils strive to solve conflicts through their own efforts, without the appeal to the court. Respondents admitted that the appeal to the court depends on who is a party to the conflict – a family member or "strange" person. Only about 10 – 12% believe that «it doesn't matter if Your interests are affected, You need the appeal to the court, even if the other side of the conflict is someone from members of Your family». However, the possibility the appeal to the court for family members allow half of the respondents, «if the conflict concerns a very important things (e.g. beating, humiliation of the dignity of the personality, the threat of losing material assets etc.)». Moreover, among Russians the share is even higher than among the Poles and Latvians (See data from the paper by I. Kurczewski).

It is clear that in hypothetical situations, the value the appeal to the court as a way to resolve conflicts is seen as very high. It allowed 30-40% of respondents (depending on the ethnicity), if someone beats their children, in building a house, if there isn't a legal basis (40-50%). This motivation is especially clear in the hypothetical situation where the police action to disperse the hooligans suffer the innocent people or when the hospital reports data on health status of employee that are used against him (60-70%).

The role of the court is recognized as important in the solution of problems in interethnic relations. And Russians to a much greater extent than Latvians see this role of the court. So, in answer to the question "part of the population of the region wants their native language with Latvian would be the official language in the region, but other residents are against it" 13.6% of Russian respondents believe that the decision to trust the courts. Among Latvians such declined to 0.8 %. But in any case a value of the court is significantly inferior to the value of referendums (20 - 40%). In the decision of ethnic problems ethnic groups in most trust mechanisms of direct democracy.

Low interest of the respondents to the legal system as a means of solving conflicts relates not only to the desire of people to focus on the resources of social solidarity in civil society, but widespread distrust of the court as a state institution. При этом в качестве важнейшего фактора, влияющего на оценку этой власти со стороны населения, министр назвал средства массовой информацииИ. Latvian government officials in public speeches often took out a critical assessment of the legal system and its communication with the society. Back in 2007 the Minister of Justice G. Berzinš noted that only one third of Latvians trusts the courts (Tikai viena ... 2007). The Speaker of the Parliament (Saeima) S. Āboltiņa in 2014 noted that "individual cases ...non-compliance to law in the interpretation and application of legal rules by judges ... casts a shadow on the entire legal system in Latvia" (Saeimas priekšsēdētāja ... 2014). The President of Latvia R. Vējonis in 2015 also spokde about the need to increase public confidence to the legal system, that must "better explain the content of its work and decisions" (Valsts prezidents 2015).

Media publish research data about the level of trust to state institutions, including the legal system. Study on the level of trust in state and public institutions carried out by the company SKDS (2015), shows that the residents of Latvia in the greatest degree trusted the system of education and the Church, but the Parliament and other political institutions don't have much confidence. In 2014 78% trusted the system of education, 66% trusted the Church, and 43% - the legal system (Vege 2015). Quite low the level of public confidence the Latvian legal system, compared with the average in the European Union. The legal system has more trust for people who have had experience of communication with it (than those who have formed a view based on the received information from the media) (Šnitnikovs, Kārkliņa 2013, p. 10 - 12). Researchers showed many factors that inhibit confidence the courts by the citizens. Sociologists reveal widespread alienation from the institutions of power, that is typical for the passive political culture. Social stratification in Latvia also that does not allow poor clients to hire good lawyers. Reduces confidence the courts a lack of legal knowledge of citizens and their orientation to information about the legal system from unreliable and biased sources. A reflection of the work of the courts in the media pursues mainly the goal is to attract the reader's attention to

conflicts in society. Is a noticeable lack of information in the media about the need for improvement the legal system. The media displays a lobbying one side or another in the judicial process. Does not inspire confidence the real facts of corruption in the courts, the inefficiency of the courts, lack of internal control over activities of judges, the quality of the court decision and its understandability for the citizens, the conduct of some judges during the process, their inconsistencies and subjectivity. In small towns with close communication environment (as Daugavpils) it is difficult to implement objectivity in the relationship of the judiciary and their potential or actual clients. In general, researchers believe that residents of Latvia are characterized by a sceptical attitude towards the legal system (Šņitņikovs, Kārkliņa 2013, p. 14 – 29, 59 – 64).

By 2015 the level of distrust of the institutions of state power in Latvia declined slightly. By this time the level of distrust the various national authorities in the EU also increased, and some indicators of Latvia in the background do not look so dramatic (EUROBAROMETER ... 2009, p. 20, 22, 25, 46; Standarta Eirobarometrs ... 2014, p. 6-7).

Conclusion

Democratic multi-ethnic states set themselves a very challenging goal: to ensure the integration of society based on the culture of ethnic majority with respect for the cultures of ethnic minorities. This implies the structuring of ethnic identities. At the same time republicanism protects the principle of equality of citizens with different ethnic identity in all spheres of public and private life. The functioning of the common public space of inter-ethnic communication without hard barriers is an important criterion for the recognition of multi-ethnic diversity and equality of all citizens, regardless of their ethnic origin and cultivated ethnic identity. The study in Daugavpils has confirmed the relevance of this approach. This study showed the existing untapped reserves of liberal values to create the open space of public communication for all ethnic groups. Inter-ethnic communication in Latvia is constrained by existing forms updating and structuring of Latvians' and Russians' ethnic identity of. The data of the sociological research indicate that inter-ethnic communication often perceived by the respondents not only as a way to form a common and integrated multi-ethnic society, based on the sense of social solidarity, but also as a way of implementation and consolidation in the mass behavior the institutionalized differences of the statuses of ethnic majority and minorities.

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