

Latvijas Universitātes Žurnāls

# VĒSTURE



2023

16

# HISTORY

Journal of the University of Latvia

Latvijas Universitātes Žurnāls

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Skaisti sniegotajās 2023. gada decembra dienās gatavojam izdošanai šī gada žurnāla otro numuru. Šis numurs gandrīz pilnībā ir veltīts 20. gadsimta pirmās puses vēstures problēmām: norisēm sabiedrībā un bruņotajos spēkos Latvijas Neatkarības kara laikā, etnisko minoritāšu idejām Latvijā starpkaru periodā, kā arī starptautiskajai tirdzniecībai. Lasītājiem piedāvājam četrus zinātniskus rakstus un vairākas recenzijas par jaunākajiem pētījumiem.

Profesors Ēriks Jēkabsons savā rakstā plaši aplūko Lielbritānijas Ārlietu ministrijas neoficiālā pārstāvja Herberta Adolfusa Granta-Vatsona darbību Latvijā Neatkarības kara pirmajā pusē – no 1918. gada novembra līdz 1919. gada vasarai – laikā, kad notika aktīva karadarbība un apstākļi Latvijā bija īpaši sarežģīti. Autors izseko Granta-Vatsona ierašanās un darbības apstākļiem Latvijā, kā arī sniedz plašu ieskatu viņa priekšstatsos par Latvijā tajā laikā notiekošo. Granta-Vatsona ziņojumi par situāciju Latvijā sniedz bagātīgu informāciju par iekšpolitisko stāvokli, sabiedrības noskaņojumu, politiskajām un militārajām norisēm Latvijā, kā arī par Latvijas starptautiskajām attiecībām, īpaši ar Lielbritāniju.

Šis pats laika posms, 1918.–1920. gads, aplūkots arī nākamajā rakstā – igauņu pētnieka Toivo Kikasa pētījumā par Sarkanās armijas nacionālo vienību politisko departamentu sastādītajiem uzraudzības ziņojumiem, kurus sauca arī par politiskajiem kopsavilkumiem, – *politsvodki*. Autors analizē norādījumus par uzraudzības ziņojumu sastādīšanu, šo norādījumu izpildi un ziņojumu saturu, resp., to, ko faktiski ziņoja Sarkanās armijas Igaunijas un Latvijas nacionālo vienību politiskās nodaļas.

Šajā žurnāla numurā turpinām aizsākto tradīciju publicēt vienu rakstu, kas veidots uz nesen aizstāvēta maģistra darba bāzes. Šajā numurā tas ir Milanas Drugoveiko raksts par baltkrievu inteliģences politisko domu Latvijā laika posmā no 1920. līdz 1934. gadam. Balstoties uz baltkrievu aktīvista Konstantīna Jezovitova piemēru, autore raksturo Latvijas baltkrievu minoritātes galvenās politiskās idejas starpkaru periodā, baltkrievu attieksmi pret Latvijas valsti un tajā pastāvošo minoritāšu politiku.

Rumāņu pētnieces Andreas Dālkvistas pētījums savukārt pievēršas starptautiskajai tirdzniecībai Otrā pasaules kara laikā, analizējot šķietami ļoti tālu un savā starpā nesaistītu valstu, proti, Rumānijas un Zviedrijas, tirdznieciskos sakarus laika posmā no 1939. līdz 1944. gadam. Izsekojot Zviedrijas un Rumānijas ekonomisko attiecību attīstībai un šķēršļiem, autore secina, ka tieši karš pamudināja abas valstis izveidot ciešāku ekonomisko sadarbību. Lai arī apjoma ziņā tirdzniecība starp abām valstīm bija salīdzinoši neliela, svarīgi bija apmaiņā iesaistīto preču veidi, abām pusēm iegūstot būtiskas preces un izejvielas.

Žurnālu noslēdz recenzijas par vairākām grāmatām, šajā numurā izvēlēti trīs darbi: Neatkarības kara noslēdzošajam posmam veltīts dokumentu krājums prof. Ē. Jēkabsona redakcijā, šo rindu autores monogrāfija par politiskajām aktivitātēm trimdā, kā arī Polijā izdots pētījums, kurā analizēta Austrumu kristietības vēsture.

**Kristīne Beķere**

During the beautifully snowy days of December 2023, we are preparing the second issue of this year's journal for publication. This issue is almost entirely devoted to the historical problems of the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century: developments in society and the armed forces during the Latvian War of Independence, the ideas gaining momentum amongst the ethnic minorities in Latvia in interwar period, and also international trade. We present four scholarly articles and several reviews of recent research.

In his article, Professor of the University of Latvia Ēriks Jēkabsons discusses at length the activities of Herbert Adolphus Watson, an unofficial representative of the British Foreign Office in Latvia during the first half of the War of Independence, from November 1918 to the summer of 1919 – a time when hostilities were active and conditions in Latvia particularly difficult. The author traces the circumstances of Grant-Watson's arrival and endeavours in Latvia, providing a broad insight into his perception of the events in Latvia at the time. Grant-Watson's reports on the situation in Latvia provide a wealth of information on the domestic political situation, public sentiment, political and military developments in Latvia, as well as Latvia's international relations, particularly with Great Britain.

The same period, 1918–1920, is also addressed in the next article, a study by Estonian researcher Toivo Kikkas on the surveillance reports compiled by the political departments of the Red Army's national units, also called political summaries – *politsvodki*. The author analyses the instructions for drafting surveillance reports, the implementation of these instructions and the content of the reports, i.e. what was actually reported by the political departments of the Estonian and Latvian national units of the Red Army.

In this issue of the journal, we continue our tradition of publishing one article based on a recently defended master's thesis. In this issue, it is an article by Milana Drugoveiko on the political thought of the Belarusian intelligentsia in Latvia in the period 1920–1934. Based on the example of the Belarusian activist Konstantin Jezovitov, the author describes the main political ideas of the Belarusian minority in Latvia in the interwar period, the attitude of Belarusians towards the Latvian state and its minority policy.

The study by Romanian scholar Andreea Dahlquist, on the other hand, focuses on international trade during the Second World War, analysing the trade relations linking two seemingly very distant and unrelated countries, namely, Romania and Sweden, between 1939 and 1944. Tracing the development of economic relations connecting Sweden and Romania, and the obstacles thereof, the author concludes that it was the war that prompted the two countries to establish closer economic cooperation. Although trade between the two countries was relatively restricted in volume,

its significance lay precisely in the types of merchandise exchanged, with both sides gaining access to the goods and raw materials that were of key importance to each of them.

The journal concludes with reviews of several books: a collection of documents on the final phase of the War of Independence by Professor Ē. Jēkabsons; a monograph on political activities in exile written by the author of these lines, as well as a study dedicated to the history of Eastern Christianity in the region, published in Poland.

**Kristīne Beķere**

**Raksti**

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Articles



## Activities of Herbert Grant-Watson, British Foreign Office Representative in Latvia in March–August 1919\*

Lielbritānijas Ārlietu ministrijas pārstāvja Herberta Granta-Vatsona darbība Latvijā 1919. gada martā–augustā

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Latvijas Neatkarības kara pirmā puse no 1918. gada novembra līdz 1919. gada vasarai bija īpaši sarežģīta, Latvijā nežēlīga kara apstākļos sadūrās visu kaimiņvalstu un sašķeltās Latvijas sabiedrības grupu intereses (vācbaltiešu, latviešu, boļševiku u. c.). Šajā situācijā bija jādarbojas Rietumu lielvalstu pārstāvjiem, turklāt plašākā pārstāvniecība bija Lielbritānijai. Kopš 1918. gada nogales Latvijā klātesoši bija britu Kara flotes kuģi, no 1919. gada pavasara un vasaras – Militārā misija un Politiskā misija, turklāt no 1919. gada marta Latvijā darbojās Ārlietu ministrijas neoficiāls pārstāvis Herberts Adolfuss Grants-Vatsons, un arī viņa darbība bija ļoti aktīva, tāpēc tās izpēte ir sevišķi būtiska. Raksta mērķis ir noskaidrot Granta-Vatsona darbības apstākļus un rezultātus Liepājā un Rīgā 1919. gada martā–augustā, aplūkojot viņa aktivitātes hronoloģiski. Darbā izmantoti avoti no Lielbritānijas Nacionālā arhīva u. c.

**Atslēgvārdi:** Latvijas Neatkarības karš, 16. aprīļa apvērsums, Lielbritānijas Ārlietu ministrija, Pagaidu valdība, Herberts Grants-Vatsons.

The first half of the Latvian War of Independence, from November 1918 to the summer of 1919, was particularly difficult, with the interests of all neighbouring countries and the divided Latvian society (Baltic Germans, Latvians, Bolsheviks, etc.) clashing in the midst of a brutal war in Latvia. In this situation, the representatives of the Western powers, with Britain being the most widely represented, had a presence in Latvia from the end of 1918, with British naval vessels, the Military Mission and the Political Mission from the spring and summer of 1919. From March 1919 – an unofficial

\* The article was written within the project “Cross Junction of the Interests of England, Germany, France and Russia in the Baltic Region in 1919–1920”, No. S-MIP-21-46, funded by the Lithuanian Science Council and developed at the Faculty of History, Vilnius University.

representative of the Foreign Office, Herbert Adolphus Grant-Watson, was very active in Latvia, hence, the study of his activities is particularly important. The aim of this article is to establish the circumstances and results of Grant-Watson's activities in Liepāja and Riga in March–August 1919, examining them chronologically. This task is accomplished on the basis of the materials acquired in British National Archives and other sources.

**Keywords:** Latvian War of Independence, coup d'état of 16 April, British Foreign Office, Temporary Government, Herbert Grant-Watson.

## Introduction

On 18 November 1918, the Republic of Latvia was proclaimed, and its government and nation were forced to fight an armed struggle with several external and internal enemies until the summer of 1920, namely, with Soviet Russia and its satellite – Soviet Latvia, as well as Germany and the Baltic Germans (in addition to a forced cooperation with Germany and Baltic Germans against the Bolsheviks until the summer of 1919), as well as the army commanded by Bermond, representing the Russian anti-Bolshevist forces. It was not until 11 August 1920 that a peace treaty was signed with Soviet Russia.

The first stages of the Latvian War of Independence, from November 1918 to the summer of 1919, were particularly difficult and strenuous for the Latvian Provisional Government.<sup>1</sup> Under the conditions of a brutal war and terror in Latvia, collided the interests of all the neighbouring powers (Germany, Soviet Russia, the still internationally legally existing non-Bolshevist Russia) and other neighbouring countries, and also those of the socially, politically and nationally divided Latvian society groups (Baltic Germans, Latvians,

Bolsheviks etc.). In this situation, the representation of the interests of the Western powers in the region by the political, military and humanitarian missions of Great Britain, France and the USA was essential. From the spring of 1919, the French Military Mission and warships, the US Political Mission and the American Relief Administration Mission, with their Navy transports were active in Latvia, as were the British representatives – the most widely represented of all. This was due to the British interest in the region which was quite pronounced, especially in Estonia and Latvia. Since the end of 1918, British naval vessels were present in Latvia, and in the spring and summer of 1919 they were joined by the Military Mission and the Political Mission, whose activity and involvement in the events was very high.<sup>2</sup> In addition, from March 1919, Herbert Adolphus Grant-Watson, an unofficial representative of the British Foreign Office, who was not officially part of the missions but worked closely with them, was active in Liepāja and then Riga. Grant-Watson's activities have received some coverage in the popular publications of Latvian exile community,<sup>3</sup> he is also mentioned in the historical literature of Soviet Latvia, the exiles and the Republic of Latvia, but only in very general terms – with a brief note or highlighting the most important aspects of Grant-Watson's activities or facts found in his published reports (and even that – less than for other Allied and even British representatives in Latvia).<sup>4</sup> The aim of this article is to further clarify the circumstances and results of Grant-Watson's activities in Liepāja and Riga in March–August 1919 by examining his activities chronologically in stages (determined by the markedly different military and political situation in Latvia during these periods). This is achieved by examination of documents from British National Archives and other sources.



Herbert Watson was born on 4 January 1881, educated at Trinity College, Cambridge University, worked in the British Diplomatic Service from 1905, and in the British Embassy in Copenhagen, Denmark, during the closing years of the First World War. Later he held other posts, including Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Central American Republics 1928–1933, Cuba 1933–1935 and 1937–1940, Finland 1935–1937. Married in 1905, spouse Anna, b. Low (died 1953).<sup>5</sup> After his retirement he lived in Bournemouth, where he died on 21 November 1971, which was also noted by the Latvian press in exile, with special emphasis on his friendship towards Latvia and his interest in its problems.<sup>6</sup> This is further confirmed by the two books written and published by Grant-Watson on Latvia.<sup>7</sup> Moreover, his second wife, Catherine Grant-Watson, in correspondence with the Latvian historian of Latvia in exile, Jānis Labsvīrs, as early as autumn 1989, asked that her late husband's and her own wish be fulfilled – that a memorial service for Kārlis Ulmanis be held in Riga, which was done on 1 July 1990 at the Cathedral Church in Riga.<sup>8</sup>

## Arrival in Liepāja

Grant-Watson had attended to the Latvian question at the embassy in Copenhagen since the beginning of 1919. On the morning of 12 February, the British warships *Caledon* and *Phaeton*, escorted by several minelayers, left Copenhagen for Liepāja, arriving at their destination on 12 February. On board *Caledon*, with the task of directly ascertaining the military-political situation in Latvia, were Foreign Office officials – Vivien Bosenquet, the former consul in Riga, who had visited Riga and Liepāja several times since December 1918,

and Grant-Watson, the second secretary at the British Legation in Copenhagen, who, together with the ships' senior officers, went ashore and held several consultations with the head of the Latvian Provisional Government, Kārlis Ulmanis, ministers and other dignitaries. The representatives returned to Copenhagen on 20 February, and on 22 February Bosenquet drew up a report on the negotiations and the political and military situation, admitting that he had also based his work on Grant-Watson's notes. On the whole, the British representatives had a rather hopeful impression of the difficult situation of the government and of its relations with the German forces, von der Goltz and the *Landeswehr*.<sup>9</sup> Grant-Watson himself recalled that during a reception on board *Caledon*, Walter Cowan, commander of the British Naval Baltic Squadron, offered to accompany him on a trip to Liepāja in order to better acquaint himself with the conditions. The authorities of the mission agreed, granting Grant-Watson a leave. Cowan was also on board *Caledon*, Grant-Watson took part in the communal meals, and the diplomat was also given a revolver from the ship's armoury. He recalled how difficult and dangerous the road to Riga was because of the many mines and ice jams. The ship was brought into the port of Liepāja by a local Danish pilot, and Grant-Watson reached the shore in a boat with Bosenquet. In the city, the two negotiated with Ulmanis and the ministers with the permission of the German Governor, Rüdiger von der Goltz, but spent the nights on board.<sup>10</sup> In any case, Grant-Watson's own notes on the trip were used by the US embassy in Copenhagen for extensive reports to the State Department on the situation in Latvia in early March.<sup>11</sup>

On 6 March 1919, Austin Keenan, the head of the British Military Mission, arrived in Liepāja to begin his permanent

work in Latvia; in June, Major-General Alfred Burt took over the mission. On 19 March, Herbert Adolphus Grant-Watson, a representative of the Foreign Office, arrived in Liepāja. In early June they were joined by Stephen Tallents, Head of the Political Mission (although he had arrived in Liepāja for a few days on 11 March, but then returned to London via Estonia).

At the meeting of the government on 19 March K. Ulmanis reported that H. Grant-Watson, “*appointed as informal British counter-agent to the Latvian Government*”, had arrived in Liepāja.<sup>12</sup> When the meeting was recapped, it was noted in the press that he had already appeared before the government. It was also noted that the conversation with K. Ulmanis had taken place on 20 March, lasting “*a long time*”, and the German and Russian press in Liepāja was accused of misinterpreting the term “*informal representative*” (as if he had only come for information). The Latvian government newspaper “*Latvijas Sargs*” stressed that it was referring to an “*informal or de facto representative*”, which was explained by the fact that Latvia had not obtained international recognition. However, it was only a matter of weeks before Grant-Watson’s post would be renamed in accordance with “*international legal practice*”.<sup>13</sup> The actual situation was more complicated, and the wait for international recognition was longer.

Grant-Watson himself recalled that he had received an official assignment to go to Latvia and Lithuania as a representative to establish “*unofficial*” relations with the governments of these new countries (while V. Bosenquet went to Tallinn), and arrived in Liepāja on the *Galatea*, where he was invited by the already arrived head of the Military Mission, Major A. Keenan, to stay in the “*large summer residence*” granted by the Latvian government for his mission. Food in the city was hard to come

by and the British subsisted mainly on army rations supplied by the Navy.<sup>14</sup> He recalled that the Latvian Provisional Government had been pleased to see the start of his activities as *de facto* recognition by the British, and that ministers had stressed in their negotiations that the government’s tasks were to obtain recognition from the Allies, to have the naval blockade lifted and to obtain a loan to enable purchasing comestibles and war materials in the Scandinavian countries.<sup>15</sup>

According to his report of 1 April, from the moment of his arrival in Liepāja Grant-Watson regularly, in fact – daily discussed the situation with the Provisional Government and its leader K. Ulmanis, as well as with other “*prominent Letts*”. During the talks, the British representative was convinced that the government’s policy was definitely aligned with the direction of the “*Entente*” powers, especially “*England*”, which was supported by “*the majority of Letts*”, to the extent that in the event of a plebiscite of the population on the form of statehood, the proposal for a British protectorate would prevail (only “*failing this the Letts wish to be independent*”). Apparently echoing what he had been told by government representatives, Grant-Watson stressed that the Latvian government’s aim was first to root out Bolshevism and then to turn out Germanism. He noted that the government represented “*Lettish national aspirations*”, but because of the circumstances engendered by the German occupation power and the Bolshevik regime, it was not elected by universal suffrage, its position was “*weak*”, because the country was controlled by Bolshevik and German forces hostile to the “*Lettish movement*”, also “*the [German] Baltic landowners do not give them genuine support*”, because they were afraid of the estates being taken away and handed over to the Latvian peasants, but there were “*signs*” that an agreement may be reached

between Latvians and Baltic Germans, and there was a threat of a food shortage, etc. Grant-Watson believed that the situation could only change if the government included “*many of the best Letts*” from outside it, because it had “*many Ministers who are without any political or business experience*”, the main aim of the government at the moment being to obtain funds for food and to supply the army for the fight against the Bolsheviks, but “*in financial matters*” their performance was “*very ill*” in the “*business circles*” and the constantly high prices became even higher, causing an ever greater discontent among the “*working classes*”. The author of the report, however, considered that until the government was able to regain Riga and the German occupation ended, it would be impossible to fully assess the balance of forces between its supporters and opponents, and that the ongoing “*fight against Bolshevism practically excludes*” other possibilities. It is very important to note that here for the first time is an indication of the government’s intention to directly develop cooperation between the Baltic states – K. Ulmanis planned to convene a meeting of representatives of Latvia, Finland, Estonia and Lithuania in Liepāja to coordinate political, military, economic and other forms of cooperation, also noting the idea circulating in Liepāja and Kaunas to discuss a military treaty, “free ports” (placing the port of Liepāja at the disposal of Lithuania for importing goods), postal and monetary union, etc.

As to the domestic policy, Grant-Watson described it as “*socialistic*” (railways, telegraph, telephone communications in the hands of the government, exploitation of the Kurzeme state forests, monopoly on the flax trade, food supply, industrial reconstruction), caused by the enormous war losses, which were catastrophic – in particular concerning the social situation of the urban population.

It was Grant-Watson’s view that in the event of a revolt by the “*local Bolsheviks*”, the Germans would suppress them, perhaps by establishing a full control over the land and trying to set up a pro-German government, but its sustainability, and likewise the Germans’ ability to withstand a major Bolshevik revolt, was doubtful, since von der Goltz’s power was limited not only by the leftist committees of German soldiers in the army, but also by the socialists in the German government. Von der Goltz had told Grant-Watson that the Germans regarded the Lielupe River as a “*natural line of defence*” against the Bolsheviks and had therefore “*cooperated with the Letts*” in pushing the Bolsheviks back over the river, while Goltz had offered to “*assist the Letts to capture Riga*”. However, Grant-Watson was not clear about the Germans’ “*ulterior motives*” in this way, as several German officers had suggested that Goltz was trying to rebuild the army according to the “*old monarchical traditions*”, whereby he would then be able to influence the situation in Germany, so volunteers were carefully accepted and many refused, being sent to Germany. In any case, the Germans’ deep political and economic interest in Latvian affairs is demonstrated by the offer of a German loan, the efforts to take over the Latvian railways, the offer of land from the German volunteers to fight against the Bolsheviks, etc.

The Bolshevik forces on the other side of the front were, according to Grant-Watson, mainly “*Letts*”, so there was a “*civil war*” which was extremely brutal, with “*unprecedented barbarity*”, with Bolsheviks and Germans killing prisoners of war etc. “*have roused hatred and passion to such an extent that the whole life of the country must be embittered for many years to come*”. Grant-Watson stressed that in this crisis the Provisional Government had appealed to the Entente countries for food

aid and loans to supply the army. Although the Government was in a weak position, it could, in the opinion of “*people who know the situation well*”, become a “*centre of national aspirations*” which, with the help of the Entente, would be able to set up an administration and an army, and would be able to take the place of the Germans when they were withdrawn to Germany. However, without the support of the Entente, “*the Lettish government will fall*”, so Grant-Watson recommended that in order to “*maintain the Government and thereby to save the country from anarchy*”, this support should be given.<sup>16</sup>

It should be noted that on 6 April Grant-Watson also dealt with the Lithuanian government, which at the time did not seem to him “serious” because of its exaggerated territorial claims, and the British representative suggested that Palanga should be given to it, and Klaipėda – to Poland, if it would give up Danzig.<sup>17</sup>

## The 16 April coup and its aftermath

Later, Grant-Watson recalled that in April Liepāja had a thaw and women gardeners were planting flowers in the parks, while he started walking along the seaside, despite the daily firing drills by the German artillery.<sup>18</sup> Grant-Watson was on a mission in Kaunas at the time of the armed coup d'état by the Germans against the Provisional Government in Liepāja on 16 April. In view of the events, commander of British Navy squadron W. Cowan telegraphed him from Liepāja to return immediately. On 19 April Grant-Watson returned and, on Cowan's advice, settled for a time not in the city but on board the British warship *Seafire* in the harbour just as German soldiers were setting up barricades on the shore to block access to the British squadron, and it was *Seafire* that took up

position to counteract the Germans' intention (as the escalation increased, von der Goltz personally visited the site, calming the situation for the time being).<sup>19</sup>

In that critical situation, there was a direct need for the Allies to work together (in addition to Keenan and Grant-Watson, British and French warships, there was also a US mission under Warwick Greene in Liepāja). On 22 April, Cowan chaired the first major meeting of Allied representatives in the US mission building, with Keenan, Grant-Watson, French commander Jean Brisson, the Americans Greene and his deputy Ernest Dawley, who reported on the meeting with von der Goltz and the results of the conversation. It was decided to demand that Goltz remove the commanders of the *Landeswehr* shock troops and the Westphalian Free Corps, their withdrawal from Liepāja, the reinstatement of Latvian officers, etc., in return for a promise that, once the demands had been met, the Allied missions would declare their support only for a government in which all population groups were proportionally represented (meaning, above all, the Baltic Germans).<sup>20</sup> Robert Hale, a member of the American Mission, was also present at the meeting as an interpreter and described Grant-Watson in the following words:

*“I think Grant-Watson is the Foreign Office through and through. I think he is a product of Oxford, eight or ten years older than I am, intelligent, learned, cultivated, steeped in tradition, probably perfectly honest, probably with a broad constructive vision, and yet in his own way too pliable and affable to be as attractive a personality as Admiral [Cowan].”*<sup>21</sup>

Around the same time, the British representatives began regular visits to *Saratov*, which was in port, and consultations with the ministers of the Provisional

Government working there (K. Ulmanis had taken refuge in the British Military Mission during the coup, from where he was transferred to the ship after some time), which is also noted by historian Edgars Andersons, who writes that this happened “daily” – “to exchange information with the Latvian government and to encourage it”.<sup>22</sup> This is confirmed by Grant-Watson himself in his memoirs, according to which, after Ulmanis was transferred from his mission, where he had taken refuge, to *Saratov* in a port raid, he visited the ship every day to discuss the situation of the Prime Minister.<sup>23</sup>

### Attempts to form a coalition government

The Allied representatives unanimously saw the solution to the situation in the formation of a broad coalition government, including representatives of minorities, primarily the Baltic Germans, and from 22 April invested a determined effort to achieve this in negotiations with representatives of the interested parties. On 9 May, for example, A. Keenan reported on the negotiations on a new government (possibly “liberal” or representatives of the Ulmanis group – seven Latvians, one “conservative”, a politically right-wing or to some extent pro-German Latvian, three Baltic Germans and one Jew). He stressed, however, that if Latvians did not have a majority in the cabinet, it was doubtful whether “a Lettish national army would receive adequate support”.<sup>24</sup> Grant-Watson reported similarly on 8 May: under pressure from the Allies, negotiations were renewed on the formation of a coalition government, which would make it possible to gain the support of the Baltic Germans to take Riga, although it would increase German influence in the cabinet. He also mentioned

that if there was a British loan to buy arms and equipment, as well as British instructors, a “Lettish peasant army” could be formed (otherwise the “Lettish movement” would be stifled by the Baltic Germans and “German rule” would always remain intact in Latvia).<sup>25</sup>

Similarly, on 22 May, Grant-Watson reported that “*the Germans and the Balts are making every effort to establish their dominating influence permanently in the country*”. He described the Prime Minister of the newly formed pro-German Latvian government, Andrievs Niedra, who was supported by the German occupation authorities, as “*a Conservative pro-German Lett*”, and his government as consisting of “*few [of his] personal friends*” – mainly Baltic Germans as ministers. In addition, he reported that “*practically the whole country is passively resisting his Government, there is in reality no administration*”, almost all former government officials had left their posts, the leaders of the People’s Council and the Liepāja City Council were in prison after protesting against the situation, about 1100 Latvian soldiers of the Liepāja Newly Formed Forces who refused to submit to the orders of A. Niedra’s War Ministry, were sent to the front to have their units disbanded, only three pro-German newspapers were allowed to be published, German censorship of letters and telegrams was introduced alongside Latvian censorship, and Niedra’s only support came from German army units and the Baltic *Landeswehr*, which “*practically forms part of the German army*” because of the mass enlistment of German army soldiers (it was said that the numbers have therefore reached 15 000 men). He was apparently writing very subjectively on the basis of information provided by representatives of the Ulmanis group:

*“The Balts realise that the present regime is leading directly to civil war, but Niedra*

*very obstinate and the Germans seem determined to keep the Government in their hands. Niedra, who is not quite normal, is a political gambler and mentally he requires the excitement of danger. In his youth he was a great card player and lately he has paid 3 or 4 visits to Riga, merely because he enjoyed the sensation of running great risks. Thus though he sees that his Government is placing the country on the edge of an abyss, he still persists through love of danger, in remaining Premier and refuses to allow a Coalition Government to be formed. The Baltic National Committee, who in cooperation with the German military authorities control the Baltic Landeswehr, will continue to support him as long as they are able to maintain the help of the German soldiers.”<sup>26</sup>*

Finally, Grant-Watson stated that the Baltic Germans were very bitter about the Estonians and would undoubtedly cooperate with the anti-Bolshevik Russian forces to destroy the Estonian government and “reestablish their hegemony in that province”.

Later, Grant-Watson recalled a conversation with Anatol von Lieven, commander of the Russian unit of the *Landeswehr*, in the cabin of the warship *Velox*, where he had worked for some time. Von Lieven emphasised that he was prepared to work with anyone to fight the Bolsheviks, but that he would prefer to do so with the Allies. He also asked for two ships to send his unit to the Bolshevik front at Petrograd, which was not possible, as the British had no ships available.<sup>27</sup> Grant-Watson also recalled that he and Major Keenan had been closely observing the complex military-political developments in Latvia, which had been difficult – “wild rumours” had been circulating which were difficult to verify. Every day after lunch, the two went to talk to K. Ulmanis, who kept them well informed of developments. The situation

was sometimes humiliating for the British Mission, as there were even cases of detention of some members of the Mission by the German authorities.<sup>28</sup>

### **Crisis in late May – early July, 1919**

Events developed rapidly, and on 23 May Hubert Gough, the head of the Allied Military Mission in Finland, arrived in Liepāja, where he discussed the situation with K. Ulmanis and representatives of the Allied missions, after which he advised London to consider the issue of the Baltic states as a whole. He stressed that a stable German dominance would threaten “*the future of Russia*” and the independence of the Baltic states. To prevent this, the Latvian Provisional Government had to be restored, German troops withdrawn, and Latvian units had to be assisted by British instructors and equipped. Moreover, the situation in Liepāja was humiliating and damaging to Allied prestige.<sup>29</sup> On 23–24 May, German soldiers had roughly handled and even temporarily detained a number of British sailors, leading the British Leader of the House of Lords and cabinet member George Curzon to recommend to the Foreign Secretary, Arthur Balfour, on 30 May that von der Goltz be removed from his post.<sup>30</sup> At the beginning of June, Grant-Watson reported that the Germans had not apologised for what had happened and that Cowan had banned German ships from entering the port of Liepāja, to which the Germans responded by banning British nationals from travelling on German railways.<sup>31</sup> The British Admiralty also reported on 30 and 31 May that the Germans had effectively declared martial law in Liepāja, with guns trained on British ships ashore and German aircraft frequently flying low over the ships, and warned that if Liepāja was abandoned,

the British would lose their only base in the Baltic from which a blockade could be enforced, and that this might happen, unless the Allies took certain steps to reverse the situation. At the highest level, an apology from the German side was demanded. However, the efforts to get von der Goltz to withdraw from Latvia were to no avail.<sup>32</sup>

From June 3 to 6, Liepāja hosted another meeting on board the French warship *Le Dunios* and the British warship *Royalist* of Greene, Keenan, Alexander Duff, commander of the British Navy and Light Squadron in this sector of the Baltic Sea, who arrived in Liepāja at the end of May, Tallents, John Groome, Chief of Mission of the American Relief Administration, Grant-Watson and Brisson, which were brought up by the military-political developments in Vidzeme (armed conflict between Germans and Estonians).<sup>33</sup> On 10 June, Grant-Watson visited the British squadron commander A. Duff in the harbour, stating that the situation was “*daily getting worse [...] and the time was rapidly approaching when he and other British subjects would no longer be able to remain ashore here*”, as the German soldiers and officers were “*becoming more and more openly hostile*” and it was only “*with greatest difficulty that incidents could be avoided*”. Goltz himself was in Jelgava and from 10 June in Riga, but his replacement “paid no attention” to Grant-Watson’s requests. Duff, however, warned Grant-Watson of the grave consequences of calling off the mission and urged him to remain in the city despite the “*nearly unbearable*” situation (among other things, at the beginning of June Duff had already issued a shore ban to the sailors of the squadron).<sup>34</sup>

At the beginning of June, as German troops advanced towards the Estonian-occupied Northern Latvia after the capture of Riga, the so-called Battle of Cēsis between German and Estonian-Latvian forces began.

On 8 June in Liepāja, in view of the “*extremely critical situation in the Baltic provinces*”, the British mission leadership, together with the US mission and the British and French naval commanders in the city, decided that an Allied military mission under a British general should be sent to the Baltic states immediately, that the local forces should be provided with armaments and other necessities and that a loan should be made (immediately for Lithuania and Estonia, and as soon as a stable government could be established for Latvia).<sup>35</sup>

At the same time, the British Political Mission led by S. Tallents started its work in Liepāja and arrived on 4 June (Grant-Watson later recalled that after the arrival of the mission he actively cooperated with it, though noting that Tallents was initially promised more financial support in London to establish trade links than he actually received<sup>36</sup>). On 10 June, Tallents together with the head of the US mission W. Greene negotiated a ceasefire in Cēsis, which he actually led, and a truce was signed for a few days. On 16 June, on board *Royalist*, a meeting was held in Liepāja, attended by H. Gough, S. Tallents, A. Duff, H. Grant-Watson, A. Keenan, the Head of French Mission, Emanuil du Parquet, and others. The progress of the formation of the Latvian coalition government and the forthcoming withdrawal of German troops from Liepāja were discussed again, and in the following days the attempts were made to resolve the conflict in Northern Latvia.<sup>37</sup> On 18 June, fighting resumed there, and on 20–21 June the German troops were withdrawn from Liepāja. On 21–24 June, the situation was only resolved by Germany’s acceptance of the heavy peace terms on 23–24 June. On 20 June, Grant-Watson and other members of the British missions in Liepāja were transferred to *Royalist* on the orders of the British Senior Naval Officer. On the evening of 23 June,

news arrived on board the British ship in Liepāja that the German government had agreed to sign the peace treaty, which was “*duly celebrated*”. The British and other Allied missions returned to the city the following day.<sup>38</sup>

On the evening of 25 June, A. Niedra arrived in Liepāja from Riga and, in the words of H. Grant-Watson, “*placed the Government of the country at the disposal of the Entente*”. The following afternoon, on board the British warship *Galatea*, Allied representatives (H. Gough, H. Grant-Watson, S. Tallents, etc.) met with A. Niedra in Liepāja. At the beginning of the meeting, Gough pointed out that Niedra’s government had not obeyed Allied orders and had violated the armistice signed at Cēsis, to which Niedra replied that he had no knowledge of the terms of the armistice and insisted that it was the Estonians who had broken the armistice. He was also satisfied that the Allies were taking responsibility for maintaining order in the country, which they had not done so far, so he and “*his friends*” had been forced to seek an agreement with the Germans. Niedra called the Estonian government a “*disaster*”. Niedra also stressed that he and Ulmanis did not have very big differences of opinion, many Baltic Germans were much more radical than he was, Niedra admitted that a large part of the population did not believe him, but that the situation could change in two months. He had come to Liepāja to return his mandate to the Allies. Gough then instructed Grant-Watson to arrange a meeting the next day between Ulmanis and Niedra, which failed. After the meeting, S. Tallents wrote a message to K. Ulmanis, asking him to exercise restraint in the new government and insisting that Niedra’s safety must be guaranteed.<sup>39</sup>

On 25–27 June, the British, along with the French and the Americans, took part in all public events in the town left by

the German troops (welcoming demonstrations, the toppling of the German monument, welcoming the Latvian government ashore, etc.). S. Tallents recalled that on the afternoon of 26 June he visited K. Ulmanis on board *Saratov*, where it was agreed that “*a coalition government which should represent all parties in Latvia*” would be formed, but agreed with Mr Ulmanis that the previous government headed by him should first be restored. It was then decided that the government would return to the city the following day.<sup>40</sup> On 27 June, together with other Allied representatives in the city, Grant-Watson took part in the celebrations welcoming the Provisional Government to Liepāja, giving an extended speech which was translated from English for the audience by K. Ulmanis himself. In it, among other things, he expressed his support for the government, stressed his government’s favour of the principle of self-determination of peoples and its readiness to support Latvians, and his confidence in its success.<sup>41</sup>

However, the situation in Vidzeme and Riga continued to be difficult as the Estonian troops approached Riga. On 29 June, Grant-Watson, accompanied by a French representative, met with Ulmanis and the Baltic German officer representatives who had arrived from Riga, and, according to what Grant-Watson said to Duff, the latter had confirmed their readiness “*to recognise Ulmanis’ government*” and an agreement could be reached, which had hitherto been impossible “*because of the dominance of the Baltic Germans*”. On 30 June, Duff reported that Grant-Watson, after the previous day’s talks, had, like the Gough mission, “*supported the need to halt the Estonian advance towards Riga*”.<sup>42</sup>

On 1 July, Grant-Watson, in a wide-ranging report on the situation, admitted that the government of A. Niedra had marked “*probably the zenith of the German element in the Baltic provinces*”. He wrote:



*“Supported by the German army of General Count von der Goltz and strengthened by numerous enlistments of German subjects, the Baltic Landeswehr was able to completely dominate the Lettish army and administration and form a military dictatorship. Every effort was then made to give the Baltic domination as permanent a character as possible. Though Count von der Goltz still remained the leading spirit, Balts were employed wherever possible to mask his power.”*<sup>43</sup>

Grant-Watson believed that the Germans, emboldened by the capture of Riga, attacked Estonians and Latvians in Vidzeme in order to take Estonia and prevent further Latvian mobilisation, which would threaten German leadership of the armed forces (*“they could only hope to maintain their supremacy if the Balt army were stronger than the Lett army”*), but seriously miscalculated, underestimating the strength of the Estonian army, hoping for the support of the Russian anti-Bolshevik forces (the Judenich Corps and von Lieven’s units), which had remained neutral in the conflict, and for more help from the German troops, which immediately after the signing of the ceasefire in Cēsis began to prepare for evacuation to Germany. The defeat in the Battle of Cēsis and the abandonment of Liepāja followed, but a government emerged in Germany which clearly opposed the policy pursued by von der Goltz. When this and the inevitability of evacuation became clear, the “Balt structure” collapsed and Niedra fled Riga. In order to protect Riga and the army supplies it contained, von der Goltz diverted some German units prepared for the evacuation to defend the city and appointed Major Sixt von Arnim as Governor of Riga. After the collapse of the Niedra government, the German army units at its disposal left the “Army of Latvia” and von der

Goltz officially took command of all German forces against the Estonians in an attempt to reach an armistice, as the German soldiers showed a *“clearly averse”* to participate in a long-distance battle (the Estonians were offered to retreat towards Cēsis, the Germans – across the Daugava, with only *“a few German officers”* remaining on the right bank to supervise the evacuation of the stores). At the same time, representatives of the Baltic German National Committee arrived in Liepāja, announcing to the Entente missions their readiness to join the coalition government, working *“for the common good”*. In this situation, when panic broke out in Riga after the water pipeline was damaged by Estonian artillery fire, the Allied missions asked to support the armistice and to prevent the entry of Estonian forces into Riga (which both “Letts and Balts” were apparently against, as it would cause *“bloodshed without any corresponding advantage”*). Grant-Watson stated that power was in the hands of Estonians and Latvians, so there was no point in *“further fighting”*. He wrote:

*“Until the old Russian Empire is reconstituted it is clear that native elements if adequately supported by the Allies, will be in a position to check the Eastward movement of the Germans. The Letts are, however, not yet experienced enough to carry on the administration and govern Latvia without the assistance of the Balts, in view of the business and financial abilities of the latter. Therefore, the Balts must be admitted to take part in the Government.”*<sup>44</sup>

Grant-Watson later wrote in his memoirs that *“Ulmanis would strengthen his position”* by inviting one or two Baltic German ministers to the government, given their experience in finance and business, but the Latvian-Baltic German adversity was too deep and the attempt failed.<sup>45</sup>

K. Ulmanis, immediately after his return to Liepāja, on the direct advice of Grant-Watson, in order to stop the struggle at Riga, immediately announced the “*inclusion of Baltic Germans in the government*”, starting a transitional period, during which the so-called “business government” would function – Latvians K. Ulmanis (Prime Minister and agriculture), Zigfrīds Meierovics (foreign affairs), Miķelis Valters (internal affairs), Teodors Hermanovskis (traffic), General Dāvids Sīmansons (war), theologian, docent Kārlis Kundziņš (education, an unfulfilled suggestion), Jew Paul Münz (finance), Baltic Germans – Paul Sokolovski, Minister of Justice in the Niedra government (law, an unfulfilled suggestion), Eduard von Rosenberg (state audit office) and another German (trade and industry). Grant-Watson considered these to be much better candidates than the members of the previous cabinet. Finally, on the future plans of the Baltic Germans, Grant-Watson stated that they could not yet be fully determined, but that it was “*incredible*” that they would begin to fully support the idea of an “*autonomous and independent Latvia*” and that “*as they always cling to some outside power to support them against the Letts, they will probably turn themselves to the Russians and, through their intervention try to save themselves from being absorbed in the Lettish masses*”.<sup>46</sup>

Subsequently, on 3 July, representatives of the Allied missions secured the signing of the Armistice of Strazdumuiža, which provided for the withdrawal of German troops to Courland and Zemgale in preparation for their withdrawal to Germany. At the same time, the question of the establishment of anti-Bolshevik Russian forces in Estonia and Latvia was raised. Already on 23 June, Grant-Watson, in a telegram, reiterated the concerns just expressed by Keenan about German plans to create a “*pro-German Russian army*”. He stressed

that the plan was to “*replace*” the German forces to be withdrawn with “*Russians in German pay*”, and that the plan was strongly supported by the Baltic Germans, as it would enable them to maintain their dominance and send more troops against the Estonians. He also reported that the Germans were at the moment doing everything to “*crush the national movement*” in Latvia and Estonia, and recommended that they should try to bring the newly-formed forces under Entente control to ensure that they were used in Latvia only to fight the Bolsheviks (he also noted the recent appointment of the “*owner of Lithuanian land*” and Russian naval officer Boris von Bok as the representative of Bolshevik Russia in Liepāja).<sup>47</sup>

On 9 July, Grant-Watson telegraphed excitedly to London about the situation in Jelgava, where German soldiers were entering P. Bermond's “*Russian*” forces, was critical of von Lieven (controlled by pro-German staff officers, more concerned with local issues than “*the future of Russia*”), the Germans and Baltic Germans were trying to use the “*Russians*” to maintain their position in Courland, while Germany, although recognising Latvia's independence, was trying to convince the Russians through its agents that it supported “*United Russia*” and would supply Russian soldiers better than the Allies. Grant-Watson had therefore advised the British Military Mission to “*keep*” the Baltic Germans and Russian units “*as far apart from each other as possible*”. In his reports to London on the following days, 12, 14 and 15 July, Grant-Watson described the situation in Lithuania and its relations with Germany in detail.<sup>48</sup>

## July–August in Riga

While still in Liepāja, Grant-Watson gave a rather extensive interview to the Riga Russian-Jewish newspaper “*Rizhskoje slovo*”,

which was also reproduced by the Riga German press on 12 July. In it, he stressed his country's intentions: the question of Latvia's independence should be decided at the Paris Peace Conference, the British would only support the restoration and maintenance of order, but they saw one of the main prerequisites in the harmony and cooperation of the nationalities living in Latvia; he was also convinced of the need to support the unit of Prince Anatol von Lieven, a soldier and not a politician, etc.<sup>49</sup>

In mid-July, before his departure for Riga, Grant-Watson organised a farewell event ("*certain sporting events and a picnic*") in Liepāja with the support of A. Duff, spending £50 of his own budget. On the evening of 17 July, Grant-Watson arrived in Riga from Liepāja (apparently by land, as on 16 July the squadron commander reported from Liepāja that he had been forced to refuse Grant-Watson a transport to the ships because of the "*considerable staff*", his wife and maid, but Duff refused to take the women, asking for Admiralty's permission<sup>50</sup>). In Riga, Grant-Watson stayed in the apartment formerly rented by the British Consul, but set up his working quarters in the former German Nobility's so-called "Knight's House" (which was turned into Latvian Parliamentary building), where the British Mission as a whole worked (he himself recalled that the attitude of the owners of the house was particularly accommodating, not least because of the vain hope that this would help to avoid the nationalisation of the house<sup>51</sup>). On 25 July, Grant-Watson reported that he had found in the capital "*a state bordering on panic*" caused by reports of "*German and Russian activities in Courland*" (German troop activity). For this reason, he did not even attempt to carry out the order he had received from London to organise a celebration of the conclusion of the peace treaty

on 19 July, because "*any festivities at Riga would be out of place*".<sup>52</sup>

In his first extensive report on the general political situation from Riga on 23 July, Grant-Watson noted that German policy in Latvia and Estonia was still largely being implemented by the government's High Commissioner in East Prussia, August Winnig, whom he described as short-sighted and lacking a proper sense of reality. The author of the report rightly concluded, in principle, that Germany continued to try to maintain influence over the Russian units in Kurzeme and Zemgale (by providing equipment, salaries, etc.), or by secretly supporting the idea of the restoration of a united Russia, and for this reason was prepared to back down from recognising Latvia, because it had proved hostile to Germany and, together with Estonia, was interfering with German-Russian relations, so that Germany viewed the Latvian national aspirations personified by K. Ulmanis' government as unprecedentedly hostile. The German military objectives were pursued by von der Goltz, who seemed to have intended to "*remain in Courland until the last possible moment*" in the hope that some opportunity would arise to avoid evacuating to Germany.

Describing the "*re-entry of the Russians on the Lettish stage*", meaning the formation of Pavel Bermondts' forces in Zemgale and their cooperation with the Germans, Grant-Watson considered it a failure, since the Latvians had been facing the Russian Bolsheviks for six months, apart from the 200-man Russian unit of the *Landeswehr* commanded by Anatol von Lieven, gaining an extremely negative impression of the Russians. He then described the developments with the numerical increase of von Lieven's Russian unit, with its battalion being sent to perform Liepāja garrison duties, when the Germans on 24 June left Liepāja, the unit's Estonian

commander Eduard Kanep and his staff (including several “pro-German” Russian officers), supported by the Germans in the hope of helping them maintain their influence, but “*the plot failed*”, as Kanep, contrary to von Lieven’s orders, put his unit at the disposal of the Entente missions, shortly after which, contrary to orders from Jelgava, he left for Judenich’s forces, leaving Liepāja entirely at the Latvians’ disposal, and this influenced von Lieven’s decision to go to Narva. Grant-Watson was negative about the impact of Kanep’s unit on the Latvians in Liepāja – the arrival on the German train, the singing of the Russian anthem, the constant display of the Russian flag and the “*tactless*” attitude towards Latvian statehood, or the belief that being on Russian territory reminded Latvians of the “*hated Russian system*” (he later remembered that they had gone ashore in Liepāja, abandoned by the Germans, and that the Minister of the Interior, M. Valters, had informed the surprised British that von der Goltz had left the city for fear of artillery fire from Allied ships, moving his headquarters to Jelgava. There was a Russian unit in the town, which was “*driving the Letts to despair*”, and the British helped to resolve the situation by arranging for it to be sent to Judenich’s army<sup>53</sup>).

He stressed that after the Battle of Cēsis the Latvian and Estonian desire for independence had become much stronger, and that the Latvians who had dealings with Russia held no hope that the situation there would improve, so they did not see their future in connection with either Russia or Germany, and were increasingly fearful of the attempts to interfere in Latvian affairs. However, K. Ulmanis had assured Grant-Watson, as well as the other Allied representatives, that the Latvian Government would certainly not impede Russia trade connections through the ports of Ventspils and Rīga, and on Latvian

railways of a width suitable for Russia.<sup>54</sup> Grant-Watson also played the role of diplomatic representative to the Latvian government in Riga, for example, on 24 July he informed the head of the Provisional Government K. Ulmanis that the British government had lifted all restrictions on trade with Latvia and Lithuania imposed previously as on German-influenced countries.<sup>55</sup>

The reports to London also sufficiently addressed the domestic political situation, with some problems being examined in depth. For example, on 1 August Grant-Watson reported directly and in detail to Curzon (copied to Gough) on the importance of the Jewish factor in Latvia. The immediate reason was the appointment of Paul Mintz as a “*Jewish representative*” in the position of State Comptroller of the Provisional Government (he was expected to return to Riga shortly to take up his duties). The author of the report stressed that in this way “*the section of the Jews whom he represents agree to work for the independence of Latvia*”, even though, according to Grant-Watson, “*the majority of Jews in Latvia are not in a favour of an independent Latvia, but desire that this country, at any rate commercially, financially and economically should form part of Russia, so that the whole Russian market may be open for their activities*”.<sup>56</sup>

Grant-Watson reiterated that in a conversation with Harrison, a member of the British Political Mission, Riga-born Raphael Rosenfeld, publisher and political editor of the newspaper “*Rizskoye slovo*”, had commented that the majority of Jews in Riga and other major Latvian cities “*are bourgeois in their sympathies*”, guided primarily by economic interests, thus, this community “*does not pursue distinctively Jewish aims*”, but sought to “*promote economic and political gravitation in the direction of Russia*”, thus being “*naturally hostile to the idea Latvian independence*”. Rosenfeld

had also pointed out that the “most purely Jewish” organisation was the “Bund” – social democrats. There were also Zionists, but this movement “must not be taken very seriously” in Latvia. Rozenfeld’s views on other prominent Jewish political groups were also outlined in the report, and the main idea was that in their attitude to the question of Latvian independence the Jewish bourgeoisie and the proletariat were basically united, although based on different perceptions of their own interests – the bourgeoisie being guided by the interests of capital in connection with the restoration of Russia “more or less” to its former frontiers, therefore openly supporting the anti-Bolshevist forces, both by demanding the renunciation of anti-Semitism (expressed by the Jewish-owned newspaper “Rizskoye slovo”), while the revolutionary socialists and the social democrats were in “favour of a Greater Russia based upon democratic principles”, like the Latvian Social-Democrats, openly hostile to Alexander Kolchak, the Allied-recognised leader of the Russian anti-Bolshevik forces, whose victory would signal political reaction and the defeat of “true democracy”. Moreover, they were in favour of the Baltic states merging with “Greater Russia” on socialist principles and with a high degree of autonomy, but were against giving up “temporary independence” to the reactionary Kolchak.

Grant-Watson also wrote that there were strong (stronger than “elsewhere in Russia”) anti-Semitic tendencies among Latvians (in Russia, Jews were at the forefront of the Bolshevik movement, but in Latvia during the Soviet period there were hardly any Jews in leading positions in Riga), which did not exist before the war, but developed during it because the German occupation authorities carried out their economic “operations” through Jewish small businessmen, and they did

it in a “very reckless and avaricious manner”, which created popular hatred against Jews. Grant-Watson reported that the Government was introducing the printing of smaller denominations and that he had personally called on the Minister of the Interior, Miķelis Valters, to take “more drastic action against speculators”. However, Latvian officials were so “inefficient” that any successful action was unlikely until the situation resolved itself with an increase in import figures. In the meantime, “bitter feeling against the Jews will continue”.<sup>57</sup> On 9 August, Grant-Watson reported to Curzon and Gough that Jewish representatives had submitted to the demands of the People’s Council for autonomy in church, school and social aid (hospitals, shelters, kitchens for the poor, etc.), accompanied by an English translation of the submission.<sup>58</sup>

Notably, from July and August, the question of the evacuation of German troops from Latvia was at the centre of attention of all Western missions (on 19 July and 25 July, at Vintapi near the Olaine railway station, H. Gough and R. von der Goltz discussed the withdrawal of German forces, and during this discussion it became clear that the German side was simply delaying the withdrawal, looking for pretexts, although it formally agreed to withdraw its forces within 74 days at the latest<sup>59</sup>). Grant-Watson was no exception, repeatedly warning his government of German intentions (soldiers’ demands for land in Courland, etc.). On 4 August, Grant-Watson telegraphed to London that the Head of the Allied Mission, H. Gough, had asked him to pay particular attention to Goltz’s refusal to evacuate troops from “Courland”, declared the previous day, and further concluded that the experience of the previous weeks gave grounds to state that “no work of reconstruction” was possible while the Germans were in Jelgava, even though the time was favourable for

cooperation between Latvians and Germans, the latter having abandoned their German orientation. But if *“the moment is missed”* and General von der Goltz was allowed to incite *“natives against natives”* with intrigues, thus encouraging Bolshevism, the country may again fall into *“complete chaos”* and the Germans would find a new pretext for staying and occupying *“Courland”*. He advised the Allied governments to take firmer steps to make *“the Germans understand that the Great Powers are serious about evacuation”* (among other things, he recommended exerting pressure on the German government by drawing attention in the German press to von der Goltz’s *“schemes”*). On 3 and 6 August, he reported that the claim by German representatives that the Latvian government had promised land to German soldiers for *“colonisation”* was unfounded, etc.<sup>60</sup>

On 4 August, he looked into the matter in more detail, and this was after the worried Latvian Foreign Minister Z. Meierovics had submitted to him documents on the meeting of 10 000 German soldiers in Jelgava on 27 July, at which the German representation was called upon to support the demand for citizenship and land promised by the Latvian side for the fight *“against Bolshevism”*. The German mission also sent a resolution of the meeting to the Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, asking the Prime Minister to receive five representatives of the German soldiers to discuss the issue. However, the Latvian government replied that the agreement of 29 December 1918 with the German representative A. Winnig was only a *“draft treaty”* which had not entered into force, and even if it had entered into force, it would have been forfeited under the terms of the Versailles Peace Treaty, while the coup d’état of 16 April in Liepāja demonstrated the true position of the German troops. The meeting was therefore refused<sup>61</sup>

(it should be added that in reality the treaty could not be considered a draft, as it was signed by both parties, but the Latvian side apparently considered it as not binding upon the parties, perhaps formally taking advantage of the lack of ratification<sup>62</sup>).

Grant-Watson also paid some attention to other domestic political developments in Latvia, for example, on 5 August he reported from Riga in some detail on the resumption of the People’s Council on 11 August, focusing on the Electoral and Amnesty Laws. He stressed that the *“Libau [Liepāja] Compromise”*, or the inclusion of Baltic Germans and Jews in the government, would remain in force until the election of the Constituent Assembly, and specifically considered the positions of the leading parties on the most important points of the electoral law, noting in particular the role of the Social Democrats. According to the Allied Missions, it would be more correct to include in the law the 24-year voting age limit advocated by some civic parties, rather than the 18 or at least 21 years recommended by the Social Democrats (*“owing to the undeveloped state of the Lettish people, it would be dangerous to fix the age limit so low, especially in view of the radical and indeed revolutionary tendencies shown by some sections of the population”*), since the 24-year limit could easily be lowered later. He believed that if young, immature people took part in the elections, power could fall into the hands of *“inexperienced politicians who might wreck, ruin the whole future of the country”*. The Allies should therefore try to use their influence with the *“bourgeois parties”* to secure a higher threshold, all the more so as *“left tendencies”* would be unrestrained and it would be *“impossible to obtain support the assistance from the Balts, without whom the economic reconstruction of the country is impossible”* (he also cited the example of Estonia, which frightened the Latvian

Baltic Germans, with its Constituent Assembly threatening to confiscate land without compensation).

Describing the Latvian Social Democrats, Grant-Watson noted that they were rather “*not friendly to the Allies*” and were acutely sensitive to possible “*foreign interference*”, the Latvian workers were “*demoralised*” by the Bolshevik regime and the heavy social war (hence the continuing strikes in Riga and Liepāja, despite widespread unemployment). He also mentioned the price of wheat flour bread – 22 roubles per pound under the Bolsheviks, 2 roubles at the present moment, and with a tendency to fall to 30 kopeks during the new harvest, while the wages of a skilled worker comprised 1.50, and of an unskilled one – 0.80 roubles per hour (before the war – 25–30 and 10–12 kopeks per hour, respectively), which, however, did not reduce the intensity of the strikes. Grant-Watson believed that the discontent in society was being fuelled by Bolshevik and German agents, and that only the stabilisation of currency and supplies would resolve the situation; there was also “*quite a strong Chauvinist*” feeling in society against Germans and Russians, and that it was precisely to curb “*these writers and journalists*” that the Provisional Government was forced to introduce martial law and war censorship, the tenement houses in Riga owned by the former elite were still closed, and the 2000 or so Baltic German families who fled to Jelgava and elsewhere still did not return to the capital, the internal situation would remain difficult as long as the Germans occupy Kurzeme and Zemgale (“*it would therefore be premature to criticise the Lettish administration at present*”). Grant-Watson was particularly interested in whether the Latvian authorities had sufficient food and fuel supplies for the winter, noting that the American Relief Administration mission would cease operations on 15 June. The government would buy

one-third of the grain harvest to sell at low prices to the poor, rations of bread, potatoes, sugar and possibly herrings would be limited, 300 men were being employed to procure firewood and about half of what was needed was already available, and soup kitchens were to be set up for the poor.<sup>63</sup>

On 7 August Grant-Watson telegraphed about the possibility of meeting the Latvian Government’s request for a loan of £20 million, supporting a loan of £5 million at once to meet the most important needs of the country. On 12 August, while reporting on the situation in Zemgale, he correctly noted that German soldiers were continuing to join Russian units, but incorrectly – that an agreement had been concluded between Latvians and Lithuanians to attack Bermond’s forces if they advanced from Jelgava to Daugavpils, contrary to Judenich’s orders. On 10 and 13 August – about his contacts with Vladimir Derjugin, a representative of the Russian Red Cross, who had come from Copenhagen, and was trying to get his support for the Latvian government to obtain relief for the organisation’s goods in Latvia, on 13 August – about the request sent by the Latvian government to the British government for arms and equipment for the Latvian army. On 13 August, he also wrote on the opening of the session of the People’s Council (particularly noting his satisfaction with the news that had been spread about the forthcoming evacuation of German forces from Latvia, which would further “*strain the government’s position*”), etc.<sup>64</sup>

On the same day, Grant-Watson mentioned the creation of a Department for Latgale Affairs in the Ministry of the Interior, stressing that this area would probably be granted a temporary autonomy to ease the transition period to “*Lettish laws, etc.*”. He also described the specific features of Latgale and its population (belonging to

the Vitebsk province, unlike the Baltic provinces, a population of about 400 000 out of half a million Catholics, different legislation, etc.), as well as the “*Latvian fears*” of possible annexation by Polish “*imperialists*” due to the former Polish affiliation and the dominance of the Catholic religion in the area. He noted that this was why the Latvians sent two officers to Vilnius to discuss a plan for a concerted attack [nothing of the sort had happened at this time, it was apparently only a question of intention – Ē. J.] and noted the appointment of the Catholic Bishop of Riga, Edward O'Rourke, after a 300-year hiatus in the interests of the people of Latvia.<sup>65</sup> Also on 13 August, Grant-Watson telegraphed about the arrival of representatives of the German Finance Ministry in Riga to offer the Latvian Government to purchase arms and equipment, and that Ulmanis had personally informed him that the Latvian side would not accept the offer.<sup>66</sup>

Grant-Watson's effectiveness was enhanced by the fact that he was able to work successfully with both the political and military missions. This cooperation is reflected, among other things, by the fact that in July and early August, when the head of the Political Mission, S. Tallents, was temporarily away in London, Grant-Watson took over liaison with the Latvian press (from early July Tallents organised the so-called weekly press conferences at which he briefed journalists on current events). For example, two days after his arrival in Riga, on 21 July, in a conversation with the press, he expressed his hope for peace and an end to “*national enmity*” (he particularly stressed the need for the press to “*refrain from articles and reports that promote national enmity*”, citing Liepāja as an example, where “*the population is already much more peaceful and Riga must not be left behind little Liepāja in this respect*”, and denied rumours of an “*attack*

*on Riga*” from Zemgale). On 28 July, he repeatedly expressed his hope for a solution of the German troop issue, etc.<sup>67</sup> On 4 August, Grant-Watson met with journalists in the former Armouries House (now the *Saeima*), where many members and staff of the British missions worked and lived, in a conversation that was “*relaxed and unforced*”. The main issue discussed was the situation of German troops in occupied Courland and Zemgale, and Grant-Watson spoke of Gough's visit to Latvia and talks with von der Goltz about the evacuation of troops to Germany. He also expressed confidence that the Latvian government would resolve the food question despite the departure of the American Relief Administration mission in mid-August, announced that regular mail service with England would be established in the coming week, that supplies to the Latvian army would start after the transportation issue was resolved, and was optimistic about the situation at the front.<sup>68</sup>

On 15 August, Tallents returned to Riga and shortly afterwards Grant-Watson left for the United Kingdom. On 26 August, the newspaper “*Latvijas Sargs*” was convinced that the information in other newspapers about Grant-Watson not returning to Riga was unfounded.<sup>69</sup> However, it was true and Grant-Watson only telegraphed in November from his embassy in Copenhagen to congratulate the Latvian government on the anniversary of the statehood and the victory over Bermond's forces.<sup>70</sup> Grant-Watson wanted to return to London on his own due to urgent business, so he asked for a leave and received it. According to his own memoirs, his main tasks in Latvia and Lithuania – the reduction of German influence and the problem of the anti-Bolshevist Russian army – were still on the agenda, but they had been completely taken over by the British Military Mission. Thus, he and his wife set off



for Ventspils in a car, avoiding German sentry posts on the way, visiting the estate of his friend Baron von Baehr [probably Pope or Ugāle, but Zlēkas or Ēdole cannot be ruled out – Ē. J.] and reached Ventspils in the evening, heading for Newcastle on a merchant ship.<sup>71</sup> Grant-Watson's activities in Latvia and Lithuania had come to an end.

## Conclusions

The activities of British missions and representatives in Latvia were naturally linked to British policy in the whole region,<sup>72</sup> and the policy was rather vague, even marginal from London's point of view (the Baltic Sea had not been a British economic priority since the 19<sup>th</sup> century). However, thanks to the large number of mission staff and the expectations of the Baltic governments to cooperate with Britain, the actions were very intensive and in many cases even decisive in solving local problems. The British representatives therefore played a significant role in the processes in Latvia and the Baltic states as a whole, and the favourable attitude and interest of many British officers and mission employees, first of all – of H. Grant-Watson, W. Cowan, S. Tallents and others, should also be noted. In case of Latvia, the uncertainty and importance of the British "Baltic policy" can be seen very clearly. Moreover, during the period under review, it was Grant-Watson's reports that had the most immediate and direct impact on the British government's position towards Latvia and the other Baltic states, as he was the direct representative of the British Foreign Office.

At the time addressed in the current article, the focus of British policy in the region was clearly dominated by problems related to the activities of German troops

in the Baltic area, along with the problem imposed by the Bolshevik threat, which undoubtedly increased the importance of the Latvian factor. Moreover, these difficulties had to be resolved in an effort to prevent disagreements and conflicts between local forces (in Latvia's case, primarily Latvians and Baltic Germans).

Herbert Grant-Watson was directly involved in the events in Latvia from February to August 1919 – he was almost constantly at the epicentre of the events in Liepāja, being directly and immediately informed about the current events by the highest Latvian and German officials, taking part in the Allied attempts to play the role of mediator and even initiator-mediator in the formation of a new coalition government to reconcile Latvians and Baltic Germans, observing German foreign policy and military activities, etc. Grant-Watson's reports, which are generally considered to be reasonably exhaustive, correct and comprehensive (with some inaccuracies due to lack of knowledge of the situation or reliance on the reliability of oral sources, but they are not significant and as such also provide important information about the situation at that time and the opinion of the social group represented by Grant-Watson's interlocutor-source), thus reflecting not only the current situation but also the mood of the circles with which Grant-Watson was in contact – primarily the Latvian Provisional Government, the Baltic Germans, Anatol von Lieven, and others.

Grant-Watson is undoubtedly an important political figure in his own right. His reviews of the political situation up to the time when the Political Mission headed by S. Tallents permanently started its work in Latvia in June, alongside the reports on the military situation by A. Keenan, the head of the Military Mission, formed the picture in London of the situation

in the region in general and in Latvia in particular. Moreover, in June and August they significantly supplemented the comprehensive reports of S. Tallents, all the more so as Grant-Watson remained in Liepāja for a relatively long period (until 19 July) while Tallents worked in Riga, and then the former actually replaced Tallents in his absence, thus to a large extent remaining an important source of information for London. On the one hand, Grant-Watson represented the generally cautious position of his government, while on the other he expressed a genuine interest in the settlement of the situation and

a favourable attitude towards Latvia and Latvians. While representing the view, generally characteristic of the Western Allies at this time, that without the former dominant elite in society – the Baltic German professionals, the restoration of the land would be impossible, Grant-Watson at the same time showed a genuine interest in the success of that restoration, as evidenced, among other things, by his subsequent attitude towards Latvia and the Latvians. In any case, an analysis of his work significantly contributes to the view of Latvia's creation and the War of Independence.

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- <sup>19</sup> NAUK, Admiralty, 137/1665/392-393. In greater detail, see: JĒKABSONS, ZARIŅŠ, Latvijas Neatkarības karš 1918.–1919. gadā, p. 263.
- <sup>20</sup> In greater detail, see: JĒKABSONS, ZARIŅŠ, Latvijas Neatkarības karš 1918.–1919. gadā, p. 269.
- <sup>21</sup> ALEKSANDRS PLENSNERS. Divdesmitā gadsimta pārvērtības. Atmiņas [Transformations of the twentieth century. Memories]. S. I. 1978, p. 387. E. Andersons writes incorrectly that the meeting took place on 16 April: ANDERSONS, Latvijas vēsture 1914–1920, p. 485.
- <sup>22</sup> ANDERSONS, Latvijas vēsture 1914–1920, p. 447.
- <sup>23</sup> GRANT-WATSON, An account, pp. 31–40.
- <sup>24</sup> NAUK, FO, 608/190/165, p. 167.
- <sup>25</sup> NAUK, FO, 608/190/216.
- <sup>26</sup> NAUK, FO, 608/191, pp. 21–22.
- <sup>27</sup> GRANT-WATSON, An account, p. 30.
- <sup>28</sup> Ibidem, p. 31.
- <sup>29</sup> NAUK, FO, 608/185/239-240 (Gough to War Office, 23 May 1919); NAUK, WO, 106/596 (Gough. Statement of Lettish National Views, 23 May 1919).
- <sup>30</sup> NAUK, FO, 608/190/246-265 (Grant-Watson to FO, 26 May 1919).
- <sup>31</sup> NAUK, FO, 608/190/275, 280.
- <sup>32</sup> NAUK, FO, 608/190/291-292, 293, 300.
- <sup>33</sup> ANDERSONS, Latvijas vēsture 1914–1920, p. 462.
- <sup>34</sup> NAUK, Admiralty, 137/1666/218. For details, see: JĒKABSONS, ZARIŅŠ, Latvijas Neatkarības karš 1918.–1919. gadā, p. 287 (Duff's Report to the Admiralty, 11 June 1919).
- <sup>35</sup> NAUK, FO, 608/191/73-74 (S. Tallents to A. Balfour, Libau, 8 June 1919).
- <sup>36</sup> GRANT-WATSON, An account, pp. 44–45.
- <sup>37</sup> NAUK, FO, 608/191/395-411 (Report by Lt.-Col. Tallents on Events Connected with the Wenden Armistice – June 14<sup>th</sup>–June 21<sup>st</sup>, with appendixes).
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- <sup>39</sup> NAUK, FO, 608/187/34-36.
- <sup>40</sup> STIEVEN TALLENTS. Man and Boy. London 1943, p. 322.
- <sup>41</sup> About the events in Liepāja in recent days. In: Baltijas Ziņas, 01.07.1919, p. 1; Anglijas priekšstāvja runa Pagaidu valdības sagaidīšanas svinībās [Speech of the representative of England at the celebration of welcoming the Provisional Government]. In: Latvijas Sargs, 02.07.1919, p. 2.

- <sup>42</sup> JĒKABSONS, ZARIŅŠ, Latvijas Neatkarības karš 1918.–1919. gadā, pp. 303, 305.
- <sup>43</sup> GRANT-WATSON, An account, pp. 42–43.
- <sup>44</sup> Ibidem.
- <sup>45</sup> Ibidem.
- <sup>46</sup> NAUK, FO, 608/192/69-73.
- <sup>47</sup> NAUK, FO, 608/191/355.
- <sup>48</sup> E. WOODWARD, ROHAN BUTLER (eds.). Documents of British Foreign Policy 1919–1939, First series, vol. III, 1919, ed. London 1949, pp. 18, 19–25.
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- <sup>51</sup> GRANT-WATSON, An account, p. 48.
- <sup>52</sup> NAUK, FO, 608/192/488.
- <sup>53</sup> GRANT-WATSON, An account, p. 41.
- <sup>54</sup> NAUK, FO, 608/192/246-251. Published in: WOODWARD, BUTLER, Documents of British Foreign Policy 1919–1939, pp. 40–43; Ēriks Jēkabsons. Stāvoklis Latvijā 1919. gada jūlijā: Lielbritānijas pārstāvju viedoklis [Situation in Latvia in July, 1919: The perspective of British representatives]. In: Latvijas Universitātes Žurnāls. Vēsture 2018, No. 5, pp. 131–144.
- <sup>55</sup> Tirdzniecības aprobežojumu atcelšana [Removal of trade restrictions]. In: Sociāldemokrāts, 30.07.1919, p. 2.
- <sup>56</sup> NAUK, FO 371/3625, 240-244.
- <sup>57</sup> Ibidem.
- <sup>58</sup> NAUK, FO 371/3625, 246-249.
- <sup>59</sup> For more details see: Ēriks JĒKABSONS. Stāvoklis Latvijā pēc Cēsu kaujām: Sabiedroto misijas vadības un vācu pavēlniecības sarunas 1919. gada 19. jūlijā Vintapos pie Olaines stacijas [The situation in Latvia after the Battle of Cēsis: Negotiations between the Allied mission leadership and the German command on 19 July 1919 in Vintapi by the Olaine station]. In: Latvijas Arhivi 2016, No. 3/4, pp. 87–106.
- <sup>60</sup> NAUK, FO, 608/192/145, 191.
- <sup>61</sup> NAUK, FO, 608/192/258-260. Published in: WOODWARD, BUTLER, Documents of British Foreign Policy 1919–1939, pp. 50–51.
- <sup>62</sup> On the legal effect of the treaty, see: ANDRIEVS NIEDRA. Kā tās lietas tika darītas [How those things were done]. Rīga 1943, pp. 63–65.
- <sup>63</sup> NAUK, FO, 608/192/267-270.
- <sup>64</sup> NAUK, FO, 608/192/311, 400, 402, 408, 410.
- <sup>65</sup> NAUK, FO, 371/3625/389-390.
- <sup>66</sup> WOODWARD, BUTLER, Documents of British Foreign Policy 1919–1939, pp. 59–60.
- <sup>67</sup> Rīga. In: Sociāldemokrāts, 22.07.1919, p. 3; Kārtējā preses priekšstāvju apspriede angļu misijā [Regular press conference at the English mission]. In: Latvijas Sargs, 22.07.1919, p. 3; Ar preses priekšstāvjiem angļu misijā [With press representatives at the English mission]. In: Latvijas Sargs, 29.07.1919, p. 3; Laikrakstu priekšstāvju sapulce 21. jūlijā bruņnieku namā [Meeting of newspaper representatives on 21 July at the Knights' House]. In: Baltijas Vestnesis, 22.07.1919, p. 3.
- <sup>68</sup> Or-. Pie Anglijas diplomātiskā priekšstāvja [Visiting the diplomatic representative of England]. In: Brīvā Zeme, 05.08.1919, p. 4.
- <sup>69</sup> Rīga. In: Latvijas Sargs, 26.08.1919, p. 3.
- <sup>70</sup> Granta Vatsona sveiciens [Greeting of Grant-Watson]. In: Latvijas Sargs, 23.11.1919, p. 3.

<sup>71</sup> GRANT-WATSON, An account, p. 51.

<sup>72</sup> See for more details: OLAVI HOVI. The Baltic Area in British Policy, 1918–1921. Helsinki 1980, pp. 13–211.

## KOPSAVILKUMS

Latvijas Neatkarības kara pirmais posms no 1918. gada novembra līdz 1919. gada vasarai Latvijas Pagaidu valdībai bija īpaši sarežģīts un smags. Latvijā nežēlīga kara un terora apstākļos sadūrās ne vien visu kaimiņu lielvalstu (Vācijas, Padomju Krievijas, vēl starptautiski tiesiski pastāvošās neboļševistiskās Krievijas) un citu kaimiņvalstu, bet arī sociāli, politiski un nacionāli sašķeltās Latvijas sabiedrības grupu intereses (vācbaltiešu, latviešu, boļševiku u. c.). Šajā situācijā ļoti liela nozīme bija arī Rietumu lielvalstu interešu pārstāvniecībai reģionā, ko realizēja Lielbritānijas, Francijas un ASV politiskās, militārās un humanitārās misijas. No 1919. gada pavasara Latvijā darbojās Francijas Militārā misija un karakuģi, ASV Politiskā misija un Amerikas Palīdzības administrācijas misija ar Kara flotes transportkuģiem, kā arī Lielbritānijas pārstāvji, kuri bija pārstāvēti visplašāk, – to noteica Lielbritānijas ieinteresētība reģionā. Kopš 1918. gada nogales Latvijā klātesoši bija britu Kara flotes kuģi, 1919. gada pavasarī un vasarā tiem pievienojās Militārā misija un Politiskā misija, kuru aktivitāte un iesaiste norisēs bija ļoti augsta. Turklāt no 1919. gada marta Liepājā un pēc tam Rīgā darbojās neoficiāls Lielbritānijas Ārlietu ministrijas (*Foreign Office*) pārstāvis – Herberts Adolfuss Grants-Vatsons (*Herbert Adolphus Grant-Watson*). Viņš oficiāli nepiedalījās nevienā misijā, bet ar tām cieši sadarbojās, un viņa darbība bija ļoti aktīva, tāpēc tās izpēte ir sevišķi būtiska. Zināmu atspoguļojumu Granta-Vatsona darbība guva trimdas latviešu publicistikā, viņš pieminēts arī Padomju Latvijas, trimdas un Latvijas Republikas vēstures literatūrā, taču vienīgi vispārīgi, ir tikai minēti vai iezīmēti svarīgākie Granta-Vatsona darbības aspekti vai fakti no viņa publicētajiem ziņojumiem (turklāt mazāk, nekā runājot par citiem Sabiedroto un pat Lielbritānijas pārstāvjiem Latvijā). Šī raksta mērķis ir dziļāk noskaidrot Granta-Vatsona darbības apstākļus un rezultātus Liepājā un Rīgā 1919. gada martā–augustā, aplūkojot viņa aktivitātes hronoloģiski pa posmiem (to nosaka izteikti atšķirīgā militārā un politiskā situācija Latvijā šajos laika posmos). Darbā izmantoti avoti no Lielbritānijas Nacionālā arhīva u. c.

Britu misiju un pārstāvju darbība kopumā Latvijā pašsaprotami bija saistīta ar Lielbritānijas politiku visā reģionā, un tā bija diezgan nenoteikta – no Londonas viedokļa, pat margināla (Baltijas jūra nebija britu saimnieciskā prioritāte jau kopš 19. gadsimta). Tomēr, pateicoties daudzajiem misiju darbiniekiem un Baltijas valstu valdību cerībām no sadarbības ar Lielbritāniju, to darbība bija ļoti aktīva un daudzus gadījumos pat izšķiroša vietējo problēmu risināšanā. Tāpēc Lielbritānijas pārstāvjiem bija ievērojama nozīme procesos Latvijā un Baltijas valstīs kopumā, turklāt daudzi britu virsnieki un misiju darbinieki, pirmām kārtām H. Grants-Vatsons, Valters Kovans (*Walter Cowan*), Stīvens Talents (*Stephen Tallents*) un citi, bija labvēlīgi noskaņoti un ieinteresēti sadarboties. Pateicoties minētajiem apstākļiem, Latvijā ir ļoti labi saskatāma gan Lielbritānijas “Baltijas politikas” nenoteiktība, gan tās nozīme. Turklāt aplūkojamajā laika posmā tieši Granta-Vatsona ziņojumi visātrāk un vistiešāk iespaidoja britu valdības nostāju pret Latviju un pārējām Baltijas valstīm, jo viņš pārstāvēja Ārlietu ministriju.

Aplūkojamajā periodā britu politikas uzmanības centrā reģionā izteikti dominēja problēmas saistībā ar vācu karaspēka aktivitātēm Baltijas telpā, turklāt vienlaikus ar boļševisma draudu problēmu, kas neapšaubāmi palielināja Latvijas faktora nozīmi. Turklāt tās bija jārisina, cenšoties novērst lokālo spēku (Latvijas gadījumā – latviešu un vācbaltiešu) savstarpējās nesaskaņas un konfliktus.

H. Grants-Vatsons bija tieši iesaistīts norisēs Latvijā faktiski no 1919. gada februāra līdz augustam – viņš gandrīz pastāvīgi atradās aktivitāšu epicentrā Liepājā, būdams tieši un uzreiz informēts par aktualitātēm no augstākajām latviešu un vācu amatpersonām. Viņš piedalījās gan Sabiedroto mēģinājumos spēlēt starpnieka un pat iniciatora starpnieka lomu jaunas koalīcijas valdības izveidē ar nolūku samierināt latviešus un vācbaltiešus, gan Vācijas ārpolitisko un militāro aktivitāšu novērošanā un citos svarīgos procesos un norisēs. Tāpēc Granta-Vatsona ziņojumi kopumā ir atzīstami par samērā dziļiem, korektiem un vispusīgiem (pieļautas atsevišķas neprecizitātes, ko izraisa stāvokļa nepārzināšana vai paļaušanās uz mutvārdu avota ticamību, taču tās nav nozīmīgas un arī kā tādas sniedz būtisku informāciju par pastāvošo situāciju šajā laikā un Granta-Vatsona sarunbiedrā avota pārstāvētās sabiedrības grupas viedokli), un tādējādi tie atspoguļo ne vien aktuālo situāciju, bet arī noskaņojumu aprindās, ar kurām Grants-Vatsons kontaktējās, – Latvijas Pagaidu valdību, vācbaltiešiem, Anatolu Līvenu u. c.

Grants-Vatsons neapšaubāmi uzskatāms par nozīmīgu, samērā patstāvīgu politisku figūru. Viņa politiskās situācijas apskati līdz laikam, kad darbu jūnijā Latvijā uzsāka S. Talents vadītā Politiskā misija, blakus Militārās misijas vadītāja Ostina Kīnena (*Austin Keenan*) ziņojumiem par militāro stāvokli veidoja Londonā priekšstatu par situāciju reģionā kopumā un Latvijā īpaši. Turklāt jūnijā–augustā tie būtiski papildināja izsmēļošos S. Talents ziņojumus, vēl jo vairāk tāpēc, ka samērā ilgi (līdz 19. jūlijam) Grants-Vatsons palika Liepājā, kamēr Talents strādāja Rīgā, bet pēc tam pirmais faktiski aizvietoja Talentsu viņa prombūtnes laikā un tādējādi lielā mērā turpināja būt svarīgs informācijas avots Londonai. No vienas puses, Grants-Vatsons pārstāvēja savas valdības visumā piesardzīgo nostāju, no otras puses – pauda patiesu ieinteresētību stāvokļa noregulēšanā un labvēlīgu attieksmi pret Latviju un latviešiem. Pārstāvot Rietumu Sabiedrotajiem šajā laikā kopumā raksturīgo viedokli, ka bez bijušās sabiedrībā dominējošās elites – vācbaltiešu profesionāļiem – zemes atjaunošana nav iespējama, Grants-Vatsons vienlaikus izcēlās ar patiesu interesi par minētās atjaunotnes izdošanos, ko cita starpā apliecina arī viņa vēlākā attieksme pret Latviju un latviešiem. Jebkurā gadījumā viņa darbības analīze ļauj būtiski papildināt viedokli par Latvijas tapšanas un Neatkarības kara laiku.



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## Surveillance Reports of National Units of the Red Army Political Departments in 1918–1920\*

### Sarkanās armijas politisko nodaļu sastādītie nacionālo vienību uzraudzības ziņojumi 1918.–1920. gadā

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While surveillance as a mechanism of political control was a common practice of states even before the First World War, the introduction of the Political Departments to the Red Army in 1918–1920 was a completely new historical-military phenomenon. Surveillance reports submitted by the commissars of the political departments had to provide an overview of the attitudes of soldiers, progress in political education, and the condition of various military aspects, such as the supply of uniforms. Next to nothing is known about surveillance reports compiled by these institutions in national units of the Red Army. This paper summarizes the instructions for compiling surveillance reports, their implementation, and what was actually reported by the Political Departments of Estonian and Latvian national units of the Red Army.

**Keywords:** political control, surveillance, Russian Civil War, the Red Army, military history.

Lai gan uzraudzība kā politiskās kontroles mehānisms bija ierasta valstu prakse jau pirms Pirmā pasaules kara, politisko departamentu ieviešana Sarkanajā armijā 1918.–1920. gadā bija pilnīgi jauns vēsturiski militārs fenomens. Politisko departamentu komisāru sagatavotajos uzraudzības ziņojumos bija jāsniedz pārskats par karavīru attieksmi, politiskās izglītības progresu un dažādiem militārajiem jautājumiem, piemēram, par formas tērpu apgādes stāvokli. Gandrīz nekas nav zināms par uzraudzības ziņojumiem, ko šīs iestādes sastādīja Sarkanās armijas nacionālajās vienībās. Šajā rakstā apkopotas uzraudzības ziņojumu sastādīšanas instrukcijas, to izpilde un jautājumi, par kādiem faktiski ziņoja Sarkanās armijas Igaunijas un Latvijas nacionālo vienību politiskās nodaļas.

**Atslēgvārdi:** politiskā kontrole, uzraudzība, Krievijas pilsoņu karš, Sarkanā armija, militārā vēsture.

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## Introduction

After the fall of the Russian Empire in 1917, there were series of rapid changes to the borderlands, including the Baltic region. While a number of Latvians and Estonians were supporting the Bolsheviks, many among both populations found the new Soviet ideology or the idea of democratic, independent republics to be vague. Once mobilized into the ranks of the Red Army, such individuals needed to be placed under surveillance. While surveillance itself was nothing new, the societies that needed to be put under surveillance had transformed with the collapse of the Russian Empire. Mobilizing the masses during the First World War had made citizens more sentient – i.e., they were now harder to order around or even control. Still, the newly emerged nation-states and Soviet Russia needed to recruit and arm those same citizens who had largely participated in the World War, experienced both the inequality of the multinational army, and witnessed unjust behaviour from their commanding officers before the February Revolution in 1917, while growing weary of the war. The former state apparatuses of surveillance had crumbled, and professionals dismissed from their jobs, while interest in politics was more widespread amongst public.

There has been no comparative research on the subject of inner surveillance with a focus on national units of the Red Army. Therefore, our understanding of the processes that took place during the Baltic wars of independence and Russian Civil War is limited. We have very scarce knowledge about the motivation that inspired the battle-worn men to continue fighting after the First World War had ended, or the ways how Soviet Russia managed to control or influence soldiers not only to remain in ranks but actually fight for Bolshevik cause.

The article explores the attempts of the Political Departments of the Red Army to implement political control through surveillance among Estonian and Latvian national units in 1918–1920. Likewise, national units existed in the Russian Army during the First World War.<sup>1</sup> Furthermore, there were Lithuanian and several other national units in the Red Army,<sup>2</sup> but within the scope of the study, this article focuses only on Estonian and Latvian units. The current article fits into the broader research of Russian historians in the last three decades on political surveillance within the Red Army and allows for even more extensive comparisons.

Political control can be defined as a system of different branches of state apparatus with the purpose of gathering and analysing information on a regular basis. This information includes moods and attitudes of different segments of society towards the actions of the authorities and, finally, the behaviour and goals of extremist and anti-government groups. Political control enables a state to create the necessary ideology for the authorities among the people and to receive regular reports on political attitudes, especially regarding the opposition. The mechanisms of political control include surveillance and censorship.<sup>3</sup>

During the Russian Civil War, both Reds and Whites employed surveillance and compiled reports. Peter Holquist has analysed the surveillance of Bolsheviks<sup>4</sup> and Russian Whites<sup>5</sup> during that era. He reached the same conclusions as the Russian historians: both sides had two connected goals – to provide the state apparatus with an overview of the population's attitudes and to shape the consciousness of the people in the direction desired by the authorities.<sup>6</sup> The Soviet regime needed surveillance from the outset to mould “new people”.<sup>7</sup> This article seeks to shed light on the basic workings of the early days of Soviet



surveillance reports, compiled mainly by political departments of the national units of the Red Army. To provide a broader context, some examples of summaries from other units are also described. The main question is: what did the Soviets want to know? And once more precise instructions were given, did commissars report what was required? The control over the army was just one aspect of the general Soviet policy. Similar surveillance reports were also compiled concerning the attitudes of workers and peasants towards authorities.

For this study, the summaries preserved in the Estonian National Archive<sup>8</sup> and the Latvian State Archive<sup>9</sup> have been used. The sources located in the Russian Archives (namely, the Russian State Military Archive, the former Central Archive of the Red Army) were not accessible at the time. In total, 379 reports were used – some of which are from higher levels of command, such as armies and fronts, but addressed the condition of Estonian and Latvian national units. The majority of the source materials are in Russian, and some of these are handwritten. Despite the large number of reports, this primary source is a difficult one, for it offers very little variety. One of the main reasons is the instructions, which did not allow, for example, any illustrative examples – as was the case with military censorship summaries of Russian Empire or Soviet Russia. Another reason is the authors of political summaries, who, not only as members of the Communist Party but also as commissars, were themselves under heavy pressure. On the other hand, surveillance reports offer insight into the conditions in the Red Army and the challenges faced by the Communist Party in attempting to implement an ideological framework. These reports require other types of sources alongside to fill in the silent blanks left there by commissars.

Regarding terminology, in recent research, Estonian historians use the dubious term “Estonian Red Army”,<sup>10</sup> and in addition to this, the incorrect term “Latvian Red Army” is used in the most recent Estonian study.<sup>11</sup> The correct term for the Latvian formation is “Army of Soviet Latvia”. With Estonians, the case is more complicated. In 1919, both terms “Jestljandskaja armija” and “Jestonskaja armija” (Estonian Army) were in use. The initiative to institute such a formation came from Estonian Bolsheviks. As a similar term, “Estonian Army”, has been used to mark the opposing army of the Republic of Estonia, “Army of Soviet Estonia” is used in this article to avoid further confusion. There was, however, no Estonian Socialist Soviet Republic, but instead the Commune of the Working People of Estonia. Regarding the ranks of commanders in the Red Army, their positions are named instead – just as it has been in documents and in Estonian historiography. Regimental commander Leonhard Ritt was not addressed as “lieutenant” (the rank he had gained in the Russian Army) while he was serving in the Red Army. Only when he deserted to the army of the Republic of Estonia was he again addressed as “Lieutenant Ritt”. As for the first names, they are present when known.

### **Estonian and Latvian national units of the Red Army**

Latvians and Estonians had no small measure of activities in the early years of the Red Army. According to the myth, the first victorious battles of the Red Army were fought on 23 February, 1918, in Narva and Pskov. More precisely, there was the first contact of Bolshevik militia – future Red Army – units with opposing German Army. Jukums Vāciētis was the first commander-in-chief of the armed forces

of Soviet Russia. He was assigned to this position on 1 September 1918, when such a position was created.

Aleksei Bezugol'nyj, who has thoroughly analysed the national composition of the Red Army, points out that nationality was not considered an important indicator in the Red Army during the Russian Civil War. Therefore, for a long time, it was not reflected in the various records that registered soldiers. According to Bezugol'nyj, in July 1919, there was still no place to indicate the nationality in the registration form for those liable for military service. On the other hand, he acknowledges that ethnicity was not completely unimportant, and in some regions it was still taken into account – for example, in April 1918 in Petrograd. Likewise, nationality had to be indicated in the questionnaire of the All-Russian Bureau of Military Commissars from July 1918.<sup>12</sup>

The latest research tells a different story. While formations and numbers, as well as the national composition of Estonian and Latvian units were constantly changing during the Russian Civil War, at least the number of Latvians in the Red Army is now very well documented. Ēriks Jēkabsons has the most precise figures to date concerning Latvian units. At the time of its creation, 6000 riflemen joined the Latvian Soviet Riflemen Division. In November 1918, it had about 18 000 men; at the beginning of 1920, about the same number, with about 80–85% of men being Latvians. However, at this time intensive replenishment of the staff with recruits from Siberia, Central Asia, etc. began. Finally, on 21 November 1920, the Latvian Soviet Riflemen Division had 17 254 soldiers, but only 8000 (48%) were Latvian. According to Jēkabsons, it can be explained by the heavy losses in the battles of 1920 in South Russia, where after the battles several – the 4<sup>th</sup>, 5<sup>th</sup>, 6<sup>th</sup> and 9<sup>th</sup> – regiments were eliminated, and

the surviving riflemen of the 6<sup>th</sup> regiment were killed in captivity.<sup>13</sup> Afterwards, these regiments were re-established and replenished by non-Latvian soldiers.

The total number of Estonians in national units of the Red Army is known a little less precisely but likely it has not risen above 10 000 at any given moment. According to the latest study, it appears that there were a total 8500 men in Estonian units of the Red Army by the end of February 1919. The forming of the Army of Soviet Estonia on the basis of Estonian units within the 7<sup>th</sup> Army began in the first days of March 1919. The commander of the Army was Mikhail Vasiliev, and chief of staff was August Kork. The Estonian Riflemen Division under the command of Leonhard Ritt was formed at the same time. There were Estonian Riflemen Regiments numbered 1–4 within these formations.<sup>14</sup> As for the composition, there were no pure national units. For example, the ranks of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Latvian Riflemen Brigade in 1919 at one point comprised 2815 Latvians, 681 Russians, 99 Poles, 36 Estonians and more than half a dozen other nationalities.<sup>15</sup>

A significant change for the Estonian and Latvian national units came in late spring of 1919. In early days of June 1919, the “project” of Soviet Estonia was discontinued due to the loss of all territory. The institutions of Estonian Workers' Commune liquidated to create preconditions for peace negotiations between Soviet Russia and the Estonian Republic.<sup>16</sup> The Latvian Socialist Soviet Republic was accepted into the military union of the Soviet republics on 1 June 1919, but Soviet Latvia continued to exist formally until January 1920.<sup>17</sup> Soviet Russia had suffered serious defeats by mid-summer of 1919. In July, the commander-in-chief of the Red Army, J. Vācietis, was replaced with Sergey Kamenev. Vladimir Lenin called for concentrating against General Anton Denikin

in the south.<sup>18</sup> Estonian and Latvian national units had also suffered setbacks in the previous months, experiencing reductions in numbers and formations.

The Estonian and Latvian Armies were no more. Many Estonians had switched sides in May, and a lot of Latvians had deserted in late May and early June. By the summer of 1919, the Estonian Riflemen Division had been reduced into a separate Riflemen Brigade under the command of the 7<sup>th</sup> Army. However, by the fall 1919, Estonians were reformed again into the Riflemen Division and sent to the Southern Front, where they fought among the ranks of the 13<sup>th</sup> Army, along with Latvian units in the Orel-Kromy operation against Denikin, capturing Orel and Kursk.<sup>19</sup> From July 1919, Latvian national units were among the 15<sup>th</sup> Army as the Latvian Soviet Riflemen Division.<sup>20</sup> In early to mid-September, the Latvian Soviet Riflemen Division was relocated to Belarus, within the 16<sup>th</sup> Army of the Western front. Shortly after, it was being quickly and secretly transferred to the Southern front.<sup>21</sup> Due to their fighting ability and higher morale, Estonian and Latvian national units could be considered a “fire brigade”. That explains how Latvian and Estonian units were transferred from the fronts in or near their homelands, finally ending up in Ukraine, in Crimea, where the most fierce and decisive battles took place.

### **Creation of political departments in the Red Army**

Victor Semykin<sup>22</sup> and, more recently, Georgy Ippolitov have rightly noted that organizational party work in the Red Army was a fundamentally new military-historical phenomenon.<sup>23</sup> Evgenij Naumov writes in a recent article about the 1<sup>st</sup> Army of the Eastern Front of

the Red Army that one of the most important factors that determined the victory of the Red Army on the fronts of the Civil War in Russia in 1917–1922 was the large-scale and productive work of the Bolshevik Party. Its members were engaged in agitation and organizational activities in the rear and directly in the armed forces. Amongst the troops, the implementation of these functions was entrusted to political commissars from summer of 1918 and in the Latvian case, only in the summer of 1919, after the abolishing of soldier committees. Before that, the same functions were carried out mostly by Bolshevik party organisations and soldier committees. Distribution of commissars and their work was coordinated by the political departments of the front, army, and divisional level.<sup>24</sup> Naumov concludes that there were problems with the creation of the system for several reasons until the first months of 1919, including the lack of clear regulation of the process.<sup>25</sup>

In December 1918, the structure of the Red Army included political departments (*politotdel*), under the Revolutionary Military Council (RMC) of the front.<sup>26</sup> Later in 1919, it was renamed as the Political Directorate of RMC and, even further on, the Political Directorate of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army (PURKKA, or PUR for short). Prioritizing political work had its downsides. Roger Reese suggested that the politicization of the officer corps started to obstruct the development of professional identity, autonomy, and cohesion.<sup>27</sup> Reese pointed out that within the armed forces, PUR was responsible not only for political education but also for upholding discipline and morale.<sup>28</sup>

Political Departments of the Red Army, among other tasks, submitted surveillance reports – *politsvodki* – as an application of political control. The first known reports date back to September 1918 and

deal with the Hungarian prisoners of war (POW) serving in the Red Army:

*“The mood of the former Hungarian POWs towards the Soviet authorities is favourable; many join the Red Army. The agitation section has an organized library and reading room for soldiers of the Red Army, lectures and discussions take place.”*<sup>29</sup>

According to Yulia Kalinina, reports differ in different branches of the Red Army and also in different units of the same branch. For example, in 2<sup>nd</sup> Army, commissars had orders to submit reports daily, but more detailed summaries of their own work and of the situation in the regiments had to be submitted at least weekly.<sup>30</sup> Kalinina draws attention to the fact that the reports of political department on the mood of soldiers or sailors did not always fully reflect the actual situation, as they provided an assessment of the political department's own work.<sup>31</sup> Therefore, the so-called frontline reporting could have presented to the Soviet leadership a false picture of the attitudes and problems of Red Army soldiers. At the same time, there was a risk of downplaying problems or concealing their causes in any reporting, not just in the Soviet camp. This can also be seen in the political reports of Estonian national units in the Red Army. Difficulties were often attributed to poor material conditions rather than weak political and educational work. However, such a condition was not unique for Soviet commissars, Soviet Russia, or even to that era.

In Soviet Russia, there was more than one surveillance agency in the Red Army. There were Bolshevik party organizations in the army, with control and surveillance being one of the main objectives of party members and Communist “cells” in military units. The ideological work in the party organization consisted of observing

soldiers' attitudes toward the Communist Party, ideological work, and agitation.<sup>32</sup> The Army of Soviet Latvia also had Soldier Committees until June 1919, gathering information on moods of soldiers, and there was army's inspector Reinholds Bērziņš, compiling reports on the Latvian Soviet Army's fighting capabilities and moods.<sup>33</sup>

Side by side with the Political Departments, Cheka also submitted summaries. Jānis Šiliņš has written that in the Army of Soviet Latvia, the Secret Police kept a close eye on the attitudes of the soldiers and reported findings.<sup>34</sup> Reports by chekists were compiled from 1 December 1918, in counties every two weeks and in governorates – monthly. These reports had to include possible counter-revolutionary agitation by *kulaks*, clergymen and *whites* in villages. The decision to organize a systematic and widespread compilation of surveillance reports was made on 3 June 1919, during the All-Russian Conference of Cheka. Instruction for compiling reports was also implemented then [*Rukovodstvo gubernsk(im) ChK dlja sostavlenija svodok*].<sup>35</sup> While Cheka was the “hammer” to the potential opposition, whereas political departments leaned towards employing more “subtle” means.

### Instructions for compiling surveillance reports

Three types of summaries of political departments can be found in archives: daily, weekly and two-weekly *politsvodki*. There are also monthly summaries, but these are named *info bulletins* and will not be analysed within this article. The Estonian Riflemen Division of the 7<sup>th</sup> Army submitted weekly reports in June 1919.<sup>36</sup> This leads to the conclusion that perhaps instructions – at least the ones found in archives – were drafted in July of 1919.

One type of instruction demanded daily reporting. According to Kalinina, schemes for compiling reports were created by the Political Department and more precisely, by the Information Section.<sup>37</sup> There are two variations of instructions for daily summaries in the Estonian archive – one seems to be the initial draft (“scheme”) and the second form, which was applied for usage. According to the draft, daily summaries had to observe 12 topics. The pattern for detailed instructions, such as for military censorship, was inherent already to bureaucrats of the Russian Empire. Commissars had to report the following topics in *politsvodki*: fighting ability (including communications and state of weapons) and mood (including combat spirit and relations between lower ranks and commanders, but also attitudes towards Soviet authorities and communism, counter-revolutionary agitation, anti-Semitic statements, and mass-complaints).

The most extensive topic was the “behaviour” of frontline units. That included reporting any refusal to obey orders, violations of discipline, and absences without official leave. Activities considered as fatal for discipline were those that could be considered criminal – looting, unauthorized requisitioning, playing cards, using cocaine, and embezzlement of public property. Crucial indicators of the Red Army’s fighting capabilities were desertion, defection, combat morale, but also attitudes towards defectors and POWs. Besides all the occurrences of a negative type, commissars also had to report acts of bravery.

While most of these subjects can be considered at least in some part related to political attitudes, another lengthy topic was completely of a military kind. In their summaries, the commissars had to list the situation of supplying troops with uniforms, food, salary, but also all kinds of logistical support – artillery, ammunitions,

horses, and transportation. *Politsvodki* had to include the condition of medical support. One section seemed to repeat some of the earlier demands: commissars had to summarize their efforts at the frontline on cultural-educational and party work, any sign of counter-revolutionary agitation, and the progression of mobilization. Somehow, compilers of *politsvodki* also had to get information on the mood of enemy troops, on defectors, cases of fraternization, and the dissemination of Bolshevik literature among Whites.<sup>38</sup> In general, there were very few subjects that commissars did not have to know and report on.

The second copy, a possible final “form number 1” for daily *politsvodki*, was slightly different, with six or seven general topics: fighting ability, mood, supply, medical conditions, frontline situation, enemy troops. In addition, commissars had to especially report important news, but this would not necessarily be a “core” topic, as such information could not be reported on a regular basis. Besides the use of drugs, commissars had to report the cases of drunkenness and conflicts. Regarding supplies, *politsvodki* had to contain, in addition, conditions on the availability of binding materials and newspapers. Curiously, the requirement to report on fraternization disappeared, and instead of that, commissars had to obtain information about the rear area of the enemy.<sup>39</sup>

Possibly the explanation is that it was decided that reporting cases of fraternization between the soldiers of the enemy and Red Army could have shed a bad light on commissars. In the Latvian archive, there is “a form number 1” with some differences – mainly regarding the second topic, which is called “behaviour” instead of “mood”. In addition, Latvian instruction required reporting on different groups: commanders, commissars, political workers, and ordinary soldiers of the Red Army. Besides

drunkenness and card games, Latvian *politsvodki* had to include cases of cowardice, inability to organize, etc.<sup>40</sup> Dividing the mass of the Red Army into groups reflects the theory of political control well.

Another draft for Estonian units was on two-weekly reports, listing 11 topics of interest. These types of summaries required reporting the same topics as daily reports, but in addition expanded more on work with political education. Namely, the seventh section deals in depth with “Relationships and cultural enlightenment work”. Commissars had to report how many “cells” of Komsomol (*komjacheek*) there were in regiments, battalions, and companies. Also, the number of workers of cultural enlightenment, clubs, control and economic commissions (*kontrhozkom*), Comrades’ court (*tovsudov*). Commissars had to report how many of such sections, but also how many schools, libraries, and reading rooms were organized in those two weeks.

Two-weekly summaries had to list the number of meetings, gatherings, lectures, concerts, and what questions arose during these various activities. Finally, commissars had to assess the attitude of the population towards political work. The 8<sup>th</sup> section of the instruction required an assessment of political self-awareness towards Soviet authorities and communists, the Civil War, and the political dealings of the party.<sup>41</sup> Similar instructions can be found for Latvian units. One important difference was requirement to report the percentage of literacy.<sup>42</sup>

Kalinina lists six topics in weekly summaries within the Baltic Fleet: the name of the ship or unit, mood of troops (attitude towards Soviet authorities, relationship between comrades, attitude towards commanders and commissar, relations within the “collective”), agitational-political and cultural-enlightenment work in subunits,

commanding staff (their participation in the daily life and performance of duties), relationship within the collective, between commissars and commanding staff, and finally – important notices of the week.<sup>43</sup> Unfortunately, no instructions of compiling weekly summaries can be found for Estonian and Latvian units. While focusing on relationships within a ship is fully understandable, the lack of any requirement to report on supplies, medical conditions, or political education is curious.

Did commissars have the skills to assess all the topics the instructions demanded? This is more than doubtful, as “political educators” did not usually include persons with competence in military matters. Not only that – as Roger Reese showed, the military even did not require of the officers to apply basic leaderships practices.<sup>44</sup> However, these instructions show the birth of specific terminology and abbreviations already in the first years of Soviet authorities.

## Implementing instructions

Summaries of Estonian units can be found since June 1919, but reports of Latvian units preserved in the Latvian archive are dated from August and the following months of the same year. *Politsvodki* kept listing the daily problems of the Red Army on a regular basis.

Before dissolution of the Estonian Riflemen Division, a lengthy summary of political work during the first half of June 1919 was submitted by Peeter Peterson, chief of the Political Department of the Division, and Karl Pritso, chief of Information. Each regiment was described separately, starting with the 1<sup>st</sup> Estonian Communist Riflemen Regiment. The report was pretty much along the lines of the aforementioned instructions but not yet listed as separately

numbered topics. The summary began by describing the “mood”, which, according to the commissar, depended largely on the new uniforms being received or not. Estonians were alarmed by rumours of possible reforming of their units. The relationship towards some of the commanding staff was termed as “hostile”. “Traitor-commanders” were replaced with communists.<sup>45</sup>

In a letter dated two weeks before this summary, the new commander of the Estonian Riflemen Division, Jakob Palvadre, had listed a number of former commanders who switched sides earlier in May – along with the former commander of Division L. Ritt.<sup>46</sup> The summary continued to assess the fighting ability of subunits of the 1<sup>st</sup> Regiment, concluding that “*the Regiment has not completely healed from wounds caused by traitors*”. In line of duty were listed 536 men, seven cases of desertion were recorded. In regiment were 52 communists and ten “sympathizers”, organized into a regimental collective. The summary concluded that many lacked rifles and there were not enough machine guns, medical equipment, medications, or newspapers.<sup>47</sup> Other regiments of the Estonian Riflemen Division were described as having similar deficiencies.

Summaries of the Estonian Riflemen Brigade were submitted since 22 June. In their daily summary of 24 June, P. Peterson and K. Pritso reported reduced moods due to tiredness among troops and that “*people are not certain of their strength*”. In each company, agitators-organizers focused on political education.<sup>48</sup>

There are daily summaries available of the Latvian Soviet Riflemen Division, while the division’s Political Department was located in Velikiye Luki in August as part of the 15<sup>th</sup> Army. No strict following of any instruction can be seen in these reports, and problems were listed quite

chaotically. A document dated 3 August assessed the “political mood” of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Latvian Riflemen Brigade as good, and political work was considered energetic.<sup>49</sup> Another summary from 5 August considered the “political mood” in the 1<sup>st</sup> Latvian Riflemen Brigade as merely satisfactory. A cause for this was indicated as the reforming of Latvian Riflemen. Besides political aspects, supply problems were also mentioned. For example, the situation with horses was especially bad, as no oats to feed the animals had been received in several months. Thrown into the mix were “dark elements” consisting of deserters who agitated against the Soviet authorities.<sup>50</sup>

Instructions in Latvian units were implemented by the end of August, at least in the 2<sup>nd</sup> Latvian Riflemen brigade. On 30 August, the commissar of the brigade sent a notice to the commissars of the regiments to start submitting daily reports to him without delay – at the latest, by 10 pm. Daily events had to be reported according to the instructions, summarized and precise, “*not to be discouraged by the form of expression*”. Comrades who had difficulties expressing their thoughts in Russian could write in Latvian.<sup>51</sup> Apparently, the commissar of the brigade compiled his own summary from the reports sent by the regiments.

The first summary following instructions for daily reporting appears to be compiled on the following day. The commissar of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Latvian Riflemen Brigade summarized his observations for 31 August with six numbered sections. In the first topic, the commissar reported that no counter-revolutionary agitation was detected, and there were no desertions, but it would be “recommended” for propagandist to visit the unit at least a few times per month. The second section summarized good relationships between communists, commissars, political workers, and combatants of

the Red Army. Then followed a lengthier topic describing the state of armaments – which was considered good, the continuing lack of underwear, boots, and overcoats, poor supply of horse feed, and an even worse state of horses, who were tired and sick. Supply of foodstuffs was considered “very bad” by the commissar. The supply of literature (newspapers) was poor. The fourth section reported a detrimental state of supply of medications but noted a small number of the sick.

The penultimate topic described the attitude of population to be discontent, as there were cases of non-sanctioned requisitions carried out by soldiers, mainly of foodstuffs. Meanwhile, no counter-revolutionary signs were detected. Finally, the commissar noted: “*Today, the next party meeting took place. The mood of Red Army combatants is satisfactory.*”<sup>52</sup> *Politsvodka* from the Estonian Riflemen Brigade from the same day of 31 August was forwarded by telegram and was considerably briefer and less along the lines of instruction than the Latvian summary. Nineteen cases of desertion on the march were mentioned. The supply of uniforms for the 2<sup>nd</sup> Estonian Riflemen Regiment was not considered satisfactory. News of the transfer to another front caused discouragement among the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> Regiments.<sup>53</sup> Two weeks later, the commissar of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Latvian Riflemen Brigade stopped using numeration for different topics. *Politsvodka* described the situation on 15 September.<sup>54</sup>

Something must have changed at the end of September, possibly in relation to the transfer of the Regiment from Belarus to the Southern front. The report from the 5<sup>th</sup> Latvian Regiment to the commissar of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Latvian Brigade, dated 3 October, stayed true to the instructions and listed required topics separately. However, it’s confusingly stated to be a “*daily report for 29 and 30 September, 1, 2, 3 October of*

*the same year*”.<sup>55</sup> Later in the same month, regiments again submitted daily reports, but without numeration of different sections. Information was given in a less precise manner. For example, a report describing the situation on the 5<sup>th</sup> Latvian Regiment on 23 October stated: “*The mood is good. [...] Desertions occur.*”<sup>56</sup>

After two months, in January 1920, the summary of 3<sup>rd</sup> Latvian Brigade addressed most of the topics required by instructions, but at times rather loosely. One report for two weeks from the second half of January in great detail described five topics according to the instruction, marked as fighting ability, behaviour, supply, medical conditions, and political-cultural enlightenment work. Other topics were marked but were described at best with one sentence. A summary was also submitted on 8 February.<sup>57</sup> The timeframe of some summaries did not comply with the requirements. One *politsvodka* was describing the situation within six days,<sup>58</sup> and the other encompassed the period of ten days.<sup>59</sup> Summaries from Estonian units in October were also sent by telegram and followed instructions loosely. A smaller and fragmented number of primary sources for Estonian units makes it more difficult to follow the dynamics of implementing instructions there compared to Latvian units.

### **“Engineers of the human soul” – patterns and language of reporting daily life in the Red Army**

The main task of *politsvodki* could be considered to implement political control by commissars. This system was also a mechanism for higher-ups to control and pressurize political workers, as commissars also had to report the progress of their own ideological work. However, political attitudes were not immune to the influences



of many factors of daily life. As previously seen, commissars could list all the negative aspects regarding mainly logistical problems, but still conclude that their own work had brought positive results.

As *politsvodki* were, in many cases, sent through telegram, the presence or lack of numeration is of no great importance. The lack of certain aspects or keywords required in summaries by the instructions creates more questions. Nobody would have asked about drinking, gambling, and substance abuse, or embezzlement of state property, if such behaviour did not occur. On the contrary, as Ineta Lipša has proved, after the revolution the former barriers such as the temperance movement trying to represent drinking as a sin died down among Latvians.<sup>60</sup> Such trends were not limited to the usage of alcohol and happened elsewhere, as well. Revolution and war broke several moral barriers restricting formerly shunned behaviour also in Estonia. As one Estonian serving in the Red Army wrote in his diary in December 1918, the soldiers of his squad acquired five bottles of vodka right after invading the Estonian Republic from the territory of Soviet Russia and proceeded to party in every village they were stationed.<sup>61</sup>

Hand in hand with such behaviour was the embezzlement of state property – also a topic required to be reported in summaries but curiously missing. The effects were, for example, a lack of uniforms. Sergej Bondarev has written about Cheka on 14 May 1920 being tasked with fighting specifically against speculations of military uniforms on the “black market”.<sup>62</sup> On the other hand, revealing anything related to undesirable behaviour would have caused problems for commissars. It is more than likely that some negative occurrences were “forgotten”. From quite a few summaries it appears that while every single aspect of the daily life in the Red Army was

considered to be lacking – to put it mildly, nevertheless, all troubles were “soothed”, for example, by the gathering of the local party collective and, by the end of the day, the mood was “satisfactory”.

Many *politsvodki* tried to create the impression that most of the problems were out of the hands of commissars. Did such a style of summaries become a commonplace? As the Red Army was constantly dealing with various logistical problems, and daily conditions caused severe difficulties, these issues could have affected the morale of soldiers and thus could not be ignored. Perhaps commissars saw it as an opportunity to draw attention away from their own work – or lack of it? Supply of food, shortage of equipment (mainly uniform items), poor medical conditions – these problems appear constantly. Very curious is the small number of desertions being indicated since the summer of 1919. A similarly interesting aspect is that signs of a counterrevolutionary attitude are absent, as well as the mentions of enemy propaganda.

Political education was noted at times, but not much was told about the results – at least not as much as instructions demanded. This can be explained by the situation, as units were in constant battle. Another serious reason was the problems with educational work, propaganda, and especially its mediums – mainly newspapers. Problems with supplying newspapers were mentioned – there were too few copies available or they did not arrive frequently enough. This was not an insignificant problem.

Kalinina notes that one of the most important ways to involve men (sailors, according to her study) was the process of exercising political control through the establishment of the *Pobalt* press organ in March 1919 – the newspaper “Red Baltic Fleet”. Its role in this process was dual. Firstly, the newspaper formed ideas about

the need for the participation of sailors in collecting information about the political life of the Baltic Fleet, determined (although not as clearly as for officials) the circle of information and the differentiation of objects of control. Secondly, it was an important information-gathering tool. However, Kalinina pointed out that it should be noted that the sailors, responding to appeals in the articles of the “Red Baltic Fleet”, did not always send complaints and denunciations to the newspaper, although they referred to its materials.<sup>63</sup>

The lack of newspapers very likely reduced the effectiveness of political education and control in Estonian and Latvian units. For example, a lengthy summary of political work with the Estonian Riflemen Division (before it was dissolved) during the first half of June 1919 complained about the supply of literature for political education. The number of copies of newspapers was considered insufficient, especially regarding Russian newspapers. Two different Estonian newspapers were received.<sup>64</sup> The same problems haunted Latvian units. The commissar of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Latvian Riflemen Brigade noted in his summary of 31 August that the supply of literature was considered “unsatisfactory” as there was one newspaper per 15 combatants.<sup>65</sup> That was one issue besides the logistics that commissars did report, as revealing such a problem was likely to remove the pressure from themselves.

Perhaps the most interesting is the semantics of political summaries. Yulia Kalinina suggested that the peculiarity of the language of the reports was due to previous experience of political control in the armed forces of the Russian Empire and then the Soviet Republic. She noted that the nature of the posed questions influenced the specifics of the answers, which were often expressed not in the enumeration of specific facts but in brief value

judgments, such as “good”, “satisfactory”, etc., leading to the formation of a special “clichéd” language.<sup>66</sup> One has to agree with such an assessment, but there is also a notable emergence of a new, specific political language and abbreviations used both in instructions and throughout *politsvodki*. In the daily summary of the Estonian Riflemen Brigade from 22 June 1919, each company had agitators-organizers who cleared the regiment of “unreliable elements” (*nenadezhnyj jelement*).<sup>67</sup> The summary of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Latvian Riflemen Brigade from 3 March 1920, used the term *politruk* (short for political worker).<sup>68</sup>

As Dakota Irvin notes about Soviet surveillance reports, such sources offer a rare opportunity to examine the inner workings of the Soviet system.<sup>69</sup> The same can be said about *politsvodki*, which have received little usage or analysis from historians. However, considering what instructions required to be reported, actual summaries contain, at times, very little useful information for historians. Kalinina has quoted Izmozik, who noted the low informative value of early Soviet surveillance reports. For example, in the weekly report for August 16, 1918, the following characterization was given to the mood of the army: “*On the outer front: cheerful. On the domestic front: satisfactory.*”<sup>70</sup>

Kalinina notes that the reports that appeared later, specifically devoted to the mood in the troops, inherited this laconic style.<sup>71</sup> One has to agree that such assessment of the style is quite true, yet *politsvodki* provide us with an understanding of the inner dynamics of early Soviet years, based on what is missing. There are strong signs that commissars learned self-preservation right from the beginning, thus compiling very reserved summaries. It’s also apparent that the political education and propaganda did not yield great results during the height of the Civil War.

## Conclusions

Political summaries (*politsvodki*) were compiled by the commissars of political departments as early as September 1918. Based on the primary sources, more specific instructions for Estonian and Latvian national units were drafted in July or August of 1919 and first implemented in late August 1919. Instructions required commissars to compile summaries daily and also for two weeks. Attitude – or “mood” – of the soldiers, logistical aspects, and the progress on political education had to be reported. There were some significant differences with the first drafts and also between instructions for Estonian and Latvian units. However, this was of little importance, as in reality requirements were followed quite loosely.

While not following instructions point by point, the summaries did slowly, but steadily progress to being in line with reporting what was required. Little light was shed on political education and propaganda compared to listing various logistical

problems. The assessment of attitudes was often described in a laconic manner. Being under constant reformation, transferred across the vast territories of the western parts of the former Russian Empire, and constant battles were probably the main reasons why ideological work suffered. A further important reason for inefficient political control and education was the problem with supplying newspapers to the soldiers of Red Army. In part, reporting very little on dealings with political education can also be explained as the strategy of commissars not to cause criticism of their own work – or, more exactly, the lack of results. Suspiciously enough, certain negative behaviour is not mentioned at all. It is more than probable that certain activities – such as drinking – were not absent but simply did not get reported by commissars. Noteworthy is the emerging of a specific Soviet political language and usage of terminology such as “unreliable element”, and abbreviations – for example, *politruk* – already in 1919.

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## KOPSAVILKUMS

Uzraudzība kā politiskās kontroles mehānisms bija ierasta valstu prakse jau pirms Pirmā pasaules kara. Tomēr politisko nodaļu ieviešana Sarkanajā armijā 1918.–1920. gadā bija pilnīgi jauns vēsturiski militārs fenomens. Viens no šo departamentu mērķiem bija iesniegt uzraudzības ziņojumus, ko sauca par politiskajiem kopsavilkumiem, – *politsvodki*.

Pirmie politiskie kopsavilkumi Sarkanajā armijā ir zināmi no 1918. gada rudens. Tomēr ļoti maz ir informācijas par uzraudzības ziņojumiem, ko šīs iestādes sastādīja Sarkanās armijas nacionālajās vienībās. Šajā rakstā, izmantojot 379 ziņojumus no Igaunijas un Latvijas arhīviem, apkopoti norādījumi par uzraudzības ziņojumu sastādīšanu, to izpildi un jautājumi, par kuriem faktiski ziņoja Sarkanās armijas Igaunijas un Latvijas nacionālo vienību politiskās nodaļas.

Igaunijas un Latvijas nacionālās vienības 1919. gada augusta beigās saņēma detalizētas instrukcijas par politisko kopsavilkumu sastādīšanu. Bija vairāki instrukciju projekti, kas izveidoti tā paša gada jūlijā vai augustā gan ikdienas, gan divu nedēļu kopsavilkumiem. Instrukcijas nedēļas kopsavilkumiem nav saglabājušās. Galīgajās instrukcijās bija prasīts sniegt pārskatu par karavīru attieksmi, politiskās izglītības progresu un dažādiem militārajiem jautājumiem, piemēram, par formas tērpu piegāžu stāvokli.

Tā kā instrukcijas netika stingri ievērotas, kopsavilkumos pamazām arvien vairāk tika ziņots par to, kas bija nepieciešams. Maz tika ziņots par politiskās izglītības un propagandas progresu. Tā vietā komisāri uzskaitīja dažādas militārās un loģistikas

problēmas. Attieksmes novērtējums bieži tika aprakstīts lakoniskā valodā, izmantojot tādas frāzes kā “apmierinoši”. Galvenais iemesls dažādajām problēmām ideoloģiskajā darbā izskaidrojams ar igauņu un latviešu vienību pastāvīgu pārceļšanos. Vēl viens neefektīvas politiskās kontroles un audzināšanas pamatcēlonis bija problēma ar Sarkanās armijas karavīru apgādi ar laikrakstiem. Dažu ideoloģisko problēmu noklusēšanu varētu skaidrot kā komisāru stratēģiju, lai izvairītos nonākt uzmanības centrā par rezultātu trūkumu. Noteikta negatīva uzvedība, piemēram, dzeršana, vispār nav pieminēta – visticamāk, apzināti. Ievēribas cienīgs ir fakts, ka šajos kopsavilkumos vērojama specifiskas padomju politiskās valodas dzimšana, un tāda terminoloģija kā “neuzticams elements” tika lietota jau 1919. gadā.



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## Baltkrievu inteliģences politiskā doma Latvijā (1920–1934): Konstantīna Jezovitova piemērs\*

### Political Thought of Belarusian Intellectuals in Latvia (1920–1934): Example of Konstantin Jezovitev

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Rakstā aplūkota Konstantīna Jezovitova (baltkrievu valodā: *Kanstancin Barysavich Ezavitay*) (1893–1946) politisko uzskatu attīstība kā piemērs baltkrievu inteliģences grūtībām politiskajā darbībā. Balstoties uz baltkrievu biedrības dokumentiem, 1924. gada baltkrievu tiesas prāvas dokumentiem, kā arī uz atsevišķiem K. Jezovitova dokumentiem, kas glabājas Latvijas Nacionālā arhīva Latvijas Valsts vēstures arhīvā, raksturotas galvenās tendences baltkrievu inteliģences politiskajā domā. Turpinājumā aplūkoti arī K. Jezovitova mēģinājumi konsolidēt baltkrievu sabiedrību. Baltkrievu inteliģences politiskā doma bija vērsta uz Latvijas baltkrievu minoritātes kultūras un izglītības līmeņa celšanu, kas veicināja īpašu, tikai Latvijas baltkrieviem raksturīgu nacionālo pašapziņu. Tomēr, ņemot vērā Latvijas baltkrievu izglītības līmeni un pašapziņas specifiku, inteliģence nebija spējīga rast vienotu problēmas risinājumu.

**Atslēgvārdi:** Latvijas iekšpolitika, minoritāte, baltkrievi, inteliģence, nacionālā pašapziņa.

The article is devoted to the transformation of the political views of Konstantin Jezovitev (1893–1946) as an example of difficulties encountered by Belarusian intellectuals in political action, and based on the study of Belarusian society, the 1924 “Belarusian trial”, as well as some of K. Jezovitev’s documents, analysing the main trends in the political thought of Belarusian intellectuals. In continuation of the article, the solutions offered by K. Jezovitev are addressed, which were formulated in order to

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prevent the fragmentation of Belarusian intellectuals. The political thought of Belarusian intellectuals was aimed at raising the cultural and educational level of Belarusian minority, which contributed to a special, national self-awareness characteristic of Belarusian minorities. However, Latvian Belarusian intellectuals was characterized by inability to mutually agree on finding solutions to the problems.

**Keywords:** Latvian domestic policy, minority, Belarusians, intellectuals, self-awareness.

## Ievads

Vēsturiski Baltkrievijas teritoriju apdzīvoja sabiedrības grupas ar spēcīgu nacionālo pašapziņu. Līdz ar to baltkrievu nacionālās identitātes veidošanas procesā nozīmīga loma bijusi poļu un krievu nacionālo ideju mijiedarbībai reģionā kopš 19. gadsimta sākuma. Pēc Žečpospoļitas sadalīšanas baltkrievu pašidentifikāciju, no vienas puses, veidoja poļu šļahta un katoļticīgie, kas uzskatīja, ka baltkrieviem un poļiem ir kopīga Žečpospoļitas vēsturiskā pieredze. Savukārt krievi reģionā tika uzverti kā svešs elements un teritorijas iekarotāji.<sup>1</sup> No otras puses, to veidoja pareizticīgā garīdzniecība, kā arī specifiska Krievijas impērijas rusifikācijas politika, kas balstījās uz vienotas slāvu impērijas un panslāvisma idejām par ticības un valodas līdzībām starp krieviem, baltkrieviem un mazkrieviem (ukraiņiem). Līdz ar to baltkrievu identitāti radīja zemniecība ar specifiskām tradīcijām un pasaules skatījumu, galvenokārt atsvešinātību. Šis vēsturiskais iespaids uz baltkrievu nacionālo pašidentifikāciju ir atstājis sekas, kas jūtamas joprojām. Tas ir viens no iemesliem, kādēļ baltkrieviem nav izdevies sasniegt ievērojamu progresu nacionālajā pašidentifikācijā.

Latvijas baltkrievu minoritātes nacionālās pašapziņas veicināšanā noteicošā loma

bija baltkrievu inteliģencei, īpaši Konstantīnam Jezovītovam,<sup>2</sup> kurš aktīvi darbojās baltkrievu kultūras biedrībās, baltkrievu izglītības pārvaldē, kā arī Baltkrievu vēlētajū biedrībā, kas bija viena no politiskajām partijām Latvijas Republikas laikā. Gan baltkrievu minoritātes, gan K. Jezovītova personības izpētei veltīts salīdzinoši neliels skaits pētījumu.<sup>3</sup> Galvenokārt tie ļauj izsekot kādām konkrētām baltkrievu minoritātes aktivitātēm, atsevišķu baltkrievu inteliģences pārstāvju darbībai un sniedz detalizētas ziņas par baltkrievu minoritātes attiecībām ar citām minoritātēm, piemēram, ar poļu vai krievu minoritāti Latvijā starpkaru periodā. Savukārt baltkrievu inteliģences politiskās domas<sup>4</sup> tendences nemaz nav raksturotas, trūkst arī atsevišķas K. Jezovītova darbības analīzes, īpaši pēc 1934. gada.

Veidojoties baltkrievu inteliģencei Latvijā, vērojama tās strauja attīstība ne tikai politisko aktivitāšu, bet arī kultūras un izglītības jomā. Ņemot vērā, ka inteliģences skaitliskais sastāvs bija salīdzinoši neliels, tas liek apjaust baltkrievu minoritātes vērienīgu un dinamisku attīstību salīdzinājumā ar citām minoritātēm Latvijā. Labvēlīga nacionālo minoritāšu politika Latvijas parlamentārajā posmā (1918–1934) ļāva pilnībā izpausties baltkrievu kopienai Latvijā. Tomēr Latvijas tuvā ģeogrāfiskā atrašanās Baltkrievijas Padomju Sociālistiskajai Republikai (turpmāk – BPSR) ietekmēja minoritātes darbību un radīja spriedzi vairākiem baltkrievu sabiedriski politiskajiem darbiniekiem gan savā starpā, gan attiecībās ar Latvijas varas iestādēm.

Baltkrievu minoritātes vēsturei veltītajos pētījumos ir atzīmēta īpaša baltkrievu inteliģences nozīme, tomēr K. Jezovītova loma aplūkota vien dažos teikumos bez plašākas analīzes. Piemēram, viens no svarīgākajiem darbiem par Baltkrievijas un Latvijas attiecībām, kurā pievērsta uzmanība K. Jezovītovam, ir kolektīvā monogrāfija *Latvija–Belarusj: 1918–1940*.<sup>5</sup> Darbs aptver

Baltkrievijas un Latvijas politiskās, sociāl-ekonomiskās un kultūras attiecības. Šiem pētījumiem kopumā ir raksturīgs vispārīgs baltkrievu minoritātes raksturojums, rezultātā šaurāki un problemātiski aspekti nav aplūkoti. Tāpat vēsturnieku darbos analizētas konkrētas Latvijas baltkrievu aktivitātes, piemēram, baltkrievu tiesas prāva un ar to saistītie jautājumi.<sup>6</sup> Savukārt atsevišķai analīzei par K. Jezovitova sadarbību ar Padomju Savienības diplomātiem Latvijā laikā no 1925. gada līdz 1926. gadam ir pievērsusies vēsturniece Darja Korotkova (krievu valodā: *Dar'ja Korotkova*).<sup>7</sup> Kopumā darbos analizētas baltkrievu minoritātes attiecības ar citām minoritātēm Latvijā, īpaša uzmanība pievērsta baltkrievu tiesas prāvai 1924. gadā, neiedziļinoties baltkrievu politiskajā domā, kas ļautu aplūkot arī baltkrievu minoritāti no cita skatpunkta.

K. Jezovitovs tiek uzskatīts par vienu no nozīmīgākajiem un ietekmīgākajiem baltkrievu inteliģences darbiniekiem. Viņa politisko domu veidoja uzskati gan par baltkrievu izglītības un kultūras jautājumiem, gan par baltkrievu minoritātes politisko potenciālu. Viņa darbības galvenais motīvs bija ideja par savas etniskās dzimtenes neatkarību – tas izskaidro viņa iesaisti visās iespējamās baltkrievu aktivitātēs starpkaru periodā Latvijā. Baltkrievijas historiogrāfijā K. Jezovitova nopelni tiek aktualizēti saistībā ar Baltkrievijas Tautas Republikas<sup>8</sup> (turpmāk – BTR) izveidi, kā arī uzsvērtā K. Jezovitova personība – viņš bija viens no izcilākajiem baltkrievu sabiedriskajiem darbiniekiem emigrācijā.

Raksta mērķis ir aplūkot galvenās tendences baltkrievu inteliģences politiskajā domā Latvijā laikā no 1920. gada līdz 1934. gadam. Kā galvenā avotu bāze izmantoti dažādi baltkrievu biedrības dokumenti, 1924. gada baltkrievu tiesas prāvas dokumenti un atsevišķi K. Jezovitova dokumenti, kas glabājas Latvijas Nacionālā arhīva Latvijas Valsts vēstures arhīvā. Rakstā pamatā

apskatīta K. Jezovitova politiskā darbība, kas kopumā raksturo baltkrievu inteliģences ambīcijas un mērķus, rezultātā plašāk atsedzot baltkrievu inteliģences sašķeltības problemātiku.

## Konstantīna Jezovitova politiskie uzskati no 1918. gada līdz 1920. gadam

Baltkrievu inteliģences darbības sākums vērojams līdz ar BTR proklamēšanu un BTR militāri diplomātiskās misijas izveidošanos Latvijā Neatkarības kara laikā. 1918. gada 21. februārī tika izveidots Baltkrievijas Tautas Radas sekretariāts, kurā K. Jezovitovs uzņēmās vadošo lomu kara jautājumu pārvaldes jomā.<sup>9</sup> Savukārt 1918. gada 9. martā Baltkrievijas Tautas Rada pasludināja demokrātiskās BTR izveidi, 18. martā Baltkrievijas Tautas Rada tika pārformēta par BTR, kas 25. martā proklamēja neatkarīgu Baltkrievijas valsti.<sup>10</sup> Par laiku, kad tika proklamēta BTR, K. Jezovitovs atceras:

*“Brīdī, kad bija izsludināti balsošanas rezultāti, zālē iestājās svinīgs noskaņojums, baltkrievu sociālisti dziedāja revolucionāru baltkrievu himnu “Ad veku my spali, i nas razbudzili!”. Visa rada piecēlās kājās un sāka dziedāt šo vareno dziesmu. Tajā brīdī caur logiem iespīdējās pirmie saules stari.”<sup>11</sup>*

1919. gada rudenī K. Jezovitovs ieradās Latvijā ar uzdevumu panākt BTR atzišanu *de facto* vai *de iure*, un pēc dažiem mēnešiem BTR militāri diplomātiskā misija tika nodibināta ne tikai Rīgā, bet arī Tallinā. Līdz ar aktīvu K. Jezovitova darbību Latvijā izveidojās pamats baltkrievu politikas un kultūras attīstībai. 1919. gada beigās Latvijā jau pastāvēja kultūras biedrība *Baťkovšina*<sup>12</sup> (baltkrievu valodā: *Backovshhina*), sieviešu palīdzības komiteja, BTR valdības finanšu komisija. Savukārt pēc BTR militāri

diplomātiskās misijas darbības pārtraukšanas 1920. gadā K. Jezovitovs palika Latvijā. 1921. gadā viņš ieguva Latvijas pilsonību<sup>13</sup> un uzsāka pedagoga, sabiedriskā darbinieka un politiķa karjeru. Līdz ar 1921. gadu iespējams izsekot baltkrievu inteliģences politiskajām idejām – tas skaidrojams ar BTR militāri diplomātiskās misijas darbības pārtraukšanu Latvijā.

1924. gadā baltkrievu tiesas prāvas laikā Vladimirs Korti (baltkrievu valodā: *Uladzimir Korci*), kurš bija viens no baltkrievu inteliģences darbiniekiem, atceras, ka pēc BTR misijas darbības izbeigšanas 1920. gada rudenī Latgalē pastāvēja trīs baltkrievu inteliģences kustības grupas. Pirmo grupu, pie kuras bija piederīgi K. Jezovitovs un Vladimirs Piguļevskis (baltkrievu valodā: *Uladzimir Pigulejski*), dēvēja par “S.F.” (sociālistu federālistu grupa), tā bija viena no BTR Radas frakcijām.<sup>14</sup> Līdz 1924. gadam gan “S.F.”, gan otra baltkrievu inteliģences grupa “S.R.” (sociālrevolucionāri), pie kuras piederēja Andrejs Jakubeckis (baltkrievu valodā: *Andrzej Jakubeckis*) un Paulina Metjelka (baltkrievu valodā: *Paŭlina Macjolka*), apvienojās un uzstāja pret Latvijas baltkrievu inteliģences sadarbību ar Padomju Krieviju.<sup>15</sup> Apvienotās grupas mērķis bija panākt Eiropā visu tautu nacionālo valstu nodibināšanos, pēc tam sekotu visu jaundibināto nacionālo valstu apvienošanās Eiropas federācijā. Tātad federācijā bija jāpievienojas arī patstāvīgai, nacionālai Baltkrievijas valstij. Kaut gan partijas programmā nebija paredzēts noteikt Baltkrievijas robežas, tomēr tika atzīmēts, ka nacionālās Baltkrievijas robežas jāietilpst visiem tiem apgabaliem, kuros iedzīvotāji pārsvarā bija baltkrievi. K. Jezovitovs bija pārliecināts, ka BTR Radas politiskās frakcijas bija vienotas jautājumā par iespējamām valsts robežām. Visas trīs atbalstīja BTR 1919. gada 25. marta deklarāciju, kurā bija noteikts, ka Baltkrievijas sastāvā jābūt Vitebskas guberņai

bez Ludzas, arī Rēzeknes un Daugavpils apriņķim.<sup>16</sup>

Tomēr baltkrievu inteliģencē pastāvēja arī cits viedoklis, kas nesaskanēja ar K. Jezovitova un V. Piguļevska uzskatiem par baltkrievu inteliģences politiskajiem mērķiem. Piemēram, Ivans Krasovskis (baltkrievu valodā: *Ivan Krasoŭski*), kurš pārstāvēja baltkrievu inteliģences kustības grupā “N.S.” (nacionālsociālisti), vēlējās nodibināt sakarus ar BPSR. Viņš uzskatīja, ka ir nepieciešams veicināt baltkrievu inteliģences tuvināšanos ar BPSR gadījumā, ja “*Padomju Krievija piešķirtu zināmu kultūras autonomiju Padomju Baltkrievijai*”.<sup>17</sup> Ja tas būtu noticis, pēc I. Krasovska domām, caur kultūras sakariem būtu iespējams panākt pilnīgu BTR atjaunošanos. Jāpiebilst, ka līdz 1930. gadam baltkrievu inteliģencei, tostarp arī Latvijā, bija diezgan raksturīgi mēģinājumi idealizēt BPSR. Tas ir skaidrojams ar ilūzijām baltkrievu inteliģences vidū par baltkrievu nacionālās kultūras attīstības iespējām dzimtenē. Laikā no 20. gadu sākuma līdz 1930. gadam Padomju Savienība apzināti īstenoja baltkrieviskošanas politiku (baltkrievu valodā: *Belarusizacyja*; angļu valodā: *Belarusization*), tā paredzēja aktīvu baltkrievu valodas izmantošanu sabiedriski politiskajā un kultūras darbībā. Tās rezultātā BPSR tika izveidotas vairākas baltkrievu skolas, baltkrievu valoda tika aktīvi izmantota dažādās jomās, kā arī pieauga baltkrievu īpatsvars padomju nomenklatūrā. Tādēļ nereti vairāki baltkrievu inteliģences pārstāvji, tostarp arī K. Jezovitovs, saskatīja iespēju attīstīt baltkrievu inteliģences politisko potenciālu, sadarbojoties ar padomju varu vismaz līdz 30. gadiem. 20. gadu sākumā padomju vara bija toleranta pret baltkrievu izglītības iestāžu veidošanu un dažādām kultūras izpausmēm, kas radīja labvēlīgus apstākļus baltkrievu nacionālās pašapziņas veidošanas procesam, taču no 20. gadu beigām līdz ar staļinisma politikas nostiprināšanos baltkrievu mēģinājumi

turpināt iesākto baltkrieviskošanas politiku tika pakļauti vajāšanai un stingri ierobežoti.

### **Baltkrievi starp citām Latvijas Republikas minoritātēm. Konstantīna Jezovitova nostāja pret Latvijas minoritāšu politiku**

Viens no svarīgākajiem uzdevumiem, lai izveidotu nozīmīgu pašidentifikācijas saikni baltkrievu inteliģencei Latvijā, bija mēģinājums rast vienotu redzējumu par turpmākajiem baltkrievu minoritātes darbības soļiem. Šajā sakarā vērojama interesanta tendence. No vienas puses, analizējot K. Jezovitova izteikumus, var secināt, ka viņš baltkrievu inteliģenci Latvijā uztvēra kā tādu, kas darbojas emigrācijā. Tas izskaidro K. Jezovitova, V. Piguļevska, I. Krasovska un citu mēģinājumu izveidot dažādas baltkrievu inteliģences grupas, kas pārstāv atšķirīgus redzējumus par tās turpmāko darbību un sadarbības iespējām ar Rietumu valstīm vai Padomju Krieviju. No otras puses, savās publikācijās K. Jezovitovs nereti vēršas pie Latvijas sabiedrības, aktualizējot baltkrievu minoritātes jautājumu un tās sarežģīto stāvokli salīdzinājumā ar poļu un krievu minoritātēm, īpaši Latgalē.<sup>18</sup>

Viena no galvenajām baltkrievu minoritātes iezīmēm 20. gados bija kritiski zems izglītības un kultūras līmenis, kas radīja šķēršļus nacionālās identitātes veidošanā. Piemēram, 1925. gadā baltkrievi joprojām bija viena no mazāk izglītajām minoritātēm. Baltkrievu lasītprasmes līmenis sasniedza 47,21%, savukārt rakstītprasmes līmenis – 41,68%, tas bija viszemākais lasītprasmes un rakstītprasmes līmenis starp Latvijas minoritātēm kopumā. Būtisks ir arī tuteišu fenomens, kas skaidri parādās, analizējot Ilūkstes apriņķa tautas skaitīšanas dokumentus. Ilūkstes apriņķī, kuru apdzīvoja latvieši, lietuvieši, baltkrievi un poļi, tautas skaitīšanas laikā uz jautājumu par nacionālo

piederību iedzīvotāji bieži sniedza atbildi par savu konfesionālo piederību. Apkopojot ziņas par baltkrievu un poļu demogrāfisko stāvokli laikā no 1897. gada līdz 1925. gadam, redzams, ka 1897. gadā Ilūkstes apriņķī poļu un baltkrievu procentuālais skaits bija gandrīz vienāds (baltkrievi 17,27%, poļi 17,17%), 1920. gadā baltkrievu bija tikai 9,79%, poļu – 27,34%.<sup>19</sup> Līdz ar to baltkrievu minoritāti iespējams raksturot ar tādu fenomenu kā *tuteiši*. Ar jēdzienu “tuteiši” jāsaprot vēsturisko, kulturālo un starpetnisko kontaktu rezultātā izveidojušās atsevišķas sabiedrības grupas identitāte bez skaidras nacionālās piederības. Baltkrievu pētnieki īpaši uzsver, ka tuteišu fenomens ir viena no baltkrievu identitātes formām, kas lika pamatus baltkrievu pašapziņas veidošanai.<sup>20</sup>

K. Jezovitova uzskatos baltkrievu definēšana piedzīvoja zināmu paradoksu. No vienas puses, viņš uzskatīja, ka baltkrievu zemo skaitu Latvijā iespējams skaidrot ar baltkrievu kā nācijas nespēju nostiprināt savu identitāti starp poļiem un krieviem. Līdz ar to K. Jezovitovs 20. gadu sākumā pievērsa pastiprinātu uzmanību baltkrievu izglītības pārvaldes darbībai un baltkrievu skolu tīklu izveidei. No otras puses, K. Jezovitovs skaidri nedefinē baltkrievus kā nāciju. Viņš vairākkārt atgriezās pie tēzes, ka baltkrievi pārstāv vienu no senākajām slāvu ciltīm, kurai vēsturisko likumsakarību rezultātā nācās dzīvot līdzās poļiem, lietuviešiem, ukraiņiem un krieviem.<sup>21</sup> K. Jezovitovs uzskatīja, ka viens no Baltkrievu izglītības pārvaldes galvenajiem mērķiem ir ne tikai sniegt Latvijā dzīvojošiem baltkrieviem zināšanas par savu valodu un kultūru, bet arī zināmā mērā integrēt baltkrievus Latvijas sabiedrībā, akcentējot latviešu un baltkrievu ciešās kultūras saiknes. K. Jezovitovs pievērsās neapstrīdamam vēsturiskam faktam, ka dažādas tautas var sadzīvot un strādāt kopīgam mērķim, un to izmantoja, lai veicinātu starpminoritāšu un valstu

dialogu, kura acimredzami, pēc K. Jezovitova domām, pietrūka, tādēļ centieni sasniegt kopīgus valsts mērķus bija nesekmīgi.<sup>22</sup>

K. Jezovitovs uzsvēra, ka starpminoritāšu konflikti nelabvēlīgi ietekmē Latvijas iekšpolitiku, tādā veidā sašķeļot sabiedrību.<sup>23</sup> Lai cik pārlicinošs neliktos arguments, ka valstij nevajadzētu iesaistīties nacionālo minoritāšu kultūras dzīvē, tomēr K. Jezovitovu nodarbināja jautājums par Latvijas baltkrievu kopienas attiecībām ar valsti kopumā – viņš tajā saskatīja būtiskus izaicinājumus. Viņš uzskatīja, ka visu Latvijā dzīvojošo nacionālo minoritāšu būtība un galvenais uzdevums bija veicināt nacionālo minoritāšu piederību primāri savai valstij un tikai tad savai tautai. Par to liecina K. Jezovitova izvērstā darbība baltkrievu izglītības veicināšanā, kurā galvenais uzdevums līdzās baltkrievu kultūras komponentu izkopšanai bija arī sekmēt baltkrievu piederības sajūtu Latvijai. Tomēr no 1924. gada K. Jezovitova attiecības ar Latvijas varas iestādēm mainās saistībā ar tiesas prāvu pret baltkrievu skolotājiem.

### **Vai tiešām pret Latvijas valsti? Baltkrievu inteliģence baltkrievu tiesas prāvā 1924. gadā**

Pirmais nopietnais pārbaudījums baltkrievu inteliģencei bija izmeklēšanas process un ierosinātā kriminālieta par baltkrievu pretvalstiskajām darbībām, kas historiogrāfijā pazīstama kā baltkrievu tiesas prāva. Tā iezīmē būtisku atskaites punktu baltkrievu inteliģences politiskajā domā, kā arī K. Jezovitova uzskatu maiņā un viņa turpmākajā darbībā.

1924. gadā baltkrievu skolotāji tika apsūdzēti pretvalstiskā darbībā – apsūdzības mērķis, pēc apsūdzētās puses domām, bija panākt Latvijas teritorijas, galvenokārt Latgales, atdalīšanu. Mērķa sasniegšanai tika aktīvi uzturētas attiecības ar baltkrievu

biedrībām ārzemēs, izplatīti mācību materiāli skolās ar ģeogrāfijas kartēm. Šīs darbības neatbilda Latvijas izglītības standartiem un netika saskaņotas ar Izglītības ministriju. Tāpat baltkrievu skolotāji 1921. gadā devās uz Baltkrievu nacionālpolitisko konferenci Prāgā, kur tikās ar baltkrievu inteliģences pārstāvjiem no citām Eiropas valstīm. Konferences laikā baltkrievu inteliģence aktīvi noliedza Rīgas miera līguma rezultātus, aicinot atbalstīt tikai vienu, pēc viņu viedokļa, likumīgu lēmējvaru – BTR un tās prezidiju ar Pēteri Krečevski (baltkrievu valodā: *Pjotr Krječhejski*) priekšgalā.<sup>24</sup>

Apsūdzības materiālos minēts, ka K. Jezovitovs izplatīja pastkartes ar BTR karšu attēliem, kurās redzams, ka daļa Latvijas teritorijas (Daugavpils, Ludza, Kārsava) ietilpst BTR teritorijā. Tāpat tika izplatītas lielformāta kartes, kurās redzams, ka Daugavpils un Ludzas apriņķis, kā arī daļa no Ilūkstes apriņķa ietilpst Baltkrievijas teritorijā.

*“[...] K. Jezovitovs paudis atklātībai par to, ka Daugavpilij jātop par Baltkrievijas pilsētu, ka šeit ir Baltkrievija, ka ikviens krievs, kurš dzimis Daugavpilī, pats par sevi ir jau baltkrievs, un ka skolotāja vietu var dabūt tikai tas, kurš vairāk var piesaistīt bērnus baltkrievu skolās. Tāpat K. Jezovitovs mācījis skolā ģeogrāfiju pēc mācību grāmatām, kā saturs ir vērst pret Latviju. Viņš ir ienesis arī skolās aizliegtos baltkrievu laikrakstus un devis tos lasīt skolniekiem.”<sup>25</sup>*

Savai aizstāvībai K. Jezovitovs skaidroja, ka gan pastkartes, gan ģeogrāfijas kartes ir iegūtas no *Bat'kovšinas* biedrības ap 1918. gadu Minskā. Tāpat viņš norādīja, ka jaunizveidotajai valstij bija svarīgi iemūžināt BTR izveidošanas mirkli, tādēļ par pamatu tika izvēlēts vizualizēt profesora Jevfima Karska (krievu valodā: *Evfimij Fjodorovich Kárskij*) 1917. gadā sastādīto etnogrāfijas karti.<sup>26</sup>

Aizdomām par pretvalstiskām darbībām tika pakļauti arī baltkrievu preses izdevumi, kuru redaktors bija K. Jezovitovs, piemēram, *Na chuzhyne* un *Lastochka*. Jāatzīst, ka preses izdevumiem bija raksturīga retorika aicināt cīnīties par Baltkrievijas brīvību. Savukārt, retorikai kļūstot kreisākai, radās aizdomas par K. Jezovitova sadarbību ar padomju varas iestādēm. Izmeklēšanas rezultātā tika apcietināti astoņi baltkrievu skolu skolotāji: K. Jezovitovs, V. Korti, V. Piguļevskis, Jānis Krasovskis, A. Jakubeckis, Paulīna Metelka-Grib, Porfirijš Žerdi (baltkrievu valodā: *Parfiry Gerdzi*) un Mihails Ivanovs (baltkrievu valodā: *Mihail Ivanoj*).<sup>27</sup> Neskatoties uz minētajiem apvainojumiem pret baltkrievu inteliģences darbību Latvijā, tiesa atzina, ka baltkrievu kustības darbība Latvijā ir vērsta pret krievu un poļu minoritātēm, nevis pret Latvijas valdību. Rezultātā visi apsūdzētie tika atbrīvoti no ieslodzījuma, bet K. Jezovitovs kā galvenais aizdomās turamais pavadīja Daugavpils cietumā 10 mēnešus un vēlāk tika pārcelts uz Rīgas Centrālcietumu. K. Jezovitovu atbrīvoja tikai pēc ķīlas iemaksas 1000 latu apmērā, ko samaksāja baltkrievu kultūras darbinieki.<sup>28</sup>

Latvijas historiogrāfijā pieņemts uzskatīt, ka baltkrievu tiesas prāva galvenokārt izskatīja baltkrievu skolotāju pretvalstisko noskaņojumu, par pamatu apsūdzībai ņemot atrasto BTR karti. Taču, analizējot baltkrievu tiesas prāvas dokumentus, var secināt, ka situācija bija daudz sarežģītāka, un atrastā karte, kurā Latgales teritorija iekļauta Baltkrievijā, noderēja tikai par ieganstu izmeklēšanas sākumam. Izmeklēšanas dokumenti liecina, ka Latvija bija ieinteresēta noskaidrot baltkrievu sabiedrisko darbinieku, prioritāri K. Jezovitova, darbības mērķus, uzdevumus un motīvus. Tomēr prāva izraisīja pretēju efektu, sašķēlot baltkrievu inteliģenci. 1925. gadā savu darbību pārtrauca Baltkrievu izglītības pārvalde, kuras pastāvēšanas laikā tika izveidots pamats baltkrievu izglītības sistēmai.

Tāpat 1924. gadā sašķēlās viena no nozīmīgākajām baltkrievu kultūras biedrībām *Bat'kovshina*,<sup>29</sup> kuras galvenais mērķis bija sekmēt Latvijas baltkrievu minoritātes pašapzināšanās procesu, vēstot par baltkrievu valodu, kultūru, vēsturi, tradīcijām.

K. Jezovitovs uzskatīja, ka *Bat'kovšīnai* bija atvēlēta nozīmīga loma baltkrievu pašapziņas veidošanā. Viņš biedrības darbību stingri iedalīja trīs svarīgākajos virzienos: kultūras un izglītības celšana, politiskā un ekonomiskā darbība. Viņaprāt, *Bat'kovšīnas* darbības pārtraukšana Latvijā bija liels zaudējums, kas ietekmēja Latvijas baltkrievu izglītības un kultūras darbību.

“[...] *Personīgi es esmu stingri pārliecināts, ka baltkrievu inteliģencei, kura spējīga radīt kultūras vērtības, jādarbojas kā kultūras, tā arī ekonomisko vērtību radīšanā. Personīgi es esmu nodevies kultūras un izglītības darbam, nežēlojot, ka nevaru strādāt arī ekonomiskajā darba laukā. Šai manai pārliecībai piekrit arī Lastovskis, kā arī citi baltkrievu inteliģences pārstāvji. [...] Galvenais mūsu apvienojošais moments ir tas, ka mēs vēlamies redzēt neatkarīgu, nacionālu Baltkrieviju, kā kultūras, ekonomikas ziņā, tā arī politiski. Mūsu inteliģences galvenā problēma ir tajā, ka līdz šim nav tādas kustības, kas apvienotu visus baltkrievus, respektīvi, vadošas biedrības, kurā būtu jāieklausās un jāvadās pēc šīs biedrības darbiniekiem jeb organizācijas. Bat'kovšīna nevar aizvietot šo minēto kustību visiem baltkrieviem, kas dzīvo Eiropā, jo tai nav nepieciešamās autoritātes, un tā arī nekad nekalpoja šādiem mērķiem. Tomēr Latvijas gadījumā Bat'kovšīna ir vadoša biedrība baltkrieviem Latvijā, kuras pamats izveidojās 1917./1918. gados Minskā.*”<sup>30</sup>

Baltkrievu tiesas prāvas laikā vairāki skolotāji parakstīja kolektīvu sūdzību pret K. Jezovitovu par viņa politiskajām ambīcijām, tieksmi panākt BTR valdības

atgriešanos Baltkrievijas teritorijā, kā arī par to, ka viņš lika sevi dēvēt par baltkrievu “baķku” (tā dokumentā).<sup>31</sup> K. Jezovitovs šādus izteikumus noliedza, norādot, ka pēdējā laikā viņam ir radušās konfliktsituācijas ar kolēģiem, tomēr tās ir personīga rakstura un nav saistītas ar viņa sabiedriski politisko darbību.<sup>32</sup> Piemēram, 1924. gada 23. septembrī, atrodoties Daugavpils cietumā, vēstulē kādam N. Veršīninam uz Prāgu K. Jezovitovs raksta:

*“Likteņa savādās ironijas dēļ, sēžu cietumā savā dzimtajā pilsētā, kur esmu pavadījis savas dzīves labākos gadus. [...] Neko neredzu, neko nedzirdu, neko nezinu. Ne avīzes, ne ziņas. Apsūdz mani Latvijas Republikas nodevībā un cenšanās atdalīt no viņas Piekrievijas Latgali (Daugavpils, Ludzas un Rēzeknes apriņķus, arī Ilūkste). [...] Šis nemiers, bailes pie latviešiem iesākās Padomju Baltkrievijas robežu palielināšanās [dēļ]. Viena mana domiņa – apmierinājums: ja iesākuši baltkrievus pināt pa visiem cietumiem – i poļu, i krievu, i leišu, i latviešu –, tas nozīmē izaugsmi. Palikusi baltkrievu nacionālā dzimšana, veļas vilnis pēc viņa, viens par otru augstāks un stiprāks, verd baltkrievu jūra, būs tautas auka, sagrūs viņas verdzības važas un uzleks baltkrievu saule.”<sup>33</sup>*

### **Konstantīna Jezovitova sadarbība ar Padomju Savienību laikā no 1925. gada līdz 1934. gadam**

Jau savas darbības sākumā K. Jezovitovs tika turēts aizdomās par sadarbību ar padomju varu BPSR. No 1925. gada līdz 1934. gadam K. Jezovitovs darbojās kā PSRS diplomātiskās pārstāvniecības Latvijā ziņotājs ar segvārdu “Ozols”.<sup>34</sup> Pats K. Jezovitovs noliedza sadarbību ar padomju varu līdz pat 1934. gadam. Tomēr K. Jezovitova sadarbība ar padomju pusi redzama viņa

sarakstē ar augstākām izglītības iestādēm BPSR un redakcijām, ar kuru palīdzību K. Jezovitovs saņēma mācību grāmatas, dažādus preses izdevumus un informāciju par kultūras dzīvi BPSR. Tāpat viņš saņēma atlīdzību par latviešu rakstnieku darbu tulkojumiem.<sup>35</sup>

Lai cik pārliecinošs liktos arguments par K. Jezovitova sadarbību ar BPSR, jāņem vērā, ka gan Politiskās pārvaldes konfiscētajos K. Jezovitova dokumentos un vēstulēs, gan arī viņa paskaidrojumos redzams, ka sadarbība bija vērsta kultūras, nevis politikas virzienā. K. Jezovitovs saprata šo risku, bet reizē arī tajā saskatīja izaicinājumu. Turpretī “BPSR pozitīvā baltkrievu sabiedriski-politiskā darbība[, kas] vērsta uz baltkrievu kultūras, izglītības un valodas attīstību”,<sup>36</sup> sekmēja viņa uzskatu radikalizāciju, lai panāktu Latvijas baltkrievu pašapziņas līmeņa tuvināšanos tam sabiedriski kulturālajam līmenim, kāds bija BPSR baltkrieviskošanas procesa laikā. Par to nevarēja būt šaubu, vērojot K. Jezovitova aktīvo līdzdalību Latvijas baltkrievu sabiedriski politiskajā darbā. 1930. gada augustā viņš rakstīja par Latvijas valdības un baltkrievu attiecībām:

*“Latvija ir nozīmīgākais politiskais un kultūras centrs visām baltkrievu kopienām Austrumeiropā, Rietumeiropā un Amerikā. Esmu pārliecināts, ka baltkrievu kultūras darbinieku sniegums emigrācijā, tostarp arī Latvijā, veicina pašapziņas attīstību BPSR, ar ko padomju vara neapšaubāmi rēķinās. Par to liecina salīdzinoši tuva Latvijas atraššanās vieta Rietumbaltkrievijai un BPSR. Latvijas baltkrievu interesēs nebūtu destabilizēt attiecības ar Latvijas valdību, jo tas būtu izdevīgi ne tikai Latvijas poļu un krievu minoritātēm, bet arī BPSR un Rietumbaltkrievijai.”<sup>37</sup>*

Spriežot pēc vēsturnieces D. Korotkovas publikācijas, kas balstīta uz dokumentiem no Krievijas Federācijas ārpolitikas arhīva

(krievu valodā: *Arhiv vneshej politiki Rossijskoj Federacii*),<sup>38</sup> var secināt, ka sadarbība bija, tomēr ne tik auglīga, cik vēlētos padomju puse. Spriežot pēc K. Jezovitova vēstulēm gan baltkrievu kultūras darbiniekiem emigrācijā, gan Latvijas baltkrievu kultūras darbiniekiem, viņš cerēja panākt progresīvāku un mērķtiecīgāku kultūras un izglītības darbu BPSR, lai veicinātu iekšējo šķelšanos republikas iekšienē, vienlaicīgi arī tuvinot Latvijas baltkrievu sabiedriski politisko un kultūras darbu tādām līmenim kā BPSR.<sup>39</sup>

## Secinājumi

Baltkrievu inteliģences darbība Latvijas starpkaru periodā kļuva par nozīmīgāko faktoru baltkrievu minoritātes pašidentifikācijas procesā – tika izveidotas baltkrievu kultūras biedrības, izglītības iestādes un parādīts tās politiskais potenciāls, kas bija nozīmīgs devums jaunās valsts attīstībā. Latvijas baltkrievu minoritātes gadījumā tas ir īpaši svarīgi, ņemot vērā tās kritisko demogrāfisko stāvokli, zemo izglītības līmeni un līdz ar to arī zemo inteliģences īpatsvaru.

Tomēr baltkrievu inteliģences darbu raksturoja vairākas būtiskas problēmas, tai skaitā inteliģences sašķeltība. Baltkrievu inteliģences sašķeltības problēma stipri atspoguļojas jau inteliģences darbības sākumā laikā no 1920. gada, kad savu darbību pārtrauca BTR misija. Vairāki tās darbinieki palika Latvijā, kļūstot par nozīmīgām un noteicošām personām baltkrievu minoritātes politikā. Daži baltkrievu minoritātes pārstāvji saskatīja iespēju realizēt savas ambīcijas, tuvinoties ar BPSR, savukārt citi uzskatīja, ka vienīgais realizācijas ceļš ir tuvināties ar citiem BTR misijas pārstāvjiem pārējās Centrāleiropas un Rietumeiropas valstīs, kā arī turpināt iesākto darbību emigrācijā. Minētās pretrunas vērojamas

arī K. Jezovitova darbībā, kurš bija viens no ietekmīgākajiem un nozīmīgākajiem baltkrievu inteliģences pārstāvjiem.

Par galveno baltkrievu inteliģences darbībā K. Jezovitovs izvirzīja **minoritātes intereses un izglītības un kultūras attīstības** nepieciešamību, ar to saprotot baltkrievu īpašo lomu Latgales sarežģītajā nacionālajā jautājumā saistībā ar tuteišu problemātiku. K. Jezovitovs puda skaidru nostāju, ka tuteiši ir baltkrievi bez skaidras pašapziņas un ka tas ir ilgstošas poļu ietekmes un Krievijas impērijas laika rusifikācijas rezultāts. Līdz ar to, pēc K. Jezovitova domām, Latgalē bija nepieciešams veidot tieši baltkrievu skolas, kas ļautu atrisināt tuteišu problēmu.

Kopumā, runājot par izglītības un kultūras attīstību, K. Jezovitovs uzsvēra pastāvošos draudus baltkrievu minoritātei. No vienas puses, viņš saskatīja draudus krievu un poļu minoritātes iespējamajā iespaidā uz baltkrieviem, no otras puses, viņu uztrauca baltkrievu inteliģences šķelšanās, kas nespēja nodrošināt jau BTR laikā definēto vērtību saglabāšanu. Tomēr prioritāra K. Jezovitova uzskatos bija **progresā ideja**, proti, ja Latvijas baltkrievu vērtības tiks saglabātas, tiem būs iespējams īstenot savu politisko potenciālu.

**Progresā ideja** saskan arī ar K. Jezovitova izpratni par Latvijas baltkrievu identitāti, kas ietver trīs svarīgus komponentus: baltkrievu vērtību (valodas, kultūras un izglītības) saglabāšana, eksepcionālisms (uzsvars uz baltkrievu unikalitāti un īpašu vēsturisko pieredzi, kas it kā attaisnoja tās konfliktu ar poļu un krievu minoritātēm Latvijā) un tieksme pēc politiskām tiesībām. Tā kā Latvijas baltkrievi aktīvi puda savu politisko nostāju tikai pēc 1925. gada, viņu politiskais potenciāls bija ārkārtīgi pieticīgs. Tas skaidrojams gan ar politiskā atbalsta trūkumu, gan ar pieredzes trūkumu politiskajā organizācijā. Ideja par BTR bija īpaši pievilcīga K. Jezovitovam, tomēr piesardzīgi



jāvērtē liecības par viņa vēlmi atdalīt Latgali un pievienot to kādam valstiskam veidojumam. Nedz K. Jezovitova atmiņas, nedz viņa privātās sarakstes, piezīmes un publicistikas darbi neliecina par vēlēšanos atdalīt Latgali no Latvijas. Viņš neapšaubāmi vēlējās nostiprināt baltkrievu pozīcijas nelatviskajos Latgales reģionos, tomēr attiecības ar Latviju viņam bija īpaši svarīgas. Kā bijušajam BTR kara ministram latviešu

un baltkrievu attiecību saglabāšana viņam bija nozīmīga, un Latviju viņš uzlūkoja kā iespējamo sabiedroto pret poļu un krievu ietekmi – tas bija izdevīgi arī Latvijas pupei. Tāpat piesardzīgi jāvērtē izteikumi par K. Jezovitova sadarbību ar padomju varu. Līdz ar represiju sākumu BPSR tās idealizācija un baltkrieviskošanas politikas atbalsts emigrācijā esošo baltkrievu vidū pakāpeniski samazinājās.

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- <sup>4</sup> Politiskā doma – ideju un uzskatu kopums, kas pamatojas uz izpratni par atsevišķas grupas politisko darbību un pašapziņu.
- <sup>5</sup> KOROLEV, JEKABSON, Latvija – Belarus'.
- <sup>6</sup> Ibidem.
- <sup>7</sup> KOROTKOVA, Poiski sojuznika.
- <sup>8</sup> VLADIMIR KRUTALEVICH. Istorija Belorusi: Stanovlenija nacional' derzhavnosti (1917–1922 gg.). Minsk 1999; ANDREJ CHERNUJKEVICSH. BNR Triumf pobezhdenyih. Minsk 2018.
- <sup>9</sup> JĒKABSONS, Latvijas un Baltkrievijas Tautas Republikas attiecības.
- <sup>10</sup> Ibidem, 35. lpp.
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- <sup>15</sup> Ibidem, 22. lp.
- <sup>16</sup> Lieta par Konstantīna Borisa d. Jezovitova un Matildes Minnas Jezovitas pretvalstisko darbību, 1930. LNA LVVA, 3235-2-4630, 58. lp.
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- <sup>19</sup> MARGERS SKUJENIEKS. Otrā tautas skaitīšana Latvijā 1925. gada 10. februārī. Rīga 1925, 62. lpp.
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- <sup>21</sup> Sarakste ar laikrakstu un žurnālu redakcijām par ievietoto rakstu saturu par baltkrievu skolu stāvokli, 1924. LNA LVVA, 2125-6-106, 1. lp.
- <sup>22</sup> JEZOVIČOVŠ, Par baltkrieviem un lielkrieviem Latvijā.
- <sup>23</sup> Lietiskie pierādījumi Konstantina Jezovitova lietā, 1930. LNA LVVA, 3235-6-196, 124. lp.
- <sup>24</sup> Latgales Apgabala tiesas svarīgu lietu izmeklēšanas tiesneša Saukuma iepriekšējais izmeklējums lietā par noziedzīgu baltkrievu savienību Latgalē, 1924. LNA LVVA, 1612-14-11, 5.–7. lp.
- <sup>25</sup> Ibidem, 13. lp.
- <sup>26</sup> Ibidem, 22. lp.
- <sup>27</sup> Latvijas sūtniecība Lietuvā. Dažādi jautājumi un informācija, 1925. LNA LVVA, 2575-11-145, 47. lp.
- <sup>28</sup> KATERINA KAZACHENOK. “Belorusskij process” v Latvii: obvinenie, opravdanie, nakazanie. In: MAKSIM KOROL'EV (red.). Latushi i belarusy: vmeste skvoz'veka. Minsk 2012, s. 29–43.
- <sup>29</sup> Pats K. Jezovitovs par biedrības galveno mērķi uzskatīja apvienot baltkrievus un pacelt to nacionālo pašapziņu un kultūru, kā arī “*iepažīt sevi un savus kaimiņus*”. Tāpat viņš atzīst, ka starp biedrības aktīvajiem locekļiem dominēja nolūks panākt neatkarību un patstāvīgu Baltkrieviju, bet tam bija arī pretinieki. Sk.: Latgales Apgabala tiesas svarīgu lietu izmeklēšanas tiesneša Saukuma iepriekšējais izmeklējums lietā par noziedzīgu baltkrievu savienību Latgalē, 1924. LNA LVVA, 1612-14-11, 21. lp.
- <sup>30</sup> Ibidem, 27. lp.
- <sup>31</sup> Ibidem, 73. lp.
- <sup>32</sup> Ibidem, 74. lp.
- <sup>33</sup> Ibidem, 74.–75. lp.
- <sup>34</sup> Ēriks JĒKABSONS. Baltkrievi Latvijā 1918.–1940. gadā. In: Latvijas Vēstures Institūta Žurnāls 2001, Nr. 4, 104.–133. lpp., šeit 109. lpp.
- <sup>35</sup> Lieta par Konstantīna Borisa d. Jezovitova un Matildes Minnas Jezovitovas pretvalstisko darbību, 1930. LNA LVVA, 3235-2-4630, 125.–129. lp.
- <sup>36</sup> Ibidem, 75.–78. lp.
- <sup>37</sup> Ibidem, 54.–56. lp.
- <sup>38</sup> KOROTKOVA, Poiski sojuznika.
- <sup>39</sup> Lieta par Konstantīna Borisa d. Jezovitova un Matildes Minnas Jezovitovas pretvalstisko darbību, 1930. LNA LVVA, 3235-2-4630, 141. lp.

## SUMMARY

The analysis of the political thought of Belarusian Russians, and in particular – Konstantin Jezovitov's political opinion opens up new opportunities for understanding Belarusian aspirations as a nation-building process in the Eastern European region, and in emigration. Notably, the Latvian government was allowed to implement important national self-determination functions. Latvian Belarusian intelligentsia has played a decisive role in the formation process of Belarusian national self-confidence. Konstantin Jezovitov (1893–1946) was one of the leaders in shaping the Latvian Belarusian minority national self-awareness. His activities engendered a number of Belarusian cultural societies, educational institutions, as well as political organizations in the Latvian interwar

period, and revealed the importance of the existence of the minorities, both in the context of the history of Latvia and in Latvian domestic politics during the interwar period.

From 1919, the intellectuals of Latvia's Belarusians made it a priority to promote the educational and cultural growth of Belarusians in the territory of Latvia. It was successfully started in 1921, when the Belarusian Education Authority was established and the first Belarusian educational establishments were instituted. Therefore, the **idea of progress** can be seen as a key priority for the Belarusian intellectuals. The aim of upholding these values, pursued by Latvia's Belarusian intellectuals, was to build the self-confidence of Latvia's Belarusians and to continue supporting the ideas, whereby the first steps were sought for the beginnings of Belarusian Democratic Republic.

The idea of progress includes K. Jezovitov understanding of the identity of Latvia's Belarusians which encompasses three substantial components: preservation of **Belarusian values** (language, culture and education), **exceptionalism** (emphasis on the uniqueness of Belarusians and special historical experience that supposedly exonerated its conflict with Polish and Russian minorities in Latvia), and **aspiration for political rights**.

On the other hand, because of the inclination toward individualism, the Belarusian cultural and educational representatives were unable to achieve a shared vision for maintaining their values and cultivating them. K. Jezovitov himself acknowledged that the main problem of Belarusian intellectuals was the lack of a strong, leading centre. From the beginning of their pursuits, Belarusian intellectuals had split into several small groups with different political visions. After 1924, the radicalization of Latvian Belarusian political thought was observed, and financial support was sought in Soviet Republic of Belarus. This is explained by the deterioration of Belarusian relations with the Latvian government and the rapid implementation of Belarusian politics in the Soviet Republic of Belarus – Belarusians were hoping to return to the territory of Belarus and realize their political potential in their homeland. Despite the radicalization of Belarusian ideas, Latvian Belarusians were still accepted and supported in the overall Latvian culture without being marginalized, although the real situation remained tense until 1934.



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## Economic Cooperation Attempts between Sweden and Romania (1939–1944)\*

Zviedrijas un Rumānijas ekonomiskās sadarbības mēģinājumi (1939–1944)

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During the Second World War, both Sweden and Romania tried to balance their economies despite pressure from the Great Powers. The progression of war made a closer collaboration between these two nations possible, increasing their trade. This article aims to follow the evolution of Swedish-Romanian economic relations between 1940–1944, identify successful businesses and highlight the challenges faced during this period. The main difficulties that impeded the Swedish-Romanian economic cooperation were Germany's refusal to issue transit licenses, Romanian anarchic trade practices and the inefficiency of the clearing system. The most significant event would be the signing of the first trade treaty between Sweden and Romania on 5 May 1943.

**Keywords:** trade, Second World War, Sweden, Romania, Germany, war economy, trade agreement.

Otrā pasaules kara laikā gan Zviedrija, gan Rumānija centās sabalansēt savu ekonomiku, neraugoties uz lielvaru spiedienu. Kara attīstība padarīja iespējamu ciešāku sadarbību starp šīm divām valstīm, palielinot to savstarpējo tirdzniecību. Šī raksta mērķis ir izsekot Zviedrijas un Rumānijas ekonomisko attiecību attīstībai no 1940. līdz 1944. gadam, identificēt veiksmīgus uzņēmumus un izcelt problēmas, ar kurām šajā periodā nācās saskarties. Galvenās grūtības, kas pasliktināja Zviedrijas un Rumānijas ekonomisko sadarbību, bija Vācijas atteikums izsniegt tranzīta licences, anarhiska tirdzniecības prakse un kliringa sistēmas neefektivitāte.

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Nozīmīgākais notikums bija pirmā tirdzniecības līguma parakstīšana starp Zviedriju un Rumāniju 1943. gada 5. maijā.

**Atslēgvārdi:** tirdzniecība, Otrais pasaules karš, Zviedrija, Rumānija, Vācija, kara ekonomika, tirdzniecības līgums.

## Introduction

On the eve of the Second World War, Sweden did not have close economic relations with Romania, as illustrated in the paragraphs below. The Swedish government focused on regulating trade by signing treaties and agreements with Germany, Great Britain, the USA, and the Nordic countries. On the other hand, Romania had good economic ties with Germany, Great Britain, France, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary.

Trade between Sweden and Romania developed simultaneously with the diplomatic and consular relations established by the two countries. Sweden was the first to move forward and opened its first consular representations on Romanian territory in Galați (1851), Brăila (1852), Bucharest (1852) and Constanța (1880). Romania established one vice-consulate in Gothenburg and two honorary consulates in Stockholm and Malmö. Nevertheless, at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century the trade between Sweden and Romania was unremarkable. The situation changed when the Romanian authorities adopted laws facilitating the entry of foreign capital in sectors such as agriculture and industry. Among the investors were Swedes who had become interested in providing capital for the modernization of the oil industry.<sup>1</sup>

During the interwar period, Sweden and Romania decided the legal framework for their trade through ministerial notes. In November 1921, the governments of both

states agreed to extend the stipulations of the Bern Convention on the International Transport of Goods by Rail, signed on 14 October 1890.<sup>2</sup> Initially, the document was signed by Austria-Hungary, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Russia, and Switzerland. The convention extended gradually, and other countries acceded to it. Romania signed the agreement in 1904 and Sweden – in 1907.<sup>3</sup> This document imposed a supranational law concerning freight transport for the first time. The new law entered into force in 1893, the same year the Central Office for International Carriage by Rail was established. This central body was responsible for ensuring the implementation, maintenance, and revision of the agreement. The Office also had the authority to intervene and solve conflicts between railway companies.<sup>4</sup>

Through ministerial notes dated 11 November and 18 December 1922, the Swedish and Romanian governments signed a preliminary agreement regarding commercial and economic relations. This document would be essential for further development of the trade between Sweden and Romania as both countries accorded, based on mutual application, the most favoured nation clause; this meant that trade partners should treat each other equally, without providing special terms to one specific country. However, the agreement's provisions did not apply to coastal shipping or to special benefits that Sweden may grant to Norway and Denmark, if these were not then also extended to other countries.<sup>5</sup>

A significant event for the Swedish-Romanian trade was the \$30 million loan granted to Romania by the Kreuger Group in 1929. In return, the Romanian government would concede to Kreuger the match monopoly in the whole country, as well as the electricity production and distribution monopoly in three counties (Brașov,

Vâlcea and Vaslui).<sup>6</sup> This business represented an opportunity not only for Swedish Match (STAB) and Elektro-Invest, but also for other companies that opened offices in Romania and increased their exports. Notable companies in this category included L. M. Ericsson (leading phone company), ASEA (electrical engineering company), Garvämnes AB Weibull (tannin provider), SKF (multinational company of bearings) and Helsingborgs Gummifabriks AB (rubber factory).

The trade between Sweden and Romania intensified, especially following the renewal of the preliminary agreement signed in 1922. The new document, which included five articles, was ratified by the Swedish Minister Plenipotentiary in Bucharest, Jonas Alströmer, and by the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Alexandru Vaida-Voievod, on 26 July 1930.<sup>7</sup> This convention subsequently provided positive results, which were reflected in the statistics compiled by the authorities of both states. Thus, between 1936–1937, the Romanian state budget received 275 million lei as a result of trade with Sweden.<sup>8</sup> However, Sweden failed to maintain a balanced trade; imports from Romania increased considerably, while exports to this country sometimes did not even reach half the amount of imports. In 1939, for example, Sweden bought goods from Romania worth 6.8 million Swedish crowns (SEK), while exported goods amounted to only 1.2 million SEK.<sup>9</sup> However, the situation changed following the German invasion of Denmark and Norway, and the launch of the Barbarossa Operation. Both nations then understood the necessity of increasing their trade to avoid total monopoly of Germany.

Swedish-Romanian bilateral relations, including those of an economic nature,<sup>10</sup>

have only recently become a subject of interest for historiography, hence, many aspects have been only partially analysed. The primary purpose of this paper is to highlight the dynamics of Swedish-Romanian economic cooperation during 1939–1944. This timeframe is of particular interest, as both years greatly impacted Swedish-Romanian trade. The invasion of Poland by both Germany and the Soviet Union affected one of the direct railway networks that connected Romania to the Port of Szczecin and the Baltic Sea. The following year, Germany took control of Öresund and Skagerrak by invading Denmark and Norway, thereby cutting economic ties between Sweden, North America, and South America. On 6 September 1940, General Ion Antonescu named himself “Conducătorul Statului” and established a military dictatorship after King Michael appointed him as prime minister with absolute power. Antonescu, one of Hitler’s most devoted allies, would make several decisions that influenced trade between Romania and Sweden. We chose to end our investigation at the events of 1944 because, in September, Romania would join the Allies and fight against Germany. This significant change dramatically influenced Romania’s economy and trade with other countries, including Sweden.

Our research is based mainly on primary sources we identified in the Swedish National Archive from Stockholm and the Diplomatic Archives of the Romanian Foreign Ministry from Bucharest. During our systematic study of the archival documents, we attempted to address the following questions: Which events marked the Swedish-Romanian economic cooperation? What challenges were faced by Swedish-Romanian trade, and how did the authorities of both countries solve them?

## Swedish-Romanian trade between 1939–1942: Challenges and opportunities

Sweden and Romania declared neutrality at the beginning of the Second World War. The countries tried to balance their economies in the face of pressure from Germany, France, and Great Britain, whose goals included monopolizing the Romanian oil market and Swedish iron ore export. The situation became complicated for Sweden following the Soviet Union's attack on Finland. The Winter War blocked the harbour of Petsamo, and sailing the Baltic Sea became almost impossible. The war's evolution led to the rupture of economic ties between Sweden and East Asia, which affected the Swedish economy. Several industries lacked raw materials, such as coal and oil, as well as other products – coke, grain, and fodder.<sup>11</sup> Moreover, following the German occupation of Denmark and Norway, Sweden was cut off from the transatlantic trade, which had represented approximately 70% of Swedish commerce.<sup>12</sup> This critical situation required the Swedish government to find new markets and business partners.

At the other end of Europe, Romania struggled to keep its economy independent. Following the signing of the economic treaty between Romania and Germany in March 1939, the Romanian national economy had to respect and fulfil German demands. During the summer of 1940, Romania was forced to hand over Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina and the Hertsa region to the Soviet Union. Northern Transylvania would be transferred to Hungary, and Southern Dobruja to Bulgaria. Consequently, Romania lost one-third of its territory, largely – farming land that would affect agricultural production capacity and the national economy.

However, this international backdrop brought the distant nations of Sweden

and Romania closer and prompted their leaders to increase economic cooperation. As a result, the balance of 1940 showed that Sweden imported Romanian goods worth 8 201 471 SEK. Among the products bought by the Swedish importers were kerosene and other refined fuels, oil cakes, fodder, peas, corn, acetone, and industrial lubricants.<sup>13</sup> Romania, on the other hand, imported Swedish goods valued at only 1 873 881 SEK – the list contains articles such as artillery components, bearings, ferrosilicon, and chemical products.<sup>14</sup>

Romania joining the war alongside the Axis in June 1941 affected economic relations with Sweden. Germany could better control the transit through its occupied territories and was unwilling to approve transportation licenses for products considered crucial to Hitler's war machine. Swedish-Romanian trade would also face other challenges that year. Firstly, Romania needed more tank trains to transport petroleum products to Sweden. This meant that Romania would need to deliver its products via the Danube – however, the river froze during winter, making transportation impossible. In this case, Sweden had to provide tank trains to import the needed products.<sup>15</sup> When the situation seemed settled, a conflict broke out between Swedish and German authorities, as the Reich had used some of the Swedish wagons transiting its territory for its own operations without paying rent. Moreover, the Dahlqvist company in Gothenburg, which had sent 42 train tanks to Romania, reported that most were lost.<sup>16</sup> To avoid further misunderstandings, the German authorities decided to keep in circulation only the tanks provided by Förenade Svenska Oljeimportörers AB.<sup>17</sup>

Trade agreements based on compensation represented another problem, as Romania did not have sufficient funds to pay for its imports and often claimed products

that were too valuable for the Swedish domestic market. At the same time, Sweden did not use a clearing system due to the geographic distance between the two nations. Payment through compensation harmed negotiations between Swedish and Romanian partners, and contributed to the failure of several businesses; for example, Romania requested 400 wagons of fodder, 10 tons of ferrovanadium, 30 tons of ferromolybdenum, 100 tons of ferromanganese and 400 tons of ferrosilicon.<sup>18</sup> These demands were too high for Sweden, who could export only ferrosilicon up to 1000 tons, as the remaining alloys were needed by the national industry.<sup>19</sup> The parties negotiated and agreed that Sweden would offer 470 tons of ferrosilicon, 1000 telephones, 30 tons of ferromanganese and bearings worth 1 million SEK in exchange for 2000 tons of fodder.<sup>20</sup> However, Swedish Commerce Commission on 16 September 1941 announced that Romania delivered the 2000 tons of fodder for only 1000 tons of ferrosilicon.<sup>21</sup>

Just a few weeks before Romania renounced its neutrality and joined Germany in the war against the Soviet Union, the Romanian Aeronautical Industry, an enterprise from Brşov, ordered aircraft engine components from the company See Fabriks AB Sandviken. The State Trade Commission had no objection to the transaction and approved the export of 950 kilograms of components. The Swedish company delivered the ordered material on 5 June 1941.<sup>22</sup> This would be one of a few deals concluded with positive results for both involved parties.

The German monopoly constituted another impediment to Swedish-Romanian trade and influenced fodder selling. The authorities from Berlin bought high quantities of grain and fodder from Romania to sell on to other countries. This was the case when Denmark acquired large quantities of Romanian feed from German

trading houses.<sup>23</sup> Consequently, at the end of 1941 Sweden remained the largest Scandinavian direct importer of fodder from Romania. This outcome could also have been prompted by the appointment of the first Romanian commercial attaché to Stockholm, Grigore Gheaşă.<sup>24</sup>

In December 1941, Swedish Commerce Commission approved a new list of goods that Sweden could trade with Romania the following year. This included surgical instruments, agricultural machinery and tools, bearings, woodworking machinery, cellulose, elevators, electric cables, water turbines, pumps, compressors, refrigeration plants and components for telephony. Swedish Commerce Commission was interested in importing oil cakes, mineral oils, and canned vegetables from Romania.<sup>25</sup> The Swedish authorities were confident that they could supply most of the aforementioned goods, except the industrial machinery and cellulose that was needed in the Swedish market.<sup>26</sup>

The price represented a critical indicator that guided Swedish-Romanian trade. Besides the fact that the Romanian government had increased the price of hydrocarbons by 15% since the beginning of 1942, intermediary trade companies could also apply a commercial markup varying between 20 to 200% of the original price. Swedish companies were losing already-purchased lubricants due to long waiting periods for export licenses, while refineries sold to Germany the oil tanks that have been reserved for export to Sweden. Despite protests from Sweden, representatives of the Romanian refineries continued with the same practices. Moreover, they demanded new increased prices for the delivery of petroleum products that Sweden had already paid for.<sup>27</sup>

Germany's pressure on the Romanian economy caused a complete trade freeze between Sweden and Romania in the first



half of 1942. German authorities refused to issue new transport licenses, even though they had agreed with the Romanian Foreign Minister, Mihai Antonescu (a distant relative of Ion Antonescu) not to interfere with the trade between Romania and Sweden. The Reich's decisions led to considerable delays, additional fees and customs duties, as well as blocked the export of various types of merchandise already paid for by the Swedish state.<sup>28</sup>

In June 1942, Mihai Antonescu discussed a new commercial convention between Romania and Germany with the German Plenipotentiary Minister in Bucharest, Carl August Clodius. During negotiations, Antonescu and Clodius also tackled the transit issue through the territory occupied by the Reich. The Romanian Foreign Minister asked Clodius to urgently release the transit licenses for the loads waiting to leave Romanian harbours for Sweden. Antonescu emphasized that the suspension of exports to Sweden affected the interests of Swedish business partners and led to the deterioration of already-purchased goods. Both negotiators drew up a list of commitments that the German Minister was to respect if he wanted the signing of a new commercial convention with Romania. Firstly, Germany would streamline the transit of goods between Romania and Sweden. In addition, the Reich was to cease all sales of Romanian oil to Sweden, as such practice seriously damaged the Romanian national economy.<sup>29</sup>

Despite the verbal guarantees offered by Clodius that German authorities would approve transit for the freight trains to Sweden and would no longer delay the issuance of the transport licenses,<sup>30</sup> these clauses were not specified in the Romanian-German trade agreement.<sup>31</sup>

Hence, the situation remained unchanged, and Mihai Antonescu had to actively engage to break the deadlock in trade with Sweden.<sup>32</sup> Once again, the Germans formally assured that they were working to facilitate the trade between Romania and Sweden. To ensure that these promises would materialize, Mihai Antonescu threatened the German diplomats in Bucharest that he would drastically limit exports to the Reich if the authorities from Berlin did not release the transport licenses.<sup>33</sup>

Other negotiations concluded much more positively – such as the purchase of 25 Bolinder-Munktell AB tractors by the Romanian Ministry of Agriculture. Romanian authorities paid cash and expected to receive the delivery at the beginning of 1943.<sup>34</sup> The Swedish Commerce Commission also approved the export of twelve diesel engines manufactured by the same company.<sup>35</sup> The institution consented to the export of 100–200 engines, gearboxes and 100 pre-assembled tractors, all manufactured by the Jönköpings Mekaniska Verkstads AB. The condition was that the delivery would be made following the end of the war.<sup>36</sup>

Despite numerous challenges, commerce between Sweden and Romania yielded positive results in 1942 compared to the previous years. One explanation could be that the prices constantly increased during this year. Moreover, the authorities of both states agreed to conduct payments by using free currency and only accepted compensatory exchanges in exceptional cases. The annual balance showed that Sweden imported Romanian goods worth 51 603 000 SEK – much more than in 1941, when Sweden had paid 28 133 000 SEK. On the other hand, Romania imported merchandise worth 3 895 000 SEK, while in 1941 it had paid 581 000 SEK.<sup>37</sup>




Figure 1. Sweden's trade with Romania, 1940–1942 (compiled using the data from Riksarkivet, Stockholm).

### The first trade treaty signed by Sweden and Romania on 5 May 1943

A Swedish delegation, including Romania's consul in Malmö Albert Waldén and the first secretary of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs K. A. Belfrage travelled to Bucharest on 25 September 1942, to initiate negotiations on concluding a trade treaty between Sweden and Romania. Their visit aimed to establish the list of goods for the following year and to try and recover debts that Romanian banks owed to several Swedish companies.<sup>38</sup> During his stay in Bucharest, Belfrage sent a report to Stockholm describing the lack of organization in Romanian institutions. The Swedish diplomat arrived in Romania when the Ministry of National Economy was undergoing a reform. Moreover, a month before, a new minister in the person of Ion N. Fiñescu was appointed, and he was still in the process of selecting people for his team. This atmosphere led Belfrage to consider the Romanian administrative system too chaotic for him.<sup>39</sup> Belfrage took advantage of his visit and went to meet the representatives

of the three essential oil refineries: Astra Română, Steaua Română and Concordia. He wanted to ensure that the petroleum products designated for export to Sweden existed and that they would be delivered as promised. Belfrage feared that German agents could potentially buy the entire stock of refined petroleum, leaving Sweden without anything to purchase.<sup>40</sup>

K. A. Belfrage returned to Bucharest in February 1943 to agree on import-export products. He also met with Nicolae Răzmeriță, the Finance Ministry general secretary, who returned from Berlin with positive news for the Swedish-Romanian trade. During discussions, German authorities promised to issue transport permits for approximately 850 tons of oil – the equivalent of two tank trains – as soon as naval traffic on the Danube was reopened.<sup>41</sup> Belfrage was unable to conclude any agreement, mainly because of the high prices demanded by the Romanian authorities.<sup>42</sup> It was necessary for a delegation, including Răzmeriță and Grigore Gheăță, Romania's commercial attaché in Stockholm, to meet the Swedish representatives for trade and international affairs in order to finalize the work started by K. A. Belfrage in Bucharest.<sup>43</sup> This visit resulted in the conclusion of the first trade treaty established between Sweden and Romania, signed on 5 May 1943.

According to the protocol signed by the head of the trade department, Gunnar Häggglöf, and the president of the Romanian delegation, Nicolae Răzmeriță, the governments of both countries were equally interested in promoting the development of their trade. The treaty included twelve articles and was divided into two parts: the first six articles outlined the Romanian exports to Sweden, while the next six focused on standards regarding Swedish exports to Romania. By the end of the year, Romanian authorities undertook the responsibility




Figure 2. The first page of the Trade Treaty.  
Source: Riksarkivet, Stockholm.

to obtain all necessary permits and export to Sweden 24 000 tons of mineral oil products (lubricating oils 16 000 tons, bitumen 7000 tons and other products 1000 tons). A particular requirement was that the monthly delivery should not be under 3000 tonnes of petroleum products. The Romanian government should also intervene and, in order to obtain transit papers for the named merchandise from Germany. The third article of the agreement focused on the export of fodder products. Romania would grant transport licenses for at least 25 000 tons of fodder cakes and residuals from the 1942 harvest. Moreover, the authorities from Bucharest would grant permits by the end of the year for the following goods: beef, bacon, eggs, poultry, nuts, fruit pulp, soya, oilseeds, acetone, naphthenic acids, and others. The value of all these goods was to reach 50 million lei. There was a clause regarding the trade using private compensations, but both governments decided to use this practice only in exceptional circumstances. The two governments also stipulated that exports to be shipped via the Danube were to respect the tonnage used for Romanian rivers.<sup>44</sup>

On the other hand, the Swedish government undertook the responsibility at the end of 1943 to approve export permits for the following goods: iron and steel, machines and tools, miscellaneous materials, and other goods. The exports should reach around 31.5 million SEK. The agreement had an annex that specified detailed information about the products from each category that the Romanian authorities had requested. Both parties agreed that the quotas provided in the treaty were minimum amounts, so that they could then exceed the given numbers. Regarding payments, both countries agreed to use free currencies and irrevocable letters of credit before the delivery of the goods. Moreover, if one of the two parties obtained assets from the reciprocal commercial exchanges, then Swedish and Romanian authorities would examine the possibility of allowing this capital to be used for additional orders. The last article of the agreement specified that the signed protocol would come into force on 5 May 1943, and would remain in force until the end of the year. Both countries would begin negotiations for a new agreement before the expiry of the protocol.<sup>45</sup>

The document had an annex in which the Swedish Commerce Commission reserved the right to examine offers sent by the Romanian companies before negotiations began. According to the regulation, Swedish companies were to present complete documentation in order to obtain transport permits. The papers should include details about product type, quantity, value, payment conditions, and information about the company that had made the offer.<sup>46</sup> Romania needed modern machines and tools for its industrial and agricultural sectors, and planned to import Swedish technology in large quantities. However, the Swedish Commerce Commission analysed the offers, compared them with its internal needs and concluded that

it would not issue transport licenses for some goods such as diesel locomotives, pumps and motorized draisines.<sup>47</sup>

Clearly, the list of goods was similar to the ones filed before by the representatives of Sweden and Romania. Swedish authorities were still interested in buying petroleum products and fodder, while Romania needed machinery, iron, and steel products. The requirement regarding the use of an irrevocable letter of credit as a method of discharge meant that both governments needed a guarantee of payment for the goods purchased; a document that could only be cancelled if all the involved parties agreed. It was a matter of trust, and, as mentioned before, Swedish authorities were wary of Romanian traders, following previous transactions that had gone awry. This agreement also solved an old problem regarding the payment using compensation, a practice considered archaic by Swedish authorities.

Reactions to the conclusion of this economic treaty varied. While the Minister of Foreign Affairs Christian Günther expressed his enthusiasm in a telegram sent to his counterpart Mihai Antonescu,<sup>48</sup> Germany did not react with the same satisfaction. In a conversation held between C. A. Clodius and M. Antonescu regarding the transit situation of Romanian goods through the Reich's territory to Sweden, the German diplomat displayed his bewilderment towards Romania's insistence on maintaining commercial ties with Sweden. Clodius believed that exporting goods to Sweden was equivalent to supplying enemies of the Axis.<sup>49</sup> However, the treaty had immediate, positive results for Swedish commerce. In June, the Romanian authorities reduced customs tariffs by 75% for agricultural equipment from Sweden. This reduction had been applied previously for similar products bought from Germany, Italy, and Switzerland.<sup>50</sup> Moreover, Sweden

exported goods in the value of nine million SEK to Romania in the first half of 1943, proving the commercial treaty to be the catalyst that accelerated exports.<sup>51</sup>

It is interesting to note that soon after the conclusion of the commercial treaty, both sides signed additional documents. Nicolae Răzmeriță informed Swedish authorities that the Romanian government would try to raise the limit of 2000 tons of petroleum products per month to 3000 tons, with the caveat that German authorities must be willing to approve the necessary transit documentation.<sup>52</sup> Moreover, Răzmeriță added that Romanian authorities were ready to increase the quota of 25 000 tons of cakes and residues from the 1942 harvest to 30 000 tons. The Romanian government committed to inform the Swedish partners about the fodder quantity that could be added to the quota established by the agreement signed on 5 May 1943, as soon as the authorities evaluated the harvest of 1943. An official response to this matter was to be sent no later than 15 September 1943.<sup>53</sup> Hägglöf responded that if the Romanian government wished to transform its assets resulting from Romanian export to Sweden, the National Bank of Sweden was willing to sell gold to Romania. The transaction would conform to the following conditions: the respective quantity of gold would be transferred to the National Bank of Romania in Switzerland, and the value would be fixed according to the price in Swiss France. If circumstances hindered Sweden from making the gold available in Switzerland, then the National Bank of Sweden would examine the possibility of selling its gold in Stockholm.<sup>54</sup>

Analysing the additions made immediately after the signing of the commercial treaty, it becomes clear that Romania wished to retain Sweden as a business partner. The real reason why Romania

needed a stable trade with Sweden was that Germany had stopped paying for its imports in gold or free currency. Therefore, Romanian authorities were forced to sell their merchandise to the countries with a strong currency, so that they could collect the money needed to cover harvesting expenses. At that time, only two countries were able to pay in free currency: Sweden and Switzerland.<sup>55</sup>

### Swedish-Romanian trade during 1944

At the beginning of 1944, engineer Petre Dumitraşcu – a technical expert within the Procurement Commission – was found in Stockholm. His task was to change the order of six tons of high-speed steel, placed in the fall of 1943, to 49 tons of tungsten steel. Dumitraşcu's negotiations yielded positive results, and Swedish authorities approved the proposal.<sup>56</sup> While in Stockholm, Dumitraşcu took note of the list of products planned for trade with Romania. The primary goods Sweden wished to procure were: lubricants, oil, gasoline, paraffin, flour, bran, rapeseed cake, fodder and offal. Romania purchased drilling machines, metal cutters, drills, iron pipes and various machinery.<sup>57</sup>

The problematic situation created by the war severely limited the options of Swedish companies, which needed somewhere to sell their products or source the required raw materials, especially after Germany blockaded merchant boats from the USA.<sup>58</sup> Because of this situation, many firms were on the verge of bankruptcy. The company AB Archimedes was one of the businesses struggling because its export had decreased considerably. The problem was that the machine park only manufactured outboard motors for small boats. The company officials persistently asked Swedish institutions to authorize export to

Romania. Finally, the company received approval to sell 44 motors, under the proviso that the buyer declare that these engines were for civil and not military use.<sup>59</sup> One of the few businesses for which the Swedish authorities gave their consent promptly was Fagersta Bruks AB, concerning the sale of equipment estimated at 17 037 SEK to the Autonomous House of Monopolies in Romania.<sup>60</sup>

A visible decline in trade between Sweden and Romania appeared in the first half of 1944. One explanation for this phenomenon could be that Romania focused on negotiating and signing the armistice with the Allies. The dynamics of the Romanian economy and commerce changed dramatically after 23 August 1944, when Romania turned its weapons against Germany and later on signed the armistice with the Allies. As a result, the authorities from Berlin cut trade ties between Romania and the Axis, and completely blocked the transit of goods through its territory. Simultaneously, Romania was to accept conditions given by the new allies, which interrupted trade connections with Switzerland and the USA.<sup>61</sup>

Between 1940 and 1944, Sweden and Romania's import/export balance fell in Romania's favour. The Romanian state's imports from Sweden represented only 0.3% of total imports, while exports to Sweden represented 2.2% of the total quantity. These percentages were very low compared to the imports/exports that Sweden and Romania practised with other countries. However, as stated previously, Swedish-Romanian trade contributed to economic survival of both nations during the war.

### Conclusions

The evolution of economic cooperation between Sweden and Romania during the analysed period demonstrated that

the governments of both nations displayed a keen interest in cultivating trade with each other in order to survive economically. Prior to the Second World War, Romania was not at the top of Swedish commercial destinations, and Sweden was not interested in the Romanian economy. The outbreak of conflict limited trade alternatives and led to a mutual discovery in terms of trade, while both countries attempted to procure raw materials and other goods needed for domestic consumption. The conflict's evolution, Germany's restrictive attitude towards issuing transport licenses, and the complications caused by payment via compensation as opposed to free currency would come to represent the main challenges to Swedish-Romanian trade. Another challenge was that Sweden and Romania would not sign their first trade treaty until 1943, an agreement that positively impacted trade evolution and encouraged Swedish businesses to invest in the Romanian market.

Maintaining a reasonable level of trade under such conditions was not easy. There were significant fluctuations in the import/export balance. Romania did not have

the same purchasing power as Sweden, so authorities from Bucharest reserved a limited budget for imports from Sweden. On the other hand, Swedish authorities attempted to buy as much fodder and petroleum products as possible. Moreover, several Swedish companies perceived Romania as a means of survival and tried to increase sales to this country. The Swedish Commerce Commission would occasionally deny export licenses – a result of prioritising domestic need, or due to insecure transport roads through Europe that had been destroyed by war. There is evidence of businesses that succeeded and yielded a positive profit for Swedish companies following the end of the war.

When analysing economic statistics, the trade between Sweden and Romania can appear insignificant when compared to other nations. However, the true importance of Swedish-Romanian trade lies in the type of goods exchanged and the fact that this economic partnership ensured both nations a degree of economic independence that could not otherwise have been achieved.

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## KOPSAVILKUMS

Otrā pasaules kara priekšvakarā Zviedrijai nebija ciešu ekonomisko attiecību ar Rumāniju. Abu valstu valdības koncentrējās uz tirdzniecības regulēšanu, parakstot līgumus ar kaimiņvalstīm. Starpkaru periodā Zviedrija un Rumānija ar 1922. gada 11. novembra un 18. decembra ministru notām noteica tirdzniecības tiesisko regulējumu un parakstīja provizorisku līgumu par tirdzniecības un ekonomiskajām attiecībām. Zviedrijas un Rumānijas tirdzniecībai nozīmīgs notikums bija *Kreuger Group* 1929. gadā Rumānijai piešķirtais aizdevums. Pretī Rumānijas valdība piešķīra *Kreuger* sērskociņu monopolu un elektroenerģijas ražošanas un sadales monopolu. Tirdzniecība starp Zviedriju un Rumāniju kļuva intensīvāka, jo īpaši pēc tam, kad 1930. gada 26. jūlijā tika atjaunots provizoriskais līgums. Piemēram, 1939. gadā Zviedrija no Rumānijas iegādājās preces 6,8 miljonu Zviedrijas kronu (SEK) vērtībā, kamēr eksportētās preces sasniedza tikai 1,2 miljonus SEK.

Otrā pasaules kara sākums satuvināja Zviedriju un Rumāniju un pamudināja to vadītājus pastiprināt ekonomisko sadarbību. Rezultātā 1940. gada bilance liecināja, ka Zviedrija importēja Rumānijas preces par 8 201 471 Zviedrijas kronu. Rumānijas pievienošanās karam Ass valstu pusē 1941. gada jūnijā ietekmēja ekonomiskās attiecības ar Zviedriju. Vācija varēja labāk kontrolēt tranzītu caur tās okupētajām teritorijām un nevēlējās apstiprināt transporta licences vairākiem produktiem. Tirdzniecības līgumi, kas balstījās uz kompensācijām, radīja vēl vienu problēmu, jo Rumānijai nebija pietiekami daudz naudas, lai samaksātu par importu, un tā bieži pieprasīja produktus, kas bija pārāk nepieciešami Zviedrijas iekšējam tirgum.

No 1942. gada septembra līdz 1943. gada maijam notika sarunas par pirmā tirdzniecības līguma noslēgšanu starp Zviedriju un Rumāniju. Dokumentā, kas tika parakstīts 1943. gada 5. maijā, bija iekļauti 12 panti. Šis līgums pozitīvi ietekmēja tirdzniecības attīstību un mudināja Zviedrijas uzņēmumus uzticēties Rumānijas tirgum. Galvenās preces, ko Zviedrija iepirka no Rumānijas partneriem, bija smērvielas, eļļa, benzīns, parafīns, milti, klijas, rapšu sēklas un subprodukti. Rumānija iepirka urbjašīnas, metāla frēzes, urbjus, dzelzs caurules un dažādas iekārtas.

1944. gada pirmajā pusē vērojams ievērojams tirdzniecības samazinājums starp Zviedriju un Rumāniju. Viens no šīs parādības skaidrojumiem varētu būt tas, ka Rumānija koncentrējās uz sarunām un pamiera parakstīšanu ar Sabiedrotajiem. Analizējot statistikas datus, redzams, ka Zviedrijas un Rumānijas tirdzniecība šķiet nenozīmīga, ja to salīdzina ar citām valstīm, taču Zviedrijas un Rumānijas tirdzniecības patiesā nozīme slēpjas konkrēta veida preču apmaiņā.



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# Recenzijas

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Reviews




## Paliekošs devums

Recenzija par grāmatu: Cīņa par brīvību: Latvijas Neatkarības karš (1918–1920) Latvijas Valsts vēstures arhīva dokumentos. 4. daļa: 1919. gada decembra sākums – 1920. gada rudens.

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**Aivars Stranga**, *Dr. habil. hist.*



Latvijas Neatkarības karš (1918–1920) ir viens no ievērojamākajiem notikumiem Latvijas vēsturē, par kuru visplašāko dokumentāro liecību klāstu glabā Latvijas Nacionālā arhīva Latvijas Valsts vēstures arhīvs. Līdz 2019. gadam, kad nāca klajā dokumentu krājuma pirmā daļa, absolūti lielākais vairums no tiem nebija publicēts un bija maz zināms plašākai sabiedrībai. Pirmajā daļā ievietoti 190 dokumenti, no kuriem 152 bija pirmpublicējumi. Dokumentus atlasījuši un komentējuši *Dr. hist.* Ēriks Jēkabsons un *Dr. hist.* Jānis Šiliņš. Ir pagājuši četri gadi, un lielais darbs ir noslēdzies – Ēriks Jēkabsons ir sagatavojis dokumentu krājuma ceturto, noslēdzošo daļu, kas ir turpinājums iepriekšējai daļai, kurā aplūkots Latvijas armijas izveidošanas process 1919. gada vasarā, cīņas Austrumu (Latgales) frontē un kaujas pret Pāvela Bermonta komandēto Rietumkrievijas brīvprātīgo armiju 1919. gada rudenī. Milzīgs un ļoti kvalitatīvs darbs ir paveikts salīdzinoši īsā laikā.

Dokumentu krājuma ceturtajā daļā publicēti 228 dokumenti. Krājumam ir plašs ievads, kas faktiski ir neliela monogrāfija, kuras uzrakstīšanai izmantots ļoti daudz avotu – ieskaitot Latvijas, Lietuvas, Polijas, Lielbritānijas un ASV arhīvus – un plaša literatūra, kas sniedz ieskatu aplūkojamā perioda militārajās, politiskajās un sociālajās norisēs. Vēsturiskā konteksta labākai izpratnei krājuma beigās ievietots sīks hronoloģisks pārskats par šī laika posma svarīgākajiem notikumiem. Krājumu labi papildina bagāts attēlu klāsts.

Ievadraksts sākas ar precīzu vispārējās situācijas raksturojumu reģionā 1919. gada decembrī – 1920. gada janvārī. Apgaismojot Latvijas attiecības ar Igauniju, izvērtētas nesaskaņas robežu jautājumā par Valkas un citu teritoriju piederību un aplūkota igauņu agresīvā rīcība pret latviešu iestādēm, izraidot tās no pilsētās. Vienlaikus Igaunija

nepatīkami pārsteidza Latviju, 1919. gada decembra beigās bez brīdinājuma noslēdzot pamieru ar Padomju Krieviju un tādējādi dodot iespēju Krievijai pārvietot savas karaspēka daļas no Igaunijas uz Latvijas un Polijas frontes sektoru.

Agresīvi, pat imperiālistiski nolūki var būt raksturīgi ne tikai lielvalstīm, bet arī mazām vai vidējām valstīm. Tas diezgan spilgti izpaudās Lietuvas nostājā pret Latviju: tā uzskatīja par savām Kurzemes guberņas daļas un pat pretendēja uz Daugavpils cietoksni, kurš – saskaņā ar Lietuvas ārlietu ministra Augustīna Voldemāra priekšstatu – ir “Lietuvas galvaspilsētas Viļņas atslēga” un kurš ne no vēsturiskā, ne no etnogrāfiskā viedokļa nepiederot Latvijai. Lietuvieši pat uzskatīja, ka latgalieši arī valodas ziņā stāvēt viņiem tuvāk nekā latviešiem. Polija, savukārt, nepretendēja uz Latgali, un tieši ar Poliju 1919. gada 30. decembrī tika parakstīts Latvijas armijas virspavēlniecības līgums par uzbrukumu Latgalē.

Ievadrakstā liela uzmanība ir veltīta Latvijas armijas stāvokļa, sastāva un dislokācijas raksturojumam, tai skaitā atsevišķo īpašo karaspēka daļu aprakstam; tā, piemēram, uzsvērts, ka Latvijas vācu zemessardze (jeb bijušais landesvērs) bija ļoti īpatnēja gan augsto karaspēka kaujasspēju, gan struktūras un rakstura dēļ. Faktiski šī karaspēka daļa bija uzskatāma par brigādi un tai Latgales atbrīvošanā bija ļoti nozīmīga loma. Latgales atbrīvošanas operācija ievadrakstā ir aplūkota ļoti pamatīgi, sākot ar Pētera Radziņa izstrādāto un ar poļiem saskaņoto Latvijas armijas uzbrukuma plānu. Latgalē ar latviešiem un poļiem cīnījās daudzveidīgā Sarkanā armija, kurā bija ķiniešu rotas, ungāru komunisti un baškīru tautības karavīri. Kaujas Ziemeļlatgalē varēja ielgt, tādēļ 1920. gada 16. janvārī Rīgā tika noslēgta jauna Latvijas armijas virspavēlniecības vienošanās ar Poliju. Iepazīstoties ar kauju gaitu, lasītājs uzzinās, ka Vācu zemessargi, pat pārkāpjot pavēles nosacījumus, 21. janvāra

rītā ar kauju ielauzās Rēzeknē, ieņemot pilsētu un dzelzceļa mezglu. Domāju, ka lielākajai daļai lasītāju pavisam jauna būs informācija par nedēļu ilgajām tā dēvētajām Šķaunes kaujām, kuras notika ārkārtīgi smagos apstākļos un kuras 23. janvārī uzsāka poļu karaspēks. Pa to laiku 1920. gada 30. janvārī Maskavā tika parakstīts slepens pamiers starp Latviju un Krieviju, taču lokālas sadursmes un savstarpēji izlūkgājieni frontē turpinājās un dažreiz kritušo un gūstā saņemto karavīru skaits sniedzās vairākos desmitos. Ievadrakstā ļoti pamatīgi apskatīts arī jautājums par Polijas karaspēka uzturēšanos Latvijā un par tā pilnīgu izvešanu no Latvijas teritorijas: 1920. gada jūlijā, kad Polija piedzīvoja ļoti bīstamu Padomju Krievijas uzbrukumu, kas faktiski Polijai nesa eksistenciālus draudus, pilnīgi negaidīti izšķīrās līdz tam neskaidrais daļas Latvijas teritorijas liktenis – atkāpjoties Sarkanās armijas spiediena priekšā, poļi beidzot atstāja faktiski Polijas sastāvā iekļautos sešus Ilūkstes apriņķa pagastus un Grīvas pilsētu.

1920. gadā arī kara laika bēgļi sāka atgriezties no Krievijas, un tas radīja papildu slodzi Latvijas civilajam un militārajam resoram; karaspēka daļām frontē bija jāiesaistās jūlijā aizsāktajā bēgļu ešelonu pieņemšanā un caurlaišanā (latviešu karavīri cita starpā arī palīdzēja bēgļiem no padomju vilciena, kurš pienāca līdz sapostītajam tiltam starp Pitalovu un Žogovu, nest mantas uz Latvijas vilcieni).

Aplūkojot Latvijas starptautisko situāciju un ārvalstu misiju faktoru Latgales operācijas gaitā, uzsvērts, ka attiecībās starp Baltijas valstīm dominēja mēģinājumi izveidot militāri politisku Baltijas valstu savienību, kam traucēja savstarpējas teritoriālas un citas nesaskaņas, no kurām viena no jutamākajām bija Lietuvas nesaskaņas ar Poliju. Vienlaikus 1920. gada 16. aprīlī sākās Latvijas miera sarunas ar Padomju Krieviju, kuru laikā tomēr frontē turpinājās ierobežota karadarbība, kas dažreiz bija

diezgan ievērojama; tā 1. maija naktī 1. Liepājas kājnieku pulka izlūki kapteiņa Hugo Helmaņa vadībā saņēma 96 gūstekņus un iznīcināja divus lielgabalus.

Ievadrakstā liela uzmanība veltīta Rietumu sabiedroto lielvalstu – Lielbritānijas, ASV un Francijas – militāro, politisko un humānās palīdzības misiju darbībai (amerikāņu darbība sīkāk ir aplūkota jau 2018. gadā iznākušajā Ē. Jēkabsona fundamentālajā darbā “Latvijas un Amerikas Savienoto Valstu attiecības 1918.–1922. gadā”). Misiju darbība bija aktīva, un tās saņēma visu iespējamo Latvijas varas iestāžu pretimnākšanu un atsaucību.

Raksturojot situāciju frontes aizmugurē, norādīts, ka nopietnāko problēmu Kurzēmē no 1919. gada pavasara radīja komunistu Kārļa Kretuļa vadītie, labi apmācītie un organizētie lielinieku partizāni diversanti, kuri turpināja darboties līdz pat 1920. gada martam, sagādājot nopietnu problēmu vietējām armijas komandantūrām, policijas un pašvaldības iestādēm, kā arī iedzīvotājiem kopumā. Bruņotas ienaidnieka diversantu grupas darbojās ne tikai Kurzēmē, bet arī Vidzemē un Latgalē, turklāt tieši piefrontes joslā. Visnozīmīgākā boļševiku diversantu grupu darbība bija Jaungulbenes apkārtnē. Cīņā ar boļševiku partizāniem un vietējiem komunistiem bija spiestas iesaistīties arī frontes karaspēka daļas.

Izvērtējot stāvokli Igaunijas, Lietuvas un Polijas karaspēka ieņemtajās Latvijas teritorijās, uzsvērts, ka visu trīs kaimiņvalstu ieņemtajās teritorijās valsts un pašvaldības iestādes, kā arī iedzīvotāji cieta grūti aprēķināmus, taču nozīmīgus zaudējumus, jo karaspēka daļas izdarīja ne vien rekvizīcijas, bet pat atklātas laupīšanas un konfiskācijas, organizēti izveda materiālās un kultūras vērtības. Šī situācija vēl vairāk palielināja jau tā augsto noziedzības līmeni, no kura cieta iedzīvotāji un iestādes.

Patiesi novatorisks ir sanitārā stāvokļa raksturojums – frontē, aizmugurē un

atbrīvotajā Latgalē. Ē. Jēkabsona ievērojamais devums ir divējāds: pirmkārt, viņš pats ir autors nopietniem pētījumiem par sanitāro stāvokli (piemēram, 2020. gadā ir publicēts darbs par dizentērijas epidēmiju Latvijā); otrkārt, viņa vadībā ir izauguši jauni vēsturnieki, kuri pievērsušies minētajai tēmai (piemēram, Inna Gile, kura jau pati ir novatorisku darbu autore).

Aplūkojot politiskās un militārās norises 1920. gada vasarā–rudenī, uzmanība pievērsta Bulduru konferencei, miera līguma parakstīšanai ar Krieviju un frontes likvidācijai, kā arī konfliktam ar lietuviešiem Ilūkstes apriņķī: 1920. gada vasaras beigās Latvijā atradās apmēram 4000 lietuviešu karavīru, kuri pilnībā kontrolēja stāvokli teritorijā ar samērā latviskajiem Ilūkstes apriņķa pagastiem; lietuviešu karaspēks lēnām, bet noteikti paplašināja to kontrolēto teritoriju, pakāpeniski virzoties uz ziemeļiem un padzenot no ieņemtās teritorijas Latvijas varas iestādes. Savukārt Latvijas armija jau no 1919. gada ieņēma pārsvarā lietuvisko Palangu un arī Mažeļķus.

Apjomīgo ievadrakstu noslēdz Neatkarības kara kopējā bilance par dzīvā spēka zaudējumiem un secinājumiem. Autors secina, ka Latgales operācija, kurā Latvijas teritorija tika atbrīvota no pēdējā ienaidnieka – Padomju Krievijas varas –, bija Neatkarības kara ilgākā operācija, kas aizņēma vairāk par septiņiem mēnešiem. Sekmīga bija Latvijas un Polijas sadarbība Latgalē – bez Polijas armijas atbalsta, tai uzņemoties pārraudzīt ievērojamu frontes sektoru, Latvijas armijai teritoriju atbrīvot būtu grūti vai pat neiespējami.

Sākot aplūkot krājumā ievietotos dokumentus, es gribētu īpašu uzmanību pievērst ierēdņa A. Perlbaņa ziņojumam par stāvokli Vecgulbenes un Balvu apkārtnē 1919. gada 15. decembrī (dok. Nr. 6) – tas ļoti uzskatāmi parāda, cik smagā stāvoklī atradās Latvijas apgabali, kurus bija okupējis Igaunijas karaspēks: “*Lieta ir gājusi tik tālu, ka*

iedzīvotāji igauņu kara pulkus dēvē par *bandām*, kas līdzīgi *Bermontam* nākušas izpostīt Latviju un tā iedzīvoties. Igaunņu tuvums vai viņa vārda pieminēšana jau vien sacēļ bailes daudz cietušos lauciniekos. [...] *Nemiers par igauņiem iedzīvotājos ir liels. No nemitīgām laupīšanām un patvarībām iebaidīti, tie padodas bez pretrunām dažādām igauņu iegribām un pūlas neizpaust viņu noziegumus, lai nesāņemtu atribību.*” (85., 89. lpp.) Igaunņu loma vēsturiskajā uzvarā pār vācu karaspēku Cēsu kaujās bija milzīga, taču tagad igauņi bija kļuvuši arī par apspiedējiem.

Viena no krājuma galvenajām tēmām ir Latgales atbrīvošana, un daudzi dokumenti ļauj tai rūpīgi izsekot, sākot ar Latvijas un Polijas militārās sadarbības līgumu 1919. gada 28. [30.] decembrī (dok. Nr. 16), ar kuru vairākums lasītāju sastapsies pirmo reizi. Izsekojot kauju gaitai Latgalē, uzzināsim, ka “*kaujā pie Sula [Sūļiem] (7–8 verstis uz ziemeļiem no Rēzeknes–Krustpils dzelzceļa) ņēmuši dalību ķīnieši. [...] ir domājams, ka tie pieder pie tā paša “otrjad”, kurš stāvēja Daugavpilī*” (dok. Nr. 43, 140. lpp.). Savukārt, raksturojot noskaņojumu Sarkanajā armijā, Latvijas armijas virspavēlnieka Operatīvā daļa 1920. gada 14. janvārī konstatēja, ka “*gara stāvoklis Sarkan[aj]ā armijā ar katru dienu top vājāks. Bezpartejiskie atsakās no karošanas, uzkraudami visu vainu par karu komunistiem. Pēdējie ar sitieniem piespiež kareivjus iet kaujā. Gūstekņu starpā daudzi no komunistiem stipri sadauzīti*” (141. lpp.).

Krājumā ir publicēts Latvijas un Padomju Krievijas līgums par pamieru, kas tika parakstīts Maskavā 1920. gada 30. janvārī (dok. Nr. 61). Tas ir ļoti vērtīgi: miera līgums ar Padomju Krieviju ir daudz maz zināms, jo ir vairākkārt publicēts, taču pamiera līgumu lielākā daļa interesentu varēs lasīt pirmo reizi.

Kā jau atzīmēts iepriekš, krājuma lasītāji pirmo reizi iepazīsies ar plašiem dokumentiem par sanitāro situāciju Latvijā minētajā laikā. Armijas kara sanitārās pārvaldes

priekšnieka palīga A. Brambata ziņojumā 1920. gada 14. februārī (dok. Nr. 79) atzīmēts: “*Nopostītas un piegānītas sētas un mājas, utis un sērgas ir tas mantojums, ko Padomju Krievija atstājusi izmocītai Latgalei.*” (188. lpp.) Pārvarot vislielākās grūtības, tika iekārtotas iespējami labi apgādātas lazaretis: “*Kurzemes divīzijas lauku lazaretis palātas, kuras bija labi apsildītas un vēdinātas, ar savu tīrību, tīro gultas un slimnieku miesas veļu atstāja vislabāko iespaidu. [...] Lazaretē 6. II [19] 20. g. pusdienā bija laba zirņu zupa ar cūkas gaļu.*” (189. lpp.) Šķietami pavisam ikdienišķa lieta – laba zirņu zupa, bet cik daudz tā nozīmēja izvārgušaļiem slimniekiem!

Polijas karaspēka loma Latgales atbrīvošanā bija ļoti liela, taču, kā pierāda krājumā ievietotie dokumenti, Latvija diezgan drīz sāka ilgoties pēc poļu karaspēka ātrākas aiziešanas, jo tā uzvedība nereti bija diezgan rupja. Tā 1920. gada 11. aprīlī Daugavpils apriņķa komandanta vietas izpildītājs A. Ozoliņš ziņoja: “*[...] katru dienu ienāk man vairāku iedzīvotāju žēlošanās, ka ceļā poļi uzbrūkot, vajājot un dauzot iedzīvotājus [...] Daugavpils Liksnas pagasta vecākais Staņislavs Ivbulis sadauzīts līdz nesamaņai*” (dok. Nr. 125, 240. lpp.). Līdz ar to ir saprotams atvieglējums, kāds Latvijā iestājās, kad poļu karavīri Latviju beidzot atstāja.

Ļoti nozīmīgs notikums Latvijas vēsturē bija bēgļu atgriešanās no Krievijas. Krājumā ir ievietots svarīgais Latvijas un Padomju Krievijas līgums par bēgļu reevakuāciju, kas tika parakstīts Maskavā 1920. gada 13. jūnijā (dok. Nr. 165). Arī šis dokuments lasītājiem ir mazāk zināms, un tā pilnīga publikācija ir ļoti vērtīga.

Krājuma sastādītāja nolūks bijis sniegt iespējami godīgu un objektīvu skatījumu uz notikumu gaitu Latvijā 1919. gada beigās – 1920. gadā. Nav bijis ne mazākās vēlēšanās radīt iluzoru, izskaistinātu ainu. Tā, piemēram, kāds 5. Cēsu kājnieku pulka 9. rotas kareivis 1920. gada 17. jūnijā (dok. Nr. 171)



atzina: “Še vēl arvienu tiek piekopta kandžas brīvvešana. Gadās bieži redzēt līdz nesamaņai piedzērušos kareivjus un civilos.” (273. lpp.) Savukārt Latgales divīzijas štāba priekšnieka vietas izpildītājs A. Dālbergs 25. jūnijā (dok. Nr. 176) konstatēja: “Mūsu armijā tagad dien zināms skaits virsnieku, kuri tika pārvesti no krievu armijām (Judeņiča, Deņikina). Pēc ie-nākušām ziņām daži no šiem virsniekiem rupji apejoties ar kareivjiem pēc vecas ieražas. Tas pie tagadējiem apstākļiem un Latvijas armijas kareivja īpašībām nav nekādā ziņā pielai-žams.” (277. lpp.) Te uzskatāmi redzams, ka jaunā Latvijas armija nevēlējās būt vecās Krievijas armijas lidziniece.

Krājumā ir publicēti divi ļoti svarīgi li-gumi: 1920. gada 15. jūlija Pagaidu līgums par sakaru atjaunošanu starp Latviju un Vāciju un vēsturiskais Latvijas un Padomju Krievijas miera līgums. Lai arī abi doku-menti jau ir tikuši publicēti, to atkārtota publicēšana ir pilnīgi attaisnojama un va-jadzīga. Savukārt Ārlietu ministrijas Poli-tiski diplomātiskā departamenta direktora L. Sējas pārskats par ārpolitisko situāciju 1920. gada 23. jūnijā (dok. Nr. 195) ir vē-rtīgs pirmpublicējums, kurā ir arī savīlņojošs Polijas stāvokļa apraksts: “Polijas stāvoklis kara laukos palicis katastrofāls. Poļu armija vairs neatkāpjas, bet nekārtībā bēg. Lielinieki paši necerēja, ka lietas ies priekš viņiem tik spoži. Latvijā uz poļu uzbrukumu [Ukrai-nā] arvien skatījās ar lielām bažām, bet ka


notikumi dabūs tik strauju tempu, to tomēr neviens nedomāja.” (299. lpp.) Polijas sakā-ve būtu bijusi katastrofa arī Latvijai, varbūt pat visai Eiropai. Par laimi, pēc kāda laika notika “brīnums pie Vislas” un Sarkanā ar-mija tika sakauta; ar to tika nosargāta arī Latvijas neatkarība.

Krājuma beigu daļā viens no vērtīgā-kajiem dokumentiem ir Zemgales divīzijas komandiera Oskara Dankera 1920. gada 21. augusta pavēle (dok. Nr. 210) par ope-rācijas uzsākšanu pret Lietuvas karaspēku Ilūkstes apriņķī: “Mēs nedrīkstam ilgāk ne-dzirdēt savu brāļu saucienus, kuri, tāpat kā mēs, grib dzīvot brīvā Latvijā, baudot ar mūsu asinīm un dzīvībām iegūto mieru, tāpēc mūsu valdība nolēmusi, ka mums pašiem jāapsargā savi brāļi Kurzemē pret visu to, ko viņi tagad cieš. Mūsu varonīg[aj]iem kara vīriem jāie-ved miers un kārtība visā Kurzemē no viņas ritu robežas līdz pat Baltijas jūras krastiem. Mēs negribam karot, bet tikai darīt galu mūsu kaimiņu – leišu bezkaunīgajai uzbāzībai.” (323. lpp.) Varētu likties, ka tik patētiski vārdi iederētos tikai uzsaukumā pret Ber-montu vai Sarkanu armiju, taču tagad tie skanēja pret šķietami brālīgo Lietuvu.

Krājumā ir atspoguļoti visi Neatkarības kara nobeiguma aspekti – militārie, politis-kie, diplomātiskie, sociālie, starpnacionālie. Tāpat kā trīs iepriekšējie krājumi, arī šis būs neaizvietojams katram pētniekam un interesentam.

## Austrumu baznīcas Livonijā

Recenzija par grāmatu: Andrzej Gil. Kościoły wschodnie w Inflantach i ich zaplecze w okresie od XIII do początku XIX wieku. Konteksty – uwarunkowania – tradycje. Lublin 2019. [Andžejs Gils. Austrumu Baznīcas un to struktūras Livonijā posmā no 13. līdz 19. gs. sākumam. Konteksti – apstākļi – tradīcijas. Ļubļina 2019]



Edvards Seliška, Mg. hist.

2019. gadā Ļubļinas Katoļu universitāte (*Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski*) izdeva Austrumu kristietības konfesiju vēstures speciālista profesora Andžeja Gila (*Andrzej Gil*) grāmatu “Austrumu Baznīcas un to struktūras Livonijā posmā no 13. līdz 19. gs. sākumam. Konteksti – apstākļi – tradīcijas” (*Kościoły wschodnie w Inflantach i ich zaplecze w okresie od XIII do początku XIX wieku. Konteksty – uwarunkowania – tradycje*). Jānorāda, ka grāmata jau izdošanas brīdī ir bibliogrāfisks retums, jo iznācis tikai 50 eksemplāros.

Pirms pievērsties pētījumā aplūkotajiem jautājumiem, jāatzīmē, ka būtiska ir ģeopolitiskā terminoloģija, kas parādās jau pašā darba nosaukumā. Runa ir par terminu “Inflantija” (*Inflanty*) poļu valodā, kas latviski tulkots kā “Livonija”. Būtiski ir zināt šī termina lietojuma kontekstu konkrētā brīdī, jo ar šo vārdu Polijas vēstures zinātnē apzīmē dažādas teritorijas – Livonijas zemes 13.–16. gs., Žečpospoļitas jeb Polijas–Lietuvas pakļautībā esošo Pārdaugavas hercogisti 16.–17. gs., t. s. “Zviedru Vidzemi” 17.–18. gs., Polijas–Lietuvas valsts pārvaldībā palikušo mūsdienu Latgales teritoriju 17.–18. gs. (Inflantijas vojevodisti jeb hercogisti), Krievijas sastāvā nonākušo “Zviedru Vidzemi” 18.–20. gs. vai pat visu mūsdienu Latvijas teritoriju ar Igauniju vai bez tās, bet ar Kurzemes un Zemgales hercogistes teritoriju jebkurā laika posmā starp viduslaikiem un 20. gs. sākumu. Kā redzams, A. Gils ērtības labad izmanto pēdējo risinājumu. Apsveicami, ka autors šo problēmu aplūko jau ievadā un cenšas to skaidrot.

Darba mērķis, kuru autors izvirza, ir mēģinājums sniegt visu trīs Austrumu kristietības novirzienu, kuri vēsturiski bija klātesoši Latvijā un Igaunijā, – pareizticības, vecticības un uniātisma – pirmo sintēzi. Būtiska loma darbā ierādīta politisko un militārpolitisko procesu

mijiedarbībai un lomai šo konfesiju vēsturē. Tādēļ recenzijā aplūkots gan autora veikums, kas attiecas tieši uz šo konfesiju vēsturi, gan arī rakstītais par politiskajām un militārajām norisēm.

Darba ģeogrāfiskais ietvars ir fokusēts uz ieguldījumu arī Polijas vēstures izpētē. Ir rakstīts par visu viduslaiku Livonijas teritoriju 13.–15. gs., taču no 16.–18. gs. aplūkotas tikai tās Latvijas un Igaunijas zemes, kuras dažādos laika posmos bijušas Žečpospoļitas tiešā pakļautībā vai vasaļatkarībā (kā Kurzemes un Zemgales hercogiste). Piemēram, ir aplūkota situācija Latgalē 18. gs. (141.–164. lpp.), bet ne Vidzemē vai Rīgā. Līdz ar to darba smaguma centrs ir tieši 16.–18. gs. (69.–186. lpp.). Tomēr atrodamā arī zināma nekonsekvenca – pielikumā Nr. 1 (279.–282. lpp.) ir mēģināts dot ieskatu par pareizticīgās Baznīcas funkcionēšanu Vidzemes guberņā, tajā skaitā par latviešu zemnieku pāriešanu pareizticībā. Tas ir atsevišķs, gana komplekss temats, kura problemātiskumu jau populārzinātniski iezīmējis Mārtiņš Mintauris.<sup>1</sup> Šim jautājumam būtu jāvelta atsevišķs padziļināts pētījums, vai arī par to šajā monogrāfijā nebūtu jāraksta vispār. Savukārt pielikumi Nr. 2 un 3 ir ļoti vērtīgi – tie ir vieni no retajiem monogrāfijā izmantotajiem arhīva materiāliem, kas ienesti zinātniskajā aprītē.

Šis profesora A. Gila darbs ienāk pētījumu telpā, kurā jau ir Latvijas vēsturnieku sintēzes vai to mēģinājumi, kuri attiecas gan uz pareizticību, gan vecticību. Uzreiz gan jānorāda, ka daļai šo pētījumu ir tendence izteikt morālu vērtējumu “labs” vai “ļauns” par tiem vai citiem Latvijas vēstures spēlētājiem. No pareizticības apoloģētikas viedokļa, kur savīti vācu (luterāņa) vai poļu (katoļa) “muižnieka-apspiedēja”, “apspiestā latviešu zemnieka” un “ieciētīgā pareizticīgā misionāra” motīvi, rakstījis Antonijs Pommers.<sup>2</sup> Šāda pieeja bija ieturēta Jurija Samarina 19. gs. vidū “Vēstulēs no Rīgas” radītajā diskursā, rakstot par Baltiju no

lielkrievu pozīcijām.<sup>3</sup> Lielā mērā šo pieeju bija pārņēmis arī Latvijas baltkrievu izglītības darbinieks Sergejs Saharovs,<sup>4</sup> kurš pozitīvi raudzījās uz pareizticību un negatīvi uz uniātismu.<sup>5</sup> 20. gs. beigās un 21. gs. nenovērtējams ir profesora Aleksandra Gavriļina veikums, kaut gan viņš pamatā pētīja pareizticību Latvijā 19.–20. gs.<sup>6</sup>

Ņemot vērā vecticībnieku vēsturiski ciešo saikni ar Latviju un faktu, ka Latvijas teritorijā dzīvojošo krievu vidū tā bija izplatītākā konfesija,<sup>7</sup> šis novirziens ir salīdzinoši labi pētīts. Vecticībai veltīta Arnolda Podomazova sintēze,<sup>8</sup> kurā, ņemot vērā vecticībnieku vēstures īpatnības, Zobenbrāļu ordenis viduslaikos vērtēts negatīvi, savukārt Žečpospoļitas varas posms Latgalē vai pat konkrētu muižnieku, piemēram, Konstantīna Kazimira Plātera,<sup>9</sup> darbība aplūkota pozitīvi.<sup>10</sup> Pētīti arī atsevišķi aspekti, kā Novgorodas bezpriesteru vecticībnieku ienākšana Inflantijā Feodosija Vasiļjeva vadībā.<sup>11</sup> Jāatzīmē arī pie sociālās vēstures pieskaitāmā Nadeždas Pazuhinas eseja par vecticībnieku integrētību Latvijas sabiedrībā. Pareizticībai Kurzēmē pievērsusies Kristīne Ante,<sup>12</sup> bet Maija Grizāne mēģinājusi sniegt pareizticības un vecticības vēstures sintēzi Latvijā 19.–20. gs.<sup>13</sup>

Par uniātismu, ņemot vērā arī mazāku tā klātesamību Latvijā, pētījumu ir krietni mazāk. Valda Franciska Plennes veikums ir plašākais šobrīd latviešu valodā pieejamais darbs.<sup>14</sup> Šajā kontekstā A. Gila pētījuma nodaļas, kas veltītas uniātisma vēsturei Latvijā (171.–178., 179.–186. lpp.), ir pilnīgākais uniātisma Latvijā raksturojums poļu valodā. Uz visu triju novirzienu aprakstīšanu 16.–18. gs. Latgales teritorijā pretendē Reiņa Norkārkla pētījums, kurā cita starpā izmantoti arī Latvijas Nacionālā arhīva Latvijas Valsts vēstures arhīva (LNA LVVA) materiāli<sup>15</sup> – tas pietrūcis citiem pētījumiem.<sup>16</sup>

Profesora A. Gila darba struktūru veido ievads, piecas nodaļas, kuras sadalītas

apakšnodaļās, nobeigums, kopsavilkums krievu valodā un pielikumi. Pozitīvi vērtējams tas, ka visu nodaļu noslēgumā ir arī kopsavilkums vai secinājumi. Darba ievads faktiski ir problēmas izklāsta un ļoti virspusēja historiogrāfijas ieskata sajaukums. Tas ļauj uzreiz apzināt autora avotu bāzi – tā ir gandrīz tikai zinātniskie pētījumi un publicētie avoti. A. Gilam trūkst izmantoto avotu un literatūras analīzes, īpaši ņemot vērā, ka izmantotā literatūra ir plaša. Taču ir piefiksēti Latvijas vēsturnieki, kuri pēta kristīgo konfesiju vēsturi, un A. Gila grāmata noteikti būs labs uzziņas avots nākamajiem vēsturniekiem par jau veiktajiem pētījumiem, īpaši krievu un baltkrievu zinātnieku darbiem.

Rakstot par publicētajiem avotiem, autors tiešām izmantojis maksimāli plašu pieejamo literatūru, kurā atrodamas ziņas par Austrumu kristīgajām konfesijām. Publicētie avoti ir, piemēram, Žečpospoļitas Seima uzdevumā veiktā Pārdaugavas hercogistes muižu revīzija 1599. gadā<sup>17</sup> vai hercogistes katoļu baznīcu vizitācija 1613. gadā.<sup>18</sup> Taču nav izmantoti publicētie avoti latviešu valodā (Boļeslava Brežgo<sup>19</sup> vai Staņislava Škutāna<sup>20</sup> izdotie materiāli). Nav izmantoti arī ne Lietuvas, ne Polijas arhīvi, kuros ir ļoti bagātīga sava laika ietekmīgāko Žečpospoļitas dzimtu sarakste, kas aptver plašu tēmu loku un kur parādās reliģiskie un konfesionālie aspekti, piemēram, Lietuvas Valsts vēstures arhīvs Viļņā (*Lietuvos valstybės istorijos archyvas*), kurā ir 1276. fonds – t. s. Plāteru fonds, vai Seno aktu galvenais arhīvs Varšavā (*Archiwum Głównie Akt Dawnych*), kurā ir Radzivilu vai Tizenhauzu fondi. Tāpat nodēriņas var būt LNA LVVA 712. un 1881. fondu atrodamās Ludzas, Rēzeknes un Daugavpils traktu revīzijas 1772.–1773. gadā, ko veikušas Krievijas varas iestādes vai vietējā šļahta pēc viņu norādījuma.<sup>21</sup> Kā statistisks materiāls tas ir labs avots arī etnisko un reliģisko aspektu analīzei.

Uzmanības vērta ir informācija, kas atrodama atsaucēs, – tās ir ļoti apjomīgas,

tiesa gan, to izvietošanas princips var apgrūtināt tālākus meklējumus, jo nereti rindkopas beigās ielikta atsauce, kas ietver četrus, pat piecus darbus, kuri attiecas uz dažādām pamatteksta daļām, taču ir grūti izsekot, uz kuru tieši.

Pirmā nodaļa, ņemot vērā arī avotu izpētes līmeni (piemēram, Ēvalda Mugurēviča pētījumi, kuri gan nav specifiski par pareizticību viduslaiku Livonijā, taču ir faktoloģiski bagāti), ir tiešām veiksmīgs pārskats par Polockas, Pleskavas, Novgorodas, Lietuvas kņazu, Livonijas ordeņa un katoļu Baznīcas Livonijā politiski militāro mijiedarbību konfesionālajā politikā.

Otrajā nodaļā daudz, vietām pārāk daudz vietas veltīts 16. gs. vidus un otrās puses Livonijas politiskās vēstures aprakstam. Saprotama ir autora vēlme iepazīstināt poļu lasītāju ar plašāku Livonijas kara vēstures militārpolitisko fonu, taču tas jau ir aprakstīts gan fundamentālos Latvijas vēsturnieku darbos 20. gs. vidū,<sup>22</sup> gan mūsdienu poļu zinātniskajā literatūrā – Annas Zemlevskas pētījumā par Rīgu Žečpospoļitas varā.<sup>23</sup> Līdz ar to grāmatas otrās nodaļas ceturta (77.–79. lpp.) un piektā apakšnodaļa (79.–81. lpp.), kuras aplūko Žečpospoļitas–Maskavas karu un Krievijas cara Ivana IV un Dānijas prinča Magnusa attiecības, ir pārāk plašas un iziet ārpus darba tēmas. Savukārt, rakstot par Livonijas karu (1558.–1582. g.), autors, mēģinādams konspektīvi to izklāstīt, vienkāršo vairākus aspektus, un tas noved pie neprecizitātēm. Turklāt autors lielā mērā paļaujas uz baltkrievu un krievu pētījumiem. A. Gils izsaka interesantu domu, ka caram Ivanam IV sākotnēji nav bijis tālejošu stratēģisku plānu iekarot Livoniju un ka tie veidojušies pakāpeniski (tajā skaitā ideoloģizējot pareizticības lomu), jo cara militārpolitisko interešu smaguma centrs tobrīd bijusi Kazana un Astrahaņa. Taču vienlaikus tas disonē ar autora norādi turpat iepriekš, ka cara politika attiecībā uz Livoniju bijusi Maskavas lielkņazu Ivana III un Vasilija III politikas

turpinājums (73.–74. lpp.) un ka faktiski pareizticība bija mērķtiecīgas krievu imperiālisma politikas sastāvdaļa līdzās kolonizēšanai (204.–205., 208. lpp.). Līdz ar to jānorāda, ka Maskavas lielkņaziste kā Lietuvas lielkņazistes un Livonijas kopējais ienaidnieks iezīmējas jau 16. gs. sākumā,<sup>24</sup> nevis tikai Livonijas kara priekšvakarā (74. lpp.). Diez vai veiksmīgs ir formulējums, ka Livonijas ordeņa lielmeistrs fon Firstenbergas panāca Polijas karaļa un Lietuvas lielkņaza Sigismunda II Augusta iesaistīšanos Livonijas iekšējās cīņās 16. gs. 50. gadu beigās (73. lpp.). Būtisks Livonijas iekšējās militārpolitiskajās cīņās bija starptautiskais aspekts – Polijas karali un Lietuvas lielkņazu Sigismundu II Augustu satrauca, viņuprāt, iespējamā Livonijas un Maskavas lielkņazistes politiskā tuvināšanās.<sup>25</sup> Tāpat arī, minot Rīgas neieņemšanu, argumentus autors smeļas tikai no krievu avotiem (100. lpp., 39. ats.).<sup>26</sup> Attiecībā uz t. s. Sigismunda Augusta privilēģiju (1561. g.), kas tiešām bija nozīmīgs dokuments muižnieku apziņā gan Vidzemē zviedru un krievu valdīšanas posmā, gan Latgalē (Inflantijas vojevodistē) (76. lpp.), vērts atgādināt: kaut faktiski vācbaltiešu muižnieki īstenoja tajā pausto, tomēr vienīgais monarhs, kurš to atzina juridiski, bija Žečpospolītas Staņislavs Augusts Poņatovskis 1764. gadā.<sup>27</sup>

Noteikti niansētāk jārauga uz mazpētīto 1570.–1582. g. Maskavas varas posmu Livonijā, kad, kā norāda profesors A. Gils, norisa “Livonijas kolonizācija” (79.–80. lpp.). Kaut vai livoniešu Jirgena fon Fārensbaha vai Johanna Taubes dienēšana Ivanam IV<sup>28</sup> vai livoniešu “promaskaviskā partija”, sarunas ar Maskavu<sup>29</sup> veido ainu, kurā livoniešu un Maskavas attiecības bija sarežģītākas, nekā var šķist. Taču jebkurā gadījumā A. Gils pirmais ir mēģinājis izveidot visaptverošu priekšstatu par šo neilgo Maskavas varas posmu Livonijā no reliģijas vēstures viedokļa.

Trešās nodaļas sākumā, kura skar posmu pēc 1582. gada, noteikti noderīgs būtu

ieskats atšķirīgajos pareizticības novirzienos – attiecības starp Konstantinopoles un Maskavas patriarhātu un Žečpospolītas laicīgās varas nostāja. Faktiski autors tam piešķir, taču nesniedz plašāku ieskatu, kas lasītājam nespeciālistam noteikti ļautu labāk izprast niansas. Piemēram, ļoti interesanta ir informācija par “polisko pareizticību” (178. lpp.), kas prasītu padziļinātāku izpēti.

Noteikti ne kā pārmetums autoram, jo tas nav viņa tiešā uzmanības lokā, minams fakts, ka viņš piemin vairākus datus par 17. gs., kuri izklāstīti ļoti “tradicionāli”, taču nebūt nav tik viennozīmīgi. Būtu bijis vērts kaut vai īsumā norādīt uz Inflantijas izveidošanās īpatnībām 17. gs. 20. un vēlāk 60. gados. Pirmajā gadījumā šī Latvijas teritorijas daļa Žečpospolītas sastāvā paliek Zviedrijas neieinteresētības dēļ,<sup>30</sup> bet otrajā gadījumā nejaušības dēļ, jo gan Žečpospolīta, gan Krievija bija gatavas atteikties no šīs teritorijas par labu otrai.<sup>31</sup> Polijas–Lietuvas monarhu Stefana Batorija un Sigismunda III īpašumu izdales politika Pārdaugavas hercogistē kā apbalvojums par labu dienestu (126. lpp.) bija iecerēta, taču praksē nācās iecelt amatos livoniešus un atsevišķos gadījumos arī pareizticīgos Žečpospolītas šļahtičus.<sup>32</sup> Tāpat noteikti dziļākas izpētes vērts ir jautājums par Livonijas rekatolizācijas mērķiem (128.–129. lpp.) – vai Stefana Batorija mērķi sakrita ar jezuītu mērķiem ģeogrāfiski<sup>33</sup> un vai tas neslēpa sevī dziļāku konfliktu nākotnē starp laicīgo un garīgo varu par to, kurš ir vadošais Baznīcas ģeopolitisko un ticības mērķu noteicējs?

1677. gadā izveidotās Inflantijas vojevodistes pārvaldei varēja pievērsties vairāk, jo tas labāk ļautu izprast ģeopolitisko situāciju, demogrāfisko un migrācijas aspektu ietekmi uz kristīgajām konfesijām. Piemēram, jautājums par to, kā Inflantijas vojevodiste vietējā limeņa sanāksmēs (seimikos) izraudzījās Seima deputātus. Šie seši deputāti (bija gadījumi, kad izraudzījās mazāk) nepārstāvēja tautības (125. lpp.), tie



## ATSAUCES UN SKAIDROJUMI

- <sup>1</sup> MĀRTIŅŠ MINTAURS, MĀRIS ZANDERS. U. c. Ārpus kolektīvās atmiņas palikušie. Rīga 2023, 104.–111. lpp.
- <sup>2</sup> ANTONIJS POMMERS. Pareizticība Latvijā. Vēsturisks apcerējums. Rīga 2015 (1931. gada atkārtots izdevums), 6.–18. lpp.
- <sup>3</sup> JURIJ SAMARIN. Pravoslavije i narodnostj. Moskva 2008, s. 511–547.
- <sup>4</sup> SERGEJS SAHAROVŠ. No Latvijas vēstures. Pareizticīgā Baznīca Latgalē. Vēsturiski statistiski apraksts. Ilūkstes apriņķa baznīcas. 1. daļa. Rīga 1938 (manuskripts krievu val.), 16.–33., 248. lpp.  
Tā kā S. Saharovs bija “Batkaušcīna” redzams darbinieks, tad acīmredzot bija saistīts arī ar Latvijas baltkrievu politisko darbinieku, pretrunīgo Konstantīnu Jezovītovu, kurš savukārt 20. gs. 20. un 30. gados bija Latvijas izlūkdienestu redzeslokā. OJĀRS NIEDRE, ALDIS BERGMANIS, ZINTA ĀBOLA. Latvijas izlūkdienesti, 1919–1940: 664 likteņi. Rīga 2001, 239.–241. lpp.
- <sup>5</sup> Par baltkrievu nacionālo pašapziņu un uniātismu sk.: ANTONI MIRONOWICZ. Wpływ wyznań religijnych na kształtowanie się białoruskiej świadomości narodowej w XIX wieku. In: JOANNA GETKA, JERZY GRZYBOWSKI (eds.). Tożsamość białoruska. Doświadczenia przeszłości i wyzwania teraźniejszości. W 30. rocznicę uzyskania przez Białoruś niepodległości. Warszawa 2021, s. 27–42.
- <sup>6</sup> ALEKSANDR GAVRIĻIN. Očerki istoriji Rižskoi jeparhiji. 19. vek. Rīga 1999; ALEKSANDR GAVRIĻIN. Liutsinskoje (Ludzenskoje) blagochinije Polotsko-Vitebskoj jeparhiji vo vtoroi polovine XIX – načale XX veka. Rīga 2004; deviņi rakstu krājumi: ALEKSANDR GAVRIĻIN (sost.). Pravoslavņije v Latviji. Istoričeskije očerki = Pareizticība Latvijā. Vēstures apcerējumi. 1993–2011.
- <sup>7</sup> VLADISLAVS VOLKOVŠ. Krievi Latvijā. Rīga 1996, 7. lpp.
- <sup>8</sup> ARNOLDS PODOMAZOVŠ. Vecticība Latvijā. Rīga 2001.
- <sup>9</sup> Kazimīrs Konstantīns Plāters (*Kazimierz Konstanty Plater*, 1749–1807). Kopš 1770. gada Daugavpils stārasts, 1793.–1795. gadā Lietuvas lielkņazistes pēdējais vicekanclers.
- <sup>10</sup> PODOMAZOVŠ, Vecticība Latvijā, 50.–69. lpp.
- <sup>11</sup> KIRILL KOŽURIN. Staroobrjadčeskije duhovnyje centry rusko-pol'skogo pograničyja v XVII–XX vv. In: ALEKSANDRS GAVRIĻINS (sast.). Latvijas vecticībnieku identitātes saglabāšanas vēsturiskā pieredze. Rīga 2014, 217.–232. lpp.
- <sup>12</sup> KRISTINE ANTE. Kurzemes guberņas kristīgās draudzes 19. gs. 2. pusē: konfesionālisma iezīmes. Promocijas darba kopsavilkums. Rīga 2011, 19.–28. lpp.
- <sup>13</sup> MAIJA GRIZĀNE. Pareizticība un vecticība: starpkonfesionālā integrēšana Vitebskas guberņas rietumu apriņķos 19. gs. beigās – 20. gs. sākumā. Promocijas darba kopsavilkums. Daugavpils 2022.
- <sup>14</sup> VALDIS FRANCISKS PLENNE. Uniāti Latvijas teritorijā 17.–19. gadsimtā. In: Latvijas Arhivi 2018, Nr. 1, 52.–94. lpp.  
Internētā pieejama arī versija: <https://fsspx-fspsd.lv/baznīcas-vesture/baznīca-latvija/322-uniāti-latvija-17-19>
- <sup>15</sup> Piemēram, Latvijas Nacionālā arhīva Latvijas Valsts vēstures arhīvs, Rīga (turpmāk – LNA LVVA), 2598. fonds jeb t. s. Borhu arhīvs vai LNA LVVA 6984. fonds jeb t. s. Brežgo arhīvs.
- <sup>16</sup> REINIS NORKĀRKLŠ. Protestanti un austrumu kristieši Latgalē Polijas–Lietuvas valdīšanas laikā, 1582–1772. In: Ceļš 2011, Nr. 61, 147.–178. lpp., šeit 167.–176. lpp.
- <sup>17</sup> JÓZEF KORDZIKOWSKI, JAN JAKUBOWSKI (eds.). Polska XVI wieku pod względem geograficzno-statystycznym. Tom 13(1). Warszawa 1915.
- <sup>18</sup> FRIEDRICH GEORG VON BUNGE (ed.). Archiv für die Geschichte Liv-, Est- und Curlands. Band 1, 2. Verm. Revel 1857, S. 18–72.
- <sup>19</sup> BOĻESLAVS BREŽGO. Latgolas inventari un generalmēreišonas zem'ū aproksti, 1695.–1784. Daugavpils 1943; BOĻESLAVS BREŽGO. Latgolas vēstures materiāli. Daugavpils 1944.
- <sup>20</sup> STAŅISLAVS ŠKUTĀNS (sast.). Dokumenti par klaušu laikim Latgolā. [Minhene] 1974.

- <sup>21</sup> Saimnieciskās vēstures kontekstā šie materiāli izmantoti: EDVARDS SELIŠKA. Polijas–Lietuvas (Žečpospolitas) Inflantijas vojevodistes (1677–1772) nodokļu un ienākumu jautājums. In: Latvijas Universitātes Žurnāls. Vēsture 2022, Nr. 13/14, 61.–78. lpp.
- <sup>22</sup> EDGARS DUNSDORFS, ARNOLDS SPEKKE. Latvijas vēsture 1500–1600. Daugava 1964; EDGARS DUNSDORFS. Latvijas vēsture 1600–1710. Daugava 1962; VASĪLJS DOROŠENKO. Rīga Livonijas kara laikā (1558.–1583. g.), Rīga Polijas valsts sastāvā, “Kalendāra nemieri”. In: TEODORS ZEIDS (sast.). Feodālā Rīga. Rīga 1978, 126.–145. lpp.
- <sup>23</sup> ANNA ZIEMLEWSKA. Ryga w Rzeczypospolitej polsko-litewskiej (1581–1621). Toruń 2008.
- <sup>24</sup> Ibidem, s. 34.
- <sup>25</sup> Ibidem, 35–36. Padomju historiogrāfijas skatījumā savukārt Ivana IV iebrukumu Livonijā 1558. gadā pilnībā attaisnoja bažas par Livonijas–Polijas un Lietuvas savienību pret Maskavu. VASĪLJS DOROŠENKO. Livonijas karš un tā sekas. In: ALEKSANDRS DRĪZULIS (sast.). LPSR vēsture. 1. daļa. Rīga 1986, 65. lpp. Salīdzinājumam sk.: LEONARD DERBOV. Bor'ba Russkogo gosudarstva za Pribaltiku i Belorussiju v 60-h godah XVI v. In: MARK PERSOV (ed.). Učenyje zapiski Saratovskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Har'kov 1956, Tom 47, S. 149–181.
- <sup>26</sup> Salīdzinājumam sk. vācu autoru pētījumus: ZIEMLEWSKA, Ryga, s. 53–54.
- <sup>27</sup> EDVARDS SELIŠKA. Inflantijas (Latgales) muižnieki Žečpospolitas politiskajos notikumos (1677–1764). In: ALĪNA ROMANOVSKA (sast.). Vācieši Latgales teritorijā 16. gs. – 20. gs. sākumā: vēsture un recepcija. Kolektīvā zinātniskā monogrāfija. Daugavpils 2021, 43.–83. lpp., šeit 49. lpp.
- <sup>28</sup> EDVARDS SELIŠKA. Konfesionālās piederības nozīmes augstāko un stārstu amatu sadalē Pārdaugavas hercogistē (1582–1629) analīze. In: Latvijas Vēstures Institūta Žurnāls 2023, Nr. 1, 29.–62. lpp., šeit 49., 51. lpp.
- <sup>29</sup> DOROŠENKO, Rīga Livonijas kara laikā, 128. lpp.; ZIEMLEWSKA, Ryga, s. 53–54.
- <sup>30</sup> MARIUSZ BALCEREK. Narodziny polskich Inflant. Walki o Dyneburg w latach 1625–1627. In: KAROL ŁOPATECKI, WOJCIECH WALCZAK (eds.). Inflanty Polskie. Białystok 2012 (Stan badań nad wielokulturowym dziedzictwem dawnej Rzeczypospolitej, Tom 3), s. 125–138.
- <sup>31</sup> JAN ANTONI CHRAPOWICKI, ANDRZEJ RACHUBA, TADEUSZ WASILEWSKI (eds.). Diariusz, Część II, 1665–1669. Warszawa 1988, s. 261–263.
- <sup>32</sup> SELIŠKA, Konfesionālās piederības nozīmes, 35.–41. lpp.
- <sup>33</sup> GVIDO STRAUBE. “Poļu pretreformācija” – mērķi un realitāte. In: Latvijas Vēsture. Jaunie un Jaunākie Laiki 72, 2008, Nr. 4, 19.–23. lpp.
- <sup>34</sup> KRZYSZTOF MIKULSKI, ANDRZEJ RACHUBA, ANTONI GAŚIOROWSKI (eds.). Urzędnicy inflanccy XVI–XVIII wieku: spisy. Kórnik 1994, s. 19–20.
- <sup>35</sup> SELIŠKA, Inflantijas (Latgales) muižnieki, 67. lpp.
- <sup>36</sup> ZEMEC. Kazennye imenija v Kurljandskoj gubernii Vopros o Russkoj kolonizacij nazvannoj gubernii. Vilna 1913, s. 6, 11, 14, 16, 23, 28, 36; JAKOV LUDMER. Spravočnaja kniga po Kurljandskoj gubernii, 1901 goda. Mitava 1901, s. [47–49]; BOGUSŁAW DYBAŚ. Uwagi na temat elity wojewodztwa inflanckiego w XVII–XVIII wieku. In: JERZY URWANOWICZ, EWA DUBAS-URWANOWICZ, PIOTR GUZOWSKI (eds.). Władza i prestiż. Magnateria Rzeczypospolitej w XVI–XVIII wieku. Białystok 2003, s. 243–253, here s. 249–252.
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- <sup>38</sup> Gedeona fon Borha paziņojums [poļu val.], 04.04.1672. LNA LVVA, 2598-1-13, 1–1v. lp.
- <sup>39</sup> BOGUSŁAW DYBAŚ. Sejm pacyfikacyjny w roku 1699. Toruń 1988, s. 177, 246.
- <sup>40</sup> Jana Augusta Hilzena runa Seimā [poļu val.], b. d., 1744. Lietuvas valstybės istorijos archyvas, Vilņa, 1276-1-31, 2. lp.





- <sup>41</sup> ŁUKAZS WRÓBEL. Józef Jerzy Hylzen. Studium kariery magnackiej w XVIII wieku. Toruń 2022.
- <sup>42</sup> Latviešu literatūrā Hilzeni parādās izglītības vēstures kontekstā: ANDREJS JOHANSONS. Latvijas kultūras vēsture. Rīga 2011 (1975. gada atkārtots izdevums), 473. lpp.
- <sup>43</sup> Instrukcija inflantiešu deputātiem uz 1730. gada Seimu [poļu val.], 23.09.1730. Lietuvos mokslų akademijos Vrublevskių biblioteka, F-198-15, 11. lp.; Instrukcja posłom na sejm koronacyjny, obranym na sejmiku w Dyneburgu, 29.10.1764 (Instrukcijas Inflantijas deputātiem uz kronēšanas seimu). In: Szlachta polsko-inflancka, s. 186–197, here s. 193; ROBERTAS JURGAITIS, ADAM STANKEVIČ, ASTA VERBICKIENĖ. Lietuvos Didžiosios Kunigaikštystės seimelių instrukcijos (1788–1790) [The Dietine Instructions of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (1788–1790)]. Vilnius 2015, pp. 379–380; BOLESŁAVS BREŽGO. Latgolas Pagōtne. I daļa. Daugavpils 1943, 167.–170. lpp.

## Pētījums par latviešu trimdas politisko darbību

Recenzija par grāmatu: Kristīne Beķere. *Latvijas labā. Politiskā darbība trimdā 20. gadsimta 40.–80. gados.* Rīga 2022. 303 lpp. ISBN 978-9934-18-870-1

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Latviešu trimdas pētniecība ir pēdējo gadu zinātniska un sabiedriskā aktualitāte, kam Latvijā pievēršas arvien vairāk pētnieku. Trimda ir unikāla parādība, kurai pašai par sevi būtu īpaša vieta Latvijas vēstures pētniecībā, bet nevar aizmirst, ka trimda cīnījās arī par Latvijas valstiskuma atjaunošanu un centās aizstāvēt latviešu tautas intereses okupētajā Latvijā. Kristīnes Beķeres monogrāfija “Latvijas labā. Politiskā darbība trimdā 20. gadsimta 40.–80. gados” iznākusi 2022. gadā Latvijas Universitātes Akadēmiskajā apgādā. Autore ir pazīstama un aktīva latviešu trimdas vēstures pētniece. Viņa 2020. gada novembrī aizstāvējusi promocijas darbu vēsturē “Latvijas neatkarības idejas uzturēšana trimdā no 1940. gadu vidus līdz 1980. gadu otrai pusei: politiskā darbība”. Pati autore norāda, ka grāmatas pamatā ir šis disertācijas teksts ar atbilstošu “*pētījuma raksturu un struktūru*” (8. lpp.). Darbs sastāv no ievada, avotu apskata, desmit nodaļām un secinājumiem. Varbūt būtu bijis lietderīgi nodaļas sanumurēt. Darba ievadā raksturota problēma kopumā un īsumā aplūkoti līdzšinējie pētniecības sasniegumi. Autore norāda, ka darbam ir pārskata raksturs (9. lpp.). Darba struktūra veidota drīzāk pēc tematiskiem, nevis hronoloģiskiem principiem, un šī izvēle atzīstama par veiksmīgu.

Avotu apskats liecina par to, ka grāmata tapusi, balstoties uz plašu avotu klāstu. Kopumā darbā izmantoti nepublicēti avoti no 17 valsts vai nevalstisku organizāciju pārraudzītām dokumentu krātuvēm un divu privātpersonu privāto arhīvu materiāli (20. lpp.). Svarīgākā nozīme bijusi Latvijas Nacionālā arhīva Latvijas Valsts arhīvā un Latvijas Valsts vēstures arhīvā uzglabātajiem trimdas organizāciju un darbinieku dokumentiem. Autore izceļ Minesotas Universitātes Imigrācijas vēstures pētniecības centra dokumentus, Hūvera institūta arhīvu, dažādu valstu nacionālos arhīvus. Darbā plaši izmantota trimdas prese,

galvenokārt laikraksti "Laiks", "Austrālijas Latvietis" un "Latvietis Amerikā".

Vērtīga darba sadaļa ir teorētiska rakstura nodaļa par jēdzieniem un nosaukumiem, kurā apkopotas līdz šim piedāvātās definīcijas un ieteiktas jaunas. Katram būs savi priekšstati par to, kas ir, piemēram, trimda, bet nav noliedzams, ka iespējamās dažādas versijas un vajadzīgs definēt vienu. Bez tam eksistē alternatīvi nosaukumi, piemēram, izplūdušais koncepts "emigrācija" vai poētiskais jēdziens "kļaidis". Autore secina, ka jēdziens "diaspora" ir labi piemērots pēc Otrā pasaules kara pasaulē izklīdušo latviešu apzīmēšanai, tomēr, analizējot dažādus pasaulē nonākušo latviešu darbības aspektus, piemēram, viņu politisko aktivitāti, secina, ka trimda ir "*maksimāli precīzs apzīmējums, kas raksturo tieši konkrēto parādību tieši konkrētajā laika posmā*" (43. lpp.).

Nodaļā "Trimdas izveidošanās un raksturojums" īsumā aplūkotas latviešu bēgļu DP (*displaced persons*) nometnes. Lielā mērā latviešu trimdas kopienas veidojās Vācijas teritorijā no šīm nometnēm, no kurām trimdinieki devās tālāk pasaulē. Latviešu bēgļu sapnis bija Amerikas Savienotās Valstis, populāras bija Austrālija, Lielbritānija un Kanāda. Autore pievēršas arī latviešu trimdinieku skaita problēmai dažādās valstīs, norādot uz grūtībām šī jautājuma risināšanā. Latviešu bēgļu sabiedriskā un kultūras dzīve šajās nometnēs acimredzot būtu vēl pētāma. Pieminēšu nesenu pētījumu par Baltijas Universitāti šajā žurnālā.<sup>1</sup> Bēgļu nometņu iemītnieki rakstīja vēstules Rietumu politiķiem, piemēram, 2300 Ziemeļreinas-Vestfālenes latvieši nosūtīja 734 vēstules, no tām 45 ASV prezidentam Harijam Trumenam (*Harry S. Truman*). Jāatzīmē gan, ka adresātu vidū minēts ASV viceprezidents Dž. Daless, kāda šajā laikā un citos vēstures posmos noteikti nebija (99. lpp.). Varbūt te domāts Henrijs Volless (*Henry A. Wallace*), ASV viceprezidents no 1941. līdz 1945. gadam? Pēc Franklina Rūzvelta (*Franklin*

*D. Roosevelt*) nāves 1945. gadā prezidentam Trumenam nebija viceprezidenta līdz 1949. gadam.

Nodaļā "Trimdas strukturēšanās" autore vispirms pievēršas svarīgāko trimdas organizāciju izveidei, kā pirmo minot Amerikas Latviešu apvienības izveidi 1951. gadā. Liela loma tās dibināšanā bija Latvijas sūtnim Vašingtonā Jūlijam Feldmanim. 50. gadu sākumā šādas organizācijas veidojās tajās pasaules valstīs, kurās bija nozīmīgas latviešu trimdas kopienas. Savukārt 1955.–1956. gadā izveidojās Brīvās pasaules latviešu apvienība, kas vēlāk ieguva nosaukumu Pasaules Brīvo latviešu apvienība (PBLA). Starp citu, Latvijas vēstures zinātnē, liekas, neviens nereflektē par šo diezgan nozīmīgo akcentu maiņu. Paralēli PBLA tiklam izveidojās arī otra globāla struktūra – Daugavas Vanagi. Varbūt darbā noderētu neliela analīze, ar ko abu struktūru uzskati un darbība pēc būtības atšķiras.

Nodaļa "Politiskās darbības aizsākumi" pievēršas trimdinieku politiskajai darbībai bēgļu nometnēs. Trimdinieki, piemēram, rakstīja vēstules šīs pasaules varenajiem. Autore piedāvā interesantu analīzi par Latvijas diplomātiskā dienesta un trimdas organizāciju attiecībām. Laika gaitā pieauga tieši trimdas organizāciju nozīme. Tām bija gan lielāka rīcības brīvība, gan ievērojamāki finanšu resursi. Autore norāda, ka trimdas diplomāti apzinājās savas ierobežotās iespējas un resursus, viņiem bija jābūt uzmanīgiem, un nedrīkstēja pārkāpt ierobežojumus, ko noteica attiecīgo mītnes zemju diplomātija. Šādos apstākļos aktīvākais darbs, veicinot Latvijas neatkarības atjaunošanu, ātri pārgāja trimdas organizāciju pārziņā (107. lpp.). Noteikti sava nozīme bija arī trimdas latviešu spējai adaptēties mītnes zemēs, tikt pie turības un attiecīgi atvēlēt resursus trimdas aktivistu atbalstam.

Svarīga loma trimdas organizāciju politiskajā darbībā bija informācijas izplatīšanai, kas aplūkota nodaļā "Informācijas

par Baltijas valstīm izplatīšana”. Trimdā iznāca simtiem periodisko uzdevumu. No tiem paši ilgstošākie un ar lielāko tirāžu bija tikai daži. Autore pamatoti secina, ka trimdas prese un grāmatas bija ļoti nozīmīgas trimdas identitātes veidošanā, bet pasauli uzrunāja tikai publikācijas, kas tapušas mītnes zemju valodās (111. lpp.). Lielāko uzmanību autore veltījusi Latvijas vēsturi skaidrojošām grāmatām. Viena no veiksmīgākajām grāmatām ir izvesto sarakstu publikācija *These names accuse* (sk. 115.–116. lpp.). Svarīgs trimdinieku darba lauks bija centieni ietekmēt mītnes zemju svarīgākos preses izdevumus. Šāds instruments bija lasītāju vēstules, kurās trimdinieki iebilda pret kļūdām dažādos oficiālos un privātos informatīvos materiālos, kartēs, zinātniskajā literatūrā.<sup>2</sup>

Cita veida aktivitātes bija svētku un atceres dienu izmantošana, lai atgādinātu par Baltijas tautu likteni, tā aplūkota nodaļā “Svētku un atceres dienu politizēšana”. Varbūt “politizēšana” ar tā zināmo negatīvo konotāciju nav labākais vārds, ko izvēlēties, bet nav arī viegli ieteikt precīzāku. Tomēr pati šī problēma par simboliem un svētkiem ir novatoriska, raksturīga postmodernisma laikmetam un līdz šim maz pētīta. Tā, piemēram, ar interesi lasām, ka 18. novembra vizuālie simboli bija Latvijas karogs, tā krāsas, dekorācijas tautiskā stilā, latviski akcenti apģērbā, ozolzaru vijumi un citi elementi (126.–127. lpp.). Dažāda veida svētku un atceres dienu un nedēļu mērķis bija “*uzturēt mītnes zemju sabiedrībā un politiskajās aprindās Baltijas valstu neatkarības ideju kā aktuālu un zināmu konceptu*” un informēt sabiedrību par neatrisināto Baltijas valstu neatkarības problēmu (133.–134. lpp.). Interesanta un maz pētīta ir šāda veida pasākumu organizēšana Dienvidamerikā, ko plaši atspoguļojusi autore. Viegli pamanīt, ka lielāku atsaucību ASV trimdinieku pūlīņi gūst prezidenta Ronaldas Reigana (*Ronald Reagan*) administrācijas (1981–1989) periodā.

Nodaļā “Trimdas iesaistīšanās pretkomunisma aktivitātēs” īpaši jāuzsver Kerstena komitejai veltītās lappuses. Čārlza Kerstena (*Charles J. Kersten*) iniciētā un vadītā speciālā ASV Pārstāvju palātas komiteja izmeklēja Baltijas valstu okupāciju un inkorporāciju kā komunistu agresijas piemēru. Tā bija gandrīz vai pirmā reize, kad baltiešu trimdiniekus kāds vēlējās uzklaut tādā līmenī, un trimdas organizācijas rikojās ļoti enerģiski un aktīvi, apzinot iespējamus lieciniekus un aicinot trimdas latviešu sabiedrību sadarboties. Komitejas darbībai bija liela publicitāte un ilglaicīgas sekas. Nodaļā ir jauni un interesanti materiāli par latviešu aktivitātēm ASV valdības – Valsts departamenta un Centrālās izlūkošanas pārvaldes (CIP) veidotās struktūras – Brīvās Eiropas komitejas – paspārnē. Autore atzīmē, ka atkarība no minētajām varas struktūrām tika ilgstoši slēpta. Latviju šajā struktūrā pārstāvēja Komiteja Latvijas brīvībai, kas paveica pārsteidzoši daudz. Patiesībā sadarbība ar leģendāro CIP tās darbības avantūristiskākajā posmā varētu turpmāk izpelnīties dažādus, ne tikai pozitīvus vērtējumus.

Nodaļā “Baltijas valstu inkorporācijas PSRS *de iure* neatzišanas politikas uzturēšana” apskatīta dažādu valstu politika šajā jautājumā. Droši vien, ņemot vērā, ka ASV un Apvienotās Karalistes pozīcija plaši pētīta, liela uzmanība veltīta Vācijas Federatīvās Republikas pozīcijai. VFR situāciju ietekmēja komunistiskās Austrumvācijas *de facto* pastāvēšana, kas lika uzmanīgi izturēties pret citu pēckara “izmaiņu” atzišanu. K. Beķere norāda, ka VFR juridiski ievēroja neatzišanas politiku, bet izvairījās no “*tiešiem apgalvojumiem*” un atteicās “*šo principu publiski deklarēt vai arī kādā veidā aktīvi īstenot*” (179. lpp.). Plaši apskatīti arī Austrālijas un Jaunzēlandes lēmumi atteikties no neatzišanas politikas un šo lēmumu izraisītie baltiešu trimdinieku protesti. Austrālijas latviešiem izdevās panākt kļūmīgā lēmuma atcelšanu, taču Jaunzēlandē tas

neizdevās, piemēram, nelielās baltiešu kopienas dēļ, par ko diezgan ciniski reflektēja Jaunzēlandes ārlietu resors savos dienesta dokumentos (197. lpp.).

Nozīmīga nodaļa un grāmatas pēdējā pamatnodaļa ir “Trimdas darbība EDSA procesa gaitā”. Tā aptver laika posmu trimdas organizāciju darbībā no 20. gadsimta 70. gadu sākuma līdz 80. gadu vidum, kad trimdinieku organizācijas bija īpaši aktīvas. Vērts atzīmēt, ka šis aktīvais periods sakrita ar Ulda Gravas atrašanos PBLA priekšsēdētāja amatā (1972–1975). Nodaļā īsi aplūkota procesa būtība, kas ietvēra PSRS centienus panākt pēckara teritoriālā izkārtojuma atzīšanu, savukārt Rietumus interesēja drošības problemātika, ekonomiskā sadarbība un humanitārie jautājumi (203. lpp.). Baltiešus satrauca PSRS un ASV attiecību uzlabošanās tendences kopumā, savukārt pilnīgi nepieņemami bija jau minētie centieni panākt pastāvošo robežu atzīšanu. Latviešu trimda bija ļoti aktīva, gan panākot ciešu sadarbību ar citiem baltiešiem, gan iesaistot plašu organizāciju skaitu. Autore aplūko trimdinieku rīkotās akcijas: vizītes pie dažādu valstu diplomātiem, memorandu sagatavošanu un izplatīšanu un leģendāro incidentu Helsinkos, kad 1973. gada 4. jūlijā latviešu grupa iekļuva VDR vēstniecībā un uzrunāja PSRS ārlietu ministru Andreju Gromiko (207. lpp.). Sekojošie baltiešu aresti Somijā izraisīja milzīgu pasaules mēroga publicitāti. Bažas un negatīvu attieksmi trimdā raisīja nu jau leģendārā simtgadnieka, ASV valsts sekretāra (1973–1977) Henrija Kisindžera (*Henry Kissinger*) politika – viņš savos centienos uzlabot attiecības ar PSRS noteiktos apstākļos varētu izšķirties par soli izbeigt neatzīšanas politiku. Liela baltiešu uzvara bija prezidenta Džeralda Forda (*Gerald Ford*) paziņojums, ka ASV uztur spēkā neatzīšanas politiku. Tam sekoja ASV Kongresa rezolūcijas.

No savas puses atzīmēšu, ka kopš 70. gadiem, pateicoties trimdinieku aktīvajai

darbībai, kļuva iespējamas baltiešu vizītes ASV varas koridoru augstākajos kabinetos. Baltieši turpināja aktīvu darbu arī EDSA pārskata konferencēs. Ir plaši zināms, ka sākotnēji netika augstu vērtēti Rietumu panākumi – cilvēktiesību iekļaušana Helsinku Noslēguma aktā. Tika uzskatīts, ka PSRS devusi tukšus solījumus apmaiņā pret sev ārkārtīgi svarīgo pēckara *status quo* atzīšanu. K. Beķere norāda, ka faktiski Helsinku dokuments aktualizēja cilvēktiesību problēmas, tām tika piešķirta daudz lielāka nozīme, un to neievērošana bija “viens no aktuālākajiem un iedarbīgākajiem trimdas argumentiem pret Padomju Savienību” (223. lpp.). Varbūt bija iespējams minēt vairāk konkrētu latviešu disidentu vārdu, par kuru likteni periodā pēc Helsinku konferences cēla trauksmi trimdā.

Interesanta un novatoriska ir darba apakšnodaļa par slaveno Baltijas brīvības un miera kuģa braucienu un Kopenhāgenas tribunālu – šie notikumi, to sagatavošana un norise līdz šim pētīti visai maz.

Kristīnes Beķeres pētījums atšķir lasītājiem daudzas nezināmas vai maz pētītas trimdas vēstures lappuses. Darbs ir bagāts ar trāpīgiem un augsta līmeņa secinājumiem un vispārīnājumiem. Tajā aplūkots plašs problēmu loks, un bagātīgais fakto materiāls padara to par īstu rokasgrāmatu trimdas vēsturē. Varbūt varētu vēlēties vairāk polemikas ar citu autoru darbiem – gan memuāru literatūru, gan zinātniskiem pētījumiem, iekļaujot šādu analīzi ne tikai literatūras apskatā, bet arī darba pamattekstā. Turpmākas pētniecības uzdevums droši vien būtu trimdas darbība Latvijas Trešās atmodas laikmetā.

Kopumā ir pozitīvi vērtējams, ka K. Beķeres promocijas darbs jau tik drīz pēc tā aizstāvēšanas ir kļuvis par pamatu respektablai zinātniskai monogrāfijai, kas noteikti pelnījusi zinātnieku un plašākas sabiedrības interesi.

## ATSAUCES UN SKAIDROJUMI

- <sup>1</sup> EVITA FELDENTĀLE. Baltijas Universitātes dibināšanas gaita (1945–1946). In: Latvijas Universitātes Žurnāls. Vēsture 2017, Nr. 4, 126.–140. lpp.
- <sup>2</sup> Sk. arī: MARIKA SELGA. Debunking the Falsehoods of Historical Interpretations: Arnold Spekke on George Kennan's "Soviet-American Relations, 1917–1920. The Decision to Intervene". In: Latvijas Universitātes Žurnāls. Vēsture 2023, Nr. 15, 30.–42. lpp.

# Ziņas par autoriem

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About Authors





## Ziņas par autoriem / About Authors

**Andrea Dălkvista** ir jaunā zinātniece un Rumānijas Baltijas un Ziemeļvalstu studiju asociācijas ģenerālsēkretāre. 2022. gadā ieguvusi vēstures doktora grādu. Viņas promocijas darbā analizēta Rumānija un Zviedrija Otrā pasaules kara laikā. Piedalījies vairākās vietējas nozīmes un starptautiskās konferencēs un publicējusi rakstus Rumānijas un ārvalstu žurnālos. Viņas pētījumu uzmanības lokā ir diplomātija, identitātes politika, minoritātes un bēgļu vēsture 20. gadsimta pirmajā pusē.

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