

**LATVIA**

**Human Development  
Report  
2010/2011**



**National  
Identity  
Mobility and  
Capability**

2010/2011

# LATVIA Human Development Report



**ASPRI**  
Advanced  
Social and Political  
Research  
Institute

## National Identity, Mobility and Capability

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# Introduction

My childhood, my home, my family, my friends, my classmates, the place where I was born, my study mates and colleagues at work, Latvia and the Latvian language – all of these are not just memories, but also events which have shaped my national sense of belonging and identity and, perhaps, that of many others. These are factors which characterise personal experiences and memories about times gone by. They are also subjects which are brilliantly revealed and analysed in the current Human Development Report, «National Identity, Mobility and Capability.»

Processes of change today are based on economic development, the free flow of capital and products, as well as labour force mobility and migration. Here in Latvia, we encounter the benefits and negations of these processes every day. These are dimensions which are affected by our long presence under the rule of various totalitarian regimes, and in recent times, they have been exacerbated by political and economic instability. People adapt to shifting circumstances. Individual values become more attractive, and they replace social values such as a sense of community and mutual assistance. This vacuum is filled up with yet another round of lending at the state and the individual level. «Individual» decisions such as deciding to leave the country replace «collective» decisions, thus limiting manifestations of solidarity and influencing the morals of society and, indirectly, the very existence of the state. We all have a sharp sense of the economic realities of our country – the ones which affect the sense of national belonging that is so very important to the people of Latvia. Disgust and a sense of alienation serve as excuses for emigrating from the country, thus strengthening the importance of the search for national identity here and abroad. Émigrés, on average, are much younger than those who remain behind, and so Latvia's society is far more aged than it could be, and it is continuing to age more swiftly than it would otherwise do so. It is also true that the proportion of students and economically active people is disproportionately high among the émigrés. This brain drain is a serious threat to the future of the Latvian state and its development, because in most cases, only a minority of those who have departed plan to return in the near or long-term future. Latvia's wisest minds and most ambitious people are being bought up by those countries which can afford to pay competitive wages.


Latvia can be crossed in just a few hours by car. Therefore it is particularly important to attract people to rural territories and small towns. This is a Catch-22 situation: The fewer residents, the higher the cost of maintaining the local infrastructure, and the worse the condition of the local infrastructure, the harder it is to keep people from moving away. Ambitious people leave, while

those who remain behind have fewer opportunities. The provision of the educational and health care services that are of such great importance in terms of development is endangered, and people have less of an opportunity to simply earn a living.

And yet not all of our ambitious and energetic people are abandoning places that are seen as backward so as to join densely populated communities in urban centres or travel far abroad in search of a better life. Individuals and communities are seeking solutions to their social and economic needs. The overcoming of risks in Latvia's regions helps employers to prove their survival abilities to improve productivity and competitiveness. The search for new strategies under conditions of an economic crisis is a prerequisite for the survival of the state and nation. Some of these solutions open up the path to new opportunities and are sustainable. Many people can find innovative solutions, break down age-old stereotypes, and create success stories so as to avoid the trap of deceptive welfare in which people make use of social subsidies and refrain from taking an active part in the labour market or in the lives of their communities. We very much appreciate those who do not fall into that trap.

National identity cannot compete against other identities that are available in this globalised world unless there are powerful social, economic and civic dimensions in that identity. People who have good lives and feel secure, stable and necessary in their communities want to belong to those communities and facilitate their growth. Yes, there are differences in the views of various communities about ethnic and cultural issues, as well as civic values such as obeying the law, opposing injustice and fighting against corruption. All in all, however, the positions which communities take on such matters are quite similar. This means that civic values must be as important as national values in terms of the integration of nations. They must help in establishing a set of ethnic and civic values that will facilitate the growth of the country.

The Latvian nation is still looking for the best models to govern the country, strengthen economy, and develop all of the talents. The dream about Latvia can be dreamed not just by sinking into the past or into the concerns of today. It is a dream about the future, about creative and ambitious people and about excellence and quality, as ensured by an educated and ambitious nation on the shores of the Baltic Sea.



Andris Bērziņš  
President of the Republic of Latvia

# Education and Science: The Road Toward Strengthening National Identity

The unified 3<sup>rd</sup> Global Congress of Latvian Scientists and 4<sup>th</sup> Lettonica Congress last year was focused on aspects of national identity, and so it is only logical that the 2011 Report on Human Development is also focused on this important topic, analysing the concept of national identity and the factors which affect it.

Migration processes have had a great effect on national identity over the course of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and also during the last several decades. The latest national census and studies by scholars at the University of Latvia point to a series of important problems with respect to which we are still unable to forecast their effect on the long term development of the nation and the state. The Report on Human Development also offers an extensive analysis of the transformation of national identity under circumstances of migration.

Territorial belonging, historical memory, culture and language are all essential dimensions of national identity, but this concept cannot be imagined without a common national economy and politics which are of decisive importance during socially important changes at a time when commonly held values and goals facilitate the consolidation of the nation. For that reason, it is the job for any country to strengthen national identity and the sense of belonging to the nation among individuals. This requires policies which improve people's lives and enhance the belief of citizens in the rule of law – one law and the same justice for everyone.

The development of the nation, however, is also closely linked to the ability of individual members of the nation to act responsibly, thinking not just about private

benefits, but also about the common good. The basis for such thinking is one's understanding of one's belonging to the nation, knowledge about who we were and who we are, and a clear vision as to who we want to be.

Education is the best instrument in strengthening the self-esteem of a nation, so it is the duty of the state to establish a national system of education and science which helps the nation to pursue its goals and to ensure welfare. That is exactly why the University of Latvia was established 92 years ago – the first national university in Latvia. Its mission has never changed – to serve science and the fatherland and to facilitate the emergence of an educated nation which can facilitate the flourishing of the country.

Only an educated nation can understand its history and culture, nurture universal values, and look into the future with a sense of security. That is why this report is a good foundation for the country's development of a long term developmental strategy, as well as for the taking and implementation of politically responsible decisions.



Professor Mārcis Auziņš, rector  
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# Contents

Basic Facts about Latvia, 2010	9
--------------------------------	---

Introduction	10
--------------	----

## 1 National Identity: Content and Formation

1.1. What is National Identity? How Is It Explained?	15
1.2. Dimensions of National Identity: A Study of the Views of Local Residents	23
1.3. National Identity, History and Social Memory	39

## 2 Migration: Past and Present

2.1. Major Flows of Migration Early 19 <sup>th</sup> Century to 1991	53
2.2. Emigration and Identity	70
2.3. The Changing Face of Latvian Emigration, 2000-2010	77
2.4. The Social Security of Latvian Families in Age of Economic Migration	102

## 3 Regional Identity and the Capability Strategies of Local Governments, Communities and Individuals

Introduction	107
3.1. Regional Identity and a Sense of Belonging to a Place	108
3.2. «Close Links keep You here in a Certain Way» – Links to a Place and Factors and Types Therein	112
3.3. In Search for Local Government Strategies	118
3.4. Individual Strategies at Capability: Challenges and Risks	124
Conclusion	130

## Appendices

Technical Information About the Survey Conducted Under the Auspices of the National Identity Programme, «National Identity», «NI: Dimensions. Historical Memory. LU SZF, 2010»	132
Technical Information About the Survey Conducted Under the Auspices of the National Identity Programme, «National Identity», «NI: Location, Capabilities, Migration. LU SZF, 2010/2011»	133
Appendices for Section 1	135
A Brief Review of Human Development Indicators, 2009/2010	142
The Human Development Index and Statistical Tables	149

Sources, Bibliography	160
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
## Boxes

0.1 Topics in the Human Development Reports of Latvia	10
0.2 Dimensions of national identity	12
1.1 Main conclusions. The most important missions	22
1.2 Respondents' plans to leave Latvia in the near future, as linked to a sense of territorial belonging	23
1.3 The sense of territorial belonging by nationality	24
1.4 The sense of territorial belonging by respondent's family's level of income	24
1.5 Attitudes toward civic values by nationality	25
1.6 Attitudes toward civic values by income level	26
1.7 Active civic values by income level	26
1.8 Active civic values by nationality	27
1.9 Attitudes toward ethnic nationalism values by nationality	27
1.10 Attitudes toward ethnic and cultural values by age	28
1.11 Recognising multiple cultures by age	29
1.12 Attitudes toward global civic values by nationality	29
1.13 Attitudes toward global civic values by income levels	30
1.14 Attitudes toward collective myths by nationality	30
1.15 Attitudes toward collective myths by age	31
1.16 Pride in being a resident of Latvia by nationality	31
1.17 Pride in being a resident of Latvia by income level	32
1.18 Pride in being a resident of Latvia by age	32
1.19 Pride in being a resident of one's country	32
1.20 Pride in one's country by citizenship	33
1.21 The views of the residents of Latvia about threats to the existence of the Latvian/Russian language and culture in Latvia by nationality	33
1.22 The views of the residents of Latvia about threats to the existence of the Latvian/Russian language and culture in Latvia by education level	34
1.23 Communities identified as the result of factor analysis	35
1.24 Views of Latvians and members of other nationalities about who makes up the people of Latvia	36
1.25 The views of Latvia's residents on who should not be allowed to become a citizen of the country by nationality and citizenship	36
1.26 Attitudes toward the effects of immigrants on social and economic processes by nationality	37
1.27 Attitudes toward the effects of immigrants on social and economic processes by gender	37
1.28 Attitudes toward the effects of immigrants on social and economic processes by education level	38
1.29 Main conclusions. The most important missions	38
1.30 Poet Anda Līce, editor of a collection of memoirs by victims of Stalinist repressions, «Via dolorosa,» in 1991	40
1.31 Latvian President Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga at the unveiling of a monument to the victims and prisoners of the «Rīga-Kaiserwald» concentration camp on June 29, 2005	43
1.32 The best event in Latvia's 20 <sup>th</sup> century history	45
1.33 The worst event in Latvia's 20 <sup>th</sup> century history	45
1.34 Positive evaluations or a lack of a viewpoint about the most important phases in Latvian history	48
1.35 Cinema historian and theorist Valentīna Freimane about herself and the relationship between Latvians and the pat in late 2010 or early 2011	49
1.36 Sources of information about history	50
1.37 Main conclusions. Main missions	51
2.1 The population of Latvia and Riga (,000) between 1800 and 1991	54
2.2 Osvalds Akmentiņš, a documenter of the history of American Latvians, on the first generation of Latvian immigrants – the so-called «Old Latvians»	56
2.3 The author Andrejs Upīts about the refugees of Kurzeme	59
2.4 Writer Vilis Lācis on returning to Latvia (1935-1937) after being a refugee in the Altai Province	60
2.5 The memories of journalist Hugo Rukšāns and lawyer Arvids Auns-Urālietis about their motherland and the Latvian colony in Bashkiria	61
2.6 A farewell address by schoolteacher Roderich Walther at the Classical Gymnasium, October 18, 1939	62
2.7 The story of writer Agate Nesaule, 1995	65
2.8 The story of Lina, born in 1931 and resident in the UK	66
2.9 The thoughts of fisherman Kārlis Strazds, who fled from Latvia to Sweden in June 1952	67



2.10 Migration in the Latvian SSR	68
2.11 A declaration from the Soviet Latvian State Planning Committee to the Council of Ministers of the Latvian SSR on the consequences of halting migration. February 1, 1989	68
2.12 Main conclusions. Main missions	69
2.13 Major conclusions. Major tasks	76
2.14 Employment and unemployment rates of working age population by educational attainment, ethnicity and citizenship, 2008-2010, %	81
2.15 Changes in the profile of EURES clients in Latvia, 2004-2010	82
2.16 Net emigration from Latvia (2000-2010) and emigrants' profile at the end of 2010	84
2.17 Emigrants from Latvia (aged 22+) by completed education at the end of 2010, depending on the time of moving, ethnicity, citizenship and the host country	85
2.18 Selectivity index	86
2.19 Emigrants' main activity abroad at the end of 2010, by educational attainment, host country and time of leaving Latvia	87
2.20 Composition of Latvian (net) emigration flows by host country and time of departure, 2000-2010	88
2.21 Proportion of adult emigrants living abroad with a spouse/partner, by region of origin	88
2.22 Latvian emigrants' plans to return within 6 months and within 5 years, by ethnicity and citizenship, educational attainment, host country and duration of stay abroad, 2010/12-2011/01	89
2.23 Emigrants about reasons for emigration and about return to Latvia (1)	89
2.24 Emigrants about reasons for emigration and about return to Latvia (2)	90
2.25 Foreign work experience of Latvia's population, their relatives and friends, %	91
2.26 Return migrants' assessment of the impact of the time spent abroad on various life domains, %	91
2.27 Personal after-tax income of individuals employed in Latvia in the second half of 2010, by own and family members' foreign work experience	92
2.28 Emigration intentions of Latvia's residents, by gender and age group, 2010/12-2011/02, population aged 18-65	93
2.29 Emigration intentions of Latvia's residents, by education and main occupation. 2010/12-2011/02, population aged 18-65	94
2.30 Selectivity index of some socio-economic groups with respect to motivation and concreteness of emigration plans, 2010/12-2011/02	95
2.31 Emigration intentions of Latvia's residents, by ethnicity and citizenship, 2010/12-2011/02, population aged 18-65	96
2.32 Emigration intentions of Latvia's residents, by region, 2010/12-2011/02, population aged 18-65	97
2.33 Emigration intentions of Latvia's residents, by own, relatives' and friends' foreign experience. Population aged 18-65, 2010/12-2011/02	97
2.34 Emigration intentions of Latvia's residents, by household per capita income, 2010/12-2011/02, population aged 18-65	98
2.35 Impact of demographic factors and occupation on emigration plans	99
2.36 Main findings. Most important tasks	101
2.37 Families with children: A group at risk of poverty and social exclusion	102
2.38 The number of school-age children whose parents are working abroad	103
2.39 Increasing welfare – but at whose expense?	104
2.40 Main conclusions and messages	105
3.1 Main conclusions. The main task	111
3.2 Elements shaping linkage to a place	112
3.3 A sense of belonging: Elements which shape it at various places of residence	114
3.4 Linkage to a place of residence: Type and characterisation thereof	115
3.5 Linkage to a place of residence – type, emotional sense of belonging, evaluation of other aspects of life	116
3.6 Main conclusions. The main mission	117
3.7 Parishes merging into administrative districts: The example of the Aizpute Administrative District	119
3.8 A coalition of social NGOs in Valmiera – support for the local government	120
3.9 The main conclusions. Major tasks	123
3.10 The unemployment trap in Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and the EU 27 (%)	127
3.11 The low wage trap in Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and the EU 27 (%)	127
3.12 The number of income-tested local government support payments in Latvia's larger towns and administrative districts, 2010	128
3.13 Main conclusions. Major tasks	129
3.14 Main conclusions. Major tasks	131

## BASIC FACTS ABOUT LATVIA, 2010



### Population

Number of residents	2.2 million
Natural growth, %	-0.8
Population density/km <sup>2</sup>	34.8

### Population of urban, rural areas, %

Rural	32.3
Urban	67.7

### Gender distribution, %

Men	46.1
Women	53.9

### Age structure, % (beginning of year)

0-14	13.8
Working age (15-62 for men, 15-61.5 for women)	66.0
Above working age	20.2

### Ethnic structure, % (beginning of year)

Latvians	59.4
Russians	27.6
Belarusians	3.6
Ukrainians	2.5
Poles	2.3
Lithuanians	1.3
Others	3.3

### Ranking

<b>in human development indicators</b>	48 <sup>th</sup>
Human Development Index	0.769
Adult literacy, %	99.8

### Health

Expected lifespan, years	73.8
Men	68.8
Women	78.4
Infant mortality/1,000 newborns	5.7
Doctors per 1,000 residents	35.7

### Economy

GDP, million LVL	12,735.9
GDP per capita, 2000 prices, LVL	3,039
GDP per capita, purchasing power	12,200
GDP decline, %	-0.3
Unemployment rate, %	14.3

### Employment by sector, %

Agriculture	9
Industry	24
Services	67

### Government spending as % of GDP (2009)

TOTAL	44.2
Defence	1.2
Education	6.6
Health care	4.7
Social aid	14.0

<b>Exchange rate of LVL per USD 1 (end of year)</b>	0.5350
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<b>Territory, km<sup>2</sup></b>	64,589
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# Introduction

The production of Human Development Reports in the world began in 1990, when the UN Development Programme (UNDP) first invited a team of independent experts to prepare a report on the development of the global population in the context of the most important global processes. Twenty reports have been prepared so far on all kinds of subjects. The reports offer different views about the development of nations in the world. The basic goal is to look at the development of nations on the basis of a specific aspect. In 2009, for instance, the topic of the global report was migration, while in 2010 it was welfare.

Human Development Reports have been prepared in Latvia since 1995. For the first 10 years, this process was overseen by the Latvian office of the UNDP. Beginning in 2004, responsibility for the reports was taken on by the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Latvia and its Institute for Social and Political Research.

Latvia's Human Development Reports typically are focused on a specific subject, and the development of the nation is reviewed under a conceptual framework related to same. This makes it possible to ensure that the reports offer evidence of the nation's development as part of a research project. Previous reports have looked at traditional developmental problems such as poverty, social integration and standards of living. Other reports have been distinguished by an innovative approach to dealing with developmental problems – public policy processes, human security, and capabilities in the sense of human development (see Box 0.1 for a review of the

subjects). Human Development Reports also include the main statistical indicators which reflect the trends of socio-economic processes in the country.

**Major statistical indicators of human development in Latvia in 2010/2001: Economics and demographics.** Latvia's economic indicators remain among the lowest in Europe under the influence of the global economic crisis. This applies to per capita GDP in terms of purchasing power parity – 3,039, which is the second lowest indicator in Europe after Romania. GDP declined very little in 2009 in comparison to the previous year – just by 0.3%, but in comparison to 2007, the decline was at a level of 22%. At present, GDP is just a bit above its level in 2006. The unemployment rate in Latvia declined to 14% in 2010, or 2% less than in 2009. It must be added that unemployment declined to 12% at the end of the summer of 2011.

According to the initial results of a census that was conducted in the spring of 2011 in Latvia, the number of residents in the country has sunk below two million. The main reasons for this depopulation are emigration and a low fertility rate. Despite the fairly rapid processes of depopulation in Latvia, however, there are a few demographic indicators which speak to positive trends over the past 15 years. For instance, the number of infant deaths has visibly declined from 18.8 per 1,000 live births in 1995 to 5.7 in 2010. The expected lifespan of newborns has increased from 66.7 years in 1995 to 73.8 in 2010. At the same time, however, the overall number of residents in the country has been declining.

Box  
0.1

## Topics in the Human Development Reports of Latvia

- 1995:** A general evaluation of human development in Latvia; the effects of societal changes on local residents
- 1996:** Poverty, social integration and regional differences
- 1997:** Standards of living, education reforms and participation
- 1998:** The state, individuals and the private sector; sustainable development, equal opportunities, the quality of interpersonal relationships, and the partnership between the public and the private sector;
- 1999:** Manifestations of globalisation in Latvia, as well as related risks and opportunities
- 2000/2001:** Public policy process from the perspective of human development
- 2002/2003:** Human security as an important prerequisite for the development of society
- 2004/2005:** Capabilities in regions
- 2006/2007:** Human capital and its relationship with social capital and social institutes and networks
- 2008/2009:** Accountability

## National identity and human development

Latvia's Human Development Reports typically offer not just analysis of social processes on the basis of statistical data, but also the results of studies focused on the values, views and beliefs of individuals and social groups. The authors of the 2008/2009 report, for instance, focused on the responsibility of individuals in terms of understanding the social consequences of their actions and their readiness to take responsibility for them. The authors argue that one of the fundamental dimensions of human development is expanding the choices which are available to people. Individual freedom of choice in terms of life plans, however, is just one side of the coin. The other side, no less important, speaks to an understanding of the consequences of individual choices in the broader social context. The authors of the 2008/2009 report insist that human development is closely linked to the ability of each individual to act responsibly.

Close links between individual and social aspects can also be found in the concept of «national identity.» On the one hand, an individual's belonging to a national community is a subjective emotion. These are special links between individuals and their homeland. On the other hand, these are special relations in the sense that they bring together the individual and the state, establish invisible links with the state, and determine the individual's personal responsibilities and rights while also ensuring a sense of security about the future. The strength of a national community is based on the sense of community among members of the nation, with mutual recognition, reliance, and civic involvement and responsibility. An understanding of common values and viewpoints holds the nation together, allows it to set out goals, to act in pursuit of those goals, and to feel secure.

The job for the state, in turn, is to strengthen national identity, to facilitate a sense of belonging to the nation among members of society, to strengthen civic belonging, to clearly define political and socioeconomic rights and obligations, and to establish an educational and media system which serves as an instrument for creating the nation's image. It is the duty of the state to strengthen national culture and language, respect for the symbols of state, support for traditions and rituals, including state holidays, which form a sense of belonging to the nation, as well as to facilitate the emergence of new traditions and rituals which serve to unify all members of society irrespective of their ethnic status.

The 2010/2011 report was produced under the auspices of the national research programme «National Identity.» The job of the report is to survey the content of individual national belonging in the context of human development. The report particularly focuses on emigration issues, because human development is weakened by a reduction in the size of the country's population. The fact that people are moving to other countries shows that there is an endless competition among identities, as well as a transformation of those identities. The report also reveals the set of circumstances

and techniques (the ability to act) which facilitate links between an individual and a location or region. The first two sections of the report review national identity and emigration, focusing more on problems and missions. The third section, however, studies abilities to act, making it possible to identify the achievements which various communities have ensured in terms of strengthening their sense of belonging to a specific location.

## National identity and related concepts

**Identity** is a concept that has been used more and more frequently over the past several decades in science, the mass media, and everyday conversation. A collective identity speaks to belonging to a group. It is a subjective concept, because belonging to a group is based on individual choices. Such choices, however, can be implemented in society in line with existing structures and discursive practices. In explaining identity, one must emphasise the active role of the individual in shaping it. In this sense, identity can be seen as being in contradiction to a caste which speaks to a strict and unchangeable role for individuals in society. The position of the individual in establishing an identity is an active one. Individuals must choose the tools that are offered by society – education, employment, a place to live, parties and movements, ways of spending leisure time, music, apparel, friendships, diverse family models, and social networks. Individuals choose the elements which are most appropriate for them, and then they decide to what they feel a sense of belonging.

**Nation.** The concept of a «nation» is a very old one. It has been used in various languages and meanings in the antique world, during the Middle Ages and later. It has been used to describe various groups in terms of characteristics which differentiate them from other groups. The word can be used to describe a dynasty, students from a single country, or a group with common habits which differentiate it from its neighbours. Researchers usually point to the French Revolution as the event which attached new meaning to the concept of the «nation.» The new definition was established in the context of changes in traditional power structures. They change from ones in which the power of the monarch was based on the loyalty of his or her subjects to ones in which authority was based on a community which could act and express its will. The new understanding of the nation typically involves the belief that it is an active political agent and the initial bearer of the idea of sovereignty. When we speak of a nation today, we are usually referring to a group of people who have a common territory, history, culture, economy and laws.

**National identity** is an individual identity which speaks to the individual's sense of belonging to a national and state community. National identity plays a particular role in a country, because it establishes a sense of community and belonging to the nation among residents thereof. National identity is both a national and a personal concept. A sense of belonging to a national

community is the link which allows the individual to feel that he or she is a member of the relevant national community.

**Dimensions of national identity** speak to the content of national belonging. Scholars usually identify the following dimensions of national identity: 1) The psychological dimension (pride, emotional links of belonging which need no rational explanation); 2) Culture (values, convictions, traditions, habits, language; culture helps one to see one's community as being different than others; 3) Territorial belonging, which speaks to views about homes, natural resources and the landscape as a place which feeds people; 4) Historical memories, which allow one to be proud of one's country and to gain inspiration and joy about one's roots; 5) The political dimension, which shapes the individual's civic links to the state and the community: obligations, rights, values, loyalty, an active civic position; 6) A joint economy (Box 0.2).

National identity is separate from ethnic identity. **Ethnic identity** speaks to one's belonging to an ethnic group which is based on culture and language, as well as joint memories and myths about the origins, heroism, victories and uniqueness of the relevant community. Ethnic identity is of importance in societies in which various ethnic groups co-exist. If, for instance, Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians and representatives of other ethnic groups in Latvia speak about preserving their culture, then that is an issue related to ethnic identity. Ethnic and national identity do not exclude one another, they supplement each other in the sense that the ethnic identity of Latvians points to one's belonging to the Latvian cultural community, while national identity speaks to belonging to the nation. Ethnic identity is usually the nucleus of national identity, and in Latvia, the nucleus of national identity is the Latvian identity. At the same time, however, it must be argued that national identity is a broader concept, and in addition to elements of ethnic identity it also speaks to a joint political and economic system.

There are few mono-ethnic countries in the world in which there is just one ethnic group. Migration

has led most countries to become ever more diverse, and this means that the issue of how immigrants can preserve their ethnic identity becomes more and more important. This report, too, looks at how Latvian émigrés view their Latvian identity when they move to other countries.

A **cultural nation** is a concept which insists that at the forefront of a national community are joint culture and language, as well as protection and strengthening of same. The idea of a cultural nation in Latvia has been used since the latter half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, when Latvia was not a state. The concept was used to describe the Latvian community, as joined together by the Latvian language and concept.

The **civic nation** is a concept which insists that at the forefront of explaining a national community are loyalty to the state, the citizen's rights and obligations, the citizen's active involvement in the implementation of the community's goals, as well as in the strengthening of the community. The idea of the «civic nation» appears in Latvia in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century along with ideas about the right to self-determination of the nation.


**Historical memory** speaks to stories, legends and myths about a country's past. This is very important in linking communities. There are emotionally saturated myths about how historical development could have occurred and how the process was influenced by various twists and turns in history.

## The missions and major subjects of the report

The **goal** of the 2010/2011 Human Development Report in Latvia is to review national identity, its competition with other identities, its emergence, its content, and the circumstances which influence it. The mission for the report is to identify the role of national identity in the hierarchy of identities in various groups in society, also looking at how identity is transformed under circumstances of emigration. The report explains the concept of regional identity, looking at circumstances which link people to a specific location. There is also a

Box  
0.2

### Dimensions of national identity





consideration of models of capability which strengthen one's sense of belonging to a place or a region.

Section 1 of the report is titled «**What is National Identity? How Can it be Explained?**». The focus is on several issues which speak to the popularity of the concept of identity over the past decades. The section also looks at the content of the concept of national identity and shows the way in which it differs from other identities, as well as why it is so important for individuals and countries alike. The emergence of a national identity is explained via the thesis that identities are social constructs, pointing to the role of individuals and social agents in shaping a sense of national belonging. The dimensions which were analysed in this context are the ones which are shown in Box 0.2 above. The authors have taken a comparative look at how important these dimensions of national identity are in various groups in society. The authors have also analysed the interaction between civic and ethnic nationalism in the establishment of a sense of belonging to the state. Particular attention has been devoted to historical memory, comparing the historical memories of Latvians and Russian speakers in Latvia. The authors have made extensive use of data from the study «National Identity: NI Dimensions. LU SZF, 2010.»

The second section of the report is titled «**Migration in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> Centuries and Today: Migration and Transformations of National Identity**». Here the focus is on aspects of migration in Latvia from the historical perspective (major migration flows in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century) and from the perspective of current migration issues. The historical review of major flows of migration shows how this process influenced Latvia's economic and social development, as well as the national identity of the country's residents. In the context of the development of Latvia as a state and nation, of great importance are ideas expressed by Latvian émigrés in Ireland and England who were interviewed for the purposes of the report. These revealed the social and economic dimensions of national identity as components of national belonging – something that stands in contradiction to a certain extent with Latvia's political discourse in which an emphasis on the role of history, culture and language in the shaping of national identity means insufficient attention to the welfare of local residents as a component in national belonging. The study of Latvian immigrants in Ireland and England shows that the paths of emigration involve a dilemma between national belonging and a desire to achieve a new level of welfare more quickly. The report also offers correlative analysis of migration trends during the past decade, revealing the influence of economic growth and the economic growth on migration – how the composition of émigrés changes, as well as how opportunities to use information technologies and social networks make it ever easier to take a decision on emigration. The report also looks at émigrés who have returned to Latvia and their plans, also considering policies which are aimed at

resolving the problems of children whose parents have moved abroad to earn money while entrusting the care of their children to other relatives.

The third section of the report is titled «**Regional Identity. Links to Place. Capability**». Here the report looks at issues related to a sense of regional belonging, revealing the factors which strengthen or weaken that sense. Much attention has been devoted to the way in which regional identity has been affected by administrative and territorial reforms in Latvia. After studying various strategies which strengthen regional identity, the authors have focused on policies which seek to enhance the welfare of local residents, on partnerships among local governments, and on the practices of local groups of activists. The authors have also discovered a phenomenon which can be called the trap of welfare – a phenomenon that has emerged during the past decade in reaction to the country's social security policies in terms of people being inactive and relying on the state's social guarantees. This section of the report also analyses the circumstances which are important to people in determining belonging to a specific location. Analysis of survey data shows that a sense of belonging to a location is characterised by the structure of opportunities for people in that location in terms of the availability of educational and work opportunities and the available range of services, but also, on the other hand, by human needs, demands and lifestyles.

In preparing the Report on National Identity, the authors hope that readers will think about how they feel their identities and about the place of these identities in the hierarchy of identities. Our goal is to call on readers to think about the strongest links which establish their sense of belonging to the state, also looking at the nucleus and the seemingly less important elements of this belonging. We have proposed a discussion about the importance of civic and Latvian dimensions in national belonging. We have marked out a framework for a discussion about the principles which shape the nation in Latvia, and here we are calling for a debate about the interaction which exists between ethnic and civic nationalism. Our analysis of migration processes, in turn, shows that when people emigrate so as to ensure the welfare of their families, that represents responsibility which they must undertake. How can this individual responsibility for oneself and one's family be harmonised with responsibilities toward one's fatherland? These are issues for discussion which were considered by the authors of the report to a considerable degree.

We talked to people from various groups in society – people of different nationalities, professional groups, social statuses, jobs and various regions in Latvia. We wish to argue that the national identity of an individual emerges in interaction with the rest of society. It happens at the level of the parish, district, city, country, and even the transnational level. National identity is based on the way in which we shape it with our actions and words on an everyday basis and during celebrations.



# National Identity: Content and Formation

1

1.1. WHAT IS NATIONAL IDENTITY?  
HOW IS IT EXPLAINED?

1.2. DIMENSIONS OF NATIONAL IDENTITY:  
A STUDY OF THE VIEWS OF LOCAL RESIDENTS

1.3. NATIONAL IDENTITY, HISTORY  
AND SOCIAL MEMORY



# 1.1. What Is National Identity? How Is It Explained?

Identity is a concept which has been discussed more and more often in recent decades in everyday conversation, discussions and the scholarly literature. Why is this concept so popular? The probable cause is that the whole concept of identity fits in very well in today's mutable world – one in which people have many new opportunities. These begin with a wide variety of choices in terms of interests and lifestyles, and end with opportunities to move to another country to study or work. Identity opens the path toward answering questions such as «Who am I?», as well as «To what do I feel a sense of belonging?» These are questions which all of us have probably asked ourselves, particularly when we were young. Collective identity creates belonging to a group. It is subjective, because belonging to a group is a matter of individual choice. At the same time, however, this choice can be made under the framework of the structures and discursive practices which exist in the relevant society. In explaining identity, one must emphasise the active role of the individual in shaping it, and in this sense identity can be seen as in contrast to a system of castes, in which each person has a strict and unchangeable place in society. The individual's position in shaping identity is active in terms of the arsenal of tools which society offers – education, employment, a place and country in which to live, involvement in political parties and movements, ways of spending free time, music, apparel, diverse forms of friendship and family models, social networks, etc. In all of these areas, individuals select and choose that to which they feel a sense of belonging.

In explaining the origins of identity in terms of how individuals gain a sense of belonging, most researchers argue that identity is constructed in social terms. That means that language is a resource for the emergence of an individual's identity. A hierarchy of an individual's identity is based on discursive practices in society, on other words, on different statements about things and events, on knowledge, stories, myths, symbols and values. Of great importance in the emergence of discursive practices are traditional institutions of socialisation – families, schools, the mass media, government institutions, as well as the social networks that are so popular in the Information Society. The very rapid spread of new information technologies makes it possible for new identities to emerge.

The emergence of new belonging can create competition among identities. For instance, the ability to work abroad competes with a sense of belonging to one's country, birthplace and community. If a story about life in Ireland, England or Norway in terms of work

conditions and the ability to provide for oneself and one's family becomes attractive and leads others to wish to emigrate, as well, then it is a competing identity. We can see competing identities as competing stories. If we talk about life abroad and have no competing story about opportunities in Latvia, then that means calling on others to join the new community.

Researchers into social identities argue that a sense of belonging is important when the individual develops his or her social sense of self in society. In an interview about nationalism, the British philosopher Isaiah Berlin once said that just as people need to eat and drink, they also require security, freedom of movement, and a sense of belonging to a group. If not, then the person feels isolated and lonely: «Loneliness does not mean being alone; it means being among people who do not understand what you are saying.» (Gardels, 1991)

A sense of belonging to a group creates a sense of security, but it is interesting that this security is established on the basis of drawing border lines in relation to other groups and of emphasising the positive characteristics of one's own group so as to establish a secure space for one's own. It was several decades ago that the originators of research into identity, Oxford University Professor Henri Tajfel and Australian National University Professor John C. Turner argued that identity is constructed by emphasising one's own group in comparison to other groups, as well as that this process is strengthened by the need for a positive identity that can be obtained by emphasising the negative characteristics of other groups (Tajfel, Turner, 1979) or by pointing to injustice that might be caused by other groups (Taylor, McKirnan, 1984). It is often the case that an ethnic or linguistic group that is alongside oneself serves as a stimulus for constructing one's own identity. Comparative research conducted in post-Communist countries in the 1990s, for instance, shows that ethnic identity is more strictly expressed in those countries where there are substantial ethnic minorities in addition to the main ethnic group. Residents of Latvia, Estonia, Ukraine and Belarus said that ethnic belonging is the most important thing, while respondents in Lithuania and Poland were more likely to say that the most important factor is the sense of belonging to one's city or parish.

## National identity

National identity is one of the identities of individuals, allowing the individual to feel a sense of belonging to his or her own national or state community.

National identity is of particular importance in a country, because it shapes a sense of community and of belonging to the nation among residents of the relevant state. National identity includes elements of state and elements of that which is personal. Feeling a sense of belonging to a national community is a link which allows the relevant individual to feel that he or she is a member thereof. Oxford University Professor David Miller has argued that national identity must be shaped from the inside by the subject of the creators of the nation, as opposed to from the outside. The foundation of a national community is that those who belong to it are convinced about the community and the view that nations exist when their members recognise each other as fellow citizens. National identity is cement which holds a society together and leads members of that society to work together (Miller, 1999).

National identity is one of the identities of an individual, it represents the sense of belonging of the individual to a national or state community. National identity is of particular importance in a country, because it ensures that residents feel a sense of community and belonging to the nation. National identity includes state and personal identity. A sense of belonging to a national community creates links which allow the individual to feel like a member of the state's community. Oxford University Professor David Miller has argued that national identity must come from the inside, from the subject who is creating the nation, and not from the outside. The cornerstone for a national community is the belief and view of members therein that nations exist when their members recognise one another as fellow citizens. National identity is cement which holds society together and leads of members of society to do the same things (Miller, 1999).

The concept of the «nation» has been used for millennia in various languages and with different meanings, both in the antique world and in the Middle Ages. It is used to describe various groups and to speak to characteristics which make one group different from others. This applies to the designation of a family or students from a single country as a group with common characteristics which differentiate them from other neighbours. Researchers usually point to the French Revolution as an event which gave new meaning to the concept of the «nation.» New meaning emerged in the context of the replacement of a traditional structure of power in which the power of the monarch was based on the loyalty of his subjects with a system in which authority is based on a community which is able to act and to express its will. This new understanding of the nation typically argues that it is an active political agent and the initial bearer of the idea of sovereignty. As a source of political power and an active agent of political power, the nation creates a new understanding about politics; it is the idea that institutions and politicians express the will of the nation. When describing a nation, authors usually point to things which a specific group of residents have in common – a territory, historical memories, myths, the common culture, laws, political

processes and economics. A nation is a community of residents therein. The way in which nations have emerged as communities of residents is interesting. Various turning points in history have served to stimulate the emergence of nations – civil revolutions, the collapse of empires, national liberation, etc. In many cases nations have emerged on the basis of a specific ethnic community, and the relevant ethnic group also determines the country's name – Germans in Germany, Swedes in Sweden, Danes in Denmark, etc. Latvia's name, too, comes from the main group of residents – the Latvians. At the same time, however, we know that these countries are not mono-ethnic today. In other cases, a nation is based on the confluence of many different ethnic groups, and the result is that the name of the country is very different – the United States, for example, as well as Canada and Australia. Sometimes a nation emerges from a collapsing empire. Several countries in Eastern Europe, for instance, were established on the basis of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy.

## A discussion in Latvia about the principles of establishing a nation

Explaining the way in which the Latvian nation was established is problematic because on the one hand, the composition of the national community has been influenced by radical shifts in history such as the two world wars, the Soviet occupation and the migration of residents, while on the other hand, Latvia has never been a mono-ethnic state, but there has been little discussion about the principles that are the foundation for the establishment of the nation in Latvia.

The first discussions about a nation in Latvia occurred back when the Latvian state did not yet exist. Deniss Hanovs has studied the newspaper *Baltijas Vēstnesis* (Baltic Messenger) – one of the oldest and most important examples of the civic press of Latvians – finding that in the 1880s and 1890s, Latvian intellectuals were encouraging a debate about the content of the concept of the Latvian nation. This spoke to the things which create a sense of belonging to one's own community, as well as to that which ensures or eliminates the opportunity to be a part of the national community (Hanovs, 2003, 193-201). The most active representatives of Latvian culture initially insisted on the right of Latvians to enjoy their own language and culture, thus defining the Latvian community as «acculturation,» in which identities are sought out in the uniqueness of culture, with efforts made to stand apart from other ethnic groups. Of interest here is the fact that the «New Current» movement of the 1890s had very different views under the influence of ideas that were current at that time, i.e., emphasising the nation as a community of individuals who accept the elements of a concrete ethnic culture willingly. Interestingly, the ideas of a political nation were also developed by Miķelis Valters – an outstanding public activist who helped to draft the Latvian Constitution and to establish the Republic of Latvia on November 18, 1918. He emphasised the active nature of the nation, as

implemented via civic solidarity and participation, as well as openness to broader values. For Valters, national belonging was first and foremost a matter not of origin, but instead of cultural and democratic participation (Ijabs, 2007, 143).

Still, these ideas, which opened up the route toward a discourse about the emergence of the *political nation* did not win broader support, and the dominance of the ethnic nation retained its ruling position in the national discourse of Latvians. This was fully true after the coup that was organised by Kārlis Ulmanis in 1934, when particular attention was focused on the development of the Latvian nation, with the idea of an ethnically homogenous nation being presented as an ideal.

## Discussions in the 1990s in Latvia and the world

During the 1990s, several conferences were held and papers and books were published in Latvia to take a theoretical look at concepts such as «nation state,» «nation,» «nationalism,» and «citizenship.» In 1998, a conference was organised to discuss the political nation and aspects of ethnic policies. At it, Justice Egils Levits from the European Court of Human Rights emphasised the presence of two dimensions when talking about traditions related to the emergence of nations. In France, he said, belonging to the nation is determined by identification with the democratic political system of the state, while in other European countries such as Germany, it has meant the self-understanding of German national culture. Levits posed this question: «Should Latvians continue to be a purely ethnically defined cultural nation, is a state of the Latvian nation desirable or possible? Or would it be more realistic and desirable to combine both characteristics of the nation?» (Levits, 1998).

Professor Rasma Kārklīņa from the University of Illinois and the University of Latvia (and a member of the 10<sup>th</sup> Saeima) delivered a paper at the conference in which she emphasised the importance of active and responsible citizens. Kārklīņa said that a democratic country requires not just the relevant institutions, but also citizens at a specific level of quality. Kārklīņa reviewed citizenship from the perspective of social citizenship, arguing that in America, citizens is more than just a matter of lawful status; it is a nation of «good citizenship» – one in which individuals are seen as being of importance only if they provide for their careers and families while also, at the same time, supporting their community and engaging in their civic duties. A democracy can exist only if a large segment of the citizenry satisfies that ideal, the professor said (Kārklīņa, 1998).

There is also Elmārs Vēbers, who organised several international conferences in the 1990s to discuss the kind of nation the Latvian nation should be. These events involved scholars from all around the world, and Vēbers concluded that broad discussions about these matters were suspended because the public was not prepared for them in terms of being unable to accept a situation

in which the subject for debate relates to aspects of the national community and the principles for its emergence.

According to analysis of public integration policies, ethnic values take the upper hand over democratic civic values. Why are those values so deeply rooted that there is no room for civic values? George Schopflin (Schopflin, 2000, 64-77) has argued that the root for ethnicisation is the fear of collective survival, humiliation and scorn. The driving force behind the survival of small nations is a strict conviction about the existence of their culture, because these are moral values which represent a unique story about how people should live, when they must laugh or cry, when they must tremble in fear or be joyful, and what is good and bad. Belonging to a specific culture or language, in turn, makes it possible to learn codes which offer an understanding of events and things without any questions.

Other authors have also written about why efforts toward ethnicisation increase during various periods in history. Professor Emeritus Paul Brass at Washington University is the author of many books about comparative politics, and he argues that the importance of ethnicity as a social construct increases when links among social groups are weak and ethnicity functions as an element in structuring society. If other institutional structures such as the civil society which can facilitate the development and functioning of various other resources in society are weakly developed, then ethnic belonging comes to the forefront with its advantages – it is clearly perceived by the masses, and the elite manipulates with it very cleverly, indeed (Brass, 1985).

The American historian and political scientist Joseph Rothschild, in turn, has examined the way in which changes in society facilitate the importance of ethnicity. Rothschild argues that changes create a lot of confusion in all groups in society, and this, in turn, leads to collective ethnic fears (Rothschild, 1982). Ethnic groups in such situations feel threats against the future existence of their identity. Similarly, Professor Donald Horowitz at Duke University, who teaches law and political science, puts the focus on the role of group psychology and competition among groups (Horowitz, 1985). A rapid change in the status of a group is one factor which can stimulate the emergence of ethnic conflicts. In Latvia's case, the change in the status of ethnic Latvians and Russians (Russian speakers) has been of importance – in the USSR, Russians could see themselves as a majority, while Latvians had a minority status. In independent Latvia, by contrast, it is the Russians who are the minority, with Latvians in the majority position. The way in which both groups see their new status will also be reviewed in the chapter of this report which speaks to various dimensions of national identity.

The conclusions of these authors encourage attempts to understand why it is the case that in Latvia, on the one hand, there are no ethnic conflicts in everyday lives and situations while, on the other hand, the ethnic factor is of great importance in parliamentary elections and elections of local governments in larger territories. There one can see strict polarisation in terms of party choices

on the basis of the ethnic principle – Latvians vote for parties put together by Latvian politicians, while Russians vote for their own parties. These ideas also encourage thought about how this range of problems is echoed in national identity and how it influences the emergence of that identity in various groups in society.

## Constructing national identity

Scholars of social identities agree that identity is a social construct, but there is still the question of how this social belonging emerges and how it can be studied.

There are two things which are important to understand with respect to the construction of national identity. First of all, a sense of belonging represents the reflection of subjects themselves as to who they are, which community they consider to be their own, and where subjects draw boundaries between comrades and aliens. On the other hand, there are also external agents and social structures which have a specific role in constructing an identity. Here we must refer to families, schools, mass media, friends, social networks, etc. The effects of all of these agencies opens up a very broad spectrum in terms of families with their social, economic and intellectual capital, various school-based communities, as well as, finally, the extremely diverse mass media and social networks. We see that social identity is constructed by individual choices and creative activities, as well as by interaction among specific social agents and structures. These are at the basis of a sense of belonging to a specific community. Individuals can have many different identities with specific hierarchies in which some identities are seen as more important, while others are seen as being less significant.

Researchers who focus on a theoretical examination of national identity speak of the importance of individual activities, but they also look at the efforts and arsenals of the state in shaping national identity.

An interesting view about how to study national identity comes from Professor Michael Billig at Loughborough University. In his book «Banal Nationalism» (Billig, 1995, 61-62), he writes that «when it comes to nationalist thinking, the question is not ‘What is national identity?’, but instead it is ‘What does it mean if someone is talking about his or her own national identity?’» In writing about the concept and use of national identity, Billig argues that «it often explains less than might seem to be the case.» He believes that the concept often includes far too many aspects, although he also argues that it can be seen only as a discursive phenomenon – the way in which people talk about themselves and their national belonging, about the nation, and about the separation between «us, the nation» and «them, the others.» Billig sees nationalism as an ideology which is expressed in discursive terms and national identity as a discursive construct in which of great importance are national governments and the media.

The third chapter of this report, in which émigrés talk about their sense of belonging to their motherland and their new country of residence offers a very good look

at the way in which people talk about themselves, their national belonging, and conditions which strengthen or weaken that belonging.

At the same time, however, we must also recognise the role of structures and institutions which create the framework under which identities can be constructed. Of use here are the ideas of Manuel Castells, a Spanish scholar who has taught at a number of universities in the United States. He has written about the effects of power on the constructing of identities, speaking about identities which are in line with and march in step with the policies of the national regime, thus creating a «legitimising identity» in comparison to other identities which emerge in opposition to the first one. When people recognise that they are different and face stigmatising descriptions, a «protest identity» emerges – one in which belonging is construed as a certain protest or opposition to a lawful identity. A «project identity» in turn, is created by new initiatives and circumstances (Castells, 2004). If we apply Castells’ ideas to society in Latvia, then we can say that a «legitimising identity» very well describes the way in which the state-related identity of Latvians was constructed, as was the synergy which that identity ensures between the Latvian community and the country in which, on the one hand, the civic constructs national identity in an active and responsive way while, on the other hand, also rationalising and strengthening state power. The collective memories of Russians, as opposed to Latvians, are based on the 70 years during which the Soviet Union existed. This is a period during which three generations grew up, and it is a sufficiently long period of time to make sure that in informal environments, too, there are stronger habits and desires to maintain the continuity of those memories. It is also true that the discourse of informal (family) historical memories coincides with the things which are said by formal communicators in Russia (the country’s mass media). This serves to construct a legitimate identity for Russian citizens. Russians who live in Latvia, by contrast, base their identity on collective memories which confront collective memories about Latvia’s «regained history» – the interwar period. What kinds of identities are constructed when these different historical memories are confronted? If we use Castells’ theory on how identities are constructed, then we see that this is a good point at which to make use of the concept of a «protest identity.»

## The role of the state in the shaping of a national identity

The dynamic lives of people in the present day, the ability of people to move from one country to another, as well as processes of globalisation – all of these promote greater heterogeneity in societies. States, by contrast, are interested in facilitating processes which facilitate greater homogeneity in the models of behaviour which exist in a society. For instance, states may want to ensure that only one language is dominant in the state so that culture and traditions do not create conflicts among various groups in society. The job for national educational systems and

the mass media is to support policies which facilitate the flourishing and stability of the relevant national culture and language, thus strengthening national identity among the country's citizens. And yet, at the same time, a state is also responsible for creating legal foundations for minorities.

Professor Montserrat Guibernau at London University (Guibernau, 2007, 27) has written about things which states must do in the context of strengthening national identity: first, shape the image of the nation; second, create symbols and rituals to strengthen the sense of belonging among members of society to the nation; third, strengthen citizenship, clearly defining legal regulations, as well as political and socio-economic rights and obligations, while also helping individuals to join the national community and to increase their loyalty toward the state; fourth, create ideas about a common enemy; and, fifth, establish an educational and media system which serves as an instrument for establishing the relevant image of the nation.

The job for the state is to encourage public understanding about the mutual benefits of interaction between the state and the individual, emphasising the fact that the welfare of individuals in the country can only improve in the context of the nation's development.

## National identity: What people say about their country

A survey<sup>1</sup> which focused on the attitude of Latvia's residents toward various aspects of national identity began with this question: «What is the first thing that comes to mind when you hear the word 'Latvia'?» The answers that were given offer an interesting picture. First of all, the things which respondents said speak to deeply personal links which bind them to the country. Second, these were very emotional answers irrespective of whether respondents had positive or negative things to say about Latvia. Third, the responses touched upon all kinds of areas of life – Latvia's environment and territory, economics, politics, history, Latvian values, the diversity of cultures, etc. By mentioning individual aspects that are of importance to them, respondents gave answers which were within the framework of the national level, thus revealing their own story about national belonging.

It is interesting that researchers who focus on national identity and offer a detailed consideration of its elements, structures and dimensions, come up with similar explanations of national belonging. This confirms that one way of understanding what national identity is in today's mutative reality in the here and now is asking this question: «What does it mean when someone talks about his or her national identity?» (Billig, 1995). That, again, means studying the way in which individuals talk about themselves, their national belonging, their

nation, and the separation between «us, the nation» and «them, the others.» National identity represents the things which people say about their country, its successes, achievements and failures, its past and present, its residents and places, objects and landscapes. In other words, identity is a discursive construct, and its deconstruction means studying the text of what people have said (sort of like unwinding a film). That is one way of coming to an understanding about national identity.

The things which the people of Latvia had to say when asked about what the word «Latvia» makes them think about make it possible to set up groups of themes which cover a broad range of social phenomena. Most often the responses had to do with *Latvia as a special place* – the place where ancestors were born, where people have their native homes, their native land, the motherland in which they were born and lived, etc. «I have lived here since the age of 2, and I love it now» – that is one example. Respondents speak of a second motherland, a place that is particularly attractive, a place to which they want to return, and a place with a lovely environment, landscape, cities and the sea. A few respondents also speak of Latvia as a Baltic country and a part of Europe – a Baltic state, the Baltic state in which I live, an EU member state, a European and civilised country.

The second most frequently mentioned topic relates to *economic problems* in Latvia and the subsequent social consequences – a country with a disorderly and weak economy, a crisis, a country without management, debt, poverty, a country with stratification between the rich and the poor, high unemployment and emigration from the country. Typically, economic problems were discussed only in a negative sense and in terms of directly personal experiences: «My poor Latvia,» «our country has been robbed,» «chaos,» «our disorderly Latvia,» etc. Very seldom people mentioned traditional products or brands such as «Laima» confectionaries, «Latvijas Balzāms» alcoholic beverages, or «Dzintars» perfumery.

Quite a few responses from respondents related to *political life*, albeit, once again, mostly in negative terms – political chaos, politicians and government officials who are not right for the job, the empty babbling of the government, a hard-working nation and a bad government, mendacious politicians, a corrupt country, inequality among ethnic groups, splits on the basis of national belonging, etc.

In comparison with criticisms about economic and political life, fewer statements from respondents involved first associations such as *ethnic belonging*, *Latvianness*, Latvian culture, traditions or symbols of state: «To me, Latvia is a country in which Latvians live;» «The only country which belongs to Latvians and in which the Latvian language is heard.» People spoke about the Latvian Song and Dance Festival, culture, cultural monuments, traditions, the country's red-white-red flag, the national anthem, the Freedom Monument, Independence Day on November 18, the Summer Solstice celebrations, etc.

It must be emphasised that most of the positive statements which were made by respondents had to do

<sup>1</sup> This part of the chapter is based on a survey called «National Identity. NI Dimensions. Historical Memory.» It was produced by the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Latvia under the auspices of the national research programme «National Identity» (2010).



with the establishment of the state and its independent statehood – freedom, an independent Latvia, the barricades of 1991, as well as patriotism. Those are words and statements which speak to common *historical memory* – something that is of key importance in the shaping of a sense of national community.

We must particularly look at statements in which respondents emphasise their *emotional links* with Latvia and their pride in the country: «I have warm feelings, I love Latvia»; «I am proud that I live in Latvia as my motherland»; «It is something very beautiful»; «It is something very familial»; «I am proud of our country's ice-hockey team,» etc. Negative feelings, too, were expressed very emotionally: «sadness, sorrow, anger and a bit of shame»; «I used to be proud of Latvia, but no more.»

If we correlate the aforementioned range of subjects, then we see that when asked about their associations with Latvia, respondents most often spoke of:

- 1) The place and territory in which they live, starting with their home, their region, Latvia as a whole, and Latvia as a part of the Baltic States and Europe;
- 2) Economic life in Latvia, which led to a wealth of emotions, mostly in a negative and critical sense;
- 3) Political life in Latvia, which also created powerful associations among respondents – positive ones about Latvia's independent statehood and freedom, but mostly negative ones about ongoing issues;
- 4) A wide range of aspects related to ethnic and cultural links with the country;
- 5) Things which indicate common social memory, albeit less often; it is evident that these thoughts are overcome by negations related to economic and political life;
- 6) A particularly emotional sense of national belonging with expressions of pride or shame about the country.

## The main dimensions of national identity

Interestingly, groups of associative expressions based on the responses given by respondents directly correlate to the views of researchers about the most important manifestations of national identity. Scholars in various countries and at different universities have had fairly similar views about national identity. Thus, for instance, the aforementioned Professor Guibernau from London University, who is a well known political scientist, has written a book called «The Identity of Nations» (Guibernau, 2007). In it, she argues that national identity represents a sense of belonging to a nation, and that it also supports the different things which describe on nation in comparison to others. In her research, Professor Guibernau has marked out five dimensions for a national identity:

- 1) The psychological dimension (emotional links of belonging which do not require any rational explanation);
- 2) Culture (values, beliefs, traditions, habits, language and practices; culture helps one to imagine one's own community as different from others);

- 3) The dimension of territorial belonging, which covers views about one's home, natural resources, the landscape, and the place as one which provides food;
- 4) Historical memories which allow one to feel proud of one's country, gain inspiration and rise above one's roots in an energetic way;
- 5) The political dimension which, at the individual level, establishes civic links – obligations, rights, values, and loyalty, while in the context of the state, this covers strategies which are aimed at cultural and linguistic homogeneity in society.

Professor David Miller, a British political scientist at Oxford, has written a book called «On Nationality» (Miller, 1999, 22-24), and in it he insists that first of all, a national community is made of the beliefs of its participants, mutual recognition as members of a specific community of compatriots, and the belief that all members of the community are joined together by common and obvious characteristics, views and trust. A second element in specifying national identity, according to Miller, is historical continuity. Historical events, individuals, victories and tragedies, and the blood that has been shed by one's ancestors – all of these serve as arguments on behalf of the idea that future generations can continue what the ancestors achieved. At the same time, it also marks out prospects for the future and the existence of the community therein. «Active identity» is a third sign which separates out national identity. As a community, a nation acts together, to put it in imagery, jointly taking decisions and jointly achieving results. In practice, there are specific people from various sectors – statesmen, athletes, etc. The national becomes what it is through activity. The fourth aspect of national identity is the belonging of the community to a specific location – something which is usually described as a sense of territorial belonging. As the first dimension of national identity, Miller speaks about the human need for something that everyone holds in common – something which can be described as the nation's culture. At the same time, however, the author also argues that it would be mistaken to believe that this national culture should be monolithic or all-encompassing.

Other scholars, too, have presented similar views on national identity. Professor Emeritus Anthony D. Smith at the London School of Economics, for instance, has written in «National Identity» (Smith, 1997, 22) that the components of a nation are a common territory, historical memories and myths, a unified culture, a common economy, and equal laws, rights and obligations.

It is evident that there is much which explanations of national identity in the work of various authors have in common. Here we are dealing with indications of the main dimensions of a sense of national belonging – territory, historical memory, common culture, and civic belonging. It is also interesting to note the accents or different views which are seen in the work of some authors. Guibernau, for instance, emphasises culture as a force which unifies a community. Miller, for his part, stresses the active nature of a national community

as it emerges via processes that are based on mutual recognition and trust. Thus he particularly accents the role of the active position of citizens and the common goals of the nation. Smith, in turn, points to a common economy as a special sign of a nation.

It is interesting to compare what scholars and ordinary people have to say about national identity. In both cases, the most important elements of national identity are said to be a common territory, history, culture, economy and citizenship. It must be added, however, that local residents have pointed to another major element in a national community – ethnic belonging, Latvianness and Latvian culture. Western authors typically do not separate out elements of ethnic belonging as a separate dimension for analysis, instead placing these in a set of cultural characteristics. Miller links this to historical memory and a belief that the community has obvious characteristics which it holds in common. This, it must be added, is most characteristic of researchers in Western Europe.

Schopflin, for his part, is a scholar and politician who is of Hungarian origin, and he links traditions related to the study of nations in Europe to the historical context of various regions therein. He describes the different roles of the state, ethnicity and the civil society in the emergence of nations in Western Europe on the one hand and Central and Eastern Europe on the other. Schopflin argues that citizenship, the civil society and the active participation of citizens were at the foreground when nations were established in the West, while in Eastern Europe, of decisive importance in the emergence of states was the preservation of culture and language, along with recognition of the nation as such. Both Schopflin and Smith note that those Eastern European countries which have managed to break away from empires tend to struggle for the recognition of their identity, as well as for the recognition of the uniqueness of their culture and language and their right to maintain these. These ideas are usually articulated by representatives of national culture such as writers, folklorists and artists. Accordingly, the cultural dimension achieves dominance over other aspects which shape national communities. Countries in the Baltic region, too, have engaged in a struggle over the recognition and survival of their languages and cultures,

and that helps to explain the importance of ethnic belonging as a fundamental principle when establishing a nation. At the same time, however, the arguments of the aforementioned British scholars typically do not emphasise or separate out ethnic belonging as an integrative dimension for a national community.

When comparing the statements of Western scholars and ordinary people in Latvia, it must be emphasised in general terms that there are similar elements in the scholarly texts about national identity and in the answers given by respondents when asked what the word «Latvia» means to them – a common territory, history, culture, the economy and citizenship. And yet the statements from survey respondents also spoke to another essential element of a national community – ethnic belonging, Latvianness and Latvian culture. Here, again, it is clear that the views of scholars in Western and Eastern Europe (Schopflin is a key representative of these views in the latter region) differ. Western authors usually do not separate out manifestations of ethnic belonging as a separate dimension for analysis, instead including these into other groups of elements which characterise national communities – cultural elements or, perhaps, historical memory. Eastern European researchers, by contrast, accent the role of culture and language in the structuring of national identity.

Analysis of the associative statements of survey respondents, moreover, points to another important connection. It turns out that a very important dimension of national identity for the people of Latvia is their country's economic development and the resulting welfare of the people. Under the influence of the economic crisis, the people of Latvia are quite harsh in their perceptions about the country's economic weakness. Links to the state are determined by disgust and shame, and that provides an excuse for emigration from the country.

These data suggest that given Latvia's socio-economic situation, its membership in the EU and the global opportunities for moving from one place to another which are involved, belonging to a national culture on the one hand and the socio-economic security of residents on the other hand must be seen as competing dimensions in the area of national identity.



## Main conclusions. The most important missions

### Main conclusions

Theoretical and empirical research leads to the conclusion that for the people of Latvia, national identity means:

- a) A place or territory in which to live – a home, a region, Latvia as such, and Latvia as a part of the Baltic States and Europe;
- b) Economic and political life in Latvia;
- c) Ethnic and cultural links to the country, as well as the Latvian language;
- d) Common social memory, particularly in relation to Latvia's independent statehood and freedom;
- e) An emotionally expressed sense of national belonging, along with pride or shame about their country.

A very important dimension of national identity for the people of Latvia is their country's economic development and the resulting welfare of the people. Under the influence of the economic crisis, the people of Latvia are quite harsh in their perceptions about the country's economic weakness. Links to the state are determined by disgust and shame, and that provides an excuse for emigration from the country.

### The most important missions

The job for the state is to clearly define political, social and economic rights and obligations, as well as to establish educational and media systems which serve as instruments for shaping a sense of belonging to the nation, also taking into account the importance of the various dimensions therein – the cultural, psychological, territorial, historical memory, political and economic dimension.

There must be public understanding about the mutual benefits which are obtained when the state and the individual interact, emphasising the fact that the welfare of the individual in the country can only improve in the context of the nation's development.

# 1.2. Dimensions of National Identity: A Study of the Views of Local Residents

## A territorial sense of belonging

A territorial sense of belonging is one element in national identity, and its contents are based on the specific links which individuals have to locations, regions, and the country in which they were born, grew up, and spent a part of their lives. In a survey<sup>1</sup> that was conducted to study national identity, respondents were asked to describe the associations which they had when thinking about the word «Latvia.» Describing these associations, respondents most often spoke of Latvia as a special place because of its environmental landscape, the place where their families lived, and the place where people were born and spent their lives. Many respondents spoke of the special attractiveness of such places, as well as their deep links with some of them.

Other questions were concretely formulated, the aim being to find out how much of a sense of belonging respondents felt in relation to a specific place or administrative territory – their parish, neighbourhood, city, region, Latvia, Russia, the Baltic States, and Europe.

Respondents most often said that they feel a sense of belonging to their city and to Latvia (82% and 78% of all respondents respectively). Many respondents spoke of close links to their parish (74%) or an urban neighbourhood (67%). Far fewer people in Latvia identify themselves as residents of Europe (21%) or the Baltic States (20%), or consider themselves to have a sense of belonging to Russia (15%).

The data show that local identities – a sense of belonging to one’s surroundings, city or region – are stronger among older generations, while global identities seem

more attractive to younger generations. Among those respondents who were older than 55, 81% expressed a sense of belonging to their surroundings, 70% said so about the local region, 84% pointed to a city, and 83% spoke of Latvia. A sense of belonging to Europe, in turn, was declared more often by younger respondents (18-24) – 35% of them (Appendix 1).

The greatest differentiation in terms of the territorial sense of belonging among survey respondents was seen in relation to Europe. It turns out that a sense of belonging to Europe is influenced most by the respondent’s age and by the issue of whether the respondent is planning to move away from Latvia. More than one-third of young people aged 18-24, as well as those who plan to leave Latvia, feel themselves to be residents of Europe. In the group above 55, by contrast, only 15.5% expressed a sense of belonging to Europe, while among those who do not plan to leave Latvia, 17.5% did so (Box 1.2)

If we look at the sense of territorial belonging from the perspective of gender, we see that women are more likely to indicate close links to a region or the country, while among men, there are slightly more respondents who feel a sense of belonging to Europe. It is evident that women are more likely to represent the position of older people, and that can be attributed to the fact that there is a greater proportion of women than men in the cohort above 55 years of age.

If we compare the sense of territorial belonging among Latvians and Russians, then we see that the biggest difference exists in terms of attitudes toward Latvia and Russia. 83% of Latvians and 73% of Russians admitted to have close links to Latvia, while 34% of Russians and only a few percentage points of Latvians said that they feel a sense of belonging to Russia. Latvians

<sup>1</sup> The survey «National Identity. NI Dimensions. Historical Memory», Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, 2010.

Box 1.2

### Respondents’ plans to leave Latvia in the near future, as linked to a sense of territorial belonging

(% from each group expressing a deep sense of belonging or a sense of belonging to a specific territory; *n* = 1,004)

Plans	Parish, neighbourhood	City	Region	Latvia	Russia	Baltic States	Europe
Am planning to leave	63.4	70.9	65.4	65.6	14.8	24.6	36.4
I may leave	74.1	80.5	61.4	68.2	19.3	17.9	25.1
Am not planning to leave	76.4	85.7	70.5	8.38	14.2	20.8	18.0

Source: «National Identity. NI Dimensions.» Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, 2010

are more likely to have a local sense of belonging – their surrounding area, city or region. At the same time, however, it is interesting that there are no differences between Latvians and Russians when it comes to Baltic and European identity; in both cases, this identity is comparatively uncommon, with approximately 20% of Russians and Latvians saying that they feel a sense of belonging to the Baltic States or Europe (Box 1.3)

There is also an interesting link between the income level of respondents on the one hand and their sense of territorial belonging on the other. It turns out that a local identity is more distinct among people with medium levels of income (between LVL 120 and 200 per family member per month). Such people were more likely to speak of a sense of belonging to their surroundings, city, region and Latvia. Local senses of belonging are weaker among people with higher and lower levels of income, and it is also true that the sense of a European identity was cited most often by people with the highest level of income (above LVL 201 per month). These data suggest that a sense of belonging to one's parish or city largely depends on one's level of welfare – if it is more or less satisfactory, then the individual feels closer links to the place where he or she lives (Box 1.4).

## The civic and ethnic dimension of national belonging

When making associative statements about Latvia, respondents speak about it as a special place which relates to their homes and those of their ancestors. They also describe Latvia as a place where they can speak their native language and nurture their nation's traditions and culture:

«It is the land of my birth. It is beautiful, and it is the only country in which I would want to live.»

«My motherland, my roots, people who are close to me.»

«Our own environment, the Latvian language.»

«Songs, dances, amber, the Song Festival.»

«A beautiful country with hard-working and loyal people.»

Alongside these responses, there were also quite a few in which the residents of Latvia expressed worries or dissatisfaction about the way in which economic and political life in Latvia is developing:

«It is a country that has been affected by the crisis, one in which the government does not think about its people.»

Box  
1.3

### The sense of territorial belonging by nationality

(% of each ethnic group expressing a deep sense of belonging or a sense of belonging to a specific territory;  $n = 1,004$ )

Nationality	Parish, neighbourhood	City	Region	Latvia	Russia	Baltic States	Europe
<b>All</b>	<b>74.0</b>	<b>81.9</b>	<b>66.8</b>	<b>78.3</b>	<b>14.8</b>	<b>20.2</b>	<b>20.6</b>
Latvians	75.1	82.8	69.7	82.8	3.6	19.9	21.2
Russians	71.0	79.2	60.3	71.9	32.9	20.2	20.6
Others	78.1	87.0	64.7	73.3	21.9	21.9	17.1

Source: «National Identity. NI Dimensions,» Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, 2010

Box  
1.4

### The sense of territorial belonging by respondent's family's level of income

(% of each ethnic group expressing a deep sense of belonging or a sense of belonging to a specific territory;  $n = 1,004$ )

Income*	Parish, neighbourhood	City	Region	Latvia	Russia	Baltic States	Europe
<b>All</b>	<b>74.0</b>	<b>81.9</b>	<b>66.8</b>	<b>78.3</b>	<b>14.8</b>	<b>20.2</b>	<b>20.6</b>
< LVL 80	68.1	74.0	64.0	76.2	8.9	16.5	14.2
LVL 81-120	76.8	87.4	77.5	82.0	15.1	15.0	21.5
LVL 121-150	76.0	85.3	74.3	86.2	17.6	20.6	20.1
LVL 151-200	82.2	91.3	86.5	86.2	16.7	17.2	15.2
> LVL 200	66.2	77.4	62.6	77.7	18.6	23.0	26.6

\* Here and elsewhere, the level of income speaks to the relevant family's monthly income per family member after taxes.

Source: «National Identity. NI Dimensions,» Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, 2010

«A poor country with negative attitudes among bureaucrats toward the people of Latvia.»

«An impoverished and corrupt country.»

It must be emphasised that this dissatisfaction is mostly aimed at the national system of governance, without any sense of responsibility in terms of society or the specific individual. Here we see that when talking about their country, people find a sense of community to be important – one that is based upon the nation’s traditions and culture. It also, however, creates the question of how individuals feel their sense of civic belonging to the national community, as well as of what they think about their civic involvement and responsibilities.

Here we can also ask about that which the residents of our country consider to serve as a principle aimed at consolidating the nation – the common language and culture, or civic responsibility and involvement.

This is a theoretical issue which has been analysed by scholars in Western and in Eastern Europe, as well as in the United States. Professor Rogers Brubaker at the University of California (Brubaker, 1992, 23) argues that the establishment of a nation is determined by the principles which lead to unity in society. A society can be unified in political terms, with participation determined by citizenship; in that case, we are dealing with civic nationalism. In other cases, societies can be united on the basis of ethnicity, and that is an example of ethnic nationalism.

The British scholar Anthony D. Smith (Smith, 1997, 21) has argued that of primary importance in a Western civic nation are laws and civic values, while in ethnic nations, the primary issue is the culture of the relevant ethnos, along with, in most cases, language and everyday habits. An explanation of the origins of these differences is also offered by the aforementioned George Schopflin, who is of Hungarian origin.

On the basis of these theoretical ideas, the questionnaire that was used in the Latvian survey included blocs of questions which were aimed to evaluate values related to civic and ethnic belonging among various groups of residents in Latvia. The questions were formulated in a normative way, thus establishing the

ideal model of a citizen. This approach is rooted in the «good citizen» ideology, which speaks to the political orientation of facilitating the activity and responsibilities of a country’s citizens.

Data show that most people in Latvia think highly of the importance of civic values: 87% say that being a good citizen means observing laws and regulations, 77% say so about the payment of taxes, 76% believe that a good citizen is informed about what is happening in society, and 75% say that a good citizen votes in elections (Box 1.5).

There are also certain links when we compare attitudes toward civic values in various age, income and educational level groups. Young people feel that interest in what is happening in society is a bit less important, and their views are also more liberal when it comes to observing laws. Young and middle-aged people are far more liberal about leaving Latvia because of the crisis in comparison to those who are above 45. It must be stressed that the importance of social solidarity was emphasised to a greater degree by the youngest and oldest groups of respondents – i.e., those which are most likely to need assistance. Such help is less important to economically active residents who usually have greater resources at their disposal (Appendix 2).

It is characteristic that the highest level of understanding about civic duties can be found among the group of respondents with a higher education (Appendix 3). Low income, in turn, does not encourage observance of the law, including the payment of taxes, nor does it stimulate social solidarity or the belief that people should stay in Latvia despite the crisis (Box 1.6).

These results show that views about civic values are influenced by the individual’s level of education and welfare. An understanding of civic obligations is facilitated by education, while low income levels are more likely to be seen as a threat to understanding of civil values and readiness to fulfil relevant obligations. It is particularly important to note that both Latvians and Russians attach an equal level of importance to civic values. This shows that **civic values could be a principle to unify national communities, because they are equally important to Latvians and non-Latvians in the country.**

Box 1.5

### Attitudes toward civic values by nationality

(% of each group stating that they are «important» and «very important», *n* = 1,004)

Being a good citizen means...	Observing laws, regulations	Paying taxes	Being aware of events in society	Voting in elections	Actively opposing corruption	Helping those with worse lives	Staying Latvia despite the economic crisis
<b>All</b>	<b>87.1</b>	<b>77.0</b>	<b>75.8</b>	<b>78.9</b>	<b>70.4</b>	<b>62.7</b>	<b>39.5</b>
Latvians	87.7	76.6	77.6	79.3	73.5	63.7	40.1
Russians	86.6	76.7	71.6	79.6	64.8	61.4	39.2
Others	85.7	80.0	78.1	74.4	70.5	60.0	39.0

Source: «National Identity. NI Dimensions.» Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, 2010

## Active civic values

Students of national communities argue that a nation is shaped from the inside and that it is based on the ability of members of the nation to understand the situation, become involved in it, and take responsibility within it. Common views and understandings of values hold a nation together, allowing it to set out goals and to act. If we look at our society, however, then we see a completely opposite situation – people are unhappy with what is happening in the country, they are passive and alienated, and they want to leave the country. The research question here is about the circumstances which weaken the individual's active civic position.

There were three statements in the survey questionnaire to measure people's attitudes toward active citizenship: 1) «It is important for people in Latvia to be more active in expressing their views when they see injustice»; 2) «It is important for all the residents of Latvia to observe the law and to pay taxes»; and 3) «Latvian citizens who live abroad must vote in elections.»

Data from the study show that women are more likely to support values which relate to an active civic

position than men and people with a higher education. Less importance is attached to these values by people aged 25-34 and those who did not state their family income level (there is a probability that at least some of these people receive wages from the shadow economy) (Appendices 4, 5, 6, Box 1.7). Latvians and Russians hold equal views about the importance of an active civic position. The only difference relates to the question of whether citizens abroad should vote in elections – Latvians feel that this form of political participation is more important than Russians do (Box 1.8).

These results encourage conclusions about the deep links between individuals on the one hand and the country's economic and civic relationships on the other. The data show that a socio-economic status that is at the medium-to-high level (a higher education, average or somewhat high levels of income) serve as a stimulus for fulfilling civic duties, including the payment of taxes. Second, the fact that people with the highest level of income (more than LVL 201 per month) are not among the most active defenders of laws and taxes indicates that a better economic situation in one's family is not

Box  
1.6

### Attitudes toward civic values by income level

(% of each group saying that they are important or very important,  $n = 1,004$ )

Being a good citizen means...	Observing laws, regulations	Paying taxes	Being aware of events in society	Voting in elections	Actively opposing corruption	Helping those with worse lives	Staying Latvia despite the economic crisis
<b>All</b>	<b>87.1</b>	<b>77.0</b>	<b>75.8</b>	<b>78.9</b>	<b>70.4</b>	<b>62.7</b>	<b>39.5</b>
< LVL 80	82.4	66.1	71.4	72.0	70.3	54.2	33.0
LVL 80-120	86.9	80.7	74.5	69.6	73.6	65.9	32.5
LVL 121-150	96.3	82.7	84.8	86.7	78.2	73.7	50.0
LVL 151-200	92.7	87.2	80.8	83.3	74.6	70.4	51.4
> LVL 201	88.8	85.1	83.3	78.9	75.1	62.9	49.6

Source: «National Identity. NI Dimensions,» Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, 2010

Box  
1.7

### Active civic values by income level

(% of each group saying «fully agree» or «mostly agree»,  $n = 1,004$ )

Level of income	People must state more active views when facing injustice	All residents must observe the law, pay their taxes	Latvian citizens abroad must vote in elections
<b>All</b>	<b>87.3</b>	<b>85.9</b>	<b>71.2</b>
< LVL 80	92.4	83.8	79.5
LVL 81-120	92.3	88.8	72.4
LVL 121-150	92.6	94.8	77.3
LVL 151-200	90.1	93.0	74.5
> LVL 201	90.9	87.0	78.2
Hard to say	79.2	79.6	61.6

Source: «National Identity. NI Dimensions,» Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, 2010

a sufficient foundation for an active civic position. Presumably there are also other factors in the mix – factors such as mutual trust between the state and the individual. Third, the fact that people work in the gray zone of the economy weakens their civic involvement (Box 1.6).

## The ethnic and cultural values of national identity: View of residents

The Latvian language, Latvian culture, the Latvian flag and the country's national anthem are the most important national symbols and Latvian values which include the uniqueness that allows Latvians to understand one another, to feel that they are part of a single community, and to feel special links to their country. These are the main Latvian values that consolidate the national community and are both close to and understandable among Latvians. The research question here focuses on how strongly these values serve as a force to integrate the national community in terms of different groups in society, including Russians and members of other nationalities.

The data show that national values such as Latvian language skills and the colours of the national flag are very much appreciated by all members of society irrespective of ethnicity. If we look at the attitudes of

various groups of residents in detail, however, then we see that there are significant differences between Latvians and Russians. For instance, 93% of Latvians and 72% of Russians support the need to learn the Latvian language. It must be emphasised here that the amplitude of divergent attitudes toward this need is considerably smaller than is the case with one of the most important elements in Latvia's integration policy – «The unity of Latvia's society must be based on the Latvian language and culture» (the project «National Identity and Public Integration: Problems and Goals, Ministry of Culture, 2011). The results of the survey show that 89% of Latvians and only 46% of Russians support this idea (Box 1.9). It is significant that **this important aspect of public integration policy leads to one of the greatest differences of opinion between Latvians, Russians and members of other ethnic groups. This leads to the question of whether efforts to base public integration only on these values will bear the necessary fruit of creating a strong and integrated national community. As noted before, there are many values related to civic nationalism which are very much supported by Latvians, Russians and members of other ethnic minorities – obeying the law, opposing injustice, fighting against corruption, etc. Presumably these issues, alongside the Latvian language and culture, could serve as equally important principles**

 Box  
1.8

### Active civic values by nationality

(% of each group saying «fully agree» or «mostly agree»,  $n = 1,004$ )

Nationality	People must state more active views when facing injustice	All residents must observe the law, pay their taxes	Latvian citizens abroad must vote in elections
<b>All</b>	<b>87.3</b>	<b>85.9</b>	<b>71.2</b>
Latvians	88.3	86.6	74.0
Russians	85.1	85.1	66.5
Others	88.9	84.5	70.0

Source: «National Identity. NI Dimensions,» Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, 2010

 Box  
1.9

### Attitudes toward ethnic nationalism values by nationality

(% of each group saying «fully agree» or «mostly agree»,  $n = 1,004$ )

Nationality	All people in Latvia must speak Latvian language	I like colours of Latvian flag	Foundation for unity: Latvian language and culture	I am touched by the national anthem	People of other ethnicities cannot belong to Latvia	I would prefer a Latvia populated only by Latvians
<b>All</b>	<b>84.7</b>	<b>80.9</b>	<b>71.8</b>	<b>58.5</b>	<b>29.8</b>	<b>28.8</b>
Latvians	93.1	87.2	89.1	71.3	36.4	43.9
Russians	72.2	71.5	46.0	39.3	20.4	7.8
Others	76.0	74.5	54.5	46.3	22.3	9.1

Source: «National Identity. NI Dimensions,» Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, 2010



### for the integration of the nation, thus establishing a set of ethnic and civic nationalism values.

Many of Latvia's residents, both Latvians and Russians, have positive feelings about the colours of the Latvian flag – 87% of Latvians and 72% of Russians. There are more radical differences in terms of how people perceive the Latvian national anthem – 71% of Latvians, but only 40% of Russians admit to being touched by the anthem. Emotional perceptions of national symbols are more often admitted by women and older people (Appendix 9, Box 1.10). The data also show that the sense of national belonging has to do with the economic capacities of individuals. For instance, those who did not state their family income were less likely to admit that national symbols touch them in emotional terms (Appendix 10). More likely to talk about this, in turn, are those respondents who are not planning to leave Latvia (Appendix 11).

## A mono-national or multicultural society

Data from the 2011 national census in Latvia show that 62.1% of the country's residents are Latvians, 26.9% are Russians, 3.3% are Belarusians, and 7.7% represent other ethnicities. This clearly shows that Latvia is a multinational society. At the same time, however, there are still different views about whether it would be better if Latvia were a mono-national or mono-ethnic country or if it would be better to have people of various nationalities living there.

A bit more than one-quarter of all respondents say that they would like to see a mono-national society in Latvia (those who agreed with the statement «I would like it better if only Latvians lived in Latvia»). At the same time, however, the statement was supported by 44% of Latvians, 7.8% of Russians and 9.1% of respondents from other ethnic groups. A certain explanation for the broad dissemination of such views among ethnic Latvians might be another statement in the study: «People of

other nationalities and with different traditions and habits cannot truly belong to Latvia even if they have lived here for many years» (the statement was supported by 36% of Latvians and 20% of Russians). These data show that a substantial proportion of Latvians would be happy to draw boundaries between national communities on the basis of ethnicity. To put it another way, they would support the idea that the nation should be established on the basis of the ethnic principles. The idea was rejected by 42% of Latvians, while 14% could not answer the question. **Supporters of an ethnically homogeneous nation were more likely to be young people in the 18-24 cohort (35% of young people from all ethnicities), as well as those with a lower level of education.**

## National identity and recognition of many cultures

Questions about recognising a number of different cultures in the country make it possible to determine how widespread in various groups in society are views which oppose those who call for a mono-ethnic community. It is no surprise that Russians and people of other ethnicities are more responsive toward the co-existence of various cultures in Latvia and toward support for this situation in the country: 52% of Latvians support the statement «I like the fact that people of so many different ethnicities and with different cultures live in Latvia,» while 86% of Russians do. 65% of Latvians and 88% of Russians agreed with the statement that «the state should support the preservation of the culture and habits of different nationalities in Latvia.» 73% of Latvians and 89% of Russians supported the statement that «it is very good that there are many different national cultural organisations in Latvia.»

If we compare differences in views on the basis of the respondents' age, education or income level, we find that the results are not all that predictable. **It turns out that young people aged 18 to 24 are less tolerant toward a**

Box 1.10

### Attitudes toward ethnic and cultural values by age

(% of each group saying «fully agree» or «mostly agree»,  $n = 1,004$ )

Nationality	All people in Latvia must speak Latvian language	I like colours of Latvian flag	Foundation for unity: Latvian language and culture	I am touched by the national anthem	People of other ethnicities cannot belong to Latvia	I would prefer a Latvia populated only by Latvians
All	84.7	80.9	71.8	58.5	29.8	28.8
18-24	85.7	79.8	74.8	52.8	29.9	34.9
25-34	82.6	79.2	69.2	54.6	32.9	31.7
35-44	84.0	77.9	71.7	58.9	27.4	25.3
45-54	84.3	80.5	70.2	50.0	25.1	25.6
55-74	86.2	84.8	73.2	69.5	32.5	28.3

Source: «National Identity. NI Dimensions,» Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, 2010



**diversity of cultures**, while among older people there are more who say that the presence of different cultures is more acceptable. People with a lower level of education tend to be less tolerant. The answers from young people were quite unexpected, because young people usually demonstrate greater tolerance toward the co-existence of multiple cultures (Box 1.11).

Women were more tolerant toward a diversity of cultures in society than men were, and people with higher levels of income were also more tolerant (Appendix 13, 14).

### National identity and global citizenship

Under modern-day circumstances of globalisation, the responsibilities of individuals stretch beyond national borders, because the responsibility for the cleanliness of the environment and for climate change is closely linked. Socio-economic inequality in various regions of the world facilitates migration processes, political conflicts create human rights crises, and all of this has an effect on those people in the world who enjoy welfare and security.

The data show that Latvians are more concerned about the clean environment (82%) than are Russians (77%). Both Latvians and Russians pay considerably much

less attention to environmental problems at the global level (60% and 58% respectively), as well as to help to those who have suffered from natural disasters in parts of the world which are distant from Latvia (during the course of the survey, this applied to the consequences of an earthquake in Haiti). It is also important that respect toward ethnic minorities seems to be more important to Russians and representatives of other ethnic groups than to Latvians (Box 1.12).

It is understandable that global civic values have received more support from people with a higher education (Appendix 15), but **less predictable, it turns out, was the fact that people with medium levels of income, as opposed to those with higher levels of income, presented a higher level of understanding about the importance of global problems** (Box 1.13).

### National identity and historical memory

Historical memory is a very important element in bringing a community together in that it includes stories, legends and myths about the past of the relevant country. Here we also are dealing with emotionally saturated myths about different ways in which history

Box 1.11

#### Recognising multiple cultures by age

(% of each group saying «fully agree» or «mostly agree», *n* = 1,004)

Age group	It is very good that there are many different national cultural organisations in Latvia	The state should support the preservation of the culture and habits of different nationalities in Latvia	I like the fact that people from so many different nationalities and with different cultures live in Latvia
All	79.9	74.9	66.0
18-24	74.6	67.8	59.8
25-34	73.8	70.2	61.1
35-44	80.6	72.5	66.5
45-54	85.0	81.7	67.0
55-74	83.0	78.8	71.6

Source: «National Identity. NI Dimensions,» Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, 2010

Box 1.12

#### Attitudes toward global civic values by nationality

(% of each group saying that they are important or very important, *n* = 1,004)

Nationality	Care for clean environment in future	Respect for minorities	Helping to preserve clean environment in world	Supporting victims of natural disasters in world	Being interested in human rights in world
All	80.2	73.5	59.7	42.5	42.0
Latvians	82.0	67.4	59.8	41.2	37.0
Russians	77.0	81.3	57.8	44.6	49.2

Source: «National Identity. NI Dimensions,» Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, 2010

might have developed and how various twists and turns in history might have affected the process. According to Schopflin, myths can have several functions. Those who accept the views that are encoded in a myth also accept the overall world view that is reflected therein. This means a sense of belonging to a group for which this myth is close, and the rules of the group are then accepted. Myths accentuate that which is different and help to draw boundaries between one group and another. Myths also offer content for the self-perception of the group (Schopflin, 2000, 83).

Respondents were asked to evaluate two myths about Latvia's recent past. One related to how Latvia would have developed if, like Finland, it had retained its independence in 1940. The second has to do with the Soviet era, when the claim was that Latvia achieved a high level of economics and culture only thanks to the help of other Soviet nationalities. The data show that this is the area in which the views of Latvians and Russians diverge to the greatest degree. 60% of Latvians and 30% of Russians support the idea that Latvia would have had the same favourable scenario as Finland had it retained its independence. 22% of Latvians and 58% of Russians, in turn, accept the idea that the Soviet era was good for Latvia's development (Box 1.14). These data

clearly show that historical memory draws strict borders between the Latvian and the Russian community. For that reason, it is very important to know the extent to which these historical myths are reproduced in the relevant communities. To a certain extent, conclusions about this can be drawn by looking at how common the myths are in various age groups. The data show that there is much less support for the two options among younger people than among those who are middle aged or older (Box 1.15). Does this indicate that the role of historical memory as a boundary is diminishing between Latvians and Russians? Time will tell. Interestingly, the scenario of Finland's history is supported more often by people with a higher level of education and income, while the version about the effects of the Soviet era received more support from people with an medium level of education and income (Appendix 16, 17). It is also interesting that data from a 2000 survey («On the Road to a Civic Society, Baltic Data House, 2000) show that 11 years ago, some 60% of Russians supported the idea that the Soviet era was a positive one. Clearly, these views have not changed very much. If the myths are less common among young people, then does that mean that we can talk about transformations in the version of the historical myth

Box 1.13

### Attitudes toward global civic values by income levels

(% of each group saying that they are important or very important,  $n = 1,004$ )

Nationality	Care for clean environment in future	Respect for minorities	Helping to preserve clean environment in world	Supporting victims of natural disasters in world	Being interested in human rights in world
<b>All</b>	<b>80.2</b>	<b>73.5</b>	<b>59.7</b>	<b>42.5</b>	<b>42.0</b>
< LVL 80	78.1	66.4	49.8	34.0	28.6
LVL 81-120	81.5	72.2	59.7	40.2	40.6
LVL 121-150	89.0	8.6	73.2	55.0	52.6
LVL 151-200	85.4	81.8	68.4	51.0	48.3
> LVL 200	79.2	73.4	65.3	51.0	41.9

Source: «National Identity. NI Dimensions,» Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, 2010

Box 1.14

### Attitudes toward collective myths by nationality

(% of each group saying «fully agree» or «mostly agree»,  $n = 1,004$ )

Nationality	The standard of living in Latvia would be higher if the country had remained independent in 1940, as Finland did.	It was only thanks to help from other Soviet nations that Latvia achieved a high level of economics and culture.
<b>All</b>	<b>47.5</b>	<b>36.8</b>
Latvians	59.5	21.7
Russians	29.7	58.3
Others	34.6	55.4

Source: «National Identity. NI Dimensions,» Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, 2010

about the Soviet era? Can we expect that ideological stories about the economic might of the USSR and the mutual aid of Soviet republics – stories which took deep root during the Soviet era – might be replaced with an adequate understanding of socio-economic processes? The real question here is whether the gap between the historical memories of Latvians and Russians might shrink in time.

### Pride about being a resident of Latvia

The survey data show that despite the effects which the country's economic crisis have had on the welfare of local residents and the dissatisfaction which people feel about the system of government, most (60%) of respondents claim to be proud of the fact that they are residents of Latvia. These data show that these are special links between people and their motherland – the country in which they were born.

The greatest difference in emotional links to Latvia is between Latvians and Russians. Where 71% of Latvians are proud to be residents of the country, only 44% of Russians say the same. More likely to be proud in this regard are people with a higher education (66%; Appendix 18) and those with medium or the highest level of income (64%, Box 1.15, 1.17).

The data also reveal a link between a sense of pride on the one hand and the fact that the respondents' relatives have emigrated so as to improve the material situation of their families on the other hand. The results show that the level of welfare and the ability to provide for one's own family are very important prerequisites for having a sense of belonging to one's motherland our country. It has to be added that in comparison to the 2000 survey, the number of people who are proud of living in Latvia has declined substantially. In 2000, positive emotions about the country were expressed by 85% of Latvians and 55% of Russians. Similar data were found in a survey that was conducted in 1994, as well – 86% of Latvians and 63% of Russians displayed positive emotions toward Latvia (Zepa, Šūpule, 2006). In June 1990, by contrast, 97% of Latvians and 85% of Russians expressed pride in Latvia, and it is clear that this height of emotion could not have been preserved, because at that time people were simply excited about the restoration of Latvia's independence (Zepa, Šūpule, 2006). Still, the mid-1990s and 2000 can be good points of reference in explaining the shift in attitudes, because it is clear that some residents have become disappointed about their true feelings toward their country.

For the purposes of comparison, we can look at the sense of emotional belonging to their state which

Box  
1.15

#### Attitudes toward collective myths by age

(% of each group saying «fully agree» or «mostly agree»,  $n = 1,004$ )

Age	The standard of living in Latvia would be higher if the country had remained independent in 1940, as Finland did.	It was only thanks to help from other Soviet nations that Latvia achieved a high level of economics and culture.
<b>All</b>	<b>47.5</b>	<b>36.8</b>
18-24	43.6	29.9
25-34	42.9	30.4
35-44	51.8	38.0
45-54	44.8	39.4
55-74	52.4	41.3

Source: «National Identity. NI Dimensions,» Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, 2010

Box  
1.16

#### Pride in being a resident of Latvia by nationality

(% of relevant group,  $n = 1,004$ )

Nationality	Proud («very proud» or «mostly proud»)	Not proud («not particularly proud» or «not proud at all»)	Difficult to say
<b>All</b>	<b>59.9</b>	<b>30.7</b>	<b>9.4</b>
Latvians	70.5	2.19	7.6
Russians	44.4	42.9	12.6
Others	48.2	42.3	9.5

Source: «National Identity. NI Dimensions,» Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, 2010

Box  
1.17

## Pride in being a resident of Latvia by income level

(% of relevant group,  $n = 1,004$ )

Income	Proud («very proud» or «mostly proud»)	Not proud («not particularly proud» or «not proud at all»)	Difficult to say
< LVL 80	56.8	35.0	8.2
LVL 81-120	58.0	29.9	12.0
LVL 121-150	63.8	28.1	8.1
LVL 151-200	63.6	25.5	10.9
> LVL 201	64.4	25.7	9.9
Don't know	57.3	34.4	8.3

Source: «National Identity. NI Dimensions,» Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, 2010

Box  
1.18

## Pride in being a resident of Latvia by age

(% of relevant group,  $n = 1,004$ )

Age	Proud («very proud» or «mostly proud»)	Not proud («not particularly proud» or «not proud at all»)	Difficult to say
<b>All</b>	<b>59.9</b>	<b>30.7</b>	<b>9.4</b>
18-24	61.1	26.9	12.0
25-34	56.6	35.9	7.5
35-44	58.1	29.3	12.6
45-54	51.3	39.7	9.0
55-74	68.5	23.9	7.6

Source: «National Identity. NI Dimensions,» Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, 2010

Box  
1.19

## Pride in being a resident of one's country

(the answers «very proud» and «mostly proud»)

Country	European Values Study (EVS), 1999	European Values Study (EVS), 2008
Poland	95	96
Russia	67	92
Denmark	87	91
France	84	90
Austria	86	89
Sweden	81	87
Czech Republic	78	84
Estonia	52	81
Latvia	<b>81</b> ( $n = 1,000$ )	<b>79</b> ( $n = 1,506$ )
Lithuania	55	72

Source: EVS 1999, EVS 2008

Note: In Latvia, the question was only posed to citizens; EVS 2008 data

people in several European and former Soviet countries had in 1999 and 2008, when two separate surveys were conducted (Box 1.19.). As can be seen, the level of pride in their country among citizens in a series of countries in different European regions (Denmark, Sweden, France, Austria, Poland, the Czech Republic) either remained at the same level or increased a bit. These are countries in which the national economy developed in a more or less even way during the stated time period. In countries where the decade related to economic growth and other achievements (Russia, Estonia, Lithuania), the proportion of citizens who are proud of being a citizen in the relevant country increased substantially. It has to be recalled here that the data from Latvia did not include the views of non-citizens. All in all, we can conclude that the economic and social security of local residents goes hand in hand with the spread of a national sense of belonging in society. This is confirmed by a survey that was conducted in Latvia in 2010 – only 64% of citizens still said that they were proud of being residents of the country (Box 1.20).

### A sense of endangerment to one’s identity

A sense of threat or endangerment to one’s identity is facilitated by the caution of those who belong to the relevant group, as well as by stricter boundaries between one group and others. Survey data show that fears of the

survival of one’s language and culture lead to a symmetry of views between Latvians and Russians: 56% of Latvians and 34% of Russians feel that their language and culture are endangered in Latvia. A similar symmetry of views emerges in relation to threats against the existence of the other group’s language and culture: Only 17% of Russians feel that the existence of the Latvian language and culture in Latvia is under threat, while 11% of Latvians think the same about the future of the Russian language and culture in the country (Box 1.21). The threat to the Latvian language and culture is more often seen by Latvians with a secondary or higher education, while among Russians, it is precisely people with a higher education who were less likely to express concern about the survival of the Russian language in Latvia (Box 1.22). As noted, a sense of endangerment in relation to one’s language and culture promotes a lack of security about one’s identity, but on the other hand, it strengthens the belief that boundaries have to be created among groups.

Estonian sociologists have found similar data about the views of Estonians and the country’s Russians with respect to dangers against language and culture. There, again, Estonians were more likely than Russians to express concern about the survival of their language and culture in their country. On the basis of these data, Estonian researchers have concluded that Estonians feel that they are an endangered minority (Kalmus, 2003). Analysing the specifics of Latvian attitudes and identities, we can see that Latvian attitudes, in comparison to those residents

Box 1.20

#### Pride in one’s country by citizenship

(% of relevant group, *n* = 1,004)

Citizenship	Proud («very proud», «mostly proud»)	Not proud («not particularly proud, not at all proud»)	Hard to say
Latvian citizens	63.7%	27.6%	8.7%
Non-citizens	41.4%	45.8%	12.8%

Source: «National Identity. NI Dimensions,» Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, 2010

Box 1.21

#### The views of the residents of Latvia about threats to the existence of the Latvian/Russian language and culture in Latvia by nationality

(% of the relevant group, *n* = 1,004)

Nationality	Existence of Latvian language, culture endangered («very endangered», «more likely to be endangered than not»)	Existence of Russian language, culture, endangered («very endangered», «more likely to be endangered than not»)
All	39.8	20.0
Latvians	55.9	11.1
Russians	16.6	34.2
Others	21.7	26.0

Source: «National Identity. NI Dimensions,» Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, 2010

who speak Russian, is often more similar to the position taken by a minority, not a majority. Fear about collective survival, in turn, strengthens the belief that there must be ethnicisation with a lack of trust in competing identities.

## Identities and their boundaries

Identity makes it possible to answer the question of where one can feel a sense of belonging – what is the common «we» which makes it possible to draw boundaries between «us» and «them.» Belonging to a group allows individuals to have a common understanding of issues, security, the sense of solidarity in the community, and a limited world in which to live and find oneself (Schopflin, 2000, 10). Thus identity serves individual efforts to receive public support for the relevant choices and to avoid a sense of insecurity – something that is so very important in today's mutative social world. Identity is a social construct. As Benedict Anderson (1991, 6) has argued, a nation is an imagined community and its participants often really know only those who are closest to them. This means that the rest of the nation can only be imagined, and other identities, too, can be seen as imagined communities.

In the Latvian survey, respondents were presented with a list of 23 different groups of people and asked to choose those about which they could feel a certain sense of belonging and in the context of which they could use the word «us.» Statistical analysis based on factor analysis made it possible to determine communities which have gathered together and are groups of people which can speak about «us.» If we look at the matrix of four factors, we see that the following communities have emerged:

- The community of Slavic nations in Latvia and the world, including Latvia's non-citizens;
- The community of active citizens which includes «cultural people all around the world,» Europeans, «people who know how to defend their interests,» and «people who are responsible toward the country»;
- The community of Latvians in Latvia and the world, including Latvia's citizens;
- The community of friends, family members, schoolmates and colleagues.

Of these communities, we see that two are linked to nationality – the first is made up of Slavic nationalities, while the other is made up of Latvians. It is interesting that the other two groups are based on other principles. One brings together people with a broader scope and an active civic position. They feel a sense of belonging to people culture throughout the world, Europeans, people who know how to defend their interests, and those who are responsible for the state. The second brings together people who have or have had direct links – friends, relatives, colleagues, schoolmates and fellow university students. This could be seen as a community of social networks.

These data suggest that there are more than just ethnicity-based sense of belonging and the drawing of relevant boundaries among ethnic groups. It can be said with certainty that people of different nationalities see themselves as being among the world's cultural and active people, and it is also true that communities of friends, relatives and colleagues are also multinational. The data show that 9% of Latvians and 9% of Russians count themselves among cultural people in the world, 19% of Latvians and 16% of Russians see themselves as being responsible toward the state, and 20% of Latvians and 20% of Russians feel that they are linked to those who know how to defend their interests. 11% of Latvians and 16% of Russians feel themselves to be Europeans.

It is interesting that many groups of people which were included on the list did not form closer links with other groups, and people in those groups did not state links with those who belong to other groups. Such groups include «poor people facing financial difficulties,» «ordinary working people,» «wealthy people,» «people of my generation,» «people with my culture and traditions,» and «people of my faith.» In quite a few cases, a sense of belonging to these groups was expressed by a considerable

Box  
1.22

### The views of the residents of Latvia about threats to the existence of the Latvian/Russian language and culture in Latvia by education level

(% of the relevant group,  $n = 1,004$ )

Education	Existence of Latvian language, culture endangered («very endangered», «more likely to be endangered than not»)	Existence of Russian language, culture, endangered («very endangered», «more likely to be endangered than not»)
<b>All</b>	<b>39.8</b>	<b>20.0</b>
Primary or unfinished secondary	29.9	16.9
Secondary	44.7	22.0
Specialised secondary	37.5	22.4
Higher	43.0	14.8

Source: «National Identity. NI Dimensions,» Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, 2010



proportion of respondents. 39% said that they feel a sense of belonging to people of their own generation, 28% did so in relation to ordinary working people, 25% felt links to people with the same culture and traditions, and 19% felt this to be true in relation to people with the same faith. A sense of belonging to wealthy people was named by only 5% of respondents. It is significant that people in these groups were not part of the «us» group in the aforementioned broader communities – ethnic or social networks or people who are cultural and active in the world. This might be attributed to the fact that words such as «poor person», «ordinary working person», «person of my generation, faith or culture», etc., do not serve as objects of attraction for others who are outside the boundaries of the group and cannot, therefore, form a sense of belong to the group.

### Belonging to the Latvian nation

Students of national identity argue that a national community is based on the beliefs and views of people who are a part thereof. Nations exist when members recognise one another as fellow citizens. National identity is glue which holds society together and allows it to pursue common aims (Miller, 1999). The Latvian constitution states that «sovereign authority in the Latvian state belongs to the people of Latvia.» Asked about who makes up the Latvian nation, residents of the

country defined principles related to national belonging in Latvia, discussing those people with whom they feel a sense of national community.

The data show that there are certain differences between Latvians and Russians when it comes to the foundation for national belonging in Latvia. 98% of Latvians feel that the Latvian nation is made up of Latvians, while an almost equal number of Russians (94%) argue that a principle for establishing the nation is also citizenship. An even greater gap exists in relation to «those Latvian residents who feel a sense of belonging to the country» – 73% of Latvians and 91% of Russians consider such people to be part of the national community. It must be stressed that Latvian language knowledge as a principle related to national belonging is equally important to Latvians and to Russians. More than two-thirds of respondents in both groups support the view that «everyone who speaks Latvian and lives in Latvia» belongs to the national community. A more radical difference in the views of Latvians and Russians relates to «everyone who was born in Latvia» and «everyone who has at least one parent who is a Latvian.» This position was supported by more than 80% of Russians and more than 65% of Latvians. Approximately one-half of Latvians and fewer than 90% of Russians feel that all of the residents of Latvia belong to the Latvian nation. The views of people of other nationalities are closer to those of Russians, not Latvians (Box 1.24).

Box  
1.23

### Communities identified as the result of factor analysis

(co-efficient of element)

<b>The community of Slavic nations in Latvia and the world, including Latvia's non-citizens</b>	<b>The community of active citizens, which includes «cultural people all around the world», Europeans, «people who know how to defend their interests», and «people who are responsible toward their country</b>
Latvia's Russians, 742 Russia's Russians, 726 Latvia's non-citizens, 684 Ukrainians, Belarusians, Poles, etc., 668 Ethnic groups living in Latvia, 668 Russian speakers around the world, 601	Cultural people in the world, 624 Europeans, 594 People who know how to defend their interests, 574 People who are responsible toward their country, 532
<b>The Latvian community in Latvia and the world, including Latvia's citizens</b>	<b>The community of friends, family members, schoolmates and colleagues</b>
Latvians, 673 All Latvian citizens, 647 Latvian speakers all around the world, 544	Friends, 812 Relatives/family, 760 Classmates, 625 Colleagues, people from my profession, 547

#### Groups of people which did not establish closer links to other groups and with respect to which other groups did not see links

Poor people facing financial difficulties  
People with my culture and traditions  
People of my generation  
People of my faith  
Wealthy people  
Simple working people

Source: «National Identity. NI Dimensions,» Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, 2010



It is understandable that Latvians, as the nucleus of their nation, are stricter in drawing borderlines when asked about those groups of residents who should be seen as belonging to the Latvian nation. It must be stressed, however, that **not just ethnic belonging (Latvians), but also citizenship, a sense of belonging to the country, and Latvian language skills are among the most important principles related to national belonging insofar as Latvians are concerned.**

## Boundaries related to Latvian citizenship

Another question that was posed to survey respondents was this: «What types of people should be banned from becoming citizens of Latvia?» This made it possible to identify the boundaries which people in different social groups set in this regard. We can see that Latvians hold stricter positions than other groups do when it comes to who should and should not be allowed to become a citizen of Latvia. If we look at the criteria which limit citizenship and are mentioned most often by Latvians, then we must see that this is an active civic

position – the national community must reject those to whom Latvia's interests are not important (74%), as well as those who ignore Latvian law (don't pay taxes, etc.; 72%). A similar approach is taken toward former members of repressive and anti-national organisations (KGB agents, members of the Soviet military, etc.; 71%). Considerably fewer Latvians denied the right of citizenship in relation to other groups – immigrants (36%), or people of other nationalities (22%). 19% of Latvians and 7% of Russians believe that Latvian citizenship should be denied to those who want to preserve their own traditions and culture. It has to be said that responses about the presentation of traditions and culture can be interpreted very broadly, because it may be that respondents were thinking about attitudes toward the traditions of different religions, including Islam (Box 1.25).

It has to be added here that the views of Russians and members of other ethnic groups are fairly similar to those of Latvians when it comes to limitations on citizenship, the only difference being that these views are less common among Russians and other minorities than is the case with Latvians. This is a very important result for the research, because it shows that the views of Latvians

Box  
1.24

### Views of Latvians and members of other nationalities about who makes up the people of Latvia

(% of each nationality, the answer «yes»,  $n = 1,004$ )

Nationality	Latvians	All Latvian citizens	All Latvian residents with sense of belonging to country	All who speak Latvian and live in Latvia	All who were born in Latvia	All who have at least one parent who is a Latvian	All residents of Latvia
<b>All</b>	<b>95.8</b>	<b>86.5</b>	<b>80.5</b>	<b>77.5</b>	<b>76.3</b>	<b>72.4</b>	<b>66.0</b>
Latvians	97.9	81.1	72.9	75.6	67.7	65.1	52.7
Russians	93.7	94.4	90.6	79.9	89.6	83.9	85.9
Others	90.9	92.1	91.5	80.7	83.2	78.3	78.7

Source: «National Identity. NI Dimensions.» Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, 2010

Box  
1.25

### The views of Latvia's residents on who should not be allowed to become a citizen of the country by nationality and citizenship

(% of relevant group; the answer «should be banned»,  $n = 1,004$ )

Nationality, citizenship	Those who wish to preserve their traditions, culture	Non-Latvians	People from other countries	Members of former repressive organisations (KGB, Soviet militarists)	Those to whom Latvia's interests are unimportant	Those who ignore Latvian law (paying taxes, etc.)
<b>All</b>	<b>13.6</b>	<b>15.6</b>	<b>27.1</b>	<b>55.3</b>	<b>63.4</b>	<b>63.9</b>
Latvians	18.5	21.9	35.9	70.7	76.3	71.4
Russians	7.0	8.1	14.5	32.0	44.1	54.7
Others	6.5	3.7	15.9	40.7	50.6	50.1

Source: «National Identity. NI Dimensions.» Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, 2010

and ethnic minorities are not polarised in relation to such an important issue as criteria related to citizenship. Even though sometimes such polarisation is discussed in the mass media, the truth is the opposite – both groups name similar criteria as being the most important ones, and it is even more important that this represents a position of active citizenship.

## Immigrants: A Threat or a Benefit?

Latvia is undergoing a serious demographic crisis. It is among the 10 or 15 countries in the world which are aging most rapidly. The community of Latvia has experienced rapid depopulation in terms of fewer children and more elderly people. The situation is exacerbated even further by the fact that economically active residents have moved away from the country during the economic crisis. It can be expected that economic growth in the country will create a labour force deficit in the country, and immigrants will be needed in that case. At the same time, however, Latvian immigration policies include strict limits on the inflow of workers.

Our researchers asked people about the effects of immigrants on the national economy, culture and labour market. The answers are quite interesting. It turns out that attitudes toward immigrants mostly depend on the respondent's nationality. Latvians are considerably more likely than people of other nationalities to insist that

immigrants would have a negative effect, while Russians and people of other ethnic minorities are more likely to point to the positive consequences of the process. Thus, for instance, 48% of Latvians and 28% of Russians believe that immigrants increase the crime rate, and 66% of Latvians and 28% of Russians think that immigrants take away the jobs of people who were born in Latvia. When it comes to positive effects, 21% of Latvians and 45% of Russians say that immigrants serve the interests of Latvia's economy, while 33% of Latvians and 45% of Russians say that they make Latvia open to new ideas (Box 1.26).

It is interesting that women are less likely than men to see threats related to immigration and more likely to think that immigrants are a good thing (Box 1.27). The effects of educational levels cannot be evaluated in the same way – people with a higher education think that immigrants may increase the crime rate, but they also believe that immigrants provide benefit to the economy and open up the road for innovations. People with a lower education level think that immigrants create the threat of unemployment (Box 1.28).

## Conclusions

When it comes to civic nationalism, people understand that they belong to a single community and are subject to the same laws. In the field of civic nationalism, the choice

Box  
1.26

### Attitudes toward the effects of immigrants on social and economic processes by nationality

(% of each group, the answers «fully agree» and «mostly agree»,  $n = 1,004$ )

Nationality	Immigrants increase crime	Immigrants give benefit to the Latvian economy	Immigrants take away the jobs of people born in Latvia	Immigrants make Latvia open to new ideas and cultures
<b>All</b>	<b>40.1</b>	<b>28.7</b>	<b>61.3</b>	<b>39.6</b>
Latvians	47.7	21.1	65.6	33.4
Russians	28.9	40.7	54.9	49.3
Others	32.7	34.2	57.1	44.8

Source: «National Identity. NI Dimensions,» Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, 2010

Box  
1.27

### Attitudes toward the effects of immigrants on social and economic processes by gender

(% of group, the answers «fully agree» and «mostly agree»,  $n = 1,004$ )

Gender	Immigrants increase crime	Immigrants give benefit to the Latvian economy	Immigrants take away the jobs of people born in Latvia	Immigrants make Latvia open to new ideas and cultures
<b>All</b>	<b>40.1</b>	<b>28.7</b>	<b>61.3</b>	<b>39.6</b>
Men	41.7	28.9	63.4	36.5
Women	38.7	28.5	59.5	42.3

Source: «National Identity. NI Dimensions,» Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, 2010

of citizenship and the choice to join a specific community are individual choices. In the case of ethnic nationalism, by contrast, belonging to a nation is more collective in that it is based on ethnic origins, as well as the culture and history of the relevant group.

National policies, particularly in terms of public integration, should examine the *principles* and *values* which

are at the foundation of establishing a nation. It would be useful to discuss the fact that the civic community should not just care about Latvian values which can only be implemented in Latvia, but also emphasise the rights and obligations, political participation and social solidarity of citizens, without which neither the state nor democracy can survive.

Box  
1.28

### Attitudes toward the effects of immigrants on social and economic processes by education level

(% of group, the answers «fully agree» and «mostly agree»,  $n = 1,004$ )

Education level	Immigrants increase crime	Immigrants give benefit to the Latvian economy	Immigrants take away the jobs of people born in Latvia	Immigrants make Latvia open to new ideas and cultures
All	40.1	28.7	61.3	39.6
Primary or incomplete secondary	38.3	25.7	66.6	31.7
Secondary	36.4	30.1	57.5	38.7
Specialised secondary	39.6	25.7	63.4	39.3
Higher	47.5	33.7	60.0	46.2

Source: «National Identity. NI Dimensions.» Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, 2010

Box  
1.29

### Main conclusions. The most important missions

#### Main conclusions

There are considerable differences among Latvians, Russians and other ethnic groups when it comes to views about important aspects of public integration policies – the idea that «the unity of Latvian society must be based on Latvian language and culture,» for instance. At the same time, however, positions taken by Latvians, Russians and others are similar when it comes to civic values such as obeying the law, opposing injustice, battling corruption, etc. Presumably, civic values alongside national ones could serve as equally important principles for the integration of the nation, thus establishing a set of values related to ethnic and civic nationalism.

Examining the views of people from various groups in society about principles that unify society in the context of the nation's development, we can conclude that polarised positions among Latvians, Russians and other ethnic groups hinder the nation's development.

#### The most important missions

National policies, particularly in terms of integration of society, should examine the *principles* and *values* which are at the foundation of establishing a nation. It would be useful to discuss the fact that the civic community should not just care about Latvian values which can only be implemented in Latvia, but also emphasise the rights and obligations, political participation and social solidarity of citizens, without which neither the state nor democracy can survive. **Civic values can serve as a principle to unify the national community, because such values are equally important to Latvians and to other nationalities resident in the country.**

It is the duty of the state to facilitate the emergence of new traditions and rituals which would serve to unify all members of society irrespective of their ethnic belonging.

# 1.3. National Identity, History and Social Memory

Those who belong to a nation tend to be proud about the history of their ancestors, creating stories about the nation's strength, vitality and even superiority in comparison to other nations. National identity researcher Montserrat Guibernau has written that Greeks are proud of their ancient cultural heritage, Castilians are proud of Columbus, who discovered America, and Italians are proud of the Roman Empire. Nations recall not just periods of glory, but also ages of terror and suffering. Catalonians remember the French and Spanish occupation of Barcelona in 1714, Jews recall the tragedy of the Holocaust, and Americans commemorate the terrorist attack against the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon on September 11, 2011. The selection and use of those aspects of history in which victories interweave with other experiences – that is what shapes the collective memory of the nation. These transcendental moments from the past allow members of the community to increase their self-value, convincing them that they are outstanding in specific areas and that they are unique. History takes part in creating a nation's image; in fact, it is a forge at which the characteristics of the nation are cast (Guibernau, 20). The duty of history is to tell us *who we are*. The suffering, survival, resistance and heroism of our ancestors serve to strengthen living solidarity today. The past is an inviolable component in social identification, and it plays a critical role in inter-group relationships and mutual recognition (Tosh, 14). Memory, in turn, is an inviolable element of identity, facilitating the ability of people to feel a sense of belonging to their community, their motherland and their country. It is one of the most decisive prerequisites for establishing social roots.

History was one of the main ways of ensuring political mobilisation among people in Eastern Europe, including Latvia, when a battle was waged to escape the bloc of Socialist countries that were governed by the Soviet Union. People in these territories remembered the time before World War II, when life was *different* (i.e., not Soviet). Memories of the offences caused by the Communist regimes were even clearer and more alive. After decades of silence, these offences burst into the public arena in the late 1980s. Memories once kept privately by families and small groups melded into a powerful torrent which ended up destroying the Soviet version of history (Judt, 2002, 173). The national identity of Eastern Europeans was related to national sentiment, as well as to a sense of injustice about 20<sup>th</sup> century history. «.. the official myths of Soviet rule had been publicly discredited throughout the Soviet Union and replaced by deep-seated historical grievances and new, nationalist

myths» (Sherlock, 148). According to the historian Tony Judt, «if the problem in Western Europe has been a shortage of memory, in the continent's other half the problem is reversed. Here there is too much memory, too many pasts on which people can draw, usually as a weapon against the past of someone else» (Judt, 2002, 172). During the late 1980s and early 1990s, interest in history flourished in Eastern Europe. People wanted to learn about the blank pages in history. They wanted to learn about the events which Communist regimes had hushed up, as well as about heroes and villains. People hoped to reassess events from the past. This was basically an upheaval in history. Nearly all of the events and heroes who had been praised by the Communist regimes were denounced. Many of the phenomena and individuals that were seen as negative during the Soviet era were now praised. Belonging to one group of memories or another turned Eastern European countries and individuals into friends and/or enemies in terms of understanding the past and the realities of the present day. The restored past strengthened national identity. In politics and everyday life, it echoed with the present and created a vast wave of commemoration with new space and time for commemorations. Monuments and street names were replaced, new calendars of official holidays and dates of commemoration were established, historical narratives were reconstructed in historical, scholarly and popular books, biographies, memoirs, literature, cinema, television broadcasts and audio materials, and people engaged in many other activities, as well (see Esbenschade; Smith; Zelče, 2007).

The way in which social memory was established and functioned in post-Soviet Latvia involved many similarities with the same processes in other Eastern European countries, but there were also substantial differences because of the long-lasting presence of two different groups of social memories in Latvia – those of Latvians and those of Russian speakers (most of whom are people from other Soviet republics who moved to Latvia during the years of the Soviet occupation). These two groups have different views about key events in Latvia's past, as well as about the role of these views in the area of identity.

## Victims and heroes

The restoration of Latvia's independent statehood occurred in lockstep with a public auditing of history. Soviet Latvia lost its historical legitimacy in June 1988, when the fact of the Soviet occupation was first discussed in public (at a plenary meeting of the Creative Unions

of the Latvian SSR). There were also events held to commemorate the victims of Stalinist deportations (see Zelče, 2009, 43-46).

Beginning in 1987, one of the most important items on Latvia's agenda was to identify and commemorate Soviet offenses. This essentially turned into a mass movement. Flowers were laid down and candles were lit at the foot of the Freedom Monument and at the Cemetery of the Brethren in Riga. The same was true all over Latvia in terms of national monuments or symbolic replacements for same – train stations from which people were deported to Siberia, places where national partisans waged battle, at rivers and lakes, at the foot of massive trees and at other ancient sacred locations. People gathered to honour the victims, and they organised marches. New places of commemoration were established, pre-war organisations were re-established, and people began to visit places

where others had been imprisoned or deported. The public arena was filled with stories from those who had been repressed in all kinds of mediated formats and genres (see Kaprāns, et al.). The first press publications about the repressions and the voices of those who had been repressed on television and radio broadcasts turned into important cultural and social events with much resonance. They helped to form a collective viewpoint about the Soviet occupation, the repressive system, deportations and the things which people did in relation to them, the struggle for life, and the system of values which prevailed. Among such publications, of particular importance were the first collection of memoirs and poems about Stalinist repressions, «Via dolorosa» (1990), Anita Liepa's «Exhumation» (1990), Roberts Gabris' «Latvian Officer No. 35473» (1990), and Melānija Vanaga's «On the Banks of the River of Souls» (1991). Later this list

Box  
1.30

### Poet Anda Līce, editor of a collection of memoirs by victims of Stalinist repressions, «Via dolorosa,» in 1991

«Now our nation has another set of scriptures. We are placing the testimony of Stalinist victims alongside our Folk Songs and the Bible. This handwritten literature speaks to hell on Earth, and essentially it speaks to heaven in people and the nation. [...] This handwritten literature provides devastating facts to fill in the blank pages in the historical memory of the nation. With unique emotional directness, it scrubs the calcification off of our souls. Thousands of people who did not have time to tell the truth are speaking through the mouths of these witnesses. The same is true of those whose pain is so deep and great that they cannot touch it again. While people are still only thinking about where and how to erect a monument to the victims, these witnesses are already building it with words. Testimony published in books and periodicals offers moral satisfaction to everyone who suffered from the plague of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. It represents a knock on the door of conscience of those whose hands are bloody. Even if they do not face a trial in this life, their conscience will never be at rest. This means urging these people to regret their sins and to pay penance in relation to the only thing that can wash away the blood. If only one in a thousand can do so, then the memoirs will have done their sacred work. You will say 'They will not read the testimony.' Perhaps, but there is no peace for them. \ It is important for each of them to hold a second Nuremberg trial. [...]

It is premature to judge the importance of testimony about Stalinism in terms of our nation's spiritual life and culture. Only some of the testimony has been published. And yet I dare say that this is exactly what addresses us most harshly and most directly among all genres. Is the reader prepared for this? People who spent many years in a system of informational famine and infantile training are often stupefying themselves with erotic and trashy literature. They are afraid of losing the seeming comfort of their souls. The truth about the era and the destiny of the nation is put aside. Nothing in terms of these memories is available to those residents of the republic who read in Russian. A failure to understand Latvia's history creates incomprehension and national intolerance. This layer of literature is hardly ever used in the theatre and cinema. Professional authors, too, are mostly inspired by the present, which is so rich in events. Perhaps an entirely new genre of literature will eventually emerge on the basis of this layer. For future generations of writers, artists, historians and philosophers, this will be unprecedented experience. The scope at which memories have been disseminated remains narrow – Latvia and Latvians abroad. Thought must be given to translating these texts into the languages of the world. That is the only way in which we can warn the world. [...]

Reading this testimony means overcoming a great deal in oneself, not least in terms of concepts such as crime, punishment and forgiveness. In the battle for the truth, we must not allow evil to cloud our eyes, because then we will lose the road that is under our feet and the sky that is above us. Forgiveness is an individual matter, even though the offences have affected the entire nation. Without true repentance of sins, forgiveness is not possible on Earth or in heaven.»

Source: Līce, A. (1992). «Stalīnisma upuru liecības» (The Testimony of Victims of Stalinism) In Šneidere, I. (ed.). *Komunistiskā totalitārisma un genocīda prakse Latvijā* (The Practice of Communist Totalitarianism and Genocide in Latvia). Riga: Zinātne, pp. 169-171.



was joined by Sandra Kalniete's «With Dancing Shoes in the Snows of Siberia» (2001) and Anda Manfelde's «Children of the Dugout» (2010).

In looking back at the 1990s, anthropologist Vieda Skultāne has concluded that for Latvians, commemoration of Soviet repressions was the main characteristic in identity, just like the commemoration of the Holocaust is the main characteristic of identity for Jews (Skultāne, 765). When defining their identity, Latvians were happy to accept a description proposed by the playwright Māra Zālīte – «nation of orphans.» Self-victimisation solidified the community, served as an instrument which made it possible to draw a line between «us» and «them,» and made it possible to establish a concept about the existence of the restored nation state. The Soviet period took on the discourse of an era of «alien power,» and Latvians were a «nation of sufferers» – good people whose land and homes had been stolen and who were forced to submit before an alien regime and ideology. In this discourse, the heroes of history were all of the people who struggled against the Soviet regime. At the front of the stage in this regard were members of the World War II era Latvian Legion and all of the national partisans who took weapons in hand and made it possible to create a story about heroism in Latvian history – one that was not in contradiction to the historical identity of «sufferers,» but instead supplemented it in the sense that all of those who fought against the Soviet regime (as long as the Soviet Union's repressive structures could physically reach them) were killed or sent to Soviet prisons or camps. In speaking about the heroes of history – Legionnaires and national partisans – the then commander of the National Armed Forces, Juris Dalbiņš, had this to say in 1995: «The spirit of these people could not be broken by any regime, because they were the sons and daughters of independent Latvia. They experienced the flourishing of the country and then violence and humiliation at the hands of the occupants. The love of the motherland which these people held in their hearts could not be measured in lats, roubles, dollars or marks. This was inalienable treasure in their hearts. It was a matter of honour and duty for every one of them. [...] Our old freedom fighters have a strength of spirit and lives which set an example for younger generations in terms of how one must serve one's Mother Latvia. [...] Only that nation which honours its heroes and remembers its true history will survive» (Dalbiņš, 403-404). The Legionnaires and national partisans became heroes of history just because they fought against the Soviet regime while ignoring collective or individual collaborationism with the Nazi regime and the involvement of such people in Nazi crimes. Among the heroes of Latvian history were also heroes from Latvian history in the 1920s and 1930s – participants in the liberation battles and politicians, as well as, separately, Soviet-era dissidents, but in general terms they remained in the shadow of the Legionnaires and national partisans.

By the mid-1990s, resistance against the Soviet regime and an emphasis on heroism and revenge for suffering were a part of the historical stories that were told in the public arena in Latvia. In these stories, the

Latvian Legion, which fought against the USSR as part of the Nazi military, was cited as a positive (or, sometimes, the most positive) page in Latvian history. The same was true when it came to statements from politicians. The role of the Legionnaires in the gallery of national heroes was confirmed by a ceremony in which the general inspector of the Latvian Legion, Rūdolfs Bangerskis, and other senior officers of the Legion were disinterred and reburied at a place of honour at the Cemetery of the Brethren in Riga. A memorial to the Legionnaires in Lestene also took on the status of national holy ground. Honouring the Latvian Legion also became a part of the thinking of radically nationalist parties (see Zelče, 2010). On June 17, 1998, Parliament added to the list of national holidays and commemorative days March 16, which had been identified by the Latvian Welfare Fund («Hawks of the Daugava») veterans' organisation to honour the Latvian Legion. Commemoration of March 16 in 1998 and 1999 attracted a great deal of international attention and confirmed that the identity that was based on anti-Soviet heroism was in conflict with a European identity and various other historical identities at the local level.

When the Legionnaires experienced a discursive transformation from victims of history to major heroes of history, it illustrated the deep nature of cultural traumas from the past, particularly in terms of the Soviet occupation. It also created social demand for the historical pride that is so very much necessary for a collective identity.

## The identity of European history and the Holocaust

The basic element in the memories and identities of the Western world in the late 20<sup>th</sup> century was the Holocaust. As Judt has argued, European history was based on the «crematoria of Auschwitz.» This, the author added, it was a moral lesson in terms of never allowing such a crime to be committed again: «If Europeans are to maintain this vital link – if Europe's past is to continue to furnish Europe's present with admonitory meaning and moral purpose – then it will have to be taught afresh with each passing generation» (Judt, 2005, 831).

The history of the Holocaust has attracted vast interest in the Western world during the last several decades. The Sho'ah was the topic of films, television broadcasts, literary works, artworks, museums, memorials and commemorative rituals not just at places where the Holocaust occurred, but also in very distant parts of the world. Western understandings of values and morals are based on the idea that that Nazism was the greatest evil in the history of the world, as well as on commemorations of the Holocaust. Denunciation of the Sho'ah is the dominant discourse in Western culture today, and those who fail to know about or be aware of this history are seen as denying this culture or as standing outside of civilised society (see Bērziņš).

In writing about the memory of Eastern Europe after the end of Communist regimes, Judt has written that «To east Europeans, belatedly released after 1989 from the

burden of officially mandated Communist interpretations of World War Two, the *fin-de-siècle* Western preoccupation with the Holocaust of the Jews carries disruptive implications. On the one hand, eastern Europe after 1945 had to much more than western Europe to remember – and to forget. There were more Jews in the eastern half of Europe and more of them were killed; most of the killing took place in this region and many more locals took an active part in it. But on the other hand, far greater care was taken by the post-war authorities in eastern Europe to erase all public memory of the Holocaust. It is not that the horrors and crimes of the war in the east were played down – on the contrary, they were repeatedly rehearsed in official rhetoric and enshrined in memorials and textbooks everywhere. It is just that Jews were not part of the story» (Judt, 2005, 821–822). Far more important than the victims of the Holocaust in Eastern Europe were the national victims who had, for many decades, faced the mockery, denial or silence of Communist regimes. For this part of the world, the initial sense of the Holocaust which emerged in the 1990s and the early part of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, taken along with an understanding of the moral responsibilities of the relevant nations, initially increased the total of bitter memories, sometimes established a confrontation in terms of the importance of commemorating «our» victims and «their» victims, and also represented bitterness about the idea that the West simply did not care about the historical sufferings of Eastern Europeans. At the same time, however, recognition of the Sho'ah was an «entry ticket» to Europe, its culture and its identity (Judt, 2005, 803).

National victims also took the main role in historical stories in the Baltic States after their independent statehood was restored. It was the fundamental trauma of the past, and during the entire Soviet period, people were not allowed to talk about it. The scope of this trauma made the Holocaust peripheral in comparison to national suffering, the war, and the Soviet and Nazi occupations (Kattago, 382). Integration into Europe, however, led Latvia to take a different look at the Nazi occupation, participation in war, and national heroes and victims. In 1998, the Latvian government began to implement policies related to history so as to make easier the country's inclusion in the European cultural space and to encourage people to accept a European identity. In February 1998, Latvian President Guntis Ulmanis visited Israel and apologised for the participation of Latvians in the Sho'ah. A commission of Latvian historians was established, and support was given to research into the Holocaust and the inclusion of this topic in history lessons in schools (see Zelče, 2009, 46-51).

It would be wrong to claim that the people of Latvia knew nothing about the Holocaust and related memories during the Soviet period. There was a publicly unarticulated sense of guilt at the personal and the community level (Ezergailis, 44). The concept of the Sho'ah was not discussed publicly during the Soviet era, but the tragic fate of the Jews and the participation of Latvians in their demise were reflected in culture, often in a vividly emotional way. This was true in the prose of

Vilis Lācis (see Bērziņš, 2011a), Ēvalds Vilks, Miervaldis Birze, Dagnija Zigmonte, Mirdza Kļava, etc., in the poetry of Ojārs Vācietis, and in the memoirs of Gunārs Cīrulis. The tragedy of the Holocaust was a key element in the multi-series film «Long Road Into the Dunes» (1981), while the brutal destruction of the Roma people was the topic of the film «Klāvs, Son of Mārtiņš» (1970). During the 1960s, young Jews in Riga cleaned up the places where Jews had been murdered at Rumbula and Biķernieki, and they also started to organise commemorative events (Dribins, 2002a, 143). All in all, however, this infamous aspect of Latvian history was covered up with a lack of knowledge, bemusement, and an absence of facts and moral criteria in explaining the evil that occurred. The tradition of commemorating the victims of the Holocaust in public gained traction only after the restoration of Latvia's statehood, when it was also institutionalised at the national level. July 4 (the date when a synagogue in Riga that was full of people who were locked in was burned down in 1941) was declared to be the date to commemorate the Jewish victims of genocide. Top government officials and representatives of foreign embassies take part in the relevant rituals each year.

When the Soviet Union collapsed, the Jewish community in Latvia also audited its history, and the Holocaust became the main component of its identity. Relations with other ethnic communities were dictated by their attitude toward the Sho'ah. Of essential importance in the attitude of the Jewish community toward Latvia was a declaration approved by the Soviet Latvian Supreme Council on September 19, 1990, «On Denouncing and Banning Genocide and Anti-Semitism in Latvia.» The 1990s were a period during which relations between the history of Latvians and Jews were first developed. There were attempts to deal with discussions and myths about the tangled past – the position and role of Jews during the start of the Soviet occupation in 1940 and 1941, the level of anti-Semitism among Latvians, as well as the Holocaust, which was the focus on many important historical studies and scholarly conferences. Public debate and denunciation of those who were still anti-Semitic were also of importance (Dribins, 2002, 111, 120-128; 2002a, 148-159).

Denouncing the Holocaust and expressing compassion for its victims helped Latvia to join the European identity. The relevant memories are also maintained by the «Jews in Latvia» museum, which was opened in 1989. There is an exhibition about the Holocaust at the Latvian Occupation Museum, and new monuments have been established – one at Biķernieki commemorating the victims of World War II, including Jews, Soviet prisoners of war and civilians (2001), a memorial to the victims of Nazism at Rumbula (2002), a monument in the dunes of Šķēde (2005), a monument to Žanis Lipke in Riga (2007), and many other places of commemoration throughout Latvia (Melers). There was also a project aimed at enshrining the memory of Jews who perished during World War II, «Jews in Latvia: 1941-1945. Names and Destinies» (see <http://names.lu.lv>). Also of importance in ensuring that local communities

remembered the Holocaust was the «Heart to Heart» project which was implemented in 2006 by the Latvian Jewish community in partnership with the EU and the Latvian Public Integration Fund. The purpose was to encourage schoolchildren to learn about the history of Jews in their region and about the Holocaust, helping children to understand that it was a tragedy not just for Jews, but for all of Latvia (Dribins, 2007, 231). Holocaust researcher Meijers Melers was right when in writing about Holocaust memorials he argued that «all of the locations must not only be put in order, but also visited. Stories must be told about the people who were murdered, about their lives, about how they raised their children, about how they got along with the neighbours, and about why they were murdered. Children must understand that they were killed just because they were Jews. If students plant flowers at a monument, then they will never vandalise the relevant location» (Melers, 264).

Recovered memories during the post-Soviet era in part relate to the history of rescuing Jews. This was a process which was rich with nobleness, daring and heroism. There are some 500 incidents in which the lives of Jews were saved about which we know, but we do not know the names of all of those who helped (Vestermanis, 247). The heroism of Žanis Lipke and his family has increasingly become a matter of national pride. Confirmation of this is seen in the memorial that was established in memory of the family at Ķīpsala in Rīga, as well as a movement set up to support the monument (<http://www.lipke.lv>).

Integration of the Holocaust and the history of Latvian Jews into Latvia's social memory and identity has become more intense during recent years. Of particular importance here is the publication of the memoirs of

two Jewish intellectuals from Latvia – Valentina Freimane (2010) and Eduards Andersšs (2011). Written in Latvian, these memoirs offer an evaluation of the relationship between Latvians and Jews, as well as of the Holocaust. These books received much attention and were highly praised in Latvia's cultural world.

## The social memory and identity of Russian speakers

After Latvia restored its statehood, people who had arrived in the republic during the Soviet years found themselves facing a serious identity crisis. Their legal, political and social status changed very rapidly (Apine, 2008, 45). The fact is that all of the sources of identity and national pride which functioned during the Soviet era were gone. Sociologist Lev Gudkov argued at one time that the unmasking of the history of the Soviet regime in the early 1990s led most Russians to admit that the Soviet state, which had been seen as being extremely noble in the past, and the history of that state actually brought along poverty, suffering and mass terror. The positive and self-praising interpretation of the past was reversed, and mass thought started to suffer from low self-esteem, collective disorientation, and even masochism and wounded feelings (Gudkov, 2004, 147). Ethnologist Ilga Apine, in turn, has written that during the Soviet era, the consciousness of Russians was melded together with Soviet ideology: «The pressure which Soviet people faced in relation to Communist ideology was massive. Eventually it became more refined and linked to mythology, and that made it more effective. For instance, there have been various myths about Russian history and the great heroism of the Russian people which benefitted

### Latvian President Vaira Viķe-Freiberga at the unveiling of a monument to the victims and prisoners of the «Rīga-Kaiserwald» concentration camp on June 29, 2005

Box  
1.31

«Although 60 years have passed since the destruction of Nazism, people still vividly remember the terrible crimes that were committed during its existence. The greatest suffering in the hands of the Nazi regime was that of the Jewish people, who were subject to complete destruction – the Holocaust. In occupied Latvia, too, the Nazis and their henchmen committed terrible crimes by destroying local Jews and Jews brought from other countries. The mass graves of Jewish victims at Rumbula, Biķernieki, Šķēde and many other locations offer vivid evidence about this. [..]

As we unveil this monument today, we should all not just remember the victims who perished, but also understand what happens when people reject humanism, equality and morality. We must all understand how and why this evil, this utter lack of humanity emerged. In understanding this, we must do everything that we can to make sure that such crimes are never again possible in Latvia or anywhere else in the world. Only by working together will we be able to protect humanity from the possibility of new evil.

I think that since the restoration of Latvia's independence, there has been a serious evaluation of our recent and tragic past. School curricula and history textbooks include issues about the Holocaust in Nazi-occupied Latvia. Laws have been passed to ensure that anyone who took part in crimes against humanity is brought to justice. As a democratic country, Latvia must not hush up or hide the dark pages of its history. The Holocaust which occurred during the Nazi regime was a major tragedy for the Jewish people and for all of Latvia.»

Source: Viķe-Freiberga, V. 2007. V.V.-F. 4plus4∞. Runas, 1999-2007. Rīga: Pētergailis, pp. 437-438.

other nations. This flattered Russians and took deep root in their thinking, thus casting a shadow over the truth about the evil which the empire caused for other nations» (Apine, 2008, 46-47). During the Soviet period, Russians in Latvia became the dominant ethnoses and served as an instrument for the Russification of cities. The Russian language was used in the infrastructure of government, the economy, services, education and the media, as well as in the commemorative culture and mythology of the Soviet Union. The Russian environment was self-sufficient and ensured psychological comfort. Latvia's culture and history remained alien to Russians in the country even after the collapse of the USSR, and they shaped their identity on the basis of the Soviet and Russian system of values (Apine, 2007, 48-56).

Because of this alienation from the cultural environment of Latvians (including in the sense of history), the main instrument related to the social memory of Latvia's Russians in the 1990s was still Soviet history, which falsified Latvia's past, encoded distrust against the Baltic peoples as nationalists and «fascists,» and allowed people to ignore the offences that were committed by the Soviet regime. Of essential importance here are historical narratives from Russia which are dominated by the reconstruction of the tsarist empire in the past and by an exposition of Stalinist repressions (Sherlock, 158-161; Zelče, 2001, 36-43). This interpretation of history facilitated nostalgia among Latvia's Russians for the lost empire (both in the tsarist and the Soviet format), also allowing them to see Russians as the greatest victims of Stalinist repressions. This has led to the reconstruction of memorials to the tsarist empire, a series of publications dedicated to «Russian Riga,» the work of clubs focused on military history, and reminders that Russians fell victim to Soviet repressions in the 1920s and 1930s, and not just (as the Baltic people did) in the 1940s and 1950s. These, then, were reasons for people to distance themselves from the Latvian culture of commemorating deportations, also allowing people to reject any sense of responsibility for the crimes which were committed by the Soviet Union and for the blame of Russia in relation to the existence of Stalinism as such.

The identity crisis of Russians was deepened during the 1990s because of weak links between their social memories and Latvia and its past, as well as due to a lack of their own history. Only 8-9% of Russians in the Baltic States came from families which lived there between the wars, 1.5-2% represented the humanitarian intelligentsia which had closer links to Baltic culture, but at least 80% of those who arrived during the Soviet period were blue collar workers and military personnel at various ranks. These were not people who were likely to integrate into the local societies (Simoyan, 111-117; Apine, 2007, 49-50). This meant that the memories of the Russian community differed from those of the Latvian community in that Russian memories had weak links to the values of the interwar period. Simoyan has argued that the solidarity of the community has been based on the loss of its motherland and the fact that members of the community now found themselves living in a foreign country (Simoyan, 149-150).

The differences between Latvian and Russian values in terms of the past were exacerbated by state policies, laws and integration failures which related to ethno-nationalism. In February 2011, Russia's parliament approved a programme on the patriotic rearing of the citizens of the Russian Federation, and the mass media were actively used to bring that programme to life. The historical policies of the government of Vladimir Putin essentially meant a reassessment of the Soviet period, complete with relativisation of Soviet terror, rehabilitation of Stalin and other Soviet statesmen, and the restoration of a positive image for the KGB and its agents (Koposov, 147-152). The Russian regime cultivated a positive evaluation of the Soviet period, particularly in terms of praising the Russian victory in World War II and of assigning secondary importance to Stalinist repressions (see Zelče, 2011, 42-46). This was compensation for the official historical story of Latvia and the psychological discomfort caused among Russian speakers by the publicly dominant culture of commemoration. Most Russian speakers, therefore, accepted the Russian interpretation of history. Leo Dribins, who studies ethnic processes, has argued that the thinking of Russian speakers in Latvia is influenced by the rebirth of nationalism in Russia, as well as by the historical concept that is centred on pride about the role of Russia and Russians in the history of humankind, as well as about the Soviet Union's victory in the Great War of the Fatherland. The myth about Russia liberating Europe from fascism and the intensive cultivation of that myth has made it possible for people to ignore the fact of the Soviet occupation of Latvia, as well as the harm that was done to Latvians by that occupation (Dribins, 2007, 45).

This position initiated an even greater distance from the social memory of the Latvian community, also facilitating national pride in the rapid development of Russia during the 20<sup>th</sup> century – something which became the foundation of identity. In 1995, a survey was conducted to learn the views of people about national pride in Latvia's history, with the scale being from 1 («very proud») to 0 («not proud at all»). The average for Russians was 0.59. In 2003, the average was only 0.40 (Tabuns, 2007, 109). Another question was this: «Which elements of Latvia's 20<sup>th</sup> century history make you most proud?» 23.8% of Russian respondents said that they were not proud of any aspect of that history, and another 20.8% could not answer the question at all. The greatest amount of pride related to «the Latvian SSR as part of the USSR» (19.9%), and the battle waged by Latvian Red Army soldiers against the Nazis (19.4%) (see Rozenvalds and Ijabs, 187). When the same question was posed one year later, 35.2% of Russian speakers had no answer.

According to Apine, the main elements in Russian identity are ethnic origins and the Russian language (Apine, 2008, 50), but the fact is that social memory is also of importance here. During the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, there were major celebrations each year in Riga and in other cities to commemorate Victory Day on May 9. This promoted ethnic consolidation among


Latvia's Russians while, at the same time, ensuring that the Soviet/Russian victory in the war became the main cornerstone of social memory. When, at the end of 2010, respondents were once again asked<sup>1</sup> to name the best event in 20<sup>th</sup>-century Latvian history, 30.5% of Russian speakers plumped for the Soviet victory in World War II.

Other events from Latvia's past did not compete with the victory insofar as these respondents were concerned (see Chart 1.32). The event on May 9 each year includes speechifying, petition drives and resolutions which speak to the issues of the Russian speaking community which are on the agenda and/or have been a problem for a longer period of time. A day that is full of Russia's historical accomplishments allows celebrants to create or transfer historical solidarity to their current views about

<sup>1</sup> The survey «National Identity. NI Dimensions. Historical Memory LU SZF, 2010.»

Box 1.32


### The best event in Latvia's 20<sup>th</sup> century history



Source: «National Identity. NI Dimensions. Historical Memory». Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, 2010

Box 1.33

### The worst event in Latvia's 20<sup>th</sup> century history



Source: «National Identity. NI Dimensions. Historical Memory». Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, 2010



Latvia as a country which discriminates against them or unfairly breaks down the Soviet Union's commemorative traditions and heritage (see Ločmele, et al., 123-127). Creating pride in the historical achievements of Russia/the USSR, particularly in terms of the victory in the war, was one of the most effective ways of addressing the identity crisis of Russian speakers, and this also facilitated the consolidation, solidarity and activities of that community.

Sociologist Boris Dubin, in writing about the commemorative policies of Russia during the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, has argued that heroification of World War II, monumentalisation of its collective image, and amnesia about the vast damage that was caused by the war have all indicated that a «monument» has been chosen in place of actual memory. This means that Russia has not yet overcome the traumatic nature of World War II, and it has not understood the causes, driving forces, developments and consequences of the war. Thus World War II has not been transformed into historical experience which would never again allow society to go down the same path which led it to war in the past. Russia's people, including the regime and the Russian elite, are not immune against totalitarianism, autocracy, xenophobia, social passiveness and isolationism, jealousy and infantilism. All of these are phenomena which are always at the foundation of undemocratic regimes (Dubin, 63-64).

Gudkov, for his part, argues that victory in the war is the only positive element in the national self-confidence of post-Soviet Russians. The increase in the symbolic meaning of that victory, however, essentially legitimates the totalitarian Soviet regime, complete with repressions, famine, poverty, and countless people who perished during the war. The symbolic praise of the victory has all but completely eliminated any elements in Russia's historical awareness with respect to: 1) The aggressive nature, militarism and expansionism of the Soviet regime; 2) the regime's partnership with Nazi Germany in launching the war and destroying Poland; 3) the human, social, economic and metaphysical cost of the war; 4) the responsibility of the regime for causing and continuing the war; and 5) the consequences of the war in other countries. At the same time, the praise has increased the authority of Stalin, and it has expanded the belief that the Soviet Union would have won the war all by itself and without any allies. The status of the victory as the main symbol of history prohibits any moral, intellectual, political or other rationalisation of the negative aspects of the war. There can be no analysis of cause and effect, and the status also makes it possible to uphold the concept of the «single» truth which can be used to divide people up between «compatriots» and «others.» Gudkov argues that this means that a moral evaluation of the totalitarian Soviet regime has fallen into «collective unconsciousness» (Gudkov, 2011, 529-539).

The conclusions of Dubin and Gudkov about the historical consciousness of the masses of Russians are also in line with the dominant ideas which exist among members of the Russian speaking community in Latvia, once again including the aforementioned risks related to the values of morals, tolerance and democracy.

This attitude toward Russia's role in the war makes it impossible to have empathy for the sufferings of other peoples and nations, as well as for their right to have truth and justice in relation to the past. Russia's policies vis-à-vis history cultivate a situation in which the harm that was inflicted by the war upon Russia's own people and others, the responsibility of the Soviet regime for unleashing the war, the aggressive foreign policy of the USSR and the repressions that occurred in the Soviet Union are all excused in the name of the victory itself. This creates an eternal gap between Russian speakers and Latvians when it comes to evaluating the experience of the past and maintaining social memories.

## Failing to remember/Keeping quiet

The monumentalisation of the Soviet victory and the resulting public aggressiveness of the social memory of Russian speakers have also had an effect on the collective memory and historical consciousness of Latvians and on the ability of Latvians to heal their festering cultural traumas (see Kaprāns and Zelče). The basic problem is that there are issues which have not been discussed in public or individually or have been kept under wraps. These include those Latvians who collaborated with the totalitarian Soviet regime and its repressive structures, as well as the complete collapse of universal moral norms during the Soviet and the Nazi occupation. Judt has studied the relationship which Eastern European countries have with their past in terms of the collapse of the Communist system, and he argues that people in those countries have experienced a sense of shame about the fact that they had to live under that regime, engage in everyday lies, and accept endless petty compromises. The format of living/surviving meant that sooner or later, nearly everyone engaged in greater or lesser collaboration with the regime (Judt, 2002, 173). During the first decade of the post-Soviet period, this experience was transformed into a collective secret about which it was best to keep silent, lest there be a sense of loss, dissatisfaction and regret about the incorrectly or uselessly spent lives of Soviet people and about the contribution which people made toward the maintenance and reproduction of the Soviet system with their work, their votes in Soviet elections, their involvement in the Communist Party, the Komsomol, the Pioneers, etc., and their participation in various everyday forms of life in the Soviet Union.

In the public arena of Latvia and other Eastern European countries, history after 1939 «was exclusively the work of others, then the whole era became a sort of parenthesis in the national story» (Judt, 2005, 825). This attitude toward the past can be compared to the Vichy syndrome which Western Europe suffered for several decades after World War II and up until Western Europeans could take on responsibility for their own history. Soviet Latvia did not exist without the presence of Latvians and their greater or lesser involvement in shaping it. An evaluation of what Latvians did is the key for moral purification in terms of clearly stating what was

bad and what was good. This helps to bring greater order to the contemporary moral system as well.

One of the reactions toward a failure to remember history is nostalgia for the Soviet period or, more precisely, for the economic stability and social security which existed, particularly after the Brezhnev years, when the terrors of Stalinism were fading from memory. Central European countries have been cured of post-Socialism nostalgia, but the syndrome is at its apex in Russia. Sociological surveys conducted in Russia over the past decade show that 55-75% of Russians regret the collapse of the Soviet Union (Levada Centre, 11.04.2011). At the very end of 2010, 60% of respondents in another survey said that *perestroika* was a bad thing for Russia, and 44% said that the Brezhnev years were a period of «welfare for the country» (others said that stagnation began when those years were over) (Levada Centre, 26.01.2011). A study conducted in Latvia in November 2008 found that 9.2% of residents were proud of Soviet Latvia (1.1% of Latvians, 19.9% of Russians and 19.6% of others) (Rozenvalds and Ijabs, 187). Another survey<sup>1</sup> was conducted at the end of 2010, when the effects of the global economic crisis were most evident, and this time 54.5% of the people of Latvia said that the Soviet era (1945-1990) was good, 29.4% said that it was bad, and 16.1% had no view on the matter. There are differences among the various ethnic groups when it comes to answers given to such questions. 42.2% of Latvians, 71.2% of Russians and 68.0% of members of other nationalities believe now that the Soviet period was a good one. 43.4% of Latvians, 10.4% of Russians and 15% of others feel that it was a bad thing. That once again shows the splits which exist in social memory.

Nostalgia in Eastern Europe, and particularly the «Ostalgie» that is seen in Eastern Germany (Cooke; Pence and Betts; Bedrahl) indicate that the unclear nature of the past and the economic problems of the present day lead people to replace a denunciation of totalitarianism with delight about everyday life, fashion and design, and the standard of living which existed during the Soviet era. This is a selective approach to history which encourages people to yearn for the recent past and allows them to push aside unresolved aspects of collaborationism and moral problems. Indications to show that nostalgia for Soviet Latvia is becoming stronger in Latvia include the return of March 8 (Women's Day) to the Latvian calendar of celebrations, as well as extensive interest in an exhibition which was staged by the Latvian National History Museum in 2011 – «Soviet Everyday Design.» People have increasingly been remembering the Soviet years as ones during which agriculture and fishing in the country flourished, and so on. There has also been a reanimation of Soviet brands. A most vivid example of this is the Dinamo hockey team, which was established in 2008 and competes in the Russian Hockey League. Soviet nostalgia can also be seen in the format of the annual «New Wave» vocalist competition and in the related

appearances of Russian show business stars and tourists in the town of Jūrmala, which they can once again see as a «western Soviet spa town.»

One problem in terms of failing to talk about the Soviet period relates to the science of history in Latvia. Post-Soviet historians have absorbed a vast amount of fact-based materials, but they have not always had sufficient professional skills or civic positions in interpreting the data. The crimes of the Soviet and Nazi regimes have been well documented, but the same cannot be said of the history of Latvian collaborationism and liability. The only exception here is the history of the Holocaust, which has been studied and described in great depth. In other areas, however, Latvian historians have avoided frightening truths about Latvian collaborationism with the Soviet regime, and in ideological terms, they have chosen to write about history as a set of hidden and targeted resistance against the regime (Rizhakova, 437).

People have two roles when it comes to their participation in history. They shape history and talk about it. There is always a difference between that which happened and that which is said about it later. Like other areas of academia, the science of history has traditionally been based on the tradition of positivism, seeking that which is impossible – the creation of absolutely true knowledge. History always and inevitably emerges in the social context of the relevant period of time and in the context of relations with the existing regime. This means that a positivist approach to this at best tells the story of regimes or of those who were victorious (Trouillot, 1-30). History presented by Latvian historians is mostly written from the perspective of Latvia as a victor in terms of the collapse of the USSR, which means complete or partial silence about those aspects of the past which do not fit in with this idea. The achievements of professional historians insofar as intellectual resources are concerned ensure the shaping of public history, and this actively takes part in the enrichment of collective memory. Explanations of history are a component of identity.

## Culture and social memory

A fundamental challenge for nation states is creating national identity and loyalty. This is a long-lasting and endless process which demands effort and undergoes many phases of development. «Identity politics» (Wertsch, 69) are created or restored from time to time, particularly during periods of instability and a lack of clarity. The national identity of European countries emerged from a process of national mobilisation. The national identity of Australia and the United States, by comparison, is essentially the result of innovations and diffusion of culture. Culture formulates national identity and brings it to life (Spillman, 19-20). Latvia is similar to Australia and the United States in that many residents are immigrants, and so there are large and diverse communities of social memory. The role of government institutions and culture in terms of creating identity-related values also differs. In the 1990s, cultural activists were calling on the government to formulate «those

<sup>1</sup> The survey «National Identity. NI Dimensions. Historical Memory LU SZF, 2010.»

things which keep the people together» (Ziedonis, 468). The idea was that this was necessary for the successful growth and spirituality of the country. In reality, however, Latvia, like all of post-Communist Europe, underwent the unattractive transition from «repressive egalitarianism to unconstrained greed» (Judt, 2010, 146). The «quality of self-confidence» was lost, and a «price» replaced identity values (Ziedonis, 491, 505).


It cannot be said that culture over the past 20 years has not participated in creating the values about the past which are seminal for identity. It has, but only in fragmentary ways. It is also true that the expansion of communications at the end of the last century has had a fundamental effect on these processes. Until the last decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, most people in the world had limited access to information, and this meant that in every country, nation and/or community, people had similar knowledge about one and the same things. This was due to national education systems, state-controlled radio and television, and the culture of publications, and it was a matter of social unification. The situation today is quite the opposite – there is a lack of a common culture, and in its place there is a vast diversity in values, tastes and interests. Many things which seemed to be close and permanent for decades and even centuries are now quickly being forgotten (Judt, 2008, 5). For that reason, the media have an increasingly essential role to play. The media have become a very influential communicator about the past, forming the basic ideas about common history and helping to ensure that specific representations of the past take root in collective memory. The media, in the broadest sense of the word, attach value to episodes of history or, on the contrary, eliminate the point of those episodes. The electronic media have become the most important «storehouse» for historical knowledge in Latvia, as in other countries. Various TV and radio broadcasts tell stories about the past every day, also offering arguments to the audience which can be used to defend specific ideas about Latvia's history during the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Television broadcasts are

basically the main source of information in all age groups. Latvian television stations such as LTV, LNT and TV3 have been more or less successful with broadcasts that are dedicated to history. LTV1 has presented documentaries about outstanding cultural figures such as the actors Lilita Bērziņa, Voldemārs Zandbergs and Vija Artmane, the opera singer Jānis Zābers, the writers Vizma Belševica, Ārija Elksne and Vilis Lācis, and others. The same television station features the programme «Along the Length of the Street,» and it has offered detailed analysis of the history of Riga. TV3 has presented the broadcasts «20<sup>th</sup> Century: Post Scriptum» (2001), «Latvia: The Ulmanis Era» (2002), and «Returning to Europe: Latvia 1988-2008» (2008). Latvian television broadcasts about history are like bright flashes of light, but they are quickly extinguished by the wealth of visual stories about the past that are offered by Western and Russian television channels.

It is an axiomatic belief in Latvia that there are two separate information spaces in the country. This echoes in media attitudes toward 20<sup>th</sup> century history. The Latvian media are dominated by the official interpretation of history: Proclamation of the Republic of Latvia, three occupations during the 1940s, and the restoration of independence in 1991. The Russian language media in Latvia largely reproduce or localise the discourse of history which dominates in Russia (Skudra, 2011 and 2006; Zelče, 2011). The media of the two linguistic communities also tend to confront differing explanations of history, demonstrating intolerance for opposing views (Dribins, 2007a, 50-52; Skudra, 2005). Thus the media establish and strengthen obstacles against the democratisation of historical interpretations which are difficult to overcome. The most vivid illustration of these symbolic conflicts are the dates of March 16 and May 9 in Riga each year. In the context of these dates, the Russian language and Latvian language media actualise and defend a negative or a positive representation of the Soviet era (Zajančauska, 2011; Ločmele, et al., 2011; Ločmele, 2010; Procevska, 2010). Both dates have become inalienable aspects of commemorative culture, and it is significant that they

### Positive evaluations or a lack of a viewpoint about the most important phases in Latvian history

Box  
1.34



Source: «National Identity. NI Dimensions. Historical Memory». Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, 2010

have attracted increased media attention specifically during the past decade – the period during which Russia has activated its policies of memory.

Confronting versions about Latvian history are exacerbated by a situation in which there is a lack of cognitive and ethical clarity. Many people find it hard to assess the past and its individuals in an adequate way. This is most powerfully true when it comes to the Ulmanis era and World War II. In a broader sense, however, there is also amnesia about the historical period which existed before the 20<sup>th</sup> century (the age of ancient Latvians, the Swedish era, etc.). The more distant the period in history, the vaguer are people's ideas about it. These blank pages can also be seen in media content – television broadcasts and documentaries dedicated to history, as well as popular and academic historical literature since 1991 have mostly dealt with the 20<sup>th</sup> century, and particularly the events of the 1940s (loss of independence, Stalinist deportations, World War II) and the period of the Latvian National Awakening. The result of this is that the mediated history of the 20<sup>th</sup> century inevitably has the greatest impression on the nation's self-image.

The dominance of the 20<sup>th</sup> century in public thinking is strengthened by biographic messages which are preferred by many residents of Latvia as a source of historical information. Biographic communications were of importance in the democratisation of history which occurred during the National Renaissance. There was a torrent of life stories from people who had been repressed by the Soviet Union. Since the restoration of Latvia's independence, the genre of memoirs has developed in waves, but during the past decade there has been a constant increase in the number of (auto) biographies. In most cases these are written by Latvians. Memoirs published by Russian speakers in Latvia are a fairly marginal phenomenon, and that is not a good

thing because the (auto)biographies from the Russian speaking community essentially do not take part in the shaping of social memory. At the same time, though, biographic communications do not necessarily have to be a mediated process. Direct experience is also recognised by the people of Latvia as an equally important source of knowledge. A study conducted in the autumn of 2010 shows that 30% of respondents received most of their information about 20<sup>th</sup> century history from stories that are told by older people. These can be family stories, or they can involve the memories of broader communities (residents of the relevant apartment building or neighbourhood). Life stories as sources of information are most commonly cited by people in small towns and rural areas, where personal contacts are much more important. Local newspapers, too, have actively engaged in biographic communications since 1999, publishing biographic messages from representatives of the local community (Kaprāns, 2009).

Another part of the infrastructure of social memory which helps people at various levels of society to develop ideas about 20<sup>th</sup> century Latvian history is the cinema and the theatre, as these are no less influential in mediating history. Unlike journalists or authors of autobiographies, cinematic and theatrical directors have a chance to use their imagination to a much greater degree in dealing with past characters and events which impassion modern society. When the past is emancipated, collective identity is also set free, and history eventually increases, as opposed to oppresses the capabilities of individuals.

Only a few feature films that have been produced in Latvia since the restoration of the country's independence have dealt with history, but they have attracted much attention, and that confirms the need for this kind of source of information. The most popular feature films from the past decade in terms of the interaction between

Box  
1.35

### Cinema historian and theorist Valentīna Freimane about herself and the relationship between Latvians and the past in late 2010 or early 2011

«I feel fine in Berlin. Nothing is swept under the rug there, everything has been discussed, and the Germans have taken responsibility for the past. That is something which, for some reason, we have not been able to achieve in Latvia in looking back at two totalitarian regimes and their supporters. People have asked me about how the Germans could humiliate themselves by admitting to the fact that they were fools and criminals. The truth is that it is not humiliation, it is a matter of dignity.»

When I am in Latvia, I am tormented by the fact that people fool themselves in terms of political views and relations in society, and then they are surprised about the fact that the results are other than that which they had expected. People cannot analyse their past in a businesslike and composed way, even though, at the end of the day, that represents liberation. Here I can point to the rebirth of old-fashioned nationalism or the peculiar desire of Latvians to debase themselves by playing the role of a group of sorrowful orphans. Ours is a small, but very capable nation – one which has survived many difficulties and has proven its ability to do so on more than one occasion, but at the same time, it is simply unable to look at itself clearly. No matter what, but I am not thinking about the proposal to become a citizen of Germany. I was born a citizen of Latvia, and I will remain a citizen of Latvia until the end of my life.»

Source: Grūbe, G. 2011. «Bet es neesmu folklorā» (But I am not Folklore), Ir, No. 2, pp. 36-37.

popular culture and history have been «Summer of Terror» (2000, dir. Aigars Grauba), «Guards of Riga» (2007, Aigars Grauba), «Rūdofs' Heritage» (2010, Jānis Streičs), and «Threesome Dance» (2011, Arvids Krievs). Much viewer response was received by the LTV serial «Clearers of Destiny» (dir. Virdžinija Lejiņa). The serial dealt with the events of 20<sup>th</sup> century Latvian history.

Theatres in Latvia have also been involved in mediating history. The best examples are the musical «Kaupēns, My Dear» at the Liepāja Theatre (1999, dir. Valdis Lūriņš), the Latvian National Theatre musicals «Sphinx» (2001, Edmunds Freibergs) and «Leader» (2010, Edmunds Freibergs), the Latvian National Theatre drama «[Vilis] Lācis» (2009, Edmunds Freibergs), the New Riga theatre performances «Marta of Blue Hill» (2009, Alvis Hermanis) and «Grandfather» (2009, Alvis Hermanis), and the Valmiera Drama Theatre performance «Whirlpools» (2008, Varis Brasla). The creators of these and other cultural products often resort to populist interpretations of history, but it is a positive thing that there have been efforts in recent years to avoid any black-and-white judgments about history. All in all, the role of popular culture in mediating Latvian history has been fairly inexpressive, and the potential of this resource in strengthening national identity has not been used in a sufficiently systematic way. At the same time, however, popular culture is closest to the everyday lives of individuals, and this has everything to do with identity and the establishment or loss of meanings which create it (Edensor, 17-23).


## Conclusion

Identity is rooted in a set of moral values which regulate values and behaviours. This is based on definitions of good and bad, attractive and ugly, moral and amoral, etc. These norms are never absolute or eternal, they are adjusted and even changed. And yet moral rules are of decisive importance in collective existence. An absence of such rules represents anomalies, fragmentation and destruction (Schöpflin, 53). The confusion about values which exists to a greater or lesser extent in among Latvians weakens their identity, thus becoming an obstacle against the successful development of the Latvian nation.

Latvia needs a history that is of political and moral use – one in which the achievements and sufferings of the past have not been forgotten. All human communities use the past as an instrument to structure and interpret the present. It is also true that ideas about the modern world are shaped by concrete processes of a technical, institutional or material nature, but also by the symbolic sphere. Individuals require collective meanings if they are to understand the world in which they live. Otherwise they feel lost and isolated. Collective meanings make communities and belonging to communities possible. The past in this sense is a confirmation of the security of living and surviving. Collective meanings are most often based on conclusions about things which once made us richer, stronger and better, as a result of which it is right to do those things again (Schöpflin, 89-91).

Box  
1.36

### Sources of information about history



Source: «National Identity. NI Dimensions. Historical Memory». Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, 2010



There are many moral values and denial of same in Latvia's past, and that makes it possible to establish collective meanings which are important for one's identity – ones which can ensure that people are more convinced of themselves, more capable and more

focused on the future. One way to shape social memories which strengthen identity is to engage in a rational audit of history while honouring moral values, creating understanding and forgiveness, and not being afraid of the shadows of totalitarianism.

Box  
1.37

### Main conclusions. Main missions

#### Main conclusions

Social memory in Latvia has, over the past two decades, been based on the tragic events of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and the consequences of those events, which have caused deep cultural trauma and reduced the value of the national identity of individuals and ethnic groups.

#### Main missions

Social memory is not something that goes without saying. It must constantly be developed so as to consolidate society. Latvia must implement memory-related policies at the national level so as to narrow the gap between ethnic groups and to expand people's understanding of the historic nature of national identity while also encouraging them to identify themselves with their European heritage.



## Migration: Past and Present

2

- 2.1. MAJOR FLOWS OF MIGRATION  
EARLY 19<sup>TH</sup> CENTURY TO 1991
- 2.2. EMIGRATION AND IDENTITY
- 2.3. THE CHANGING FACE OF LATVIAN EMIGRATION,  
2000-2010
- 2.4. THE SOCIAL SECURITY OF LATVIAN FAMILIES  
IN AGE OF ECONOMIC MIGRATION

## 2.1. Major Flows of Migration Early 19<sup>th</sup> Century to 1991

Identity is based on a sense of belonging. Here we can ask the question of Hamlet: To be or not to be? To belong or not to belong? This dimension of identity is clearly related to migration – the relationship which those who have departed have with their motherland, their behaviour in their new country of residence, and the relationship between those who have arrived in the country with their new place of residence. In understanding identity, it is important that the border between «us» and «them» is established both by those who have lived in the country for a long time and by those who have newly arrived in it (Kroders; Stråth).

Latvia has experienced intensive population movements over the past several centuries. Many people have emigrated and immigrated, there have been masses of refugees, Soviet-era deportees have returned home, and there have been emigrants who do not want to do the same. Migration has had a serious effect on Latvia's economic and social development, as well as its social identity. Understanding the flows of migration and correlating experiences from the past are of importance in learning about and planning the development of the nation.

This chapter is devoted to migration in Latvia since the beginning of modernisation in the 19<sup>th</sup> century and up to the restoration of Latvia's independence in 1991. The author has sought to describe the most important population flows, as well as the Latvian diasporas which exist outside of Latvia.

### Global migration

Global migration was a socio-economic phenomenon which appeared in the world in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. There are four major migration systems in this process – the Atlantic migration system, the African-Atlantic migration system of slaves and indentured servants, the migration system of Asian contractual workers, and the diverse continental migration system which covered Eurasia from Western Europe to the distant regions of Russian Siberia (Harzig and Hoerder, 35-41). The cause for global migration was an unprecedented demographic revolution in Europe, along with modernisation and changes in the social and cultural space of the continent. Historian Norman Davies has stated: «Industrialization brought wave after wave of migration: first on a local or seasonal basis from village to factory; next on a regional basis from the countryside to the towns; and, [...] on an international and an intercontinental basis to all the industrial cities of Europe and the USA» (Davies, 787-788). At the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, emigration from Europe could be compared

to a small stream, but by the end of the century it was a torrent. Between 1801 and 1820, there were 0.08 émigrés per 1,000 Europeans, but by 1906 that number had increased to 4.02. Only the beginning of World War I interrupted the rapidly expanding process of emigration from Europe. Most of those who departed moved to the United States. On the eve of the war, the destination of 56% of émigrés was the United States, while others travelled to the Asian part of Russia (15%), Argentina (11%), Canada (6%), Australia (4%), Brazil (4%) and New Zealand (1%). The greatest number of émigrés during the 19<sup>th</sup> century came from the United Kingdom and Germany, while during the early part of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, there was a substantially larger number of émigrés from the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Russia. The result of emigration meant not only that millions of «unnecessary» people left the Old World, but also that some of them came back home eventually (some 5% in the early 19<sup>th</sup> century and 39% at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century). This ensured the dissemination of values and worldviews from the New World in Europe (Hamerow, 59-88).

### The involvement of Latvia's residents in global migration

#### Delayed migration

Migration in the Baltic States and Latvia is the least understood phenomenon among all demographic processes in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Movement of residents was first seen at the beginning of the century. Traditionally, farmhands moved from one place to another on St. George's Day. Formerly indentured servants sought earning opportunities in cities, craftsmen sought work, urban residents moved elsewhere, and students moved to cities where there were universities. And yet migration to a distant location with the purpose of settling there permanently was not a part of everyday lives. This was first and foremost because most people in Latvia in the early 19<sup>th</sup> century were indentured servants with limited legal rights to move from one place to another. After the end of indentured servitude in Kurzeme (1817), Vidzeme (1819) and Latgale (1861), the government of the Russian Empire and the local aristocratic nobility set many limitations on movement. For that reason, very few people moved outside the Baltic and Vitebsk provinces (Plakans, 2000, 59-60).

An exception to the rule was seen in the 1840s, when farmers from Vidzeme tried to move to «warmer climes» – the southern provinces of Russia. In part this was because


farmers had experienced several crop failures and wanted to get rid of that process, but also because moving away was a social protest in response to increasing amounts of forced labour on the estates of the nobility. The emigration movement turned into unrest among farmers such as the so-called potato riot of Jaunbebri, which was put down by the Russian army (Mieriņa, 78-79). There was another wave of migration in 1853 and 1845 when transformation of the system of forced labour led to poverty and a lack of work among servants. Even though their departure was legal under the auspices of a law on farmers that was adopted in 1849, the regime put up all kinds of obstacles against those who wanted to leave. During the mid-1850s, farmers departed from Latgale, and in 1859 and 1860, many farmers in Vidzeme started to prepare for departure to the Samara and Saratov provinces. The nobility and the regime tried to convince people to stay, and they used legal and economic resources to keep them from departing. There were only five Latvian colonies in Russia in 1850s (Strods, 1996, 25-28). The attitude of the government toward people moving from place to place only changed during the latter half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century.

### Migration as a necessity and a resource for a better life

Rapid modernisation during the latter half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century encouraged people in the Baltic provinces to move to other locations therein or beyond their borders. This was most directly influenced by rising population numbers, the development of industry, urban construction and transportation, as well as laws which allowed farmers to buy out their land and to move from place to place freely. Increasing numbers of people left their birthplaces. Riga became a regional metropolis and a «sponge» for people, and it continued to fulfil that function during the next century (see Box 2.1). In 1867, two-thirds of the city's residents had been born there, less than one-quarter had arrived from other parts of the Baltic provinces, and some 8% came from other provinces in Russia. By 1913, the percentage of native born residents of Riga was down to one-third, with another third coming from the Baltic provinces and an equal percentage coming from other Russian provinces. Riga became a distinctly multi-ethnic city of immigrants. Ethnic communities kept apart in terms of their social and cultural life, as well as their everyday lives. This was

Box  
2.1

### The population of Latvia and Riga (,000) between 1800 and 1991



Source: Valsts statistikas pārvalde (1939). *Latvijas statistikas gada grāmata 1939*. Rīga: Valters un Rapa. 6.lpp.; National Archives of Latvia, State Archive of Latvia, 277/14/5; 1022/11/1005; Ušackis, U. (2008). *Demogrāfija 2008*. Rīga: LR Centrālā statistikas pārvalde. P. 18-19.



facilitated by the fact that national ideology was all the rage at that time, and there were national movements which strengthened the sense of identity among ethnic groups (Oberlenders, 28-30).

There were four major linguistic groups in Latvia in the latter half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. In the 1860s, there were Germans (42.9%), Russians (25.1%), Latvians (23.6%) and Jews (5.1%). By 1913, the situation was different – Latvians (39.6%), Russians (21.2%), Germans (16.7%), and Jews (4.5%). There were also two new linguistic groups – Lithuanians (5.5%) and Poles (5.5%). The Baltic provinces were attractive to migrants in the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> century for economic reasons. Immigrants came not just from the Russian Empire, but also from Central Europe, particularly Germany (Plakans, 2000, 62-63). Only 7.3% of the residents of Latvia were urban residents in the early 19<sup>th</sup> century, but on the eve of World War I and mostly because of migration, 40.3% of all residents lived in cities (Skujenieks, 211).<sup>1</sup>

More rapid emigration of people from the Baltic provinces began during the latter half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. This was primarily based on the agrarian policies of the Baltic nobility. Few Latvian farmers had an opportunity to own land and just to ensure economic independence and wealth. Social tensions were maintained by short-term agreements between aristocrats (as landowners) and farmers (renters of land). Leasing fees for land were increased several times, and that did not allow farmers to modernise their operations because of a lack of money. Farmers who emigrated from Kurzeme and Vidzeme were also thinking about the end to indentured servitude in Russia, as the result of which farmers (including the ones in Latgale) received ownership rights to small plots of land (Mieriņa, 90-125; Skujenieks, 371). During the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the cornerstone for a farmer's identity was «my own land.» If a farmer could not buy land in the motherland, then land, together with welfare and a true purpose of life, were sought out beyond its borders.

The first major flow of émigré farmers occurred in 1863, when farmers first received the passports which they needed to travel elsewhere. Of provocative importance here were ads in the *Pēterburgas Avīzes* newspaper, which was edited by the early Latvian activist Krišjānis Valdemārs, to say that land was being sold in the Novgorod Province. Some 3,000 farmers took to the roads, and approximately one-half of them settled in or around Novgorod or elsewhere in Russia (Strods, 1996, 27; Zelče, 1999, 79-81). During the 1860s, Latvian farmers mostly moved to nearby provinces – the Pskov, Vitebsk, Kaunas, Novgorod and St. Petersburg provinces. During the next decade, farmers were travelling further to purchase land – to the Ufa, Orenburg and Simbirsk provinces. Emigration to Siberia began in the 1880s because the Russian government was seeking

to colonise the region. Land was given to immigrants for life, there were subsidies to set up farms, there was tax relief, easier rules on military services, as well as establishment of schools in the newly settled areas. Also of importance was the installation of a railroad network in Russia, because that allowed people to reach the more peripheral areas of the empire in a comparatively rapid and comfortable way. Toward the end of the century, many Latvians travelled to the Tobolsk and Yeniseisk provinces. Lettigalian migration to Siberia and other areas of Russia began around 1895. According to Fr. Kazimirs Skrinda, there were more than 20,000 Lettigalians in Siberia on the eve of World War I. A national census conducted in 1897 in the Russian Empire showed that some 112,300 Latvians were living outside of their own territory – 7.8% of all Latvians in the empire. The greatest numbers of Latvians were found in the Kaunas Province (35,188), Pskov Province (11,127), Vitebsk Province (not counting Latgale; 10,270), the St Petersburg Province (10,251), and the Mogilev Province (7,027). More than 1,000 Latvians were registered in the Novgorod Province, the Estonian part of the Vidzeme Province, the Ufa Province, the Smolensk Province and the Minsk Province. There were 71 colonies of Latvia farmers in the Russian Empire (Skujenieks, 371-373; Veigners 2009a, 114-15). Emigration continued during the early part of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. It is presumed that in advance of World War I, between 215,000 and 225,000 Latvians, or approximately 15% of all Latvians lived outside of their own territory (Veigners, 2009a, 115).

Farmers represented the majority of émigrés, but educated Latvians, blue collar workers, sailors and specialists in various jobs who could not find a job at home or thought that there were better opportunities for a professional career elsewhere in the empire followed suit. Many émigrés found jobs at Russian schools, medical institutions, pharmacies, shops, restaurants and cafeterias, as servants in people's homes, etc. (Bērziņš, 2000, 125-126; Veigners, 2009a, 542-547).

During the third quarter of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, most Latvian university students were at the University of Tartu, but by the end of the century, increasing numbers were seeking opportunities at universities in St Petersburg and Moscow (the distinguished linguist Kārlis Milēnbahs was among them). Many young men took the opportunity of getting a free education at Russia's military training institutions. Many of those who completed their education in Russia never returned to Latvia. In 1908, there were 93 people in St Petersburg and 43 in Moscow who had been educated in Russia and were working in those cities (Bērziņš, 2000, 211-213). Several of these émigrés put together very commendable professional careers for themselves. Krišjānis Valdemārs was a civil servant at the Maritime Affairs Ministry and Education Ministry of the Russian Empire, and he was also secretary of the Russian Imperial Trade Shipping Association. He made a major contribution toward the development of the country's trading fleet and the education of maritime specialists. Kārlis Hūns became a professor at the St Petersburg Academy of Art. Several

<sup>1</sup> For comparison's sake, we can note that in advance of World War I, the percentage of urban residents was 78% in England, 56.1% in Germany, 41.2% in France, 38.2% in Denmark, 24.7% in Poland, 21.1% in Sweden, 14.4% in the Russian Empire, and 15.5% in Finland (Skujenieks, 211-212).



Latvians became instructors or professors at Russian universities in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century – medic Mārtiņš Zīle at the University of Odessa, sinologist Pēteris Šmits at the Institute of the Far East in Vladivostok, medic Pēteris Sņikeris at the St Petersburg Academy of War Medicine, the medics Roberts Krimbergs, Jānis Dzirne and Augusts Pētersons at the University of Moscow, theologian Kazimirs Skrinda at the St Petersburg Theological Seminary, medic Jānis Ruberts at the University of Kyiv, Jāzeps Vītols at the St Petersburg Conservatory of Music, linguist Jānis Endzelīns at the University of Kharkov, and Francis Balodis at the Moscow Institute of Archaeology. Among those who developed an academic career at the University of Tartu were Jēkabs Osis, Jēkabs Lautenbahs, Ernests Felsbergs and others. Eižens Zemmers, Ludvigs Kundziņš and Ernests Paukuls did the same at the Tartu Veterinary Institute. Jēkabs Plūme, Aleksandrs Kambergs and Benedikts Zazerskis attained the rank of major-general in the Russian Empire's Army. Among those to do very well in sports were the wrestler Klemenss Buls, the weightlifter Jānis Krauze, and the boxer and weightlifter Jānis Grāve. Graphic artist Rihards Zariņš served as technical director for the Russian State Paper Printing House in St Petersburg, pharmacist Kārlis Krēsliņš was president of the St Petersburg Association of Pharmacists, and Jānis Doreds was a cameraman for the Russian government.

There were also émigrés who headed West from Latvia, though their numbers were fewer. It is thought that some 35,000 Latvians lived in the West at the turn of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, with that number increasing to around 45,000 on the eve of World War I (Veigners, 2009, 56). Most émigrés settled in the United States. The first Latvians arrived there in the 1880s, and they did heavy

work as railroad builders, coal miners, brick makers, port employees, forestry workers, sawmill employees and workers in industries and in the construction industry. They worked together with other émigrés – mostly Italians, Poles, Irishmen and Lithuanians. Eventually some Latvians opened stores, bakeries, gardening operations and workshops. Others opened their own construction companies, while still others became directors at factories and other new buildings. Some Latvians bought land and became farmers, and a very small number joined the field of innovations that was in such great demand at that time, offering new solutions for construction and machinery building (Akmentiņš, 243-264). The next generations of immigrants in America, in turn, proved able to integrate into that country's society quite easily.

Quite a few Latvians ended up in Brazil after economist Kārlis Balodis encouraged them to do so. Most of the émigrés were Baptists who were persecuted for religious reasons back home. Most became farmers. There were some 3,000 Latvians in Brazil in advance of World War I (Veigners, 2009b, 100-101).

Mass emigration among Jews began in the Russian Empire during the 1880s because of the government's official anti-Semitism. This began after the assassination of Tsar Alexander II by a member of the so-called Narodnaya Volya («People's Will») movement in 1881. The response was increased anti-Semitism and rioting against Jews in the Russian Empire. Many Jews from Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Poland moved to the Baltic provinces. The number of Jews in Latvia increased rapidly to nearly 190,000 in advance of World War I. Many emigrated on to the United States, Palestine and other countries. This was not just because of the increasing

Box  
2.2

### Osvalds Akmentiņš, a documenter of the history of American Latvians, on the first generation of Latvian immigrants – the so-called «Old Latvians»

«The Old Latvians have their own homes and automobiles, which the average standard of living in America allows. They are neither rich nor poor. They have bank accounts for their old age, or else they have life insurance policies. Latvians obviously do not want to burden anyone else, so they have no debt, and they rarely ask for social aid from local governments. It is often the case that when someone dies, there are no heirs, and then the bank deposits are taken over by the government. Those who have held on to communities of church congregations or associations have not been particularly successful, while those who have wandered off to distant places where they can work on their own have been lucky and have done better. The economic knowledge which servants in pre-World War I Latvia had, did not allow them to achieve anything here. None of them spoke English, and none had much money – the first stable pillars in America's economy. And yet America has gained a great deal thanks to the Latvian immigrants. Latvians are good, careful and responsible craftspeople and workers. A Latvian from the countryside has had a fairly stormy life, but if he works very hard in the choking machineries of big cities, then he can save up one cent after another, break out of the fortress, and buy a home further away from the city, where there are still green areas with trees and grass. He becomes lonely there, he thinks about his tragic life. He is not yet a true American, and he is no longer a true Latvian; he is somewhere between the two statuses. Over the long years, he has forgotten about Latvian culture, history and the efforts of his nation. Americanism seems equally pointless to him.»

Source: Akmentiņš, O. 1958. *Amerikas latvieši. 1888–1948. Fakti un apceres.* [Lincoln]: Vaidava, p. 262.

anti-Semitism and number of pogroms in the Russian Empire, but also because of economic factors (Stranga, 326-329). Among those who emigrated were the family of the distinguished painter Mark Rothko, who was born in Daugavpils, as well as the family of the Jelgava-born financier and art collector Joseph Hirshhorn, after whom a contemporary art museum in Washington, D.C., is named. Riga-born Herman Jadlowker became a global opera star, performing in Germany, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the United States, and elsewhere.

### The «Motherland» in new countries of residence

When Latvians emigrated to other countries, they set up their own organisations and cultural environment. The first Latvian centre in the United States was in Boston, where, under the leadership of Jēkabs Zībergs, Latvians established the Latvian Aid Association in 1889. Two years later, they established a Lutheran congregation with the Rev. Ansis Rebānis as its pastor. Zībergs published the newspaper *Amerikas Vēstnesis* (*American Herald*) and a series of Latvian calendars. Other organisations and congregations were established in future years. Organisations worked to support new immigrants, organised various holiday events, had choirs and theatrical troupes, and established libraries. Eventually some of the organisations bought their own buildings (Akmentiņš, 29-46).

Émigré Jews also established organisations which were based on the motherland. The association «Bne Rezitza-Režicas» («Children of Rēzekne») was established in New York in 1893. By 1905, former residents of Rēzekne had established four organisations in New York, one of them together with immigrants from Ludza. They offered mutual assistance, organised religious life, and buried the dead (Stranga, 329).

Many Latvian organisations were established in Russia, where there were larger numbers of Latvian immigrants. The St Petersburg Latvian Reading Association was established in that city in 1863. Later, all major Latvian centres had organisations and Lutheran or Catholic Church congregations. Organisations opened libraries which received the latest Latvian literature and press. Choirs were established, as were schools in the larger colonies of Latvians. There were 14 schools in 1897 and 52 in 1914 (Veigners, 2009a, 188; Bērziņš, 125-126). Immigrants in Russia also maintained regular contacts with their motherland. Latvian newspapers and magazines wrote quite a lot about emigration, offered advice, and published information about the activities of Latvian colonies and organisations. Some of these publications were critical of émigrés, but all in all the tone was one of understanding. There was an acceptance of economic emigration as a way of achieving welfare, professional achievements and a better life.

### Political emigration and forced displacement

There was also emigration from Latvia in the latter half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century which was based on political

factors. Leaders of the Latvian national movement chose St Petersburg and Moscow as their place of residence in the 1860s, because they saw no opportunities in Latvia to establish a successful career or to pursue their political aims. At the end of the century, when activists from the Social Democratic «New Current» movement were arrested, several activists fled to the West – the United States, Great Britain and Switzerland. Latvians in Boston established the Latvian Social Democratic Association, compatriots in London set up the Western European Latvian Social Democratic Association, and Latvians in Switzerland organised their own Latvian Social Democratic Association (Dūma and Paeglīte, 21-68).

The first major torrent of political refugees began after the 1905 Revolution. Some 5,000 people emigrated to escape repression (Bērziņš, 2000, 399). Many spent time in the West, where they learned a lot about democratic values. Among the émigrés were future Latvian President Kārlis Ulmanis, the writers Rainis, Aspazija and Kārlis Skalbe, and future politicians Miķelis Valters and Fēlikss Cielēns. Amnesty was proclaimed in 1913, and some of the political refugees plucked up enough courage to go back home. At the same time, however, trials were held in several Western countries to deal with participants in the revolution who had been arrested there. Ferdinands Grīniņš and Jēkabs Kovaļevskis were tried in Brussels, while Jānis Purens and Krišjānis Rudevics faced a court in New York. These cases attracted a great deal of attention. Western Social Democratic organizations, members of society and cultural activists defended the arrestees and achieved their liberation. In advance of World War I, there were many political organisations in the West, and many published their own newsletters (Stradiņš, 426; Akmentiņš, 133-242).

Among the émigrés were Social Democratic and anarchistic warriors who on several occasions engaged in audacious attacks against banks and post offices to get money for their revolution. Some of them continued to engage in robbery after emigrating. Much attention in Great Britain and Australia was attracted by a participant in the 1905 Revolution who was called Jānis Žākle, but went under the pseudonym of Peter the Painter. He and his comrades engaged in several robberies during which police officers were killed. These men became the object of a massive manhunt, and they were a symbol of criminals who could not be found. This led the prolific Belgian detective story author Georges Simenon to title the first novel which featured Commissioner Maigret «The Strange Case of Peter the Lett» in 1931 (Bankovskis; Clarke).

There were also those who were forced to leave their motherland because the authorities of the Russian Empire deported them, mostly to Siberia. The leaders of the potato riot of Jaunbebri were deported in 1841, and 2,652 people were deported on an administrative basis after the events of 1905 (Bērziņš, 2000, 399). Many deportees and political refugees returned to Latvia after amnesty was proclaimed and/or the Russian Empire collapse, but a significant number did not.

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During the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> century, people from Latvia were part of the process of global migration. Many moved to a new location permanently or for a specific period of time. For material reasons, people moved from the countryside to larger or smaller cities or from one city to another in pursuit of a job and a better and different life. Many thousands moved abroad in search of a better life. Approximately 17% were part of the global Atlantic Ocean migration system, while some 83% were part of the continental migration system. There were radical differences, however, between the emigration of Latvians and Estonians and the emigration of Lithuanians. The absolute majority of Lithuanians who left their country chose to move to the United States. Some 300,000 Lithuanians arrived in America between the 1860s and 1914 (Plakans 2011, 253-254).

The goal of most émigrés from Latvia was to buy land. The sense of belonging to land which one owned was in many cases stronger than a sense of motherland. Many of the people who moved elsewhere successfully merged their sense of belonging to the new country of residence with a long-distance sense of belonging to Latvia. This bridge was built by the activities of national communities (organisations, choirs, theatrical troupes, schools, newspapers, etc.) and the ability of people to become involved in Latvian culture, primarily by reading literature and the press.

At the same time, however, the number of people who immigrated into Latvia prior to World War II was higher than the number who departed. Between 1863 and 1913, the Latvian population increased by 1,287,000 people – 983,000 (76%) were born, while 304,000 (24%) immigrated (Mežgailis and Zvidriņš, 34). Latvia (or, more precisely, Riga) was a land of immigration prior to the war. Presumably, the immigrants did not establish a strong sense of belonging to Latvia. Where such a sense did emerge, it was interrupted by the mobilisation, evacuations, deportations and flows of refugees which related to the war.

## The era of refugees and forced displacement

The history of European migration between 1914 and the latter half of the 1940s is seen as a period of refugees and forced displacement of individuals. Historical literature describes this phase as a period of madness and catastrophes in Europe – wars, totalitarian regimes sowing death all around, and damage and degradation in unprecedented volumes (Davies, 910-914; Hobsbawm, 24). There were three types of migration during the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The first was dictated by the dominant ideology of nationalism in Europe, as well as by the values of nation states. People who were not part of the titular nation were seen as unnecessary and not comprise a part of the nation itself, and this led many people to emigrate, primarily to the United States and Latin America. The second type related to totalitarian regimes which replaced the voluntary migration of

workers in the 1920s with forced displacement. The third type was dictated by wars and violence which created streams of refugees who left their homes to save their lives (Harzig and Hoerder, 44).

All three types of migration have been seen in the history of migration in Latvia, and very vividly, as well. This was due first and foremost to the two world wars, the successful establishment of Latvia as a nation state during the interwar period, and the policies of destruction and forced displacement of residents which were implemented by the totalitarian regimes of Nazi Germany and the Communist USSR.

### The first era of refugees

An unprecedented amount of migration in Latvia occurred during World War I. The imperial government of Russia, in preparing for an attack by Germany, deported lots of people to the more distant regions of the empire – Germans who supported Germany, as well as people who were seen as undesirable along the front lines – prostitutes, for instance (Bleiere, et al., 2005, 64; Zelče, 2004, 34). In April 1915, the imperial government ordered that Jews from Kurzeme be deported to provinces on the right bank of the Dnieper River in Russia. This involved the deportation of more than 30,000 Jews, albeit not in the towns of Liepāja and Kuldīga, which were already in the hands of the Germans. Those who were deported were treated with hostility at the locations where they were settled, because they were suspected of working with the enemy. This meant that many people could not lead normal lives in their new places of residence (Stranga, 2008, 370-374).

When the war began, there were forced refugees, voluntary refugees, and people of various ethnic groups in Latvia who became refugees because of confusion and incomprehension. This was particularly true among ethnic Latvians. The commanders of the Russian Army tried to ravage the Kurzeme countryside and to empty it of civilians as the enemy approached. An evacuation was ordered, and there were various attempts to convince or force the people of Kurzeme into leaving the region during the summer of 1915. The mass displacement of people, mostly farmers, was rather complicated because people brought along their carts, livestock and other everyday objects. Vidzeme was not prepared to absorb such a large number of people. There were shortages of food and homes, and diseases were rife. Contemporaries of the events of 1915 described the period as being one of «dark horrors» and of the destruction of Kurzeme. People were pawns in the game of major politics. In the Latvian cultural discourse, refugees were seen as tragic and suffering victims who were helpless in the face of major events and destiny which they were forced to experience (see Zelče, Sprugaine, 17-19).

Industrial companies in Riga were evacuated in 1915, and many workers moved to Russia because of this. As the front line approached Riga and Vidzeme, people from those regions hit the road, as well. There have been various and sometimes contradictory reports about the

number of refugees. In the spring of 1917, for instance, 170,543 refugees were registered in Vidzeme (Bērziņš, 2000, 555-561). Another report said that 349,988 people left their homes in Kurzeme and Vidzeme. Statistician Mārgers Skujenieks has calculated that 850,000 people became refugees or were evacuated from Latvia (this number includes those who were mobilised into the armed forces). Other calculations suggest that more than one million people, or 40% of the pre-war population, left Latvia during the war (Šalda, 2007, 80-83). Refugees settled in Petrograd, Moscow, Archangelsk, Ržhev, Orla, Yaroslavl, Penza, Yekaterinoslav, Kazan, Voronezh, Rostov on the Don, Saratov, Velyikiye Luki, Nizhny Novgorod, Kyiv, Kharkov and other cities. Others found homes in Siberia and the Far East. Many organisations which took care of the refugees reduced their sense of departure from their motherland, also offering social support to the refugees.

Refugees from Kurzeme gradually began to return to their homes after the German military took over all of Vidzeme, but mass return to Latvia happened only after Latvia and Russia concluded a peace treaty. The repatriation was not a smooth process, because the government institutions of Soviet Russia tried to hinder it. There were also problems because of chaos in the railroad system, corruption, and the arbitrary decisions of repressive organs (Šalda, 278-353).

Nearly 300,000 people returned to Latvia between 1918 and 1928. The historian Vitālijs Šalda writes as follows: «Sadly, only a minority of people who had fled Latvia returned home. Even fewer remained in Soviet Russia. Approximately one-half of the Latvian refugees can be listed among the victims of World War I and the Russian civil war» (Šalda, 364). Latvia lost nearly 1,000,000 people during the war, or 37% of the pre-war population (Bērziņš, 2003, 291, 296).

### Migration and the Latvian state

The Latvian state which was established in 1918 was tolerant toward immigrants. Many thousands of people joined wartime refugees in moving to Latvia from Soviet Russia – people who had never lived in Latvia before. In 1922, for instance, more than 15,000 so-called Mensheviks or «white Russians» who were fleeing the Soviet regime found refuge in the new country. Many Russian Jews did the same (Stranga, 431-432).

Agrarian reforms which were implemented in Latvia between 1920 and 1937 resolved the main social and economic problem which existed at that time and was also a cause for emigration. Many thousands of people could buy their own land. 54,436 new farms were established, and only 18% of Latvia's residents in the latter half of the 1930s did not own land (as opposed to 61.2% in 1920) (Bleiere, 175). The small farms which were established as a result of the agrarian reforms became the economic and social backbone of Latvia. This created a foundation for the welfare of a large segment of the population, and it also satisfied the social and emotional yearnings of people who for decades had wanted to own their own land. Ownership created a sense of belonging and trust in relation to the Latvian state. Very few Latvians emigrated to other countries for economic reasons. Between 1920 and 1939, 4,700 Latvians moved to the United States, while another 2,300 moved to Brazil during the 1920s. In advance of World War II, there were some 50,000 Latvians in the West, and most of them were assimilated into the societies of the relevant countries. Some 15,000 to 20,000 people were actively involved in Latvian communities abroad (Veigners, 2009, 56, 100).

Most of the people who left Latvia did not feel a sense of belonging in the country and hoped that they could quickly improve their standard of living in the

Box  
2.3

### The author Andrejs Upīts about the refugees of Kurzeme

«Through Bauska and Jelgava, across the Venta River from the side of Tukums, all of the large and small roads toward the Daugava are full of refugees. One cart, two carts, three carts – they ride down the rutted countryside roads. In the carts are old men, wives who have just given birth and have wrapped the baby in scarves, perhaps a little boy who is holding the reins of a cart for the first time in his life. Adults deal with the livestock. There are animals following every cart. Cows are used to the pasture, they walk slowly while eating grass. Sometimes they are fussy and trample into fields of rye. Smaller animals can hardly be controlled. Sheep stubbornly want to go to their usual grazing areas. Lambs wander around amidst the cows and bleat in nervous little voices. Fattened pigs make angry noises and are constantly trying to go back home. The whip does not scare them much. Younger sows run into rye fields and trample the summer grain. Those who seek to control them are hot and tired. Men yell angrily, women run and weep, and they have no time to wipe the tears from their sweaty faces. Whips can be heard. Children whinge. Dogs run after animals which are trying to flee, they are everywhere and do not know what is happening. Horses trample the rye to the point where sometimes you can only see their ears. Fillies neigh in desperation and without any pause.

These carts are like balls of yarn which roll along the hundreds of local roads and pathways to get to the highway which leads to the Daugava. The line of riders, walkers and animals large and small is an endless torrent on the highway, and it is so very, very long.»

Source: Upīts, A. 1950. Pērkona pievārtē. In: Upīts, A. *Kopoti raksti*. Rīga: Latvijas Valsts izdevniecība. P. 15.



West. Those who were disloyal or hostile to the Latvian state mostly moved to Soviet Russia (and later the USSR). During the first years of the country's independence, some 10,100 people moved to Soviet Russia or were expelled for engaging in anti-state activities (Bērziņš, 2003, 297; Kabuzan, 133). Many Jews left Latvia, as was the case in other European countries, as well. Riga became a transit point for Jews from Russia who were on their way to the United States, Canada, and other countries (Stranga, 453). 4,500 Jews departed from Latvia to Palestine by 1939, and they established a Latvian Jewish community there (Dribins, 219).

Once the torrent of returning refugees ended during the interwar period, few people immigrated into Latvia, mostly because there were few jobs in cities. Most of the flow of workers related to seasonal work done on farms. The first farm workers arrived from Lithuania in 1925, joined by several thousand people from Estonia and a few hundred individuals from other countries. During the 1930s, the number of foreign farm workers (most of them from Lithuania and Poland) ranged from 12,000 to 40,000 people (Bērziņš, 297). In the 1930s, after the Nazis took power in Germany and occupied Austria and Czechoslovakia, several hundred Jewish refugees found shelter in Latvia (Stranga, 2001). In the autumn of 1939, when World War II had already begun, 1,500 soldiers from the Polish army and 300 to 400 civilian refugees arrived in the country (Jēkabsons, 171).

External migration during the interwar period did not have much of an effect on Latvia's demographic situation and economy. There was internal migration within Latvia, but it was not an intensive process. Latvia's cities had lost large numbers of people during World War I, but in during the 1920s and 1930s, the population of cities swelled

again as rural people came to work for government institutions, the service industry and manufacturing, but this was a process which only developed in a gradual way. The population of Riga in particular increased, doubling to 385,000 people between 1920 and 1935 (Bērziņš, 2003, 293-294). Economic development, increased welfare and social stability in Latvia did not encourage many people to leave, and, indeed, employers started to look for additional workers from other European countries. Of great importance, too, was the idea that people were helping to build the nation state, and that meant that most of those who emigrated felt that they were unnecessary in the country.

### The Latvian community in the Soviet Union

There was a large Latvian community in the Soviet Union in the 1920s and 1930s – 151,400 people in all, according to a census in 1926. 35,100 Latvians were in Siberia, 18,300 were in the Leningrad Province, 14,000 resided in Belarus, 12,900 were in Leningrad, 10,600 were in the Pskov Province, 8,100 lived in the Novgorod Province, 7,600 resided in the Smolensk Province, and 7,000 Latvians were in Bashkiria. Most Latvians lived in the countryside and were engaged in agriculture. There were 372 Latvian colonies with a total of 12,000 farms in the Soviet Union, and Latvians made up 0.1% of the Soviet population. During the aforementioned census, 78.3% of Latvians and 81.4% of Lettgallians cited Latvian as their native language (Bērziņš, 2003, 325).

Kolkhozes were established at the Latvian colonies in the late 1920s, and this was a process which involved deportations, death sentences and removal of voting rights. In 1935, there were more than 150 so-called

Box  
2.4

### Writer Vilis Lācis on returning to Latvia (1935-1937) after being a refugee in the Altai Province

«It was 11:00 AM when they crossed the border and saw the first Latvian soldier. The train proceeded slowly. Red Army soldiers who were part of the convoy jumped off the train at the border, and this eliminated the last threat from the alien and fierce land. They travelled to this place and no further! All that was harsh and terrible immediately disappeared into the past like a terrible nightmare, and people no longer had to tremble about their own lives. Mountains of concern fell off of the tired shoulders of people who felt secure about their existence and knew that they had crossed the desert and finally reached a green oasis at which they would once again enjoy all human rights and a new future.

It was a grand and ceremonial moment, it represented awakening to a new day after the terrible darkness of nightmares. The contrast between the past and the present was too severe to allow people to experience it calmly. This contrast existed everywhere – in the hearts of refugees, in the environment and in everyone. On the other side of the border there were dirty villages, a cold and wintry dusk and a tattered Red Army soldier in shoddy boots. On this side of the border stood a Latvian soldier in a nice uniform. Homes were clean, the world was bright, and people could breathe freely. They knew that no one would harm them, and they could gaze into the eyes of the world with a sense of security. Even so, they bowed their heads because of the curse of arbitrariness and destruction. Those who came home knew what they had gained, and they were thankful when viewing the country that had called them home and greeted them like a relative who was prepared to hug them. Your land rejoices every time that one of its children comes back home.»

Source: Lācis, V. 2001. Vecā jūrnīeku ligzda. Rīga: Jaunā Daugava. P. 706-707.



Latvian national kolkhozes in the Soviet Union (Riekstiņš, 2009, 9-11).

Many diaspora organisations preserved the ethnic and cultural lives of Latvians in the Soviet Union. An educational organisation, «Prometheus,» was established in Moscow in 1923, and it had a printing plant, publishing house and bookstores in Moscow and Leningrad. A Latvian theatrical troupe called «Stage» was active in Moscow, and there were also theatrical troupes in Smolensk and Leningrad. Novosibirsk was home to a travelling theatrical troupe of Lettigalians. There were many Latvian organisations, clubs, libraries, reading rooms, choirs and schools in the Soviet Union. Among the most important educational institutions were the Latvian Pedagogical Technical School (1921-1937), the Lettigalian Pedagogical Technical School (1930-1937), the Latvian Division of the Leningrad Pedagogical Institute (1927-1937), and the Faculty of Latvian Workers (1920-1937). Many periodicals were published, among which the most influential ones were the newspapers *Russian Battle* (1918-1930), *Communard Battle* (1931-1937), and *Siberian Battle* (1918-1937), as well as the magazine *Building* (1929-1937). People published calendars and books – classics from Latvian literature, as well as works by Soviet and pro-Soviet authors (Veigners, 2009, 205-232). Latvian communities were not just national collectives, but also a web established by various organisations with many informal links that were rooted in language, the cultural environment, memories of the motherland, and contacts with relatives back in Latvia (Šalda, 2010, 15).

The Latvian ethnic community was devastated by mass repressions during the latter half of the 1930s. Many high-ranking representatives of the Soviet government, the nomenclature of the Communist Party and the Soviet military were killed in 1936 and 1937. On July 2, 1937, the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist (Bolshevik) Party approved a decision on «anti-Soviet elements,» which included attacks against so-called

national operations. The «Latvian operation» began in the autumn of 1937, and most of those who were hauled into court were accused of «spying and diversions.» Latvian organisations and cultural and educational institutions were all shut down. Nationality became a security threat, and many people hid their identity, Russified their names, migrated and abandoned Latvian colonies (Riekstiņš, 2009, 40-63; Šalda, 2010, 414-491; Denningzhayz, 606-609).

A 1939 census in the Soviet Union counted up 127,000 Latvians (24,000 fewer than in 1926). It is thought that the results of the census were falsified so as to hid the true scope of repressions, famine and victims of collectivisation (Blyum, 113-130), and the number of Latvians listed in the census is probably imprecise, as well (Veigners, 564). Mass Stalinist repressions against minority nationalities destroyed the Latvian community in the USSR and led to the assimilation of those who remained alive.

### Latvian communities in Western countries and neighbouring countries

During the 1920s, some 30,000 Latvians lived in Lithuania, and 12,300 lived in Estonia, where there were Latvian organisations, schools, libraries and choirs. Some 3,000 Latvian citizens, most of them Jews, were registered in Germany. Several hundred people from Latvia settled in Czechoslovakia, Belgium, France, Denmark, the Netherlands, Great Britain and other European countries, but in very few of those nations were there Latvian organisations. People maintained their cultural environment and links to the motherland mostly with the involvement of Latvian diplomatic institutions (Bērziņš, 2003, 328-230).

During the 1930s, the largest number of Latvian-born émigrés, 38,000 people in all, was found in the United States. Major communities of Latvians existed in New York, Chicago, Boston, Philadelphia and Baltimore.

## The memories of journalist Hugo Rukšāns and lawyer Arvīds Auns-Urālietis about their motherland and the Latvian colony in Bashkiria

Box  
2.5

«To be honest, we were quite wealthy as long as there were no disasters [...], but the land provided you with a living if you were not lazy or a drunk. It was said that if you planted a shaft in the ground in the spring, a carriage would grow by the autumn, and if the growing season was particularly good, a horse would appear, as well. [...] We were far away from most Latvians, but we maintained our work and everyday morals very carefully. We did the same with the culture that we brought from our motherland, though there were those for whom it was not too deep or broad. [...]

The people's teachers. In Latvian colonies in Russia, these words created the same bright thoughts as was the case during the Latvian National Awakening. Far away from their motherland, Latvians especially thought about educating their minds, at least that was true where we were. That's why Latvians did not build saloons, instead erecting schools – larger or smaller ones, but they were there. There were one or more teachers, and they were always welcome at people's homes. The people's teacher knew how to conduct a choir and play the violin, piano or organ with foot pedals.»

Source: Rukšāns, H., Auns-Urālietis, A. 1996. *Vēstules no bērniņas zemes*. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. Rīga, pp. 170 and 174-175.

Latvians worked for the construction industry, at various workshops, as well as in fishing and agriculture. A few were entrepreneurs or retailers. Latvians set up organisations and published newspapers, magazines and books. Former political refugees set up active left-wing organisations (Bērziņš, 2003, 330; Veigners, 2009, 63-64). 7,000 Latvians lived in Brazil during the 1920s and 1930s. Some 2,000 arrived in that country in 1921 and 1922 at the suggestion of Baptist preachers. A large Latvian colony was established in Sao Paolo. Most of the immigrants bred cattle, engaged in agriculture or were craftspeople. Several thousand Latvians lived in Argentina, Canada and Manchuria, several hundred made homes for themselves in Australia, and just a few lived in Cuba, Mexico, Egypt, Algeria, Morocco and South Africa (Bērziņš, 2003, 331-332).

Migration from Latvia to the West was negligible during the interwar period, and the main reason for migration among those who did leave the country was economic considerations.

## The era of displaced persons and refugees

Once the Communist USSR and Nazi Germany set up their partnership in 1939, an era of displaced persons and refugees began in Latvia, and this created a radical drop in population numbers along with physical and moral degradation and a loss of human dignity.

### The departure of Baltic Germans

On September 28, 1939, Nazi German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop visited Moscow to sign a special protocol between Germany and the USSR on emigration. The text said that the Soviet Union would not put up any obstacles against the emigration of German citizens or persons of German origin who lived in the Soviet Union's sphere of interests if they wished to move to Germany (Bleiere, 2008, 1934). This was the foreign policy basis for the emigration of Germans from Latvia. The fact is that two countries – the USSR and Germany – took a decision

about the inhabitants of a third country – Latvia – thus violating its sovereignty (Loeber, 31). On October 6, Adolf Hitler appeared before the Reichstag and called on Baltic Germans to return to the Reich or, more precisely, the area around the Warthe River. This was the first public statement about the emigration issue, and it launched the relevant process. Germany and Latvia concluded an agreement on October 30 about the transfer of German residents of Latvia to Germany (Feldmanis, 1994, 37). There was a vast propaganda campaign waged by Baltic German organisations and the press to ensure that Baltic Germans understood the idea of repatriation and of Germany as their true fatherland (see Ziemele).

The emigration began in mid-October 1939, when ships were sent from Germany to bring people back to that country. The first ship carrying Germans who were citizens of Latvia sailed from Riga on November 7, 1939. Prior to that, in October, there had been two ships to transport Germans who lived in Latvia but were citizens of Germany. The last ship departed on December 15. This meant the closure of many German organisations, schools, church congregations and newspapers. The migration continued in the spring of 1940 until 51,000 Baltic Germans were gone. After Latvia was incorporated into the USSR, another 10,500 Germans departed during the winter of 1941, and only 1,500 ethnic Germans remained in the country (Dribins, 156, Feldmanis, 38-39). The departure of the Baltic Germans meant a loss of approximately 2.5% of the Latvian population. At the end of World War II, moreover, Baltic Germans who were still in Latvia fled to Germany, while some 8,000 died during the war (Dribins, 156, Dunsdorfs, 62-64). The Baltic German community was gone, and Latvia lost an important ethnic group.

### Forced displacement organised by the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany and migration dictated by war

Between 1933 and 1945, the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany killed 14 million people in Eastern Europe. Historian Timothy Snyder has described the territory in which both regimes committed terrible crimes as

## A farewell address by schoolteacher Roderich Walther at the Classical Gymnasium, October 18, 1939

Box  
2.6

«We are also saying farewell to the environment in which we have lived – the untouched nature, the place, the things and the conditions under which we have lived and which established the community to which we were so very much accustomed. This farewell means a long separation. It seems that we will never be able to return to our accustomed environment. Even if some of us are destined to return, the circumstances and the environment will have changed at their very foundation. The past can never return. We are saying goodbye to our past and our history. This means more than just a separation. It means completely breaking off links with the past. We are interrupting succession, and our traditions are disappearing. [...] We will no longer be Baltic Germans. We are moving to a completely different environment, and we will have to join it and adapt to it.»

Source: Adolfs, R. et al. (ed.) 2001. 800 gadi. Mūsu kopējā Rīga. Rīga: Karla Širrena biedrība. P. 319-320.

«bloodlands» (Snyder, vii-xix). Between 1939 and 1943, the Communists and Nazis deported, displaced or scattered as many as 30 million people (Judt, 39). Latvia lost many people because of the displacement and repression of people which occurred at the hands of the totalitarian regimes.

There were two rounds of mass deportation in Latvia during the Soviet occupation. 15,424 people, or 0.78% of the country's residents were deported on June 14, 1941.<sup>1</sup> The citizens of Latvia who were arrested were sent to camps in Vyatka, Norilsk, the northern Urals, Ussolye and others. Those who were administrative deportees were settled in the Krasnoyarsk District, the Novosibirsk District, the Kazakh District and elsewhere. During the winter of 1941 and 1942, many were sent to the far North of Siberia. According to incomplete information, 700 Latvian citizens were shot in the Soviet Union, more than 3,440 died in prison, and 1,940 perished at settlements. Of those who were deported on June 14, 1941, 6,081 (39.43%) died (Riekstiņš, 2001, 9-25; Zālīte and Eglīte, 46-47).

The second mass deportation occurred on March 25, 1949, and 42,125 people (2.2% of the population were deported). They were sent to the Amur, Omsk and Tomsk districts, and 12% of them died while there (Riekstiņš, 2007, 23; Zvidriņš and Vītoliņš, 253). The forced displacement, labour camps and settlements were key elements in the Soviet economy during the 1930s and 1940s. Deportees were a free labour force for important economic sectors in the USSR, thus creating foundations for the country's industrial and military development (see Appelbaum).

Those people who were sent to Russia during the mass deportations were not the only ones to face forced displacement at the hands of the Soviet regime. Both in 1940 and 1941 and after World War II, many individuals were arrested. During the first year of the occupation, between 22,000 and 23,000 people in Latvia were arrested, administratively deported or executed (Bleiere, et al., 2008, 201). Between 1944 and 1953, some 120,000 people fell victim to Soviet terror. Of these, more than 70,000 were sent to camps in the Gulag, more than 40,000 were deported, and some 2,500 were shot (Riekstiņš, 2007, 12). Liberation of prisoners and deportees began in 1954 and gradually developed over the next several years. Not all deportees and prisoners returned to Latvia. In some places local governments refused to allow people to leave or else did everything possible to hinder the process. In other cases, people simply decided to stay where they were. Some had established families with local residents, built homes or found good jobs. Many deportees did not want to return to Latvia because

they did not want to face those who had betrayed and denounced them, nor did they want to see their ravaged homes or the Sovietisation of their beloved country. Lots of people were also convinced that the deportations would continue and that if they went home, they would probably be shipped back to Siberia anyway. It is thought that 80% of those who were deported in 1949 returned home (Zvidriņš and Vītoliņš, 253). The repressions organised by the Soviet regime and the violent displacement of local residents have had a long-lasting and traumatic effect on the people of Latvia and on the collective memories of Latvians.

When the war between Nazi Germany and the USSR began in 1941, many members of the Soviet Latvian government and the Latvian Communist Party left the country along with their families. The same was true of others who did not wish to live in a country occupied by the Nazis. Soviet institutions were unable to provide for any orderly evacuation, and so those who left the country did so in a fairly chaotic and panicked way. Many who wanted to withdraw with the Red Army failed to do so. They died in battles between Latvian self-defence organisations, the Red Army and the Soviet secret police (NKVD). Others were killed during punitive activities or bombardment by Nazi aircraft. The NKVD posted men on the border between Latvia and Russia and ordered many would-be refugees (including Jews) to turn back, thus dooming many of them to destruction. It is thought that 53,000 people from Latvia moved behind the front lines in the Soviet Union, but many of them, particularly children, died because of poor living conditions and food shortages (Bleiere, et al., 2008, 385-388, 396).

Nazi Germany also implemented repressions in occupied Latvia. Between 66,000 and 68,000 Latvian Jews perished in the Holocaust (Stranga, 532).

The Nazis used Latvia's economic and labour resources for war purposes. Many people were sent to Germany to engage in forced labour. Initially this was a voluntary principle, but local residents soon learned about the harsh working conditions of those who were sent to Germany and about the fact that the Germans were breaking all of their promises in this regard. The number of willing workers collapsed, and forcible methods were used instead. Quite soon, Latvia's institutions of governance opposed the transfer of people to work in Germany, because Latvia itself had a distinct lack of workers in agriculture and industry. All in all, it is through that 16,800 people were sent to do work in Germany by 1944 (Kangeris, 47).

When the Nazis withdrew from Latvia, they successfully implemented the «scorched earth» policy which meant the evacuation or destruction of everything that was valuable – industrial equipment, agricultural products, law materials and cultural values. The Nazis also organised a programme to transfer people to Germany. The process began in the summer of 1944. From October 5 to 9 of that year, the authorities organised a dragnet to capture people on the street and deliver them directly to ships (Bleiere, et al, 2008, 470). As the Red Army approached, the number of voluntary refugees skyrocketed. Data show

<sup>1</sup> The Soviet Union also conducted mass deportations in other territories which it had occupied in accordance with agreements with Nazi Germany. Deportations in Lithuania and Estonia occurred at the same time as in Latvia – on the night from June 13 to June 14. Deportations in Western Ukraine occurred on May 22, in Moldova on the night from June 12 to June 13, and in Belarus on the night from June 19 to 20 (Riekstiņš, 2001, 13). Between 1939 and 1941, more than one million people were deported from Soviet-occupied Poland, Western Ukraine and the Baltic States (Judt, 39).

that between 265,000 and 285,000 people left Latvia in all. Some 25,000 had moved to Germany previously, while another 20,000 or so were deported against their own will (Strods, 1994, 129-134).

There were several other forced displacements of civilians during the war. Nazi Germany's regime established several prisons in Latvia to house people from other countries. Several thousand Jews from Western Europe ended their lives in the Riga ghetto and then the concentration camps of Mežaparks, Salaspils and Jumpravmuiža. Other prisoners came from Russia and Belarus. There were several camps for Soviet prisoners of war in Latvia, as well. As the Red Army approached, the Nazis moved the prisoners of war westward (Bleiere, et al., 2008, 263-267).

The mobility of Latvia's residents also involved the mobilisation of people by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. There were 110,000 Latvians in the ranks of the Nazi armed forces, 52,000 of them in the Latvian SS Legion (Bleiere, et al, 2008, 354). Some 50,000 Latvians who wore the military uniforms of Nazi Germany perished on the battlefield (Vilciņš, 32), and some 25,400 members of the Latvian Legion were captured by the Western allies toward the close of World War II (Bleiere, et al., 2008, 472). Some 50,000 legionnaires were captured by the Soviet military, and most of them were sent to Soviet prisons for longer or shorter periods of time (Vilciņš, 32). When it comes to the Red Army, there was a Latvian division of riflemen in it from the very beginning of the war in 1941. It was made up of Latvians who found themselves in the Soviet Union at the start of the war as well as Latvians who had lived in the USSR for a longer period of time. When the Red Army returned to Latvia in July 1944, it began to mobilise local residents – 57,422 in all by the end of the war (Riekstiņš, 2005, 428). Some 36,000 soldiers from the Latvian units of the Red Army fell in battle during the war (Bleiere, et al., 2005, 3000).

Soviet statistics tell us that on June 1, 1945, there were 1,500,730 people in Latvia, or a decline of 403,800 people (21.2%) since January 1, 1940 (in other words, during four years and five months) (State Archives of Latvia, 277/14/5, p. 41). The size of the population began to increase after the war as refugees and military personnel returned home. The Soviet regime organised an extensive campaign to get people who had been displaced during the war to go back home. 77,368 refugees returned to Latvia between 1945 and 1952, though some were subject to further repression and ended up at places of imprisonment and deportation outside of Latvia (Riekstiņš, 1994, 58). It is also true that as soon as the war was over, people from other Soviet republics flowed into Latvia, particularly from those regions which had been devastated by the war. This created sanitary and epidemiological problems, particularly in those towns in which there were railroad hubs. Various types of typhoid fever, malaria, scarlet fever, diphtheria and other infectious diseases appeared (State Archives of Latvia, 1022/11/997).

The forced displacement of people in Latvia which was organised by the totalitarian regimes led to the loss

of a substantial proportion of the country's population – one-third in all, according to demographers (Eglīte and Mežs, 415). Latvia's ethnic composition also changed radically. The Germans and Jews were gone altogether, and the number of Latvians was much lower because of the war, repressions and emigration (Bleiere, et al, 2008, 414). There were also important and long-lasting indirect consequences – changes in life views and perceptions, extensive fear and hatred, and a lack of initiative, capability and self-esteem. The deficit in stability reduced the willingness of people to work, to feel a sense of belonging to their motherland, and to observe norms of morality.

### Displaced persons and émigrés in the West

A large Latvian diaspora was established in the West after World War II. The Red Cross has said that a total of some 130,000 Latvians migrated in this process, but there are no precise data about this. Initially most of the refugees lived in so-called displaced persons camps in Germany, while some found themselves in Austria, Belgium, Denmark and Sweden (Bleiere, et al, 2005, 383). Historian Modris Eksteins has written that in post-war Europe, «refugees were looked on as part of the rubble of war. Like the debris in the streets, the authorities wanted to get rid of this «human rubble» as quickly as possible» (Eksteins, 112). The Western allies did not recognise the incorporation of the Baltic States into the USSR, and so the residents of displaced person camps from Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania were given the choice of going home or remaining in the West. Most chose to stay because they feared Soviet repressions and punishment for collaborating with the Nazis. They also hoped to have a better life in the West (Judt, 47).

Work to close down the displaced persons camps began in 1947, and Latvians began to emigrate to Great Britain (17,000), the United States (45,000), Australia (20,000), Canada (19,000), South American countries (5,000), etc. Some 4,000 Latvians settled in Sweden, and 15,000 remained in Germany. Western countries which were facing labour shortages welcomed stateless people if they agreed to do physical work (Bleiere, et al., 2005, 383). In Britain, for instance, women were offered jobs at hospitals, homes, textile plants and viscose plants, while men found jobs in agriculture, mines, brick making facilities, factories and other places where heavy physical labour was necessary (McDowell, 104-105). During the first years of emigration, Latvians believed that the Soviet occupation would soon end and the Western countries would achieve their nation's liberation. These illusions, however, soon dissipated. As refugees moved to all parts of the world, their lifestyles changed, and new goals and everyday routine of life were established. Life in the West meant cardinal changes in lifestyles – changes in social and material status, use of foreign languages in social contacts and employment, and changes in profession (especially for those who had an education in the humanities, arts and social sectors, as well as those who had once worked for government institutions or



as lawyers). Many Latvian refugees became economic migrants, and they gradually adapted to the consumer lifestyle of the Western developed countries. People established homes in their new countries of residence, and that which they lost was replaced by that which they gained in terms of homes, work, education, Western welfare and everyday routines.

The Latvian diaspora in Western countries created a broad network of political and other organisations (churches, educational and cultural institutions, youth organisations, professional associations, student fraternities, etc.). These provided mutual support, opportunities to amortise social and cultural traumas, socialisation, the ability to establish a national identity, as well as the function of leisure. One of the most influential organisations was the Latvian Welfare Fund, which was established by prisoners of war in a camp in December 1945. Known as the «Hawks of the Daugava,» the organisation established a broad network of branches on several continents. There were also organisations to bring together Latvians in their new countries of residence. The Latvian National Council in Great Britain

was established in 1950, as was the Latvian National Association in Canada. The American Latvian Association was established in 1951, as were the Latvian Association in Australia and New Zealand and the European Centre of the Latvian Liberation Committee. The South American Latvian Association was established in 1971. In 1956, the national organisations which had been established came together in the World Association of Free Latvians. All of the organisations fought to restore Latvia's statehood and to ensure the survival of the Latvian nation (Bleiere, et al., 2005, 385; Veigners, 2009, 527-560).

Latvian communities in the West had active cultural programmes, because many of the emigrants came from the cultural and intellectual elite of Latvia. Several thousand books were published in Latvian, including fiction, encyclopaedias and academic research. There were many periodicals, theatrical performances and song festivals. Of particular importance for the émigré community was the newspaper *Laiks (Time)*, which was established by Helmārs Rudzītis along with a book publishing house, «Grāmatas Draugs» (Friend of the Book), which published Latvian literature. The

Box  
2.7

### The story of writer Agate Nesaule, 1995

«Gradually emigration opportunities opened up. England, Canada and Australia began admitting young single workers, mostly for jobs their own people did not want to do. Families were separated once again. My cousin Astrida, at age eighteen, went to Canada by herself, to work as maid. She married a young Latvian warehouse worker there a few months later. Except for her Canadian employers, no one else attended her wedding at the register office, and she went back to washing dishes and making beds the following morning. Another cousin left to work in the coal mines in England.

When the United States opened its doors, it was again only to the most desirable workers, that is, the young and vigorous, those unencumbered by children, illness and old people. Ūmīte [granny], who had finally rejoined our family, was not allowed to emigrate with us, since America would admit only one dependent per worker. Once more Ūmīte urged everyone to go, saying she had had her life. [...]

The future in the camps looked meaningless and bleak [...].

Actually, no one used the word «emigration». People spoke of «continued exile,» which was what going to America meant. Most Latvians longed to return to Latvia, they daydreamed about the time when Latvia would once more be free of Russian occupation, and they mourned leaving Europe for another continent because that made the return to Latvia less likely. To this day «exile» rather than «emigration» is the prevailing word in American Latvian communities. [...]

The tensions in the camps became close to unbearable. Having to separate from family and friends yet again was part of the anxiety, and so were the various tests that we were undergoing, most often without being told the results. Reading and math ability, teeth, eyes, ears, skin and bodily cavities were checked and checked again, and again. A dark spot on a lung or partial deafness in one ear meant the person was condemned to the camps forever.

«We treated our horses with more dignity,» said Captain Vilciņš. [...]

In groups and individually, we were asked whether we knew that the United States was a democracy and whether we approved of democracy. We were asked whether we were insane, homosexual, alcoholic, criminal or immoral.

«Are any of you prostitutes here?» the sober-faced official at the head of the table asked a room full of people. Andrejs, a boy in Beate's class, gave her and me such sharp nudge from behind that we exclaimed and jumped up startled, like eager volunteers. The official frowned at us, and my mother told us that we had disgraced ourselves. [...] Nothing about getting to America was a joking matter.»

Source: Nesaule, A. 1995. *A Woman in Amber: Healing the Trauma of War and Exile*. New York: Soho. P. 134-136.



cornerstone for the national consciousness and physical survival of Latvians in the West was culture, memories and narratives about the flourishing Latvian state.

Cultural contacts with Soviet Latvia began to emerge in the 1960s, and over the next several decades, increasing numbers of Latvians visited their relatives in Latvia (Bleiere, et al., 2005, 384-3888; McDowell, 168-194). A number of emigrants could boast of individual achievements and public recognition in their new countries of residence. Distinguished in their fields were engineer Jānis Upatnieks, chemist Andrejs Dravnieks, film cameraman Vilis Lapenieks, Jr., painter Jānis Annuss, Brigadier General Vilmārs Kukainis, geologist Aleksis Dreimanis, Baltic studies specialist Velta Rūķe-Draviņa, ballet dancer Jānis Piķeris, architect Gunārs Birkerts, astronomer Dainis Draviņš, psychologist Vaira Viķe-Freiberga, historian Andrejs Plakans, economist Juris Viksniņš, actress Laila Robiņa, javelin thrower Jānis Stendzenieks, swimmer Jānis Konrāds, judo master Teodors Boronovskis, discus thrower Juris Pūce, speed skater Silvija Burka, chess player Edmars Mednis, volleyball player Aldis Bērziņš, swimmer Mariona Aizpore, beauty queen Mārīte Ozere («Miss USA 1963»), and many others (Veigners, 2009, 527-560). There were also adventurous Latvians who became known for their eccentricities and their challenging of destiny – Edvards Liedskalniņš, who created the Coral Castle in Florida, crocodile hunter Arvīds Blūmentāls, and a few others (see Stavro; Blūmentāls and Ziedonis).

People in Latvia perceived Western compatriots as successful people who were living in a much better society, enjoyed greater material benefits, and had political freedoms, freedom of speech, and the ability to travel freely all around the world. For some people in Latvia, life outside of Latvia was seen as being much more valuable than staying in the motherland.

The Baltic Germans who departed from Latvia in 1939 also maintained an ethnic community and a sense of belonging to the Baltic States after World War II. In 1963, there were 42,800 Baltic Germans in West Germany, 10,200 in East Germany, and several thousand in the United States, Sweden and Australia. They set up several regional research, religious, cultural and historical research, welfare and sports organisations,

and they published a monthly journal, *Baltische Briefe*. As tensions between the West and the USSR eased, Baltic Germans, too, began to form cultural contacts with their motherland (Dribins and Spāritis, 78-79, 206-211).

When Latvia regained its independence, there were expectations that those Latvians who had become refugees at the end of World War II would return to Latvia. That did not happen, however, and only a few thousand Western Latvians moved to the country. There were several reasons for this. People who left Latvia in 1944/1945 as children or adolescents were too old to start life anew in a different country, while second and third-generation exiles had deep roots in the places where they were born, grew up, were educated, formed families and established careers. Since 1991, Western Latvians have had to redefine their collective and individual identity, because they are no longer exiles from a motherland that was annexed by a hostile regime (Plakans, 2011, 409-410).

### Migration in Soviet Latvia

The Soviet regime did not allow people to travel abroad freely, and very few people left for the West during the existence of Soviet Latvia. Emigration permits were given only to a few people, and mostly for purposes of rejoining families. There were those who sought to flee from Soviet Latvia. This was a very risky piece of business, because the Soviet border was very strictly guarded, and those who were caught were often sentenced to death by the Soviet authorities because of «treason against the motherland.» During the 1950s, several people successfully fled to Sweden in fishing boats. Between 1951 and 1953, five fishing ships fled to Sweden with their entire crews. There were others who tried to get abroad by hiding in the coal bunkers or drinking water reservoirs of ships. The size of the KGB unit in Soviet Latvia was increased in the late 1950s to prevent such escapes, and those who worked in fishing and the shipping industry were controlled much more strictly. There were some people who travelled to the West as tourists or on business and asked for political refuge. Among them were the physician and author Lilija Zariņa, mechanics professor Arturs Dumpis, television laboratory director Jānis Maulāns, and journalist and KGB officer

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2.8

### The story of Lina, born in 1931 and resident in the UK

«All those years you know – 50 years. I think to begin with for many years we were all waiting for the independence to come and to go back. And now, as the independence came so late, we're no longer planning to go back but we still feel as Latvian and now those people who take part in the Latvian community here, you know in the welfare work, all our funds go to Latvia now for education, for orphans, for big families, ill people or for pensions. So we send lots of funds over there now to help to rebuild the country. Also having a Latvia passport I feel I can take part in the elections. I feel that I want to be a part of that as well. I have always voted in Britain too, so it's a bit of both.»

Source: McDowell, L. 2005 *Hard Labour: The Forgotten Voices of Latvian Migrant Volunteer Workers*. London: UCL Press, p. 186.

Imants Lešinskis. As the number of people who fled abroad increased, the Soviet KGB prepared a list of the so-called traitors against the motherland in 1969 for internal use. The list that was published in 1979 had 89 refugees from Latvia, including 67 Latvians (Strods, 2008, 120-127). Most of those who fled during the Soviet period were not political dissidents or cultural workers. They simply took a practical approach to life and wanted to improve the welfare of their lives (Strods 2008a, 74).

Most emigrants from Latvia during the Soviet era were Jews. Their emigration from the USSR began in the late 1950s, when it first became possible to cross the country's border. Emigration increased after Israel's victory in the Six Day War and, particularly, after a trial in Leningrad in 1970 in which defendants were Jews who had allegedly tried to hijack an airplane to leave the country (Gitelyman, 234-235, 248-255). Several Jews from Riga were among them. The Soviet authorities hindered the emigration of Jews in many ways, rejecting visa requests, demanding money for rejecting Soviet citizenship, or demanding that would-be émigrés pay compensation for the cost of their education in the Soviet Union. Between 1968 and 1980, despite all of this, 13,153 Soviet Latvian Jews moved to Israel or the West – 35.8% of all of the Jews who lived in the Latvian SSR at that time. Another 16,000 Jews or so emigrated by 1989, mostly to Israel (Dribins, 2001, 144). The Soviet Union concluded agreements with other countries on working together to reunify families, and this allowed Poles and Germans from Latvia to emigrate, as well (Strods, 2008, 122).

Soviet Latvia was a popular destination for migrants from other Soviet republics because it was a westerly republic and provided a comparatively higher standard of living than was the case elsewhere in the USSR. The result of this was that migration to Latvia was massive. Between 1944 and 1949, some 400,000 people moved to the Latvian SSR from Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. Most were fleeing the destruction that had been caused by the war and the Soviet economy, and they were simply looking for better lives. Latvia was comparatively much less devastated than proximate areas of Russia were. Basically these people can be described as economic refugees. The result of all of this was that by the beginning of 1950, Soviet Latvia's population was bigger than it had been in

1940 – by 57,500 souls (Mežgailis and Zvidriņš, 81). Among many Latvians, the illegal arrival of all of these migrants during the post-war era and the fact that many of them took over the homes of people who had been deported strengthened ideas about the unlawful and amoral nature of the occupant regime (Ķīlis, 123-124).

During the 1970s and 1980s, migration represented two-thirds of population growth in Latvia. The first attempt to stem the tide occurred during the latter half of the 1950s, when the so-called National Communists attempted to do so. They failed, however, their movement was destroyed, and new waves of migration began. According to demographer Pēteris Zvidriņš, «there were periods of time during which the relative indicators of increased migration were among the highest in the world» (Zvidriņš, 210-2011). A total of four million people moved to Latvia between 1951 and 1990, while 1.82 million left the country. The overall migration balance during the Soviet occupation involved 941,000 people (Mežgailis, 12-13). The authorities of the regime explained that immigration was needed because of the constantly increasing need for workers and of the low natural growth rate in the population. Extensive development of industry meant a constant need for new workers. During the 1980s, those who arrived in the Latvian SSR came not just from other republics of the Soviet Union, but also from other countries entirely. Data show that on January 1, 1990, more than 2,300 foreign citizens were working in Latvia. Among them, there were 1,300 Polish citizens who worked in the construction field (mostly in terms of restoration work done in Old Riga), 800 citizens of Vietnam (the light manufacturing industries and the wood processing sector), 150 citizens of Yugoslavia (reconstructing a factory in Zaslauks), and 80 citizens of Finland (reconstructing the Riga Dairy Plant) (Krūmiņš, 40).

There were several causes for major migration: 1) Soviet policies aimed at Sovietising Latvia and ensuring that it was closely linked to the USSR by using migrants; 2) Forced «Socialist industrialisation» which was an extensive process and required an endless new supply of workers; 3) Many military institutions from which demobilised military personnel remained in Latvia, with officers relieved of their duty from the Red Army being

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2.9

### The thoughts of fisherman Kārlis Strazds, who fled from Latvia to Sweden in June 1952

«I had not thought about or prepared for fleeing to Sweden, but when I saw the big difference between the two countries that were so close to one another, I felt that I had won. I won not just in material terms by achieving incomparably better living conditions, but also, and mostly, in terms of gaining freedom. There are no spies here at work, in restaurants and on the streets. Here the government does bug phone calls or monitor those with whom you meet. I can speak and act freely, I can join any political movement I wish, and I can travel around to see the world. My comrades with whom I escaped to Sweden are also more than satisfied with this shift in life.»

Source: Strazds, K. 2008. *Es nāku no dzimtenes. Latvija 1945–1952*. Rīga: Daugava. P. 236.

allowed to remain for life in Riga and other cities; 4) Initial living space created by the death of people during World War II, by the repressions which were organised by the Soviets and the Nazis, and by the flow of refugees to the West; 5) Historical traditions of ethnic tolerance and co-existence (Bleiere, et al., 2005, 378). Sociological studies conducted in the 1970s show that the main reason why people of working age wanted to move to Latvia was that they wanted better living conditions, wanted jobs in their area of specialisation, and knew that Latvia was better supplied with consumer goods (Riekstiņš, 2004, 9).

The percentage of Latvians in the republic's population shrank because of migration – to a level of just 52.04% at the end of the occupation. There were fears in advance of the restoration of Latvia's independence that ethnic Latvians might become a minority in their own country. The great influx of Russian speakers also weakened the positions of the Latvian language, with Russian dominating in governance, the public arena and many workplaces. The policies of the Latvian SSR were ones which allowed immigrants to improve their living conditions and to receive new and

well-appointed flats in a comparatively short period of time. A 1989 census showed that 69% of families which had lived in Latvia for less than five years already had individual flats (all in all, 79% of families had such flats), while only 57% of Latvian families lived in individual apartments. This meant social discrimination against Latvians (Blūzma, 239). Demographer Pārsla Eglīte has written that «most of the colonists who were sent in by the totalitarian regime and who received economic support from that regime [...] could feel that they could dictate terms and ignore the local language, habits and morals. Under such circumstances, the relationship between Latvians and non-Latvians was not a relationship between two nations with equal rights; instead, it was a relationship between conquerors and those who were subordinate to them. This created the foundations for a society with two different communities, and it also created fertile soil for those who wish to provoke ethnic tensions» (Eglīte, 2003, 263). One of the most important public issues during the era of *perestroika* in Latvia was the need to halt the endless torrent of migrants. In 1989, the government of the

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2.10

### Migration in the Latvian SSR

(,000 individuals)

Years	Immigration	Emigration	Migration balance
1944/45-1950			~440
1951-1960	639.9	459.8	180.0
1961-1970	476.9	335.9	141.1
1971-1980	548.6	428.2	120.4
1981-1990	506.6	423.9	82.6

Source: Central Statistic Board of Latvia

Box  
2.11

### A declaration from the Soviet Latvian State Planning Committee to the Council of Ministers of the Latvian SSR on the consequences of halting migration. February 1, 1989

«Among the possible consequences of a halt to the mechanical increase in the number of residents in the Latvian SSR, according to some of the ministries and institutions in our republic, include harsher problems with labour shortages, which supposedly will lead to a decrease in manufacturing output, including in the area of consumer goods, to a lack of capital investments in construction organisations, etc. [...]

Unlimited migration did not ensure the much more complete provision of consumer goods to local residents and did not ensure the construction of sufficient numbers of social infrastructure objects, first of all in terms of housing. Thus, for example, the city of Riga still has not returned to the pre-war level when it comes to the amount of housing floor space per resident of the city.

Given all of this, we believe that a focus on attracting an uninterrupted and unlimited flow of workers does not promote the positive resolution of problems related to socioeconomic development; on the contrary, it reduces the interest of companies and organisations in intensifying manufacturing and in implementing the achievements of scientific and technical progress.»

Source: Riekstiņš, J. (ed.) 2004. Migranti Latvijā. 1944–1989. Dokumenti. Rīga: Latvijas Valsts arhīvs. P. 72-73.

Latvian SSR approved a plan to interrupt the unjustified increase in migration (Riekstiņš, 2004, 74-80).

There was also active migration of people within the boundaries of the Latvian SSR during the Soviet period. This was because the Soviet regime confiscated land and homes, there were new models for the economy and for the labour force, and people had weaker links to their birthplace and community. Many moved house to avoid Soviet repressions. Urbanisation led people to move from the countryside to cities and towns. At the end of the Soviet era, 69% of the republic's residents lived in urban areas (Bleiere, 2005, 382).

Fairly few Latvians voluntarily moved beyond the borders of their republic. A 1959 census in the Soviet Union found that 7.3% of Latvians were living outside of Latvia. By 1989, the percentage was down to 4.9% (Kabuzan, 131). Among those who left their motherland for a certain period of time were those who took part in compulsory military service in the Soviet armed forces, young people studying at universities in Moscow, Leningrad and elsewhere, as well as those young people who took part in the process of «conquering untouched territories» or of working for Komsomol «construction shock groups.» Data show that people most often moved to Moscow, the Krasnoyarsk District, the Irkutsk District and the Tyumen District. There were also those who pursued their professional careers in the Russian SSR and

other Soviet republics – singer Irma Jaunzeme, conductor Arvīds Jansons, ballet dancer Māris Liepa, chess player Arvīds Ģipslis, etc. (Veigners, 2009, a 568-579).

When the Soviet Union collapsed, the relevant migration processes ground to a halt, and an entirely new phase began in Latvia's migration history.

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The history of migration in Latvia has been a dramatic process – one which has had an effect on the identity of the country's residents. Emigration to the West was seen as a positive phenomenon thanks to the comparatively higher level of welfare among those who went into exile, and this produced ever new illusions about welfare and achievements in the West. The great political and military cataclysms of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, however, established and maintained a sense of insecurity about Latvia, as did the forced displacement of people at the hands of the two totalitarian regimes and the migration policies of the Soviet Union. Many people did not believe that Latvia could ever be a country with an acceptable level of welfare. The sense of belonging to Latvia relates to a stable and secure country and/or to a country which has become fragile over the course of history. This facilitates decisions among people to leave the country so as to achieve welfare and stability as quickly as possible.

Box  
2.12

## Main conclusions. Main missions

### Main conclusions

The people of Latvia have voluntarily or involuntarily left their country over the past centuries because of political economic instability, as well as because of the system implemented by totalitarian regimes. For a long time, Latvia has been a country which has been unable to guarantee security, inviolability of private property, observation of human rights and stable cultural values for its residents.

### Main missions

If the aim is to reduce the desire of local residents to emigrate, there must be policies which will convince people that Latvian can ensure sustainable security, as well as political, economic and cultural stability – something which will enhance their trust in the Latvian state.

## 2.2. Emigration and Identity

Rapid political and economic changes in the wake of the restoration of Latvia's independence were followed by economic restructuring, structural unemployment, as well as a rapid decline in income for the majority of the country's residents. These factors have served to encourage economic emigration to a very substantial degree. The flow of migrants was enhanced by Latvia's accession to the European Union (EU) in 2004. At that time, the citizens of Latvia became citizens of the EU, and they won the opportunity to look for jobs in other EU member states.<sup>1</sup> Rapid economic growth after Latvia's accession to the EU reduced emigration, but only until 2008, when an economic decline began and many local residents decided to move away from the country. There are no official data about the scope of emigration, but the latest calculations indicate that in 2009 and 2010, approximately 30,000 people left Latvia each year to find work elsewhere.<sup>2</sup> A World Bank report on remittances paid to countries of origin in 2011 indicated that 12.2% of all of Latvia's residents were living abroad – 272,400 people in all. The World Bank said that they send USD 643 million a year to Latvia, adding that this is of importance for the country's economic development (World Bank, 2011, 158).

The increasing flow of emigration and the fact that demographic forecasts are not favourable in terms of Latvia's development mean that it is important to study the sense of belonging which emerges among emigrants. The sense of belonging to their host country and their country of origin will have much to do with the future choices of Latvian residents – returning to their motherland or remaining in emigration. How does emigration change the relationship between individuals and their countries of origin? Analysis of emigration processes and studies of identity at the level of individuals help to answer such questions. Studies of how a sense of belonging emerges make it possible to

understand more deeply the changes which occur in a society that is dynamic and mutable.

Professor Ulf Hedetoft at Copenhagen University has pointed to four aspects in analysing identity – the ones which reveal a multidimensional view of how a sense of belonging emerges: (i) The source of belonging; (ii) The sense of belonging which comes from a sense of socio-psychological well being, social memory, and a sense of belonging to a specific location; (iii) The structuring and institutionalisation of belonging; (iv) The mutable nature of belonging (Hedetoft, 2004, 24-25). Hedetoft argues that all of these aspects are important in the establishment and strengthening of belonging. For instance, the source of belonging is closely linked to a feeling of belonging, whether it is positive or negative. The emergence of a strong sense of belonging often serves as a reason for wanting to strengthen that belonging by institutionalising it – obtaining citizenship, for instance. At the same time, however, belonging can be mutable and situative, as well as dependent on changing circumstances and competition with other identities.

Life in Latvia and emigration can both be seen as sources for the emergence of an identity. One's living space, as a source of belonging, is multi-dimensional, because it has everything to do with why the individual emigrated, the experiences which the individual has, and prospects and opportunities in the specific place and the host country. Most studies which have been focused on the reasons and decisions of emigration have been linked primarily to the issue of socioeconomic circumstances. In Latvia's case, however, emigration has been linked to broader changes in the post-Soviet Latvia and its society, as well as with the emotions which these changes have brought about. People decided to emigrate at a time when the Latvian economy was being restructured from a planned socialist economy to a market economy. This meant that individual welfare depended on the situation which people had in the labour market and their ability to consume goods and services, as well as, on the contrary, the ability to be in demand in the market because of the individual's skills, talents and knowledge. And yet the trends of economic development in Latvia over the past few decades have led to radical differences in the development of urban centres and the country's regions, as well as increasing inequality and poverty in society. This has substantially hindered the ability of people to do things which can ensure their welfare under new socio-economic circumstances, and in many cases this has caused disappointment in that which is happening in Latvia. Under such circumstances, a decision to emigrate has increasingly often been based on a growing sense of

<sup>1</sup> The agreement on the accession to the EU of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Hungary stated that the old EU member states were allowed to set out a transition period before they would open their labour markets to citizens from the new member states. Ireland, Great Britain and Sweden opened their labour markets on May 1, 2004. Spain, Portugal, Finland and Greece followed on May 1, 2006, Italy opened its market on July 27, 2006, the Netherlands did so on May 1, 2007, Luxembourg followed suit on November 1, 2007, France opened its market on July 1, 2008, and Germany did the same on May 1, 2011.

<sup>2</sup> See Hugh, E. «Latvia: The Demographic Price of Procrastination», 28 July 2010. See <http://www.creditwritedowns.com/2010/07/latvia-the-demographic-price-of-procrastination.html>.



responsibility toward oneself and one's loved ones at a time when reliance on the state in terms of ensuring the necessary level of welfare has not yielded the expected result.

Although the lives of Latvian émigrés are linked to life in Latvia in certain respects, they also tend to have closer links to their new host country. Latvian migration researcher Aija Lulle has studied Latvian émigrés on the island of Guernsey, and she has argued that in terms of their everyday thinking, émigrés see Latvia and their new host country alongside one another, and both countries determine the way in which individuals see themselves (Lulle, 2010). New forms of belonging among émigrés emerged via interaction among memories, future plans, experiences, feelings and opportunities when living in Latvia and in the new host country. Stories told by émigrés in Ireland and England point to this interaction very vividly, indeed, because new forms of belonging in emigration emerge both directly and indirectly, comparing living situations in the new host country to those back home in Latvia. The stories told by émigrés reveal several dichotomies upon which new forms of belonging in emigration are based.

## Dichotomies of new forms of belonging

The dichotomies of new forms of belonging include two mutually exclusive social phenomena which are seen as being thematically important in the narratives of émigrés when they talk about their decision to emigrate. These narratives are related to decisions about emigrating and returning home, as well as to the context for such decisions – life in Latvia and the new host country. In conceptual terms, these dichotomies exclude one another, but in reality, both opposite poles often work alongside one another. In this case, dichotomies are ideal types. The positive side of dichotomies is essential for the welfare of individuals, but the stories which émigrés tell reveal this side as incomplete and non-existent when living in Latvia. All of the dichotomies – social justice/injustice, trust/distrust, opportunities/limitations to be a consumer, the state's care/lack of care for its residents, security/insecurity, instrumentality/emotionality, the fatherland as a piece of land or the state – must be viewed in tandem, because they often influence one another.

### Social justice/injustice

Social injustice and, particularly, distributive justice or just distribution of benefits among the residents of a country or a community – these refer to one of the dichotomies which are important when one thinks about the emergence of new forms of belonging among émigrés. One of the principles of justice defined by the American political philosopher John Rawls states that all members of a society which is characterised by social and economic inequality must have better opportunities which can be achieved. The dominance of market principles in various areas of public life in Latvia since

the restoration of its independence has had a serious effect on social justice, because it has created polarisation between the winners and the losers in this process (Smith, Stenning, Willis, 2008, 1). Stories from émigrés show that life under Latvia's socio-economic conditions led them to feel like losers, while lives in new host countries allow them to feel equal with other residents of the relevant country. Professor Loretta Capeheart and Professor Dragan Milovanovic from Northeastern Illinois University have argued that when there are constant limitations on social justice, the value of social justice is denigrated in society, and this, in turn, means to a certain extent that the development of the people is denied, there are motivations to oppose the situation as such (Capeheart and Milovanovic, 2007, 4). People feel internal conflicts which lead them to be dissatisfied with themselves; they find it necessary to seek belonging in a situation which supports the existence of the self which is not in conflict with itself. This internal conflict is reflected in the stories which émigrés tell:

«The Saeima has the beautiful statement that the law is meant for everyone, but why are some people more equal than others? There are those who imagine that they can ignore rules about the sand dune zone, and I don't know whether those of us who lived for 50 years under the Communist regime have seen nothing and find that all of a sudden we have to grab everything. I don't know what the situation is in other countries, but the situation in ours is completely absurd. It is uncontrollable. First of all, people have no financial means, they cannot become rich in a single day. I, for instance, support those people who earn a living with their brain and their inventions.» (Female, 48, five months in England)

«If I could earn as much money as I earn here, then I would go home, but I cannot earn as much money in Latvia as I do here. In that case I would have to be... Typically, there are gaps in all things in Latvia. If you don't know anyone, you will not get anywhere, and that annoys me. Here there are open competitions for jobs – you go and fight, and then you get somewhere, right? That is what I lacked in Latvia.» (Female, 29, five years in England)

The experience of émigrés in new host countries has created the feeling that they see extensive and equal opportunities with local residents in terms of achieving better life opportunities in various areas of public life such as employment and education.

### Trust/distrust

The statements made by émigrés include an explicit discourse of distrust. This is seen in contacts with fellow residents and civil servants in Latvia, as well as in terms of attitudes toward Latvia as such. Distrust in the state is often explained as a legacy from the Soviet era, but researchers have also pointed to the links between

economic equality and trust, as well as between the effectiveness of institutions and trust (Kornai, Rothstein, Rose-Ackerman, 2005, 5). The stories told by respondents indirectly indicate that equality and social justice are more visible in the new host country, and that promotes trust in that country. Respondents in England, for instance, say that there is greater justice in tax policies and the health care system, communications between residents and civil servants are orderly, and that helps to establish mutual trust. The statements from the émigrés show that relationships which are full of trust at various levels of social life are important when establishing new forms of belonging:

«For some reason, we always want to blame someone, mostly blame our government, because the overall impression is that they only think about themselves, their position and their pockets, not about the mortal people of the country. That is my impression. It used to be my impression, and it is still my impression. They have not changed, but exactly the opposite situation exists here – they think about the people and not about their seats or their pockets. That is my impression.» (Female, 48, five months in England)

«On the TVNET portal, there is a headline to show that MPs believe that public transportation tickets cost 20 santims. How are you supposed to trust such people if the price has been different for such a long time? How on earth can you believe in all of that?!» (Female, 27, 1.5 months in England)

«There have been various offers – ring or send mail [an official letter to a civil servant in England]. It is not hopelessly lost. In Latvia, it seems that it is lost. The only way to achieve something is to meet eye-to-eye and insist on a meeting. Here [in England], you get a letter which says that they received your documents, and it will take two, three or four weeks to respond. If no response is received in four weeks, then please ring this number. The letters do not disappear. In Latvia, I think, someone just sticks the letter in a desk drawer.» (Male, 34, 1.5 years in England)

«When it comes to work, for instance, I get a new job, there is a Latvian who is already working there, he does not see you as a compatriot, he bosses you around in terms of what you are supposed to do, and it gets almost to the point of cursing. Latvians are not the very best people.» (Male, 51, three years in England)

### Opportunities/limitations on being a consumer

Opportunities to consume products and receive services not just for entertainment and leisure, but also for vital everyday needs are one reason why people are positive about their lives in the new host countries. In Latvia, the freedom of an individual as a consumer under free market conditions is often limited very substantially because of low wages, unemployment, comparatively

high costs of living. At the same time, the new neo-liberal market economy that was developed in Latvia after the collapse of the Soviet Union involves the idea that individuals themselves must choose how to provide for themselves and their families. Residents of the country are expected to be consumers who consume goods and services, as opposed to citizens who have the right to a specific level of state aid (Nash, 2010, 142). Sociology Professor George Ritzer at the University of Maryland has made reference to the ideas of the Polish sociologist Zygmunt Bauman and has emphasized the concept of the «dangerous consumer». The point is that a person or a group is dangerous if there is insufficient consumption, thus endangering the consumer society (Ritzer, Goodman, 2001, 410). This seal of a «dangerous consumer» creates a certain amount of tension among those individuals who lack the resources that are needed to become a fully valuable participant in the market. The limitations do not, however, reduce the desire among individuals to obtain the goods and services that are offered in the market. In other words, people want to be part of the consumer culture. Wages in those countries to which people have emigrated allow them to be a part of the consumer culture. Among Latvian émigrés, that is an important factor in deciding to move abroad:

«Of course, that is what happened – it was a mass process [of lending]. Perhaps you do not believe in it and are shaken up by it, but you visit someone or meet with friends or acquaintances and tell them about what you bought yesterday. You tell them that you took out a loan, so there are no problems. Maybe I can do the same thing? At the end of the day, of course, you have only yourself to blame.» (Male, 34 years, 1.5 years in England)

«Let's say that I go to the store and see something that I can buy. It is not the same as in Latvia, where you look at the thing, you drool about it a little bit, and then you turn around and leave. And if I allow myself to buy something in that system, then I will go hungry for the entire month. That's not the case here.» (Female, 48, five years in England)

«The wage, of course, is the main thing. Even the minimum wage here in England is four times higher than in Latvia. Even if you earn the minimum wage, you can afford a lot more here than you could with Latvia's minimum wage.» (Male, 27, 1.5 months in England)

### A state which cares for people/A state which does not care

50 years of experience with Socialism still affects the views of society and individuals to a certain extent in terms of what the relations between a state and its citizens should be. Professor Juris Dreifelds at Brock University, when writing about Latvia, has argued that it is very difficult in a short period of time to change the «dependency on the caretaker state» (Dreifelds, 1996),

and instead accept a new situation which speaks to an individual's autonomous responsibility for himself or herself. The newly obtained freedoms have been unknown in everyday practice, and they speak to excessive individual responsibility. On the one hand, society appears not to be ready for this and expects greater support and care from the state when it comes to people. On the other hand, the fact of emigration shows that people have undertaken such «responsibility» and that they have accepted a certain level of autonomy and the ability to change things in terms of their situation and their welfare (Kešāne, 2011). Although there are evident signs of autonomy in the behaviour of individuals, the stories told by respondents include certain nostalgia for a country which cares for its citizens, as opposed to leaving them alone under market circumstances and competition. The new host country, according to respondents, fulfils the function of the caretaker state:

«The first thing is that my children have an ensured life and future. That is the basic reason why we are here. It is the basic reason why I am here, because I have five kids to think about. That is the foundation. I saw how much social institutions are forthcoming toward children and families here. Take the doctor, for instance, or the dentist – when a child is treated, you do not have to pay anything. Because I have children, I have an NHS card for the doctor. Operations are free, repair of my teeth is free, I get all kinds of help.» (Female, 48, five years in London)

«I came here to work, I have a job, and I do not look at the situation with much more depth. Damn it, I came to another country, and they can give me something [work in this case] which Latvia cannot provide; what else can I desire, how can I say that maybe something irritates me here.» (Male, 34, 1.5 years in England)

The desire among émigrés for the 'helping hand' of national and local governments is even seen in stories about everyday situations such as the need to put up street signs so as to make it easier for people to make their way around:

«Yes, it seems that London is even larger, but when I come to Rīga, I cannot understand in which direction I am supposed to go. Here the transport system is different. You take a map, you find out where you live, and off you go, because it's clear where things are. It's immediately clear. In Rīga, I'm always in a state of chaos. I don't know in which direction I'm supposed to go or where things are.» (Female, 48, five years in England).

The stories of respondents show that in the formation of new forms of belonging towards the state this feeling that besides individual's self responsibility over oneself there is also responsibility of the state towards its citizens is pretty important.

## Security/insecurity

Consequential of the previous dichotomy is the dichotomy which emphasizes significance of the security/insecurity dialectics in the quest for the new forms of belonging. The life in the new host country provides both economic and social security which in Latvia in general or at the time of migration decision seemed to be lacking. Observations, experience and feelings of respondents, when living in the host country, seems to guarantee the state of security and stability in the long term perspective:

«I wouldn't say that I really like it here, not at all. So why are you here?

I think that it's because of the stability which is here. I think that if it disappears, then things will change.» (Female, 39 seven years in England)

«I believe that the thing that is most missing in Latvia is a sense of security. You can fight and fight, and if you see that there is meaning to what you are doing, then there is a result, but if you don't see that meaning and have a family, then it is terrible. If you have a family, then you all but end up in depression. It's dreadful.» (Female, 27, 1.5 months in England)

Interestingly, there are respondents who compare this feeling of safety, provided by the host country's economic situation and particularly its national economy structure, with the life in the Soviet times. Among respondents this feeling of security is created by the awareness that there are many enterprises or factories at which each family member can find a job:

«Yes, but there are opportunities, opportunities. You perhaps have to wait for three or four weeks. The seasons of the year are also important, but there are opportunities. All that you have to do is want to work, but I can almost say that I feel a sense of guarantees of the same type [in England] that existed back then [in Soviet times]. Mama had a job, so did dad.» (Male, 34, 1.5 years in England)

## Instrumentality/emotions

In writing about the emergence of identities among émigrés, the Greek socio-anthropologist Ioanna Laliotou has argued that of essence in this is the meaning of feelings, desires and imagination, because the agency of the individual is not just rational (Laliotou, 2004, 9). In the beginning it is mentioned that emotions have an important role in the formation of new forms of belonging for each of the dichotomies. By underlining this dichotomy emotions are emphasized as a separate analytical category. Firstly, emotions are meaningful in the stories of respondents, since they mirror disappointment and sadness related to the exit from Latvia:

«I think that Latvia is very beautiful. [...] Not as a state, yes. I would say that I had never thought that

we would be forced to leave our country in this way. [...] For a long time I was such a patriot of Latvia. I didn't want to leave even though my friends were calling me to come to Dublin when times were still good there. Eventually, though, I got sick of the situation. [...] It's a painful issue, because I never imagined that I might go to England to clean hotel rooms [begins to weep].» (Female, 48 years, five months in England)

Secondly, emotions in the decision to leave and return unfold as an opposite to instrumentality. In the narratives of emigrants, when making a decision about the place to live, often instrumental thinking prevails over the emotional one. Important role in this decision is given to such existential issues as work, income and social guarantees:

«It's hard to say whether you want it or not, you want to go visiting, but the primary thing is to have something to eat and somewhere to sleep. Having something to eat is the primary thing, right? What can you do? You have love for your motherland, but if there is nothing to eat at home, then that is not good. Whether you want it or not, I don't know – I suppose that the disappointment is so great. If someone were to tell me that [...] the road back would not be fast or easy... I don't know what guarantees and promises would be needed to get me to run right back home. I don't know.» (Male, 34, 1.5 years in England)

These statements are in line with observations from other researchers to say that links of belonging are different in qualitative terms when speaking about a host country and a country of origin (Gustafson, 2005). People usually form a sense of belonging in their host country on the basis of instrumental or practical considerations, while the sense of belonging toward the country of origin is more based on emotions (Gustafson, 2005, 7). Nevertheless, it does not mean that with respect to the country of origin just emotional ties develop, though they certainly dominate over instrumental ties. Opposite situation develops with respect to the relationship with the new host country. It is of importance to note that influence of emigration over belonging is not symmetrical, meaning that weakening of belonging towards the country of origin does not necessarily multiply belonging towards the host country, since both belongings are qualitatively different.

The things said by some respondents indirectly reveal that practical considerations about emigration eventually reduce the importance of emotional attitudes toward the country of origin if emigration actually occurs:

«The first time I flew to Latvia was after eight months or so. [...] When I got out of the plane, I breathed the air as I had never done before in my life. I felt that the air was so very fresh. I had tears in my eyes, you see, a very peculiar feeling. That was only the first time, though. Now, however, I have been in Latvia, I was there in the autumn, but then I came

back, got out of the plane and thought 'Wow, I'm home. How nice!'» (Female, 48, five years in England)

«Of course, they [the respondent's children, who now live in England] come to visit, and everything seems peachy, but then you sit down and think about coming home and finding that you don't have any milk or bread, you had nothing, and then you decide that at the very end of the day, it is better here. Still, it is nice to go for a visit.» (Female, 48, five years in England).

### A country/the state

The country/state dichotomy emphasizing the belonging to a particular country or a particular state in the formation of new identities is closely related to the instrumentality/emotions dichotomy. Emigree narratives often reveal longing after Latvia as a country with clean and beautiful nature as well as longing after activities rooted in Latvia's nature. Belonging to the new host country, in contrast, is related to the socio-economic situation of the host country:

«Life here is a life of work. There is not much relaxation here. In Latvia you have the Summer Solstice. The environment is better, the water is cleaner. Here everyone swims in swimming pools. If you go to swim in the river, people wonder who the person is who is swimming in the river. Here I think that when you get out of the water, you break out in a rash. There [in Latvia], everything is cleaner. People pump sap out of trees for juice in the spring, for instance. I asked a British person why they don't do that, and he said that it was a 'dirty' process. I asked: 'What's dirty about it? It cleans you from the inside, it ferments and is wonderful.' No, they just buy some lemonade, and they're not interested in drawing sap from a tree.» (Male, 51, three years in England)

«I think that Latvia is very beautiful.  
*You mean as a piece of land?*

No, as a country. I tell you, I had never thought that we would be forced to leave our own country in this way.» (Female, 48, five months in England)

«You know what I miss from Latvia? The forest! I miss my flowerbeds at home. [...] I love flowers, and it is hard for me to live without land.» (Female, 48, five years in England)

## Institutionalisation of belonging

### Citizenship

It may seem that the flow of labour force out of Latvia is a new phenomenon, and so it is too early to talk about the institutionalisation of new senses of belonging. However, émigrés who have become citizens of their new host country say things to show that institutionalisation of belonging is already happening, and it is largely linked to

the sense of belonging and to the dimension of emotions on the one hand, but also practical considerations on the other. Residency status and citizenship status in the new host country are related to a greater sense of stability and security; for example, citizenship in the new host country gives the émigré the same rights and freedoms as local residents have, and that means broader opportunities in various areas of public life. The stories of émigrés also show, however, that it is not easy to give up Latvian citizenship, and that has more to do with the dimension of emotions, while the sense of belonging in the new country of residence has more to do with the instrumental dimension (Gustafson, 2005).

«The last dilemma was very, very difficult – I had to go and turn in my Latvian passport. In psychological terms it was a bit difficult when I first decided that I would seek [British] citizenship and sent in the application form. I was very convinced in all of that, but when I had to take the oath of citizenship, I started to think. Perhaps that would not be the case if Latvia were to permit double citizenship. Of course, that would be the case. Or maybe it would not be the case, because if you have lived here for a long time, then you think about guarantees of some kind, about everything else. [...] I surely do not want to find myself in a situation in which one fine day someone tells me thank you, you need a visa now or you have to go home.» (Female, 39, seven years in England)

«We are permanent residents, everything is open for us here, and the only question is about getting a British passport. We'll think about it. If you change jobs, if you want a more prestigious place to work, then all the doors are open if you are a permanent resident. If not, then people look at you oddly.» (Female, 49, five years in England)

Professor Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal, a social sciences specialist at Harvard, has argued that in the global world of the present day, senses of belonging relate to human rights and various civil rights (see Delanty, 2001). At the same time, however, the statements and experience of émigrés show that the decision related to achieving citizenship or permanent residency in a new country of residence means making a choice between two qualitatively different things – emotions and practical or instrumental considerations. On the one hand, people can be longing for their motherland, for people with a similar mentality, for Latvia's environment and for their homes. On the other hand, when people choose to institutionalise their sense of belonging in the new host country, preference is given to practical considerations.

### Culture and language

Institutionalisation of belonging often relates to various cultural activities such as choir singing, folk dancing and holiday celebrations. It is evident that émigrés are engaging in cultural activities that are

typical of Latvia, but this is something which émigrés discuss quite seldom. They also say that comparatively few people are interested in getting involved in such activities. There are émigré organisations in Great Britain and Ireland which organise various cultural and entertainment events such as choir singing, folk dancing, and theatrical performances. It is not clear, however, whether the desire to sing in a choir or to dance folk dances relates to a desire to preserve a Latvian identity, as opposed to the individual's simple desire to sing and dance or to meet and make friends with others who have the same interests.

«Yes, we have a choir at our Latvian organisation, as well as the folk dance ensemble *Jampadracis*. We are establishing a theatrical troupe, though only two people have signed up so far. As I said, it is hard for Latvians to do things together, they prefer to hide in their own little caves.» (Female, 34, seven years in Ireland)

«Everything is in place here in Ireland, everything seems to be happening. The unique element of national pride is Riverdance, there are all kinds of concerts and exhibitions. [...] I miss Latvian things, though. In Latvia I cared nothing for folklore and folk songs, but here I have become a Latvian. [...] I think that I have become a Latvian here, and I need to get back to Latvia.» (Female, 34, seven years in Ireland)

Opportunities for the children of émigrés to receive an education in their native language is also a way to maintain a sense of belonging toward Latvia on the basis of the Latvian language. There are Latvian schools both in Ireland and in England to which parents can send their kids a few times a month to strengthen Latvian language skills and to learn about Latvian culture and traditions. The statements from émigrés, however, show that not all parents are familiar with these opportunities. There are also those who are not interested in sending their children to Latvian schools while abroad.

«There are Russian schools [in London], but no Latvian ones. There are such schools in Ireland, yes, but not in England. Sometimes we agree to have children write a little essay so that there is at least something in all of this. It's easier for him to speak English than Latvian. I don't feel it myself, but when we were in Latvia, people said that he speaks with an accent.» (Female, 48, five years in England)

## Conclusion

There are different explanations of the content of national identity in the scholarly literature. In the introduction to this publication, it was noted that researchers differentiate various dimensions of national identity – the psychological, cultural, ethnic, historical, territorial, political, legal and economic dimension (see, e.g., Smith 1991, 15; Guibernau, 2007). When analyzing



emigration as a source of belonging in the framework of dichotomies it can be seen that identity, on the one hand, is closely related to the dimension of feelings, emotions and psychological factors, but, on the other hand, with the civic and economic dimension, where the latter also has an influence over the formers. Emotional belonging also is often expressed as a series of negative associations with Latvia, because the socioeconomic limitations which people felt there left them with a sense of resentment and humiliation. Opportunities to be an economically active citizen, to provide for the self and to prove oneself and a sense that in the case of need the caring hand of the state will be present are important factors which determine in which country to be. Professor Nikolas Rose and Professor Peter Miller from the London School of Economics and Political Science have written that «transformation in identity should not be studied at the level of culture, or solely in terms of the history of ideas about the self. A genealogy of identity must address the practices that act upon human beings and human conduct in specific domains of existence, and the systems of thoughts that underpin these practices and are embodied within them» (Rose, Miller, 2008, 174). Also new neoliberal order or market orthodoxy, which has developed in Latvia after the collapse of the Soviet union carries the idea that an individual is responsible for oneself in various areas of life, including labor market. As noted in the introduction, a conference held in Riga in 1998 to discuss the political nation and ethnic policies focused on the importance and role of an *active* and *responsible* citizen in the functioning of a democratic

country. However, the socioeconomic circumstances as defined by the chosen path of the political economy of Latvia has been limiting to the agency of an individual in order to support the idea of self-responsible individual, while emigration has been a way to enforce this self-responsibility (Ķešāne, 2011).

All of the elements which appear in dichotomies as important circumstances for the establishment of a new sense of belonging – social justice/injustice, trust/distrust, opportunities/limitations to be a consumer, the state's care/lack of care for its residents, security/insecurity, instrumentality/emotionality, a country/ the state – demonstrate the social and economic dimension as an important component in belonging to a state. This is very important in the context of Latvia's development as a state and a nation. At the same time, however, public discourse in Latvia often names history, culture and language, as opposed to welfare, as the most important elements in the shaping of national identity. Statements among émigrés show very clearly that these elements are not enough to strengthen a sense of belonging to Latvia to the point where émigrés become convinced that they must return to the country. Without a powerful social, economic and civil dimension, national identity cannot be competitive with other identities that are available in our globalised world – those which determine the mutability of belonging and identity. If the abilities of the individual are not systematically limited and if the individual has welfare, feels secure and stable and is needed in the community, then the individual wants to belong to that community and assist in its growth.

Box  
2.13

### Major conclusions. Major tasks

#### Major conclusions

Without a powerful social, economic and civil dimension, national identity cannot be competitive with other identities that are available in our globalised world – those which determine the mutability of belonging and identity. If the abilities of the individual are not systematically limited and if the individual has welfare, feels secure and stable and is needed in the community, then the individual wants to belong to that community and assist in its growth.

#### Major tasks

There must be powerful discourse in the public arena about the positive experience of émigrés who return home and about opportunities to ensure welfare in life here in Latvia.

At the level of national policy, there must be a competitive educational system which is harmonised with the main directions of economic development in the country, thus motivating young people to live, learn and work in Latvia.

Those who shape and implement economic, welfare-related and social policies must take into account the principles of political responsibility and legal confidence, as this is a key prerequisite for establishing or renewing public trust in the political system, also facilitating civic participation and a stronger sense of belonging to the state.

## 2.3. The changing face of Latvian emigration, 2000-2010<sup>1</sup>

### Introduction

In a historical perspective, a decade is very brief. However, the patterns of selection of the Baltic emigrants have changed several times during the first decade of the 21st century. These changes concern the main reasons for emigration, the most popular destinations, as well as the profile of emigrants and their plans.

Starting with 2005 and especially with 2009, the number of emigrants reached such a level which puts under threat reproduction of Latvian population, economic development and sustainability of the social security system. Thus, notwithstanding some positive side effects of emigration, it has become a serious obstacle to the human development in Latvia.

This section begins with a brief description of the history of emigration trends shaped by development of economic and institutional factors in Latvia and in potential host countries. The recent history of emigration from the Baltic countries can be divided into three episodes: (i) the pre-accession period (which we loosely designate as 2000-2003, although it includes also the first four months of 2004); (ii) the post-accession period of economic growth, to which we refer as to 2004-2008 (although the crisis hit Latvia in the last quarter of 2008, its effect on emigration appears only in the data of 2009-2010); (iii) The crisis period, 2009-2010. Our description (a qualitative story rather than a quantitative report) is linked to the economic theory of migration and, where necessary, refers to the literature on migration processes in Latvia and Europe. We will put forward some hypotheses about the nature of the emigration flows in each of the periods.

Later on, we will test these hypotheses during the quantitative analysis of migration processes and the migrants' profiling. The main data source used for this purpose is representative population survey «NI: Place, Capability, and Migration. 2010» commissioned by the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia in the framework of the State Research Programme «National Identity»; we refer to this survey as the «NI: PCM. 2010» survey hereafter. 1,009 persons aged 18 to 74 have been interviewed during this survey in December 2010 and January 2011. We will use sections of this survey

devoted to: (i) respondent's work and life experience abroad during the last 10 years; (ii) respondent's family members and close relatives who emigrated between 2000 and 2010 and lived abroad during the survey period (this gives us a representative sample of 471 emigrants, with information on their gender, age, education, year of emigration, host country, main activity, living arrangements and plans to return within five years or within six months.); (iii) respondent's emigration intentions (respondents older than 65 years have been excluded when analysing these intentions)<sup>2</sup>.

Furthermore, we are going to provide realistic estimates of the net outflow of Latvian population during 2000-2010 (by period and main destinations). For this purpose we use data from several sources: (i) the receiving countries' data on population with Latvian background (citizenship and/or country of birth), as well as on immigration and emigration of persons with Latvian background, provided by *Eurostat*, OECD, and national statistical offices of selected European countries; (ii) data on allocation of social security numbers to Latvian nationals in Ireland and the United Kingdom; (iii) data on the number or recent return migrants in Latvia, obtained from various population surveys; (iv) data provided by *Statistics Latvia* on net migration from Latvia to countries outside EU and OECD. Resulting estimates differ dramatically from the official data of *Statistics Latvia* (as of August 2011), exceeding those by a factor of 6 to 7.

When testing the hypotheses on emigration patterns, the results based on the «NI: PCM. 2010» survey data on emigrants and return migrants will be compared with the results by Hazans and Philips (2010), based on different kind of data (the Labour Force Surveys 2002-2007). Furthermore, the findings on emigration intentions from the «NI: PCM. 2010» survey will be complemented by findings from the «DnB NORD Latvia's Barometer No. 35. February 2011» survey («DnB NORD» survey hereafter) devoted to emigration issues. This supports robustness of our conclusions. Moreover, combining the data from the two surveys provides an in-depth insight on the further

<sup>1</sup> The author thanks DNB Bank and research centre SKDS for the dataset of the survey «DNB NORD Latvia's Barometer No. 35. February 2011», the Latvian Ministry of Welfare for datasets of the surveys conducted in the framework of the ESF funded National Programme «Labour Market Studies» (2005-2007), and Marcis Trapencieris for the dataset of the population survey conducted in July 2008 by SPI.

<sup>2</sup> It is worth mentioning that information on emigration experience of respondents of the «NI: PCM. 2010» survey and their close relatives during the period between 2000 and 2010 is especially valuable, taking into account that the Population Census of 2011 will not be able to provide an accurate information about this period, because the Census questionnaire asked about living abroad after 1989 (rather than after 2000; plausibly, the question has been copied from the Population Census of 2000); by requesting «too much», the Census questionnaire undermined respondents' motivation to answer this question.

development of Latvian emigration, because the «NI: PCM. 2010» survey includes information on concreteness of emigration plans and refers to the near future, whereas DnB NORD survey explores the reasons why people are going to leave Latvia. In the course of the analysis, data of several earlier surveys (conducted in 2005-2008) will be also used for comparison.

## Economic theory of migration: the basics

According to the human capital model of migration decisions (Sjaastad 1962; Borjas 1987, 1999), an individual (or a family) decides whether to move by comparing expected (over the planning period) benefits and cost associated with migration. In order to assess [net] benefits, one should account for all factors that can affect the quality of life in the home country and in the potential host country: job finding and job losing probabilities, expected earnings, legal status, career prospects, working and living conditions, generosity of social security system, social and cultural norms, perceived life prospects for children, etc. These factors can interact with each other in a variety of ways. For instance, attractiveness of long-term migration is significantly undermined if, in the case of job loss in the host country, the immigrant has to apply for a work permit repeatedly. The same is true if employment protection and/or unemployment assistance legislation in the host country does not cover the immigrants to the same extent as native workers.

The determinants of migration flows are often subdivided into two groups: push factors are related to negative (undesired) circumstances in the country of origin, whereas pull factors are those which make the potential host countries attractive (Lee, 1966). A factor can play both roles either simultaneously (for instance, in 2009-2010, high unemployment in Latvia was a push factor, but low unemployment in Norway was a pull factor) or depending on circumstances (for instance, the wage level is a pull factor for professionals who earn 600 Lats (€ 854) per month in Latvia but can earn three to five times more abroad, while it is a push factor for those whose earnings in Latvia are not sufficient to support their family).

The costs of migration, in turn, include monetary and effort costs and can be subdivided into the following categories: (i) costs related to acquiring the necessary information and job search costs; (ii) transportation costs; (iii) costs of maintaining contact with the country of origin; (iv) psychological costs related to missing people and the environment one has left behind, uncertainty associated with life in the new country, and adaptation to the new reality.

This framework will help us to understand the individuals' migration decisions, as well as the characteristics which drive emigrants' self-selection, in other words, which groups have higher propensity to emigrate in a specific situation. Let us explain this point with an example comparing individuals with different family status. Other things equal, psychological costs

of emigration are lower for a person living alone than for somebody living with a partner and/or children, but plans to move alone (at least initially). On the other hand, emigration together with the whole family implies higher transportation and adaptation costs. Furthermore, if the partner has a good job in the home country and limited possibilities to find such a job abroad, expected net benefits from migration can be much lower for the family than for a single mover. Hence, in usual circumstances, the model predicts that single persons are more likely to move. On the other hand, if during an economic crisis the income fall is especially painful for many families with children, these families will be ready to accept substantial psychological costs and, probably, will demonstrate a higher propensity to emigrate than single persons.

## The pre-accession wave: personal initiative and effort

Between 2000 and 2003, Latvia featured rather high unemployment (above 10% according to the Labour Force Survey data), combined with very low wages: average earnings in the public sector (at purchasing power parity) was well below earnings of an unskilled worker in the UK, Germany or the Nordic countries<sup>1</sup>. Therefore many people in Latvia were dissatisfied with their material well-being and were considering permanent or temporary emigration as a solution to their problems. According to a survey of economically active population conducted in 2000 (see Rose, 2000: 34-35 or Hazans, 2003: Table 3.3.), 8% of ethnic Latvians and 25% of their minority counterparts said that they (or some family member) would like to work abroad [at least] for some years when their country enters the EU; moreover, 4% of Latvians and 9% of non-Latvians were ready to emigrate permanently. Higher propensity to emigrate among non-Latvians can be explained by the fact that their labour market situation at that time was, on average, worse than that of titular population (Hazans, 2010, 2011), as well as by relatively weaker sense of belonging to Latvia (see Section 1.2 in this Report). These data imply that in year 2000, about 15% of economically active population of Latvia were willing to work abroad, and half of them were considering permanent emigration. According to the same survey, another 25% of the labour force considered emigration as a possibility. Thus, emigration potential was rather big already at that time.

Actual emigration rates were of course much lower<sup>2</sup>. Emigration potential was restricted not only by hopes on better life in Latvia (in 2000-2003, unemployment

<sup>1</sup> Hazans (2003, Tables A4.1–A4.4) provides a detailed comparison of earnings.

<sup>2</sup> As shown in Box 2.16 below, by the end of 2010, 30 to 50 thousand persons, who left Latvia in 2000 – 2003, were living abroad. On the other hand, in the first quarter of 2003, 6.6% of users of Internet portal «Delfi» were working abroad (for a foreign employer) according to an online survey (Hazans, 2003). Taking into account that the total number of «Delfi» users was estimated between 192 and 388 thousand persons (Hazans, 2003, Notes to Table 3.2), this corresponds to 12 to 26 thousand labour emigrants.

was slowly but steadily decreasing and earnings were growing faster than consumer prices), but also by institutional environment which was not favourable for economic migration and by very high migration costs. Both residence and work permits were necessary unless one was ready to take on the risk of illegal immigration and/or employment. Latvian non-citizens, in addition, needed visas to enter most EU member states. Looking for a job abroad was a lot more difficult and expensive than it is nowadays. International phone calls from Latvia were very expensive (and, believe it or not, there was no Skype available...). The internet was slow, expensive and of limited access. Flights were fairly expensive, too. Moreover, there were no convenient wide-coverage sources of information on vacancies and living and working conditions abroad such as the EURES portal<sup>1</sup> developed after 2004, where this information is even presented in Latvian.

The services of private recruitment firms were expensive and often associated with high risk of fraud. In an online survey conducted in Latvia in 2003, among 2,100 respondents who said that after EU accession they would be ready to work in another EU country, 89% would move only with a work contract in hand, and only 20% considered a contract with a licensed Latvian recruitment firm as a sufficient guarantee (Hazans 2003: Tables A2.12, A2.13).

In sum, economic emigration in the pre-accession period was restricted by rather high *de facto* thresholds with respect to own-initiative, access to information, and willingness to accept risk. In such a situation, relatively lower emigration costs were associated with a high level of initiative, professional or at least private contacts in potential host countries, good foreign language and IT skills, and opportunities to use the internet for private purposes at the workplace. Clearly, all these attributes are more often found among university graduates.

Emigrants' choice of host country was also probably affected by cost considerations: while some tried to minimize information and adaptation costs by using social networks associated with previous emigration and immigration waves to/from the United States, Canada, Australia, Sweden and Germany, as well as Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, others were oriented towards relatively new directions, mainly the United Kingdom and Ireland (which combined lower language barriers than other EU countries with being much closer than other English-speaking countries), but also other countries of the «Old Europe».

The above discussion leads to the following expectations about the pre-accession emigration wave:

- (H1) *Theoretical considerations suggest that in 2000–2003, economic emigrants from Latvia featured:*
- (a) *a higher than average proportion of tertiary educated persons;*
  - (b) *a higher than average proportion of ethnic minorities;*
  - (c) *a high degree of geographical diversification.*

<sup>1</sup> EURES – *The European Job Mobility Portal*, available at <http://ec.europa.eu/eures/>

## The post-accession emigration (before the crisis): Institutional and market factors

During Latvia's first five years within the EU (before the effect of the crisis on migration patterns became apparent) the migration flows were shaped mainly by two factors: (i) gradual implementation of the free movement of labour within the EU (see Brucker et al. 2009, Table 2.1); (ii) economic growth in Latvia as well as in the potential host countries.

Economic growth in the old Europe resulted in an increased demand for labour, thus enhancing expected gains of the potential economic emigrants and stimulating migration. On the other hand, due to strong economic growth in Latvia, unemployment rate was falling while real wages were growing, thus gradually reducing expected gains from emigration. As the result motivation to move abroad was falling, whilst motivation to return among recent emigrants was on the rise. See Hazans and Philips (2010, Section 7) for a detailed discussion of emigration impact on Latvia's labour market and economy in 2004–2007.

Introduction of the free movement of labour lowered both the monetary and the non-monetary costs of job search abroad and migration, thus stimulating emigration. By contrast with relatively slow changes in Latvia's labour market, the institutional changes had an almost immediate effect. Since May 1, 2004, citizens of Latvia and other new member states could compete for jobs in Ireland, the UK and Sweden on equal terms with natives<sup>2</sup>. This reduced psychological and adaptation costs of migration, as well as the risk of failed labour migration. At the same time, European Mobility Portal and consultants of European Employment Services (EURES) started to work in Latvia (and elsewhere in Europe). EURES consultants provided about 10,000 consultations in 2004–2005, followed by 12,000 in 2006–2007. This substantially reduced potential emigrants' information and job search costs.

Migration-friendly institutional changes boosted demand for international transportation and telecommunication services. This resulted in a strong growth of the cheap segment of the passenger and cargo transportation market across Europe (including Latvia of course), causing air and land transportation costs, as well as international phone call tariffs to fall; communication costs were also reduced by increased coverage and speed of internet connections. This, in turn, further reduced both job search costs and direct costs of migration. As other side effects of the EU provisions for free movement of labour one can mention Latvian diasporas in Ireland, the UK, Sweden, Germany and elsewhere in Europe. Rich social infrastructure (including printed and electronic media) within these diasporas (see SKDS, 2006; Hazans

<sup>2</sup> In Ireland and in the UK, citizens of the new member states need to register to obtain living and working permits; however, if the documents are in order, the permits are guaranteed without any specific prerequisites (Brucker et al., 2009, Table 2.1).



and Philips, 2010: Section 10) also helped to reduce both the risk of «failed emigration» and information, job search and psychic costs of migration.

Several factors contributed to further decline in emigration costs and related risks. First, because of ongoing emigration and return migration, potential emigrants could increasingly rely on relatives and friends as a source of information about work abroad (this is known as *social network* or *migrant network* effect). Second, a number of countries (Finland, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain; in part also Norway) opened their labour markets in 2006; the Netherlands and Luxembourg followed in 2007; (see Brucker et al. (2009: Table 2.1) for details.

As the result of these developments, the threshold for potential emigrants with respect to own-initiative and risk taking was not as high as before EU accession. Hence, in 2004-2008 emigrants' self-selection in terms of human capital was driven not so much by individuals' comparative advantage in terms of [falling] migration costs, but mainly by expected gains in terms of income and working conditions. These gains were, on average, greater for persons with secondary or lower education. For instance, in 2005 tertiary educated employees in Latvia earned 54% (76%) more than otherwise similar workers with secondary (below secondary) education (Hazans, 2007: p.18 and Figure 2.1). On the other hand, 40% to 50% of tertiary educated Latvian migrant workers abroad in 2004-2007 held jobs which did not require a higher education (Hazans and Philips 2010: Figure 7) and hence could not earn much more than other emigrants from Latvia<sup>1</sup>.

The effect of ethnicity and citizenship on the propensity to emigrate has also changed. Due to strong economic growth and labour shortages caused by emigration (see, for example, Hazans and Philips 2010: Section 7 and Figure 12), as well as gradual improvements in language skills among minorities (Hazans 2010: Figure 3; Hazans 2011: Tables 8.8 and 8.9), the labour market position of ethnic minorities in 2004-2007 steadily improved: economic activity and employment rates among Non-Latvians were growing faster than among Latvians, thus reducing ethnic employment gap (which disappeared completely by 2007, see Hazans, 2010, 2011). In addition, a substantial part of the minority population – those without Latvian citizenship – was not covered by the legal provisions on free movement of labour<sup>2</sup>.

To sum up, theoretical considerations suggest the following expectations about the post-accession emigration wave:

<sup>1</sup> Brucker et al. (2009, Tables 6.7 and 6.8) show that in 2004-2007 returns to schooling for post-accession immigrants from new member states in the United Kingdom were quite low: just 2 per cent per year of schooling. Moreover, 82 per cent of tertiary educated representatives of this group worked in medium- or low-skilled jobs.

<sup>2</sup> Indirectly – via spouses who held Latvian citizenship, as well as via social networks – new migration possibilities emerged also for non-citizens. Nevertheless, their relative position in comparison to citizens worsened.

(H2) Between 2004 and 2008, in comparison with the pre-accession period,

- (a) the rate of economic emigration from Latvia substantially increased due to introduction of free movement of labour within EU, decreasing migration costs and social network effect;
- (b) migration flows to a large extent re-directed towards the United Kingdom, Ireland and Sweden;
- (c) the proportion of tertiary educated persons among emigrants decreased and became lower than similar proportion among [adult] population of Latvia;
- (d) the proportion of non-Latvians (especially non-citizens) among emigrants declined.

In addition,

- (e) In the second half of the period, the intensity of emigration declined due to strong economic growth in Latvia.

It is worth noting that validity of hypotheses (a), (b) and (e) have been confirmed in previous studies (Hazans, 2009; Hazans and Philips, 2010; Brucker et al., 2009) and is now well known. Hypotheses (c) and (d) have been earlier confirmed (using Latvian Labour Force Survey data) with respect to guest workers who worked abroad while still being considered as household members in Latvia (Hazans, 2009: 9, 14; Hazans and Philips, 2010: Figures 3 and 11); here we provide a broader evidence.

Another important feature (which could not be envisaged based on theoretical considerations alone) of this emigration wave is its mixed nature: while migration was to a large extent short-term and/or cyclical (Krišjāne et al., 2007: 57, 61, 76-77, 87; European Commission, 2008: 121; Hazans and Philips, 2010: Section 6, Figures 9 and 10), Latvian diasporas abroad were steadily growing. According to Eurostat population statistics summarised by Fic et al. (2011: Table 3.1), between end of 2000 and end of 2009, the number of Latvian nationals in EU-15 countries increased from 14 to 80 thousand; almost 90% of this increase occurred after EU accession (see Boxes 2.16 and 2.20 below for data covering all destinations and a larger time span).

## The crisis-driven wave (2009-2010): Lost jobs and lost hopes.

The economic crisis which started at the end of 2008, in a short time left jobless a segment of Latvian population. In the second quarter of 2008, just slightly more than 6% of economically active males and females were jobseekers, but a year later this rate more than tripled among males and more than doubled among females. Moreover, by the end of 2009, unemployment rate had reached 25% among males and 16% among females<sup>3</sup>. Only one out of three jobseekers received unemployment benefit; furthermore, benefit recipients with less than 20 years of social insurance record (which was the case for most of potential emigrants) faced the

<sup>3</sup> Latvian Labour Force Survey data, 2009/Q4 and 2010/Q1 average.



prospect that the benefit will be reduced to just 40 lats (57 euro) per month. Those who were lucky to keep their jobs experienced earnings cuts, usually by 25% to 30%. The psychological shock was no less painful: a large proportion of people of active age (including those who managed to keep their jobs), which until then were quite sure about their successful future career and life in Latvia, could not be as sure anymore.

In order to assess propensity to emigrate during the crisis by socio-economic group, let us look at the differences in employment and unemployment rates depending on ethnicity, citizenship and education before and during the crisis (Box 2.14). It appears that unemployment was a particularly strong push factor with respect to persons without higher education (even more as long as those without secondary education are concerned), as well as with respect to non-Latvians without Latvian citizenship.

While Western Europe was also hit by the crisis, it was still possible to find a job there, although not as easily as before (hence, the role of diasporas and informal social networks increased). Unemployment rate was very low (three to four per cent) in Norway, the Netherlands and Austria, while it was modest (about eight per cent) in the UK, Germany, Sweden, Denmark and Finland (European Commission, 2010: Table 24). During 2009-2010, the vacancy rate (i.e. the number of vacancies relative to the sum of vacancies and occupied posts) in these countries was five to eight times higher than the one observed in Latvia (European Commission, 2010: Chart 6). Moreover, across old Europe nominal earnings continued to

grow, while real earnings did not decline (European Commission, 2011: Graphs I.1.8, III.A3.5). Thus, expected gains from emigration in terms of employment and earnings have increased in comparison with the pre-crisis period.

Plausibly, the issue of social protection, previously ignored by successful people, has become even more important. In contrast with the UK, Ireland, the Nordic countries, Germany and the Netherlands, where a worker with a sufficient contribution record and earnings between 67% and 100% of the average receives (in benefits) about 70% of previous net earnings even in the case of long-term unemployment, in Latvia already after 9 months of unemployment (and for those younger than 35 and others with less than 20 years of contribution record – even after 6 months), income replacement rate is just about 40% even when social assistance and housing benefits, if any, are accounted for (European Commission, 2011: Graph II.2.4). Moreover, Latvian child benefits (8 lats, or €11.5 per month) are negligible in comparison with those paid, for every child younger than 16 years, in the old Europe (e.g. €140 per month in Ireland and £20.3/£13.4 per week for the first/next child in the UK<sup>1</sup>).

Due to all the factors mentioned above, emigration started to emerge as a real option in minds of even those Latvian residents who had not considered such a

<sup>1</sup> See [http://www.citizensinformation.ie/en/social\\_welfare/social\\_welfare\\_payments/](http://www.citizensinformation.ie/en/social_welfare/social_welfare_payments/); <http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/childbenefit/>. Data accessed on August 15, 2011 and refer to year 2011.

Box  
2.14

### Employment and unemployment rates of working age population by educational attainment, ethnicity and citizenship, 2008-2010, %

		Education level (population aged 15-64)			Ethnicity and citizenship (population aged 18-64)		
		Tertiary	Secondary	Below secondary	Latvian	Minority (LV citizens)	Minority (other)
Employment <sup>a</sup>	2008 <sup>c</sup>	86.9	74.5	37.1	74.2	71.3	70.7
	2009 <sup>c</sup>	82.3	64.6	29.4	66.8	63.2	58.4
	2010 <sup>c</sup>	80.6	61.5	28.4			
	2010/12-2011/02 <sup>d</sup>				64.4	65.5	52.8
Unemployment <sup>b</sup>	2008 <sup>c</sup>	4.2	7.7	14.6	6.4	8.7	11.3
	2009 <sup>c</sup>	8.4	18.7	31.4	15.1	18.1	23.6
	2010 <sup>c</sup>	10.5	20.4	32.3			
	2010/12-2011/02 <sup>d</sup>				19.2	20.5	32.5

Notes. <sup>a</sup> Employment rate is defined as proportion of employed population in total population (in a particular age group). <sup>b</sup> Unemployment rate is defined as proportion of jobseekers in economically active population (in a particular age group). <sup>c</sup> Labour Force Survey results. <sup>d</sup> Average of the results obtained from «NI: PCM. 2010» and «DnB NORD» surveys.

Sources: <sup>c</sup> – Eurostat; <sup>d</sup> – calculation with survey data.

possibility before. This category consists of two groups: (i) individuals who are inherently not very mobile but just did see another way out of trouble<sup>1</sup>; (ii) persons who were not satisfied with the development in Latvia and with their own prospects here. In the latter group, one can expect to find a higher-than-average proportion of university graduates because people who have opted to invest in higher education are usually future-oriented. As far as propensity to emigrate among persons with less than secondary education is concerned, the direction of change is theoretically ambiguous a priori. On one hand, representatives of this group suffered more than others from crisis-triggered unemployment (see Box 2.14); on the other hand, in crisis time it is difficult for them to compete for jobs abroad with graduates of secondary school one of the reasons being poor language skills).

There are two reasons why one should expect ethnic non-Latvians to be over-represented among the post-crisis emigrants (in fact, among both above mentioned groups). First, the proportion of workers who lost their jobs during the crisis was higher among non-Latvians (Hazans, 2010: Table 1), resulting in re-emerging of a significant ethnic employment gap, especially wide among university graduates (Hazans, 2010: Figures 6 and 7; see also Box 2.14 above. Second, in July 2009, the government adopted (despite objections by employers' associations) new Cabinet of Ministers Regulations on state language proficiency requirements, which have substantially extended the list of occupations (both in private and public sectors), which require certified Latvian language skills at intermediate or advanced level. Given that the previous regulations have been perceived by most workers (Latvians and non-Latvians alike) as adequate or in some cases even too strict (Hazans, 2010: 151–153), non-Latvians saw this as a step undermining labour market position of minority workers and, in a wider context, signalling radicalisation of language policies and ethno politics in general. Such

<sup>1</sup> As one user of Latvian news portal Delfi put it in his comment: «To many, working abroad is the only way to survive – to earn money to pay back one's debt, to educate one's children and to support one's parents, whom our government does not envisage pensions which would ensure more or less normal existence» (Delfi Aculiecinieks 2010: To>>Esmu, 30.11.2010).

a signal of course works as an additional push factor increasing inclination to emigrate among non-Latvians. Taking into account that non-citizens of Latvia are not covered by EU provisions for free mobility of labour, one should expect the largest increase in propensity to emigrate among non-Latvians holding Latvian citizenship.

To sum up, in the beginning of 2009 one could expect (as formulated in Hazans, 2009) both intensification of emigration and changes in emigrants' structure and motivation:

*(H3) In 2009-2010, in comparison with the pre-crisis period:*

- (a) the intensity of emigration from Latvia increased;*
- (b) migration flows have further diversified; share of Ireland, heavily hit by the crisis, declined, while shares of other (also non-European) destinations increased;*
- (c) the role of push factors (especially unemployment and wage cuts, but also lack of prospects, loss of hopes and uncertainty of Latvia's development path) in shaping migration flows increased; moreover, the role of host country's social protection system increased among pull factors;*
- (d) migrants are much more oriented towards long-term or permanent emigration and more often move as whole families;*
- (e) the proportion of the highly educated among emigrants increased significantly and exceeded corresponding proportion among the persons who stayed;*
- (f) the proportion of individuals oriented towards self-employment or own business among emigrants increased;*
- (g) the proportion of ethnic minorities (especially those holding Latvian citizenship) among emigrants increased.*

Some of these hypotheses are supported by an interesting account of the changes in the profile of potential emigrants from Latvia (EURES clients) based on the daily records of EURES consultants summarized by the former EURES manager in Latvia Žanna Ribakova and presented in Box 2.15.

Box  
2.15

### Changes in the profile of EURES clients in Latvia, 2004-2010

2004-2007	2008-2010
Planning to move alone	Planning to move with family
Looking for temporary, low-skilled job	Looking for permanent, skilled job
Minimal knowledge of foreign languages	Better knowledge of foreign languages, higher qualifications
Planning to return	Interested in legal employment and social security

Source: Ribakova (2009).

## How many people have left Latvia during a decade?

As recently as in September 2011, official Latvian statistics claimed that net emigration from Latvia during 2000-2010 amounted to just 33 thousand persons (LR CSP, 2011a), which is obviously very far from reality. To arrive at a realistic estimate, we have used destination countries' statistics on population and on bilateral migration flows by citizenship and/or country of birth, provided by Eurostat, OECD and national statistical offices (in cases when year 2010 data were not available, conservative extrapolation has been used); in addition, we have used data on allocation of social security numbers (SSN hereafter) in the United Kingdom and Ireland. By combining these data with Statistics Latvia data on migration flows between Latvia and countries outside EU and OECD, two well-documented estimates of net outflow of Latvian population during 2000-2010 (141 and 169 thousand, respectively) and by sub-periods: 24-31 thousand in 2000-2003, 68 thousand in 2004-2008 and 48-70 thousand in 2009-2010 (see Box 2.16). Due to data limitations, both estimates do not ensure full coverage of movers who were Latvia's permanent residents but did not hold Latvian citizenship or were born outside Latvia; those who stay in the host country less than 6 months are also not covered in most cases. The first (minimal) estimate with respect to EU and OECD countries is based on data about increase of the number of Latvian citizens (and/or persons born in Latvia) among population of these countries (rather than on migration flows); in the case of the United Kingdom these data were available only as estimates from the UK Labour Force Survey, and we have corrected them (within confidence intervals) taking into account SSN allocation.

The second (conservative) estimate makes use of EU and OECD countries' data on immigration and emigration of Latvian citizens (and/or persons born in Latvia), but with some corrections. First, in cases of the United Kingdom and Ireland immigration data have been replaced with SSN allocation data. Second, for the 2004-2008 period, net inflow from Latvia into countries of the EU, as well as Norway and Switzerland, has been estimated at 60% of the gross inflow, consistent with the estimates of the number of return migrants based on the Latvian Labour Force Survey data (Hazans and Philips 2010), as well as on various population surveys. This correction was necessary because during this period of predominantly short-term and circulatory migration (see above) many of the emigrants returned to Latvia, but only a small part of them were registered by partner countries' emigration statistics (which is generally well-known to be less accurate than immigration statistics). Third, the resulting estimates of net emigration for 2000-2003 and for 2004-2008 have been adjusted upwards by 10%, to account for incomplete coverage of Latvian non-citizens and persons born outside Latvia in the receiving countries' statistics, as well as for undocumented migration. On the other hand, during 2009-2010 return migration to Latvia was less intensive, therefore the

receiving countries' statistics for this period were used «as is» (i.e., uncorrected and without the 10% adjustment of the net emigration).

To sum up, both the minimal and the conservative estimates are well documented and quite cautious. We consider the highest of the two (169 thousand emigrants) to be closer to reality. For each of the three periods we also break down the estimates of net emigration by main groups of destinations (see Box 2.20). Furthermore, the realistic expert estimate (200 thousand emigrants, including 80 thousand during 2009-2010) adjusts the conservative estimate upwards, assuming that the number of emigrants not covered by the receiving countries' statistics substantially exceeds those 10% which have been added to the 2000-2003 and 2004-2008 results in the conservative estimate, and conducting not so conservative extrapolation in cases when year 2010 data were missing. This estimate, which exceeds the official data at the time of writing by a factor of more than six, we consider the most plausible. Finally, the high expert estimate (total net outflow 250 thousand persons during 2000-2010) takes into account that the year 2011 Census data yielded just 1,880 thousand directly collected records (Statistics Latvia 2012), which is 335 thousand less than the previously published population figure on March 31, 2011 (<http://www.csb.gov.lv/en/statistikas-temas/population-key-indicators-30624.html>, accessed on August 15, 2011).

It is worth noting that since publication of the Latvian version of this report, our preferred estimate of emigration (200 thousand) has been cited in Weisbrot and Ray (2011) and IMF (2011). Moreover, the preliminary Census results (released on January 18, 2012, four months after our estimate was first published) report net emigration of 190 thousand persons between the Censuses of 2000 and 2011.

## Emigrants' profile and its changes over time

Box 2.16 presents the statistical portrait of adult emigrants at the end of 2010; the portrait is based on data provided by respondents of the «NI: PCM. 2010» survey about their family members and close relatives who left Latvia in 2000-2010 (and were living abroad during the survey). The emigrants are broken down in three groups by year of leaving. For comparison, Box 2.16. presents the profiles of *stayers* – residents of Latvia, who during the last decade have not lived abroad three or more months at a time, as well as of those with such experience who were living in Latvia during the survey. The representatives of the latter category are [loosely] referred to as return *migrants*, although many of them have not spent abroad a sufficiently long time to be included in partner countries' population or migration statistics.

### Gender and age structure

According to survey data (see Box 2.16), in terms of gender distribution emigrants who left Latvia in

Box  
2.16

## Net emigration from Latvia (2000-2010) and emigrants' profile at the end of 2010

	Emigrants (by year of leaving)				Latvia's population, end of 2010			
	2000-2003	2004-2008	2009-2010	2000-2010	All	Aged 18-35	Aged 36-54	Aged 55+
Emigration estimates	Net outflow (1,000 persons)				Number (1,000 persons)			
Minimal (documented) <sup>a</sup>	24.4	68.0	48.2	140.6	2122.2	501.2	605.4	646.0
Conservative (documented) <sup>b</sup>	30.6	68.3	70.2	169.2	2093.6	482.7	597.6	645.1
Realistic expert estimate <sup>c</sup>	40.0	80.0	80.0	200.0	2062.8	462.7	589.3	644.1
High expert estimate <sup>c</sup>	50.0	100.0	100.0	250.0	2012.8	430.3	575.7	642.6
	% distribution <sup>d</sup>				% distribution <sup>e</sup>			
	Emigrants (by year of leaving)				Stayers		Return migrants <sup>f</sup>	
	2000-2003	2004-2008	2009-2010	2000-2010	Aged like emigrants	Aged 18-74		
Males	46.5	45.2	39.9	42.8	47.1	45.7	61.3	
Females	53.5	54.9	60.1	57.2	52.9	54.4	38.7	
Age								
18-24	6.9	23.4	32.7	22.6	22.6	13.8	20.0	
25-34	54.3	48.1	38.8	44.9	44.9	17.8	37.6	
35-44	29.7	18.3	17.9	19.6	19.6	18.0	22.8	
45-54	7.2	8.3	9.3	8.5	8.5	19.9	12.8	
55-74	1.9	1.9	1.4	3.2	3.2	30.6	6.7	
Level of education								
Below secondary	5.3	5.4	4.6	6.0	13.5	13.9	11.6	
Secondary	53.8	70.6	59.9	61.8	63.6	64.8	70.2	
Tertiary	32.0	21.5	27.0	24.2	22.9	21.4	18.1	
Unknown	8.9	2.5	8.6	8.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
Selectivity index of university graduates (at the time of leaving)								
Against all stayers aged 18-60	0.36	0.03	0.14					
Main occupation								
Wage earner	55.2	84.8	79.9	78.3	59.6	50.5	59.4	
Self-employed or employer	0.0	1.8	3.6	2.1	3.8	3.8	6.2	
Student	1.7	6.2	5.7	5.0	12.1	7.2	6.6	
Unemployed	0.0	0.6	1.5	0.9	16.3	14.5	16.9	
Other or N/A <sup>g</sup>	43.1	6.7	9.3	13.7	8.2	24.0	10.9	

Sources: <sup>a</sup> Conservative documented estimates based on Eurostat, receiving countries' and OECD population and/or migration statistics by citizenship and/or country of birth; net emigration from Latvia to countries outside EU and OECD is reported as in Statistics Latvia online database. <sup>b</sup> Similar to <sup>a</sup>, but inflows into Ireland and the UK are estimated using data on allocation of social security numbers, while data on outflows from the EEA countries have been corrected using Latvian LFS data, as well as data on return migrants from various population surveys. In particular, for 2004-2008, return migration from EEA countries is estimated to be 40% of gross inflows from Latvia to these countries during this period. <sup>c</sup> – expert estimates based on <sup>b</sup> and accounting for the gaps in receiving countries' statistics (Latvian non-citizens are likely not to be fully captured by the statistics «by citizenship»; emigrants who are Latvian citizens or non-citizens but were born outside Latvia, typically in former Soviet Union, are not captured by the statistics «by country of birth»; emigrants which have not officially registered in the host country are not covered (the «realistic» estimates is the most plausible one; the «high» estimate, is however also consistent with the fact that during the 2011 Population Census, data on just 1.88 million persons have been collected directly, while 188 thousand have been added from registers on questionable grounds (see Statistics Latvia, 2012). <sup>d</sup> Emigrants' distribution is based on information provided by their close relatives in Latvia; it is not clear to what extent it describes also emigrants who do not have such relatives. For 12% of emigrants, exact time of leaving is not known; they are accounted for in column «2000-2010», although not shown separately. <sup>e</sup> Calculation with the «NI: PCM. 2010» survey data (the age structure is not corrected).

Notes. <sup>f</sup> Return migrants – persons who between 2000 and 2010 spent three months or more abroad at a time but lived in Latvia during the survey. <sup>g</sup> «Other» include housekeepers, pensioners and other economically inactive persons, while option «NA» refers only to emigrants.

2000-2008 are quite similar to *stayers*, but during the crisis years proportion of females among emigrants has reached 60% (this is confirmed also by EU countries' statistics on immigrants from Latvia). Overall, among adult emigrants who left Latvia during the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century females account for 57%, which exceeds their proportion among *stayers*; this put at risk the reproductive potential of Latvian population. This finding, however, should be interpreted with caution because the latest available demographic data on immigrants from Latvia in the EU countries suggest that majority of them are males.

Furthermore, 60% of return migrants are males. This proportion is clearly higher than the share of males among emigrants according to either of the two sources mentioned above, suggesting that male emigrants are more likely to return than their female counterparts.

A much larger risk for Latvia's demographic prospects is related to emigrants' age structure. By the end of 2010, two thirds of emigrants were younger than 35; this is more than twice as high as the share of this age group among *stayers*. Persons aged 35-44 are proportionally represented among emigrants, while just one out of ten emigrants is older than 54 years. Return migrants are, on average, slightly older than emigrants but much younger than *stayers*.

## Education


By the end of 2010, the proportion of university graduates among emigrants (24%) was somewhat higher than the same proportion among *stayers* (21%).

The proportions of medium- and low-educated among emigrants are similar to the ones found among *stayers*: about two-thirds have secondary education, whereas one-seventh have not attained this level (we assume that those 8% of emigrants, whose relatives were unaware of their educational attainment, are less likely to have secondary than lower education, and unlikely to have a university degree). However, when each of the three emigration waves is compared to *stayers*, emigrants clearly appear to be better educated. Both among those who moved before EU enlargement and among the crisis-driven emigrants, one finds a much higher proportion of university graduates and lower or equal share of persons without secondary education than among *stayers*. On the other hand, those who moved in 2004-2008 feature the same proportion of university graduates as *stayers* but a higher share of secondary-educated and a lower share of those without secondary education. Among the return migrants, in turn, one finds slightly lower shares of both low-educated and university graduates, while 70% hold secondary education.

These findings support the previously stated hypotheses (H1)-(a), (H2)-(c) and (H3)-(e) about the dynamics of propensity to emigrate among tertiary educated Latvia's residents. This becomes even more obvious when only emigrants older than 21 years are considered (note that this group includes all but two tertiary educated emigrants in our sample): among pre-accession emigrants, the proportion of university graduates is 31%, in the post-accession period this proportion falls to 24%, but rises again to reach 32% among those who left Latvia in 2009-2010 (Box 2.17).

Box  
2.17

### Emigrants from Latvia (aged 22+) by completed education at the end of 2010, depending on the time of moving, ethnicity, citizenship and the host country



Notes: Ethnicity and citizenship are proxied by attributes of the relative who provided the information about the emigrant.

Source: Calculations with «NI: PCM. 2010» survey data.



Box 2.17. presents also the differences between educational profiles of emigrants depending on their ethnicity, citizenship and the host country. The largest proportion of university graduates is found among emigrants reported by non-Latvians holding Latvian citizenship. This is well in line with two already mentioned circumstances: relatively low employment rate among tertiary-educated non-Latvians and restrictions faced by Latvian non-citizens in EU labour markets. When emigrants hosted by different countries are compared, the lowest proportion of university graduates is found in Ireland.

To test thoroughly the hypotheses (H1)-(a), (H2)-(c) and (H3)-(e) about the changes over time in the propensity to emigrate among tertiary educated Latvia's residents, one need to compare the proportions of university graduates among adult emigrants and *stayers at the time of moving*<sup>1</sup>. For this purpose we use *selectivity index SI* (see Box 2.18). According to results reported in Box 2.17, both in the pre-accession period and (to a smaller extent) during the crisis, university graduates were significantly

<sup>1</sup> To estimate this proportion among emigrants, we proceed as follows. Emigrants, which did not have tertiary education by 2010, obviously could not have it at the time of moving. Almost all tertiary educated emigrants in our sample left Latvia being at least 22 years old; we assume them to receive their first degree by then, – unlike four individuals who moved being between 18 and 20 years. Remaining eight tertiary educated emigrants cannot affect the results significantly.

overrepresented among emigrants in comparison with *stayers* aged 18 to 60 (virtually all adult emigrants belong to this age group), while this was not the case for emigrants who left Latvia during the boom years 2004-2008.

### Labour market status and occupation

A striking feature of emigrants' situation in the host countries' labour market status is extremely high employment rate: at least 87% among those who left Latvia in 2004-2008 and at least 84% among the crisis period emigrants (actual level can be even higher given that information on labour market status is missing for 7–9% of emigrants belonging to these two waves). For comparison, among *stayers* aged 18 to 74 just 54% were employed at the end of 2010, while among *stayers* in the emigrants' age 63% were working. As far as emigrants who left Latvia before 2004 are concerned, for 43% of them information on employment is not available, so one cannot measure accurately the employment level of this group, but it is surely higher than among the *stayers*. Noteworthy, also return migrants in Latvia feature a higher employment rate (about 66%) than persons without foreign experience.

The proportion of self-employed and entrepreneurs among the crisis period emigrants doubled in comparison with the previous period, thus confirming the hypothesis (H3)-(f). On the other hand, one finds

Box  
2.18

### Selectivity index

Selectivity index allows for comparison of the proportions of some demographic group  $D$  (e. g., university graduates) within the sub-population of interest (hereafter,  $M$ ) and within the rest of population (or some other sub-population, usually called «the reference group»), denoted  $S$ . Hereafter, we assume  $M$  and  $S$  to consist of emigrants and *stayers*, respectively (in our context, *stayers* are permanent residents of Latvia, which during the period under consideration have not lived abroad)<sup>1</sup>. To calculate the selectivity index  $SI$ , one has to find the ratio of proportions of  $D$  among emigrants and *stayers*:  $R = D_M / D_S$ . Situation when  $R > 1$  (respectively,  $R < 1$ ), is commonly referred to in the literature as «emigrants are positively (respectively, negatively) selected» with respect to belonging to group  $D$  (e.g. having completed tertiary education), although in fact we are talking about self-selection (rather than selection) here. It is convenient to transform  $R$  in such a way that:

If the proportion of  $D$  among emigrants is larger (respectively, smaller) than among *stayers*, then the value of  $SI$  is positive (respectively, negative).

This can be achieved by subtracting from  $R$  unity, as in Kaczmarczyk et al. (2010). Here we use another approach and define the selectivity index as follows:

$$SI = \ln(R) = \ln(D_M / D_S).$$

The advantage of this measure is that in cases when  $D_M / D_S = k$  and  $D_M / D_S = 1/k$ ,  $SI$  has equal absolute values but opposite signs: e.g., +0.69 and -0.69 if  $k = 2$  (for comparison, formula  $SI = R - 1$  would give values +1 and -0.5). Likewise, if the proportion of  $D$  among emigrants is 1.5 times larger (respectively, smaller) than among *stayers*, then  $SI = 0.41$  (respectively, -0.41).

Noteworthy, when studying emigrants' self-selection mechanism, one can compare  $SI$  values across demographic groups, countries and time periods. On the other hand, only statistically significant (and not too small) differences are interpretable.

<sup>1</sup> Of course both  $M$  and  $S$  can be further narrowed down, e.g. by restricting age or by including only economically active individuals.

more self-employed and entrepreneurs among return migrants than among individuals without foreign experience: 6% vs. 4%.

Even under the most radical (and unlikely) assumption that all emigrants whose occupation was not reported by their relatives in Latvia are unemployed, during the crisis emigrants of the last two waves feature a much lower unemployment level than the one observed in Latvia. To sum up, emigrants' labour market outcomes are significantly better than that of *stayers*.

Box 2.19 provides a more detailed breakdown of Latvian emigrants by main activity abroad (depending on education, host country and time of leaving Latvia). On average, only 26% of emigrants hold a paid job in which they to a large extent use their qualifications (education), even if in a different profession. This proportion is higher (and the incidence of brain waste smaller) in the continental EU15, where it reaches 36%, than in other host countries. The lowest rate of using one's qualification (19%) is found among emigrants living in Ireland and countries outside the old Europe (USA, Canada, Russia, Ukraine, etc.). Tertiary educated emigrants are more likely to use their qualification than those with a secondary or lower education. Those who emigrated during the crisis were less choosy with respect to job abroad: just 23% of them use their qualification, whereas this is the case for

29% of the previous wave's emigrants (the difference is statistically significant).


### Geography

Box 2.20 compares host countries' administrative data and «NI: PCM. 2010» survey data on the geographical composition of Latvian emigration flows before and after accession, as well as during the economic crisis. Both sources confirm the hypotheses (H1)-(c), (H2)-(b) and (H3)-(b) about the changes in this composition over time. With respect to the 2004-2008 and 2009-2010 periods, the data from the survey date are well in line with the administrative ones (which, in turn, are of course not perfect). With respect to the pre-accession period, the emigrants who moved to countries outside EEA (mainly, the CIS, USA and Canada) are under-represented in survey data – plausibly, because many of them have not left close relatives in Latvia.

The «NI: PCM. 2010» module about household members and close relatives living abroad asked, among other, with whom the emigrants live together. Respondents from Zemgale and Latgale reported that more than a half of their relatives (56% and 59%, respectively) live with a spouse or a partner (Box 2.21). This suggests that people from these two regions more

Box  
2.19

### Emigrants' main activity abroad at the end of 2010, by educational attainment, host country and time of leaving Latvia



Notes: «Continental Europe» refers to the EU15 (without the United Kingdom and Ireland), Norway and Switzerland.

Source: Calculations with «NI: PCM. 2010» survey data.


often move with the whole family. In other regions the proportion of relatives living abroad with a partner is much smaller: 28% to 38% (Box 2.21).

### Will the emigrants ever come back?

Given Latvia's deteriorating demographic situation the emigrants' intentions to return are extremely important. Box 2.22 summarizes information on Latvian emigrants' plans to return, as reported by their family members or close relatives during the «NI: PCM. 2010» survey». On average, 8% of emigrants plan (or rather plan than not) to return within six months. In a longer perspective (within five years) about 20% of emigrants assume the possibility of returning. These findings are in striking contrast with the situation observed five years earlier, when two-thirds of emigrants who left Latvia in 2004-2005 were planning to return within two

years, most of them (almost half of all emigrants) even within one year (Hazans and Philips 2010: Figure 9). In fact, in 2002-2007, more than half of Latvian guest-workers returned home within a year, according to the Latvian LFS (Hazans 2009: p.19; Hazans and Philips 2010: Figure 10). This comparison supports hypothesis H3 (d) that during the crisis Latvian emigrants are to a much larger extent oriented towards long-term or permanent emigration.

From the ethnicity and citizenship perspective, non-Latvians without Latvian citizenship feature the smallest propensity to return: just 8% within five years, see Box 2.22. Tertiary and secondary educated Latvian emigrants are more likely to return than their counterparts without a secondary education. When different host countries are compared, it appears that Latvian ex-pats in Ireland feature the smallest propensity to return within five years (Box 2.22).



**Box 2.21**  
**Proportion of adult emigrants living abroad with a spouse/partner, by region of origin**

Region of origin	Proportion (%)
Riga	38.2%
Riga vicinity	28.0%
Vidzeme	38.3%
Kurzeme	29.7%
Zemgale	56.4%
Latgale	58.8%

Notes: The region of origin is identified approximately as the region of residence of the relative who provided the information about the emigrant.

Source: Calculations with «NI: PCM. 2010» survey data.


The likelihood of returning sharply declines as the duration of stay abroad increases. Thus, among those who left Latvia less than a year ago, one-fifth plan to return within six months, and more than one-third assume the possibility of returning within five years. By comparison,

these proportions fall to 3% and 15%, respectively, among emigrants who stay abroad between three and five years.

These findings, of course, do not exclude that more emigrants will return to Latvia when reaching the retirement age (with a pension earned abroad). Such a

### Latvian emigrants' plans to return within 6 months and within 5 years, by ethnicity and citizenship, educational attainment, host country and duration of stay abroad, 2010/12-2011/01

Box  
2.22



Source: Calculations with «NI: PCM. 2010» survey data.

Box  
2.23

### Emigrants about reasons for emigration and about return to Latvia (1)

«Many will return home – not now and not in 10 years. [They] will return, when dignified pensions will be earned in the host countries and housing credits will be paid back to banks, to have a home one can return to.» (Esmu, 30.11.2010.)

«I have earned a pension, now will go home and play a rich uncle. In my rural municipality with such a pension I will be the man number one.» (Ansis, 30.11.2010. 13:09)

«...A big part [of the emigrants] acts and will act like this. I am among them – in principle, the pension has been earned, although it is far away yet, but in LV circumstances it would be sufficient also today :-). All 3 children have completed their schooling, they live their own life, and at this age one does not want to rush around the world unless one really likes it :-). As I don't plan to stay «there» forever, I rent out my apartment [in Latvia], so some money goes into my account, I can enjoy life and take on a casual job from time to time :-))» (Repatriants, 30.11.2010. 14:42)

Source: Delfi Aculiecinieks, 2010

possibility has been mentioned by many participants (not just from Ireland) of online discussion «Ireland's Latvians, will you leave Ireland?» (Delfi Aculiecinieks (Delfi Eyewitness), 2010) at the end of 2010, see Box 2.23.

While return of wealthy pensioners won't solve Latvia's demographic problems, it at least will stimulate the domestic market.

Apart from (undoubtedly, important) purely economic considerations, uncertainty, lack of fair rules of the game and the general quality of life in Latvia are often mentioned among the reasons why emigrants don't plan to return in the near future (Box 2.24).

## Development of migration networks and experience of return migrants

As shown in Box 2.25, among population aged 18 to 65 the proportion of individuals who have some relative or friend with foreign work experience has reached 75% already at the end of 2005 and increased to 82% by the beginning of 2011. Both at the end of 2006 and in the middle of 2008, 15% of working age individuals could obtain information about work abroad from recent (of the last two years) experience of their own or a close relative. Moreover, at the end of 2010, 28% of respondents indicated that some of their close relatives worked abroad during the survey (rather than in the past), and 10% had own foreign work experience (including 9% during the last five years).

These data confirm emergence of powerful migration social networks. This, as noted above, information and job search costs for potential emigrants, as well as psychic and adaptation costs of migration significantly reduced. Another (possibly, even more important) conclusion from information summarised in Box 2.25 is that during the recent years work abroad has become an integral part of Latvian national identity.

Let us now look at how return migrants assess their foreign experience. The «NI: PCM. 2010» survey has identified 89 respondents who have spent abroad at least three months (in one visit) during the last ten years but have returned to Latvia. Box 2.26 presents information on the impact of foreign experience on various life domains (health, family, etc.) of the returnees, according to their own assessment.

In general, one finds that return migrants' opinions about the impact of the time spent abroad on their life are mostly positive.

Majority (60%) of these respondents report a positive effect of the time spent outside Latvia on their health. A more detailed analysis (not reflected in Box 2.26) shows that positive impact on health more often is reported by females (65%) and persons with higher education (71%).

Likewise, 64% of respondents think that the time spent abroad has positively affected their relationships with family members. Also in this case a positive opinion is more often expressed by females (78%) and persons

Box  
2.24

### Emigrants about reasons for emigration and about return to Latvia (2)

*«...It is already a year since I am living in Norway, and every day I am thinking about home. I wanted to come back in July, but I learned that I am pregnant and was forced to stay, because in Latvia there will be no benefit. My son has started in school here, and my husband is glad that I will be around, but I fall deeper into depression every day. Why does home, with all its hopelessness, pull me back so strongly? – I am unable to explain...» (Norge, 30.11.2010.)*

*«Will I leave Ireland in the near future? – A «difficult» question... especially when you are already rooted here, accumulate possessions and have a secure job, where no one monitors or regulates you – you can do what you consider of primary importance. [...] But there is one but... the years pass by, and thinking about future I recognise, that in the best part of my working life it does not make sense to expose myself to uncertainty and fragmentation. Therefore I stay in Ireland and accumulate my working years here... and, if something unexpected happens, then social assistance is guaranteed for me until I find my next «niche».» (hika, 06.12.2010.)*

*«I live in the UK and I am not going to return to Latvia. Why should I sell my skills for a nothing, if here I can sell them for a normal remuneration?» (Gladiators, 30.11.2010. 20:06)*

*«...I have graduated from university and was lucky to find an interesting and well-paid job. I am afraid to return to LV for three reasons. First, there are no possibilities to develop ones career, in Latvia one's connections determine everything, and I don't respect such rules of the game. [...], what should I do there, especially with a Russian name and surname? Second, social security is so poor and the further the poorer, I can't afford to pay taxes to a state which is unable to allocate them effectively. I better help my parents myself and know where the money goes...» (Manasdomas 07.12.2010. 16:12)*

*«When it will be veeeeery bad in Ireland, even then it won't be comparable to Latvia. This is a completely different life. You don't understand how bad the life your are living is.» (oto, 30.11.2010.)*

Source: Delfi Aculiecinieks, 2010



with higher education (70%), as well as respondents aged 45 to 54 years (84%).

A positive assessment of the impact of the time spent outside Latvia on material well-being is shared by 73% of return migrants, and the answers do not differ much across demographic groups. Only 8% have reported a negative impact.

A vast majority of respondents (82%) say that time spent abroad has positively affected their self-confidence, while an opposite opinion is expressed by merely 7%. Also in this question, no significant differences are found between the answers of various groups.

The survey also asks to assess the effect of the time spent outside Latvia on one's professional skills. Again,

Box  
2.25

### Foreign work experience of Latvia's population, their relatives and friends, %

Survey period	The respondent has worked abroad (return migrants)			The respondent has worked abroad or some of his/her family members or close relatives are working or have worked abroad			The respondent has worked abroad or some of his/her relatives or friends are working or have worked abroad	
	Any time, anywhere	In the EEA <sup>f</sup>	After 01.01.2004	Any time, anywhere	In the EEA <sup>f</sup>	After 01.01.2004	Any time	After 01.01.2004
2005/Q4-2006/Q1 <sup>a</sup>	9.0	7.2		20.5	15.5	6.7 <sup>g</sup> – 10.0 <sup>h</sup>	75.1	72.2
2006/Q4-2007/Q1 <sup>b</sup>			5.0			14.6		
2008/07 <sup>c</sup>			3.3 (after 01.07.2006)			15.7 (after 01.07.2006)		
2010/10-2011/01 <sup>d</sup>	9.9 (after 01.01.2000)		9.0 (after 01.01.2006)	33.1 (after 01.01.2000)		31.5 (during the survey: 27.8)		
2011/02 <sup>e</sup>							82.3	

Notes. <sup>a</sup> Survey conducted for the project «Geographical Mobility of Labour Force» of the ESF funded National Programme of Labour Market Studies. It does not cover relatives who have worked abroad but returned. <sup>b</sup> Survey conducted for the project «Specific Problems of Labour Market of Latvia and its Regions» of the ESF funded National Programme of Labour Market Studies. <sup>c</sup> Survey conducted by SPI. <sup>d</sup> «NI: PCM. 2010» survey. It does not cover relatives who have worked abroad but returned. <sup>f</sup> The EU countries, Norway and Switzerland <sup>e</sup> «DnB NORD Latvian barometer» Nr. 35. <sup>g</sup> Excluding own experience (due to lack of information on the time period). <sup>h</sup> Author estimate.

Source: Calculations with survey data.

Box  
2.26

### Return migrants' assessment of the impact of the time spent abroad on various life domains, %

	Positive	Both positive and negative	Negative	Difficult to tell	No impact
Health	60.4	14.9	12.1	2.3	10.3
Family relationship	63.6	14.7	3.5	5.7	12.5
Material well-being	73.3	14.4	7.8	1.2	3.4
Self-confidence	82.0	3.2	6.8	3.3	4.7
Professional skills	69.4	10.9	2.1	3.3	14.2
Latvian or Russian language (the non-native one) skills	44.3	11.8	5.3	4.7	34.0
English language skills	69.1	10.4	8.3	2.2	10.0
Other foreign language skills	33.1	13.9	12.5	9.2	31.3

Source: Calculations with «NI: PCM. 2010» survey data.

most respondents (69%) see this effect as positive, whereas a negative effect is reported by just 2% (see Box 2.26 for details). This effect is more often seen as positive by young respondents, while respondent's education level does not play a significant role.

The effect of the foreign experience on Latvian or Russian (the non-native one) language skills is less pronounced but very interesting. A positive effect is reported by 44% respondents, one-third have not felt any impact, while a negative assessment is very rare (see Box 2.26 for details). In this case the impact differs depending on the main language used in the respondents' family: among the Latvian-speakers, 51% of responses are positive, whereas among the Russian-speakers this proportion is just 37%. In other words, half of the Latvian-speakers and almost two-fifths of the Russian-speakers think that the foreign experience helped them to improve skills in the second language.

Expectedly, the time spent abroad had a positive impact on English language skills of most (69%) respondents. More often than others an improvement in their English language proficiency report young respondents: 83% of the 18 to 24 year olds and 77% of the 25 to 34 year olds. In this question, the respondent's education level also matters: Among those with basic education just 50% report a positive effect, whereas among respondents with secondary (respectively, tertiary) education this proportion is 70% (respectively, 77%).

With respect to other foreign language skills, the negative assessment of foreign experience is more pronounced (13%) than in the case of English, yet the positive assessment prevails (33%).

As noticed when discussing Box 2.14 above, return migrants feature a higher employment level than population without foreign experience; however, econometric analysis (omitted here) proves that this difference can be explained by the differences in age and gender distributions of the two groups.


Box 2.27 sheds some light on the question whether foreign work experience helps to earn more in Latvia. For this purpose, we look at personal after-tax income of individuals employed in Latvia in the second half of 2010, depending on their (and their family members') post-accession foreign work experience. Among those respondents who did not have family members working abroad during the survey, those with own foreign work experience have, on average, a 18% higher income than those without such an experience (306 vs. 261 lats per month). On the other hand, among respondents who did have a family member working abroad during the survey (and, therefore, were likely to receive remittances), return migrants' average income exceeds average income of individuals without recent foreign work experience by 25% (383 vs. 306 lats per month). Comparing median rather than average income of these groups does not change the results qualitatively. Econometric analysis (details omitted) confirms that also after controlling for education level, age, gender, region and family members working abroad, employed return migrants collect a 13% higher income than their counterparts employed without post-accession foreign work experience; moreover this difference is due to foreign experience rather than to productivity difference between return migrants and other workers. A similar result based on data of year 2007 is found in Hazans (2008).

In sum, both the respondents' opinions and their labour market outcomes suggest that the effect of foreign work experience on various life domains of return migrants has been positive most of the time.

### Emigration intentions

This section explores emigration intentions of Latvia's residents aged 18-65 in the period between December 2010 and February 2011, after more than two years of recession, accompanied by a powerful emigration wave.

**Box 2.27** Personal after-tax income of individuals employed in Latvia in the second half of 2010, by own and family members' foreign work experience



Source: Calculations with «NI: PCM. 2010» survey data.

The results are broken down by respondents' education level, main occupation (status), ethnicity, citizenship, region, type of settlement and foreign experience.

The «NI: PCM. 2010» survey includes a question whether the respondent plans to move from Latvia in the near future in order to improve his [family] material well-being. Those who answered «Yes» or «I do not exclude such a possibility» are categorized as potential emigrants; the former group is further referred to as having concrete plans.

To analyse reasons for emigration, we use the question «Do you plan to live and work abroad?» from the «DnB NORD» survey; positive answers were supposed to be supplied together with one or several reasons from the given list. We divide the potential emigrants into two categories. The first one includes those who mention one of the following *economic reasons* (no jobs available in Latvia; no possibility to earn a living in Latvia; elsewhere one can earn much more; better social protection abroad), possibly together with one or more other (non-economic) reasons. The second category includes those who did not mention any of the economic reasons, but plan emigration *only for non-economic reasons* – one or the few of the following: possibility to see the world, to get new impressions, to meet new friends; education and career possibilities; no future in Latvia; does not like what is going on in Latvia; does not like the political environment; wants to live in a stable country; influence of other people.

Note that estimated total emigration potential is somewhat larger according to the «DnB NORD» survey. This is because in this survey the question on emigration intentions is not restricted to economic emigration and

refers to plans in general rather than to plans regarding the near future.

### Gender and age


As far as respondents' gender and age are concerned, we find expected results – there is more potential movers among males and young individuals. Among males, 30% are potential emigrants: about 10% of males plan to leave Latvia in the near future, while another 20% do not exclude such a possibility (Box 2.28, right). The proportion of potential movers among females is smaller – about 23%. According to «DnB NORD» survey (which does not refer to «the near future»), this difference is less pronounced: 33% males and 28% females plan to leave Latvia. Both males and females more often mention economic reasons for moving abroad; however, the proportion of those driven only by non-economic reasons is higher among female potential emigrants (Box 2.28, left).

When different age groups are compared, the highest proportions of those with concrete plans to leave Latvia in the near future are found among those aged 18 to 24 years (16%) and 25 to 34 years (15%). Both the proportion of those who plan to leave Latvia in the near future and the proportion of those who do not exclude such a possibility decreases with age (Box 2.28, right). Relative importance of economic reasons for emigration decreases with age, while the proportion potential movers driven only by non-economic reasons increases.

Overall, in December 2010 – January 2011, 9% of population aged 18 to 65 planned to leave Latvia in the

## Emigration intentions of Latvia's residents, by gender and age group, 2010/12-2011/02, population aged 18-65

Box  
2.28



Sources: Calculations with survey data.

Left – «DnB NORD Latvia's barometer Nr. 35» survey. Right – «NI: PCM. 2010» survey.

near future and another 17% did not exclude such a possibility, together making a 26% large group of potential emigrants. On the other hand, in February 2011, 20% of the same population admitted plans to emigrate for economic (or economic and other) reasons, while another 10% – only for non-economic reasons, thus raising the proportion of potential movers to 31% (note that in this case the plans do not necessarily refer to the near future).

It is important to notice that two-thirds of those who plan to move abroad in the near future are younger than 35, whereas the proportion of this age group among *stayers* aged 18 to 65 is less than one-third. Hence, implementation of the above-mentioned emigration plans will substantially speed-up aging of Latvia's society.

Education and main occupation


According to the «NI: PCM. 2010» survey, the highest propensity to emigrate *in the near future* is found among the population with a secondary education: 28 per cent of them are potential movers, including 10 per cent with concrete plans. The other two groups are not far behind, however: 25 % those with less than secondary education and 22 % of the highly-educated are potential emigrants, in both cases including 7 % with concrete plans (Box 2.29, right).

Larger differences between the skilled groups are observed with respect to *reasons for emigration* (Box 2.29,

left). We divide the reasons into two categories: *economic reasons* (no jobs available in Latvia; no possibility to earn a living in Latvia; elsewhere one can earn much more; better social protection abroad) and *non-economic reasons* (possibility to see the world, to get new impressions, to meet new friends; education and career possibilities; no future in Latvia; does not like what is going on in Latvia; does not like the political environment; wants to live in a stable country; influence of other people). Respondents could indicate more than one reasons. Note that total emigration potential is somewhat larger according to the left panel of Box 2.29 than is found in the right panel. This is because the survey question used in the left panel is not restricted to economic emigration and refers to plans in general rather than to plans regarding the near future.

The proportion of those who plan to move abroad for economic (and maybe other) reasons decreases with education level: from 29 per cent among respondents with a basic education to 13 per cent among university graduates. By contrast, the proportion of those who plan emigration only for non-economic reasons increases from 8 per cent among the low-educated to 14 per cent among respondents with a tertiary education.

From an occupational perspective, the highest propensity to emigrate in the near future is found among students: more than a half of them are potential emigrants, including 18 per cent with concrete plans



(Box 2.29, right). A smaller yet significant propensity to emigrate is found among the unemployed, manual workers and non-manual workers, with between 23 and 30 per cent potential emigrants, including between 7 and 12 per cent with concrete plans (Box 2.29, right). On average, one-third of potential movers mention only non-economic reasons for emigration; the only occupational group in which most potential movers do not mention any economic reasons for their plans, is that of non-manual workers (Box 2.29, left).

Noteworthy, very high propensity to emigrate (37% overall, including almost 9% with concrete plans) is found among persons with unfinished higher education whose main occupation is not studies (this result is not shown in Box 2.29).

The unemployed are more often inclined to leave Latvia due to economic or economic and non-economic reasons (this is the case for 35% of all jobseekers) than only for non-economic reasons (8%). A similar situation is found among manual workers (20% and 7%, respectively). Among non-manual workers, on the other hand, 15% plan to leave Latvia only for non-economic reasons, while 12% mention economic reasons. Noteworthy, total emigration potential is equally large (27%) among both manual and non-manual workers (Box 2.29, left).


*Selectivity charts* provide a convenient way to show to what extent various population groups are over- or under-represented among potential emigrants (in

comparison with *stayers*). Box 2.30 presents such charts, for various education levels and occupation categories, in according to the «DnB NORD» survey (left) and the «NI: VMR. 2010» survey (right). Recall that each of the surveys identifies two categories of potential emigrants (by reasons and by concreteness of plans, respectively), and each category is presented by a polygon whose vertices correspond to population groups; another polygon presents all potential emigrants together. The distance between a particular vertex and the *zero line* (black dotted line in Box 2.30) equals the selectivity index (see Box 2.18) of the corresponding population group: if that is positive (respectively, negative), the vertex is outside (respectively, inside) the zero line. The further outside the line is a vertex, the larger is the extent (ratio) to which the proportion of the corresponding group among movers exceeds such a proportion among *stayers*. If these proportions are equal, the vertex is located on the zero line. The centre of the selectivity chart does not have an interpretation, this is just a reference point.

As one can see in Box 2.30, the proportion of students in all categories of movers is much higher than among *stayers*. Although in a less pronounced way, this is the case also for the unemployed, but with exception of the category «movers for only non-economic reasons», where the unemployed are represented proportionally. Individuals with higher education are under-represented among those planning to leave Latvia in the near future

Box  
2.30

### Selectivity index of some socio-economic groups with respect to motivation and concreteness of emigration plans, 2010/12-2011/02



Sources: Calculations with survey data.

Left – «DnB NORD Latvia's barometer Nr. 35» survey. Right – «NI: PCM. 2010» survey.



(especially among those with concrete plans), as well as among potential emigrants driven by economic reasons. On the other hand, among those who plan to move abroad only for non-economic reasons, the proportions of tertiary-educated and non-manual workers are larger, but the proportions of manual workers and individuals with just basic education – smaller than among *stayers*. Persons with basic education are over-represented among movers driven by economic reasons, as well as among all potential (not necessarily in the near future) emigrants.

The ethnic factor

Ethnicity and citizenship are important determinants of migration intentions. The highest propensity to emigrate in the near future is found among non-Latvians with Latvian citizenship: one-third of them are potential emigrants, compared with one-quarter among ethnic Latvians. Non-Latvians without Latvian citizenship feature the smallest propensity to emigrate: only one-fifth of them plan to leave Latvia or do not exclude such a possibility (Box 2.31, right). Recall that the latter group is not covered by the legal provisions on free movement of labour within the EU, which reduces expected gains from migration. On average, 28% of non-Latvians are potential emigrants.

The same pattern is found when emigration plans regarding either the near or distant future (and for any reason) are considered: 37% of non-Latvians with Latvian citizenship are potential emigrants in this wider sense, followed by ethnic Latvians with 29% and minority non-citizens with 26% (Box 2.31, left).

In comparison with the results based on surveys conducted in 2005-2007 (see Hazans and Philips, 2010:


Table 2, cols [6-10]), these findings support the above stated hypothesis *H3 (g)* about the increase of the proportion of minorities (especially those holding Latvian citizenship) among emigrants during the crisis.

It is worth noting, however, that the proportions of potential emigrants with concrete plans differ very little across the ethnic groups, and this time the highest rate (10%) is found among ethnic Latvians, followed by minority non-citizens (9%) and minority-citizens (8%), see Box 2.31, right. However, ethnic Latvians and non-Latvians differ in terms of motivation for emigration: among Latvians, 39% of potential emigrants mentioned only non-economic reasons, whereas among non-Latvians this proportion was just 28%.

Regional disparities

Region of residence is an important determinant of migration intentions. As shown above, the two surveys we are using («NI: PCM. 2010» and «DnB NORD») produce similar findings about the effects of age, gender, education, occupation, ethnicity and citizenship on emigration plans. Unfortunately, this is not the case with regions (especially as far as Vidzeme and Kurzeme regions are concerned). This is because the sample size in each of these surveys (about 1,000 respondents) is not sufficient to ensure representativity at the regional level. Some municipalities were covered in one of the surveys but not in the other or have substantially different weights in the two samples. Given that municipalities within the same region can differ strongly in terms of the level of economic development, this can lead to inconsistencies between the two surveys at the regional level.

To ensure validity of the results at the regional level, we present emigration potential as the average result



of the two surveys, without distinguishing potential emigrants by reason or by certainty of plans (this is a legitimate approach, given similar question wording and a short time interval between the surveys). As shown in Box 2.32, in three of the five regions (Vidzeme, Riga region and Latgale) the [relative] emigration potential at the beginning of 2011 was virtually identical: 30% to 31% of population aged 18 to 65 considered emigration; in Kurzeme this proportion was 26%, but in Zemgale – 19%.

### The role of social networks and foreign experience

Informal channels of obtaining information – social networks and own experience – have a significant role in shaping emigration plans. Moreover, the more recent is experience and the closer to the person is the provider of information, the larger possibility of emigration. Box 2.3 illustrates.

Among individuals (aged 18 to 65) who do not have relatives or friends with a foreign work experience (and of course do not have such an experience themselves)

### Emigration intentions of Latvia's residents, by region, 2010/12-2011/02, population aged 18-65

Box  
2.32




Notes: The Figure presents average results of two surveys, accounting for answers «Yes» and «Do not exclude» in the «NI: PCM. 2010» survey and for all positive answers (disregarding the stated reason for moving) in the «DnB NORD Latvia's barometer Nr. 35».

Source: Calculations with survey data.

### Emigration intentions of Latvia's residents, by own, relatives' and friends' foreign experience. Population aged 18-65, 2010/12-2011/02

Box  
2.33



Sources: Calculations with survey data.

Left – «DnB NORD Latvia's barometer Nr. 35». Right – «NI: PCM. 2010» survey.

just 14% are potential emigrants (Box 2.33, left). Among persons without a foreign work experience during the last 10 years, who do not have relatives (but may have friends) with such an experience, already 18% plan to move abroad in the near future or do not exclude such a possibility (Box 2.33, right). Among individuals who have a relative or friends with a foreign work experience in the past (respectively, working abroad during the survey), 31% (respectively, 37%) plan to move abroad (Box 2.33, left); moreover, for someone who has a relative with a foreign work experience within last 10 years, there is a 30% likelihood to plan emigration *in the near future* or to admit such a possibility (Box 2.33, right). Finally, 43% of the return migrants plan to move abroad again in the near future and another 23% admit such a possibility.

### The wealthy also pack their bags

A priori, one can think that the highest propensity to move abroad is found among those who have the largest difficulties to make ends meet in Latvia, i.e. among the low-income population, while the wealthy feature the lowest incidence of emigration plans Box 2.34 presents the proportion of potential movers by quintiles of household per capita income. As income increases from low to middle, the proportion of potential movers with concrete plans in the near future indeed declines from 11% to 5%, but then it increases again to 8% and 7% among persons with middle-high and high income (Box 2.34, right). There is virtually no difference in propensity to move abroad in the near future between low-middle and middle-high income groups.

On the other hand, among individuals from the three lowest income quintiles, 22% to 25% plan emigration for economic (and maybe other) reasons, whereas within two highest quintiles this proportion is just 14% to 16%. Overall propensity to move (for whatever reason) among persons with middle-high and high income is just slightly lower than among others: 26% vs. 29% to 33%. This suggests that income level has a significant yet not decisive impact on emigration intentions of Latvia's population.


### Multifactor analysis of emigration intentions

In order to gain in-depth understanding of motivation and concreteness of emigration intentions of various population groups, we use econometric models, which explain impact of gender, age, family status, completed education level, ethnicity and citizenship, main occupation, region and degree of urbanisation on individual's emigration plans. The main results of this analysis are summarised in Box 2.35.

Other things equal, females and males without under-age children<sup>1</sup> do not differ much in terms of propensity to emigrate, although probability to plan moving abroad in the near future is by 2.6 percentage points larger for a female than for otherwise similar male. By contrast, when a female with children is compared to an otherwise similar male with children, female's probability to plan emigration

<sup>1</sup> Hereafter, «with children» means that in respondent's family there is at least one child younger than 18 years who lives together with the respondent. Otherwise the respondent is referred to as «without children».

**Box 2.34** Emigration intentions of Latvia's residents, by household per capita income, 2010/12-2011/02, population aged 18–65



Sources: Calculations with survey data. Left – «DnB NORD Latvia's barometer Nr. 35». Right – «NI: PCM. 2010» survey.

in the near future or in general is by 5.5 to 6 percentage points smaller, probability to plan emigration due to economic reasons – by 9 percentage points smaller, while probability to plan emigration due to only non-economic reasons – by 3 percentage points larger<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> These results are obtained by adding up the effects from rows «Female» and «Female with children».

Presence of children in the family significantly increases males' propensity to emigrate due to economic reasons, while for females this effect is negative with respect to concrete plans in the near future but is not significant with respect to emigration in general or due to only non-economic reasons (note that for females the children's effect in each of the five columns of Box 2.35

Box  
2.35

## Impact of demographic factors and occupation on emigration plans

Percentage points

	Do you plan to move from Latvia in the near future to improve your/family material well-being?		Do you plan to live and work abroad?		
	Yes	Yes or Do not Exclude	Yes (for any reason)	Yes, for economic (and maybe other) reasons	Yes, only for non-economic reasons
<i>Proportion of positive answers</i>	9.1%	26.2%	30.8%	20.4%	10.4%
<b>Factors</b>					
<b>Gender and family</b>					
Female	2.6**	-3.0	-1.2	0.7	-1.5
Married or lives with a partner	1.3	-7.0***	-2.6	-0.7	-2.9
Lives with children	3.6**	8.0***	4.6	7.8***	-3.6
Female with children	-8.1***	-6.4*	-5.1*	-9.6***	4.9**
<b>Age (vs. 55–65)</b>					
18-24	22.9***	33.0***	34.5***	33.4***	2.2
25-34	23.0***	32.4***	30.4***	25.6***	8.0**
35-44	17.0***	20.9***	22.8***	19.2***	6.3**
45-54	11.4***	14.1***	13.2***	13.2***	2.6
<b>Education (vs. secondary)</b>					
Below secondary	-6.0***	-7.1**	-3.4	-1.9	-1.9
Tertiary	-2.7	-2.5	2.3	-3.0	4.3***
<b>Ethnicity &amp; citizenship (vs. Latvian)</b>					
Non-Latvian, LV citizen	-2.0	7.3***	7.4***	8.3***	-0.5
Non-Latvian, non-citizen	2.6*	2.4	0.9	6.7**	-6.4***
<b>Main occupation (vs. wage earners)</b>					
Unemployed	4.8***	6.0**	14.9***	14.3***	-1.1
Student	1.7	6.8	19.4***	6.3	11.1***
Other	1.1	-10.7***	1.4	2.0	-0.8
<b>Monthly household income per capita, LVL (vs. 121-160)</b>					
Up to 80	5.4**	-1.9	-2.3	-5.1*	3.2
81-120	4.3**	1.8	1.5	-4.5	8.0***
161-200	3.3	1.8	-1.1	-8.8***	9.3***
>200	1.3	-3.3	-4.4	-7.8**	5.2**
NA	4.3*	-0.3	0.5	-9.3***	11.2***
<b>Other controls</b>					
	5 regions and 3 urbanisation levels ( indicator variables)				
<b>N observations</b>	869	869	868	868	868

Notes: \*, \*\*, \*\*\* – estimates significantly different from zero at 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.

Sources: Calculations with survey data: The first two columns – «DnB NORD Latvia's barometer Nr. 35»; the last three columns – «NI: PCM. 2010» survey.

can be obtained by adding up the effects from the rows «Lives with children» and «Female with children»). This supports hypothesis (H3)-(d) that after the crisis the potential emigrants are oriented towards long-term or permanent emigration and more often move as whole families.

While emigration intentions vary significantly by age group, it is worth noting that the 25 to 34 year olds have practically as strong propensity to emigrate as those aged 18 to 24: in comparison with the 55 to 65 year olds, other things equal, for both groups probability to plan emigration in the near future is by 23 percentage points larger, probability to plan emigration in general (without specifying the time) – by 30 to 35 percentage points larger, but probability to plan emigration due to economic reasons – by 26 to 34 percentage points larger. For population aged 35 to 44 years, all above mentioned probabilities are by 6 to 11 percentage points smaller than for the 25 to 34 year olds, but for those aged 45 to 54 years – by another 6 to 10 percentage points smaller. When the average probability for each model is taken into account (see row «Proportion of positive answers» in Box 2.35), it appears that the strongest age effects, which exceed the average prevalence of emigration plans by a factor of two-and-a-half, are related to concrete plans to move abroad in the near future.

Noteworthy, the strongest propensity to emigrate only due to non-economic reasons is found within population aged 25 to 44 years.

When other factors are controlled for, the difference between persons with secondary and tertiary education with respect to propensity to emigrate becomes insignificant, except for emigration only due to non-economic reasons; in the latter case, university graduates feature a 4.3 larger probability. These findings once again support our hypothesis (H3)-(e) about a significant increase in the proportion of the highly educated among emigrants during crisis.

On the other hand, for a person whose education is below secondary, probability to plan [economic] emigration in the near future is by 6 to 7 percentage points smaller than for an otherwise similar secondary-educated person. This is despite the low-educated suffered more than others from the recession-triggered lay-offs (see Box 2.35).

Non-Latvians with Latvian citizenship, in comparison with otherwise similar ethnic Latvians, feature by 7 to 8 percentage points larger probability to plan or admit moving abroad in the near future; the same is true for the overall probability to emigrate (without specifying the time) and for the probability to plan emigration due to economic reasons. On the other hand, non-Latvians without Latvian citizenship are not significantly

different from Latvians with respect to the first two of the above-mentioned probabilities. However, probability to plan emigration due to economic reasons among non-citizens is by 7 percentage points larger than among ethnic Latvians, other things equal. This, in turn, is partly offset by a 6 percentage points smaller probability to plan emigration only due to non-economic reasons. Finally, among non-Latvians with Latvian citizenship the propensity to move abroad only due to non-economic reasons is the same as among otherwise similar Latvians.

While findings reported in the previous paragraph indicate that non-citizens are less inclined to emigrate than otherwise similar Non-Latvians with Latvian citizenship, results from the first column of Box 2.35 are slightly different: other thing equal, probability to plan economic emigration in the near future for non-citizens is, on average, by of two-and-a-half percentage points larger than for Latvians and by four-and-a-half percentage points larger than for minority citizens. Plausibly, this is explained by a difficult labour market situation of non-citizens (see Box 2.14). Overall, the results of econometric analysis support our hypothesis (H3)-(g) about changes in the role of ethnicity in the post-crisis period: propensity to emigrate has become larger among minority individuals than among Latvians, other things equal.

The unemployed, in comparison with otherwise similar employed persons, much more often plan moving abroad in the near future, emigration in general (disregarding reason and without specifying the time) and emigration due to economic (and maybe other) reasons; the impressive size of this effect is demonstrated by the fact that the difference in probabilities between the unemployed and employed (respectively, 5, 15 and 14 percentage points), in the two former cases is as large as a half of the average probability, but in the latter case – even 70%. If those who admit a possibility to move abroad in the near future are also considered potential emigrants (along with those having specific plans), then the likelihood to belong to this group for an unemployed is by 6 percentage points larger than for an employed person, other things equal; this effect is also significant, although not as sizable in relative terms as the ones mentioned before. By contrast, with respect to plans to move abroad only for non-economic reasons, an unemployed person does not differ significantly from an otherwise similar employed individual.

Finally, students are much more oriented towards emigration only for non-economic reasons than those whose main activity is work (other things equal): the difference in probabilities (11 percentage points) exceeds the average probability of this outcome.



Box  
2.36

## Main findings. Most important tasks

### Main findings

In 2000 – 2010, Latvia has lost at least 170-200 thousand persons due to [mostly unregistered] emigration. Emigrants, as well as potential emigrants, are, on average, much younger than *stayers*, hence actual age structure of Latvia's population substantially differs from the official one – Latvia's society is much older than we used to think, and it is aging faster than each of us.

Just 8% of emigrants plan (or rather plan than not) to return within six months. In a longer perspective (within five years) about 20% of emigrants admit a possibility of returning. In the time of economic crisis (2009-2010), the migration flows were to a much larger extent than before shaped by push factors (such as joblessness and wage cuts, as well as non-economic factors – loss of prospects, uncertainty and general dissatisfaction with the situation in Latvia). Noteworthy, the propensity to emigrate due to only non-economic reasons among citizens of Latvia does not depend on ethnicity and is larger than among non-citizens. Overall propensity to move abroad during the crisis is larger among non-Latvians (especially those holding Latvian citizenship). The proportion of the highly educated among emigrants increased significantly and exceeded corresponding proportion among *stayers*. Students are strongly over-represented among the potential emigrants. The brain drain risk becomes considerable.

### The most important tasks

First, the state should introduce a praxis of expert assessment of any significant policy changes, especially in such fields as education, employment, health care, taxes and benefits, in order to exclude risks that these changes increase motivation to emigrate among large groups of population.

Second, state and municipalities should engage in strengthening the links with the emigrants. This would be both the right thing to do from the moral standpoint and a strategically justified course of action from the perspective of human development. Most likely, it will not return home those emigrants, which do not plan it themselves. However, in the longer perspective such a praxis will facilitate return migration and expand Latvia's «virtual borders». One might define the «national identity» in many ways, but whatever the definition, all of us – *stayers* and *movers* – still are to a large extent one nation: the people of Latvia. Negative effects of emigration will be smaller, if this will remain the case.

Third, at the EU level Latvia together with other new member states should actively promote creation of a mechanism which should compensate the countries of origin of the migrants for the loss of human capital, labour force and reproductive potential.

## 2.4. The Social Security of Latvian Families in Age of Economic Migration

When Latvia joined the European Union (hereafter EU) one of the stated aims was to provide social assistance and services for families. The families with children were defined in political documents as high-risk families for social exclusion (LM, 2003, 20-5). However, the welfare and wellbeing of these families and children has not improved despite the existence of various types of social assistance and support services. Data shows that families with children are still one of the main groups at risk of poverty and social exclusion (see Box 2.37). Simultaneously, to a great extent these families with children are among those social groups who are most affected by economic crises. Thus breadwinners in the families often have to make radical decisions such as looking for a work abroad with an aim to improve the material wellbeing of their families.

From the beginning of the new millennium until 2008 Latvia experienced rapid economic growth that offered people opportunities for work out of wider variety of vacancies. Then an economic recession began, unemployment soared, and many people decided to go abroad. General estimates indicate that between 2004 and 2008 was around 76,000 people from Latvia emigrated to Great Britain and Ireland, and another 4,000 emigrated to other countries in the European Economic Zone (hereafter EEZ). In 2009 were 15,385 emigrated to Great Britain (Indans, 2010, 4). The free movement of people in the common EU labour market offered flexible employment policies, e.g., terminated job agreements, seasonal work, etc. Evidence from the recent studies shows that decision to emigrate is higher among those who are exposed to socioeconomic unfavourable living conditions with weaker family ties. On the one hand,

they appear to have a weaker social capital and sense of belonging to their families and homes. On the other hand, it is considered easier for them to adapt to new circumstances abroad (see Broka 2011).

The modern family today is characterised by intensive mobility. With an aim to improve the living conditions it is possible to move from a poorer region to more developed one, from the countryside to a city, from a small town to the capital, or from one country to another. Emigration for welfare purpose often creates challenges and risks both for those who migrate and those staying behind. The families are facing additional burdens, particularly in the early stage of migration when socioeconomic conditions are underprivileged (see Parreñas, 2005; Borjas and Bratsberg, February 1996). Thus emerging labour migration from Latvia has affected social security of families and children left-behind. Statistical data demonstrates that Custody court informed local social service agencies about 2,061 (2,237 in 2010) socioeconomically disadvantaged families where 3,661 (3,851 in 2010) children were living in insecurity and vulnerability (LR LM VBTAI, 2010b, 2011). These are those families who were in need for social assistance and support. In 2011 there were 8 101 children in total living out of family care separately from their parents; and for 450 (373 in 2010) children their grandparents were assigned to perform the guardianship. While for another 245 (238 in 2010) children the guardianship was performed by other relatives (of total 846 in 2011 and 798 in 2010 new children out of family care) (LR LM VBTAI 2010a, 2011). The current socioeconomic situation, living conditions and political awareness are significant determinants

Box  
2.37

### Families with children: A group at risk of poverty and social exclusion

In 2010, 38.1% of Latvian population were at risk of poverty and social exclusion (Eurobarometer, February 2010; Eurostat, 2011a). The largest social group who obtained the poor person status in 2010 were children in Latvia (39 500 in January and 62 420 in October) (see Meiere 2010, 17). The poverty risk index for households with dependent children has increased from 18.5% to 22.7% during the recent years from 2004 to 2009. Particularly single-parent households with children (40%), and two parent households with three or more children (38.8%) are the main group being at risk of poverty. In comparison, two-parent families with one child (17.5%) or two children (18.4%) are among those experiencing lower poverty risks in their households (LR CSB, 2009). These objectionable data signifies the identity of poor families who are emerging in Latvia. Families finding themselves entrapped by poverty are also facing the higher risks for social exclusion. Hence the most vulnerable group are those excluded by targeted social policies and assistance increasing their human security and development potential. The longer time they are experiencing poverty and vulnerability, the harder it is to escape from it.

influencing parental emigration strategies and well-being of children left-behind.

The on-going migration process has established «transnational families». These are the families living some or most of the time separated from each other, yet hold together and creating something that can be seen as a feeling of collective welfare and unity, namely 'family hood', across national borders (see Bryceson and Vuorela, 2002, 3). This household type and family unit has become more common in Latvia. In the recent years, the number of children with one or both parents working abroad is increasing. While in May were estimated 4,123 children living with parents working abroad (391 with both parents and 3,732 with one parent working abroad), in September the number increased by 13.5% (559 children). At the beginning of the 2010/2011 school year there were 3,449 children with parents working abroad (see Box 2.38). Share of children whose parents are working abroad of population density shows that the largest number are living in Vidzeme (440) and Latgale (409) regions (LR IZM data). Transnational families and parents often are organizing the family relations and care for their children left-behind over time and space.

Due to the fact that the number of people moving abroad is increasing, the Regulations of the Cabinet of Ministers No. 655 with developed common plan for 2006-2009 was aimed to improve the current situation and reduce social exclusion of children left-behind by their migrating parents (Regulations of the Cabinet of Ministers/ Ministru Kabinets, entry into force on August 30, 2006 No. 655). However, the will to expand and provide support to families and children in urgent situations was abolished by the ministry of welfare arguing that previously mentioned policy-planning document is no longer on agenda due to the fact that the date has expired (LR Ministry of Welfare 2010). Another essential policy document, «The State Family Policy guidelines for 2011-2017» has prioritized several items in regard to children whose parents are working abroad: development of methodological guidelines for custody courts aiming to empower the international co-operation in protecting the rights of the child; provide teaching


assistance for students at 'drop-out' risk; and enhance the psychological assistance in educational and child care process (LR MK, 2011). In turn, the LR Ministry of Welfare in its developed plan for action has addressed only the wellbeing of the children lacking the sufficient care and general support (LR LM *nd.*, 15). Box 2.39 illustrates a situation when both parents are working abroad and other family members are taking care of the children.

Similar stories are often told in many places of Latvia. Parents are leaving and someone else has to care for their children. In such situation, custody court and social institutions on local level are involved in the process. Case study indicates that child is commonly the one who has no 'voice' and has to adapt to new circumstances. Children are not asked whether they are accepting the situation. Caregivers enter the families with new demands, rules and apply their experience that may be different from the ones the child has. As caregivers they do not perform their natural role; instead, they are substituting their parents. Relationship between children and parents may weaken over a longer period of time. Older children take the adult responsibilities and roles in terms of caring for younger children, cleaning house and preparing meals. Education becomes a secondary priority for those teenagers who have to take care of their homes. The social security of the family is endangered and often children are left on their own. The hardest time for children is in the early stage of economic migration. While children continue to live in socioeconomically disadvantaged circumstances, parents living abroad have access to different social guarantees and welfare in their new country of destination. They are able to maintain their material needs more easily (see Parreñas, 2005; Broka, 2009).

Broka has found that most common is that the children from one migrating parent families stay with mothers. Some children stay with their grandparents and very few stay with more distant relatives, friends or acquaintances (Karičerta, 2006, 2009). It is worth to mention that increasing number of children are left with guardians or other caregivers who are not members of their family in Latvia. Authorities at custody court say

Box  
2.38

### The number of school-age children whose parents are working abroad



Source: Author's data on the basis of information from the Ministry of Education and Science (IZM)

that children often are without lawful guardianship, or left-behind by the parents (an interview with custody court authority, 2011; Broka 2009). However, for the more precise evaluation there is a need for the latest statistics about this phenomenon, not completely recognized yet. In 2009 were 2,300 families who did not ensure the appropriate care and development of 3,916 children in Latvia (LR LM VBTAI, 2009b).

### Why there is a need to address the well being of children's well-being in transnational families?

Transnational families are becoming more and more common in Latvia and this signifies new challenges for them. Transnational families are experiencing the change and transformation of the social relationships in the family. The role of women and particular role of mother is changing. Distance often has a negative effect on relationships between family members. Social exclusion and divorced families are becoming more common. These processes have an essential effect on the socialisation of children, as well as partnerships between parents in caring for and supervising their children. In

interviews, one parent said that he «left behind a small child, but [upon returning] I encountered an adult.» People feel that they have lost control and authority as parents. Parents who leave Latvia provide their children with material support and hope that this will make up for the absence of emotional care (Broka, 2009). Despite this, there is the risk that when material support and emotional support are not in balance, there can be negative results for the children in the long term. When parents decide to move abroad to deal with the material situation of their families and leave the children behind, the primary issue is the psycho-social and emotional feelings of the child, not the issue of material support.

Also of vital importance is the child's age. There is a close correlation between age and the ability of children to adapt to new circumstances in the sense that the older the child, the easier it is for parents to prepare them for the departure of their parents (explaining and reaching agreement on distanced care organisations and principles). This is necessary to avoid negative influence on ongoing family life. Before parents leave, it is valuable to contact a psychologist and a social worker so that if the family faces needs while the parents are gone, they already have contacts with these specialists. That makes

Box  
2.39

#### Increasing welfare – but at whose expense?

Inga (47) has three daughters – Liene (5), Aija (10) and Liga (16). She has been unemployed for a long time. Supportive authorities at the local State Employment Agency (NVA) have told her about an opportunity to go for the seasonal work to England from February until November. There is not enough time to handle all formalities and documentation. Inga asks her mother from the countryside to come and to take care of her children. Two weeks later she leaves for work abroad.

Aija and Liga understand that mother have to travel abroad thus being able to earn more money, pay for the rent and other household payments. They appreciate it. They will no longer have to pinch' pennies for survival. Liene, in turn, is happy for her birthday party because she knows that there will be a cake and presents. The grandmother is willing to help her daughter and becomes an active caregiver for three grandchildren.

Later in May, the local education board realises that Liga has missed school without any excuse and that the grades of Liene and Aija have worsened. Information about the situation of the family is sent over to the local social services and the custody court. The court discovers that the mother did not ensure lawful guardianship for her children – the grandmother is not authorised guardian for the children, and she has not been assessed.

The custody court authorities and the social workers visit the family. Aija says that since her mother went for work abroad she is feeling badly. Liga adds that the relationship with grandmother is hard. Grandmother does not allow her to meet her friends, often shouts at Liene when she has not cleaned up things after herself or something else went wrong. The girls are not allowed to make phone calls or go anywhere. Aija claims that her grades have worsened because she often has a headache and stomach ache. She says that the grandmother hits her younger sisters. The girls are not speaking with mother, as calls abroad are expensive. For the most they are talking about school. The grandmother denies what the children have said. She admits that it is not easy for her to deal with three children. She also says that the money sent by her daughter are enough for the basic needs.

The custody court determines that the father of the three girls is also abroad and has not taken any part in care for the children for a long time. The children have no legal representation and thus the issue of establishing guardianship arises. Information is requested to make sure that the grandmother is a suitable guardian. The social service has developed a social rehabilitation plan and work with the family has begun. A psychologist helps the grandmother to select and implement the most appropriate child rearing methods. A guardian is appointed for the children and the family is under the watchful eye of the relevant institutions. The appointment of the guardian does not eliminate the mother's parental rights but the social services do take steps to remove the right of parentage from the father.

it easier for the caregiver and for the child to adapt to changing social circumstances. Parents must clearly understand that economic gains (improved welfare and material conditions) do not compensate for the emotional losses, which the family feels – the younger the child, the more powerful the sense of loss. Finally, the family must decide on how long a period their children will be able to spend without their parents. It is important to understand that the longer the children are left without their parents, the harder it will be for them to learn about the traditional model of a family and to absorb life experience from their parents (Lialigene, Rupshene, November 2008; Broka, 2009).

The state shall ensure the child such protection and care as is necessary for his or her well-being. Thus if parents cannot provide moral and material care for their children the state and other assistance of the public authorities have responsibility to ensure particular care of children left without a family and to those without adequate support (UN, 1989; Eurochild, 2008-2010). The Latvian law on social services and social protection

states that families facing social problems and in need have the right to state protection. A special protection is also intended for children without the care of their parents.<sup>1</sup> However, the status of children left-behind by migrating parents has not been defined as a precondition when children are without the care of their parents. Therefore, the children left-behind are not subjects to preventive social assistance and support provided by the state and local authorities. In the future perspective the social welfare, health and education policies shall identify vulnerability and ensure social security for all families with children in need. The well-being of families in the future can be guaranteed by the social welfare, employment policies and practices today. The social security of families and children depend on human and social capital, living conditions, the prevailing socioeconomic situation, and political responsibility for that situation.

<sup>1</sup> Article 33.1, 33.1<sup>2</sup>, 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 of the law.

Box  
2.40

## Main conclusions and messages

### Main conclusions

The economic labour migration has enhanced the development of transnational family model in Latvia. Increasing numbers of children left-behind have parents living and working abroad. Hence these families and children are the subjects of social insecurity. Divided by borders families are experiencing lower living conditions and facing higher risks for social exclusion, particularly in the early stage of migration. These migrating families have weaker social networks to Latvia and are more open for labour migration and social security.

### Messages

New **social, welfare and family policies** in Latvia shall address the well-being and social security of transnational families divided by borders, particularly taking into consideration the well-being of children left-behind.

There is a need to increase **the knowledge and understanding** about migration patterns and its impact on established relationship between parents and children left-behind that is balancing between material, moral and emotional care. Thus targeted national and local policies shall increase the responsibility of parents going abroad and support children left-behind.

Shared responsibility between the state and society shall be included in social, economical and psychological security policy framework in Latvia.

At EU level Latvia together with other new member states shall be active in development of 'translocal' protecting mechanisms that may relatively compensate the loss of human capital and 'brain drain'.





## Regional Identity and the Capability Strategies of Local Governments, Communities and Individuals

3

### INTRODUCTION

3.1. REGIONAL IDENTITY AND A SENSE OF BELONGING TO A PLACE

3.2. «CLOSE LINKS KEEP YOU HERE IN A CERTAIN WAY» – LINKS TO A PLACE AND FACTORS AND TYPES THEREIN

3.3. IN SEARCH FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT STRATEGIES

3.4. INDIVIDUAL STRATEGIES AT CAPABILITY: CHALLENGES AND RISKS

### CONCLUSION

# Introduction

Regional identity represents a sense of belonging to the region or place where a person lives. In the context of human development, it is important to determine the way in which regional identity influences the capability of various social agents. In this context, we can pose a series of questions such as how important is regional identity in contemporary society, how local governments, activists and other social agents come together to defend their interests and resolve common problems in specific territories or places. What are the individual strategies which people establish to ensure their own welfare?

This chapter of the report will review regional identity and the way in which it emerges, looking at how the territorial belonging of people has been influenced by administrative and territorial reforms (ATR), what local governments have done in establishing and implementing developmental strategies, and what is done by other,

local social agents (businesspeople, other employers, local action groups, etc.).

Latvia is a small country. It can be crossed in just a few hours' time, and travellers may not even notice the things which people feel to be important differences in their everyday lives in terms of making one location more attractive while ensuring that another location is abandoned even if it was once actively populated. There are a number of important administrative and territorial centres – cities which emerged in places which have been settled for millennia – which today are semi-abandoned and with dusty and potholed streets. Elsewhere, a small workers' estate has been turned into a well-appointed town over the course of several decades. Can the attractiveness of a place be assessed on the basis of kilometres of paved roads, the number of hospitals, schools, registered companies, etc., or the age and gender proportions of the location's population?

## 3.1. Regional Identity and a Sense of Belonging to a Place

What makes a place unique and attractive for residents? What, on the contrary, ensures that a place will be abandoned and weary? Are we dealing with an attractive landscape, cubic metres of easily available natural resources, or the memory of our ancestors? Is the issue good traffic links and modern communications, convenient shopping opportunities and lots of jobs? Perhaps we are considering a developed social infrastructure or the people who live in the location?

A place comes back to life when it becomes important to residents who allow it to turn from an anonymous and amorphous part of the Universe into a place where social reality is actively formed. The environment in which we live is not a passive object of social life. It actively participates in the formation of human knowledge, experience and behaviour, and that is a process which begins in early childhood. The 2004/2005 Report on Human Development focused on the concept of regional identity, finding that a sense of belonging to Latvia and to a specific place of residence are of equal importance (Zobena, 2005). The concept of **regional identity** merges the aspects of a region (place) and a social community. Explanations of **collective identity** usually involve the question of the groups in society to which the individual feels a sense of belonging. The concept of regional identity underlines belonging to nearby communities – families, kinships, colleagues, neighbours, etc., also thinking about the location which the individual perceives as a recognisable place in which his or her daily life is spent.

In traditional communities, belonging to a social community and a place coincide – the community populates a specific territory, has common values, traditions, etc. (culture), and is **limited in terms of social and spatial mobility**. People inherit ways of earning a living and careers from their ancestors, and their relations with others are substantially influenced by the reputation (social status) of the relevant family. This

remains true over the course of several generations. In communities of farmers, spatial mobility is limited by links to the land which is farmed. The scope and practices of spatial belonging among individuals today are changing very rapidly. Jobs, provision of services, involvement in networks and communities at various levels and everyday movement models are very diverse, indeed. Sometimes there are neighbours who have not ever visited anyplace further than the nearest small town, work for their neighbours, shop at the local store and find that watching television is their most important form of entertainment. Alongside them there may be true citizens of the world who travel all around the world for business purposes, go shopping in Western Europe, and holiday in Egypt or Turkey. We can see that «links to a place» can be very diverse – whether limited to the nearby surroundings or develop to the global scope. At the same time, however, people who live in a single territory usually feel a sense of belonging to very different communities, and they are familiar with spaces of various sizes.

### Sedentarists or nomads?<sup>2</sup>

Latvians are often presented in the Latvian mass media as sedentarists who can be compared to people who have an unstable sense of a place and are more likely to be seen as nomads. Nomads cannot integrate into established social structures, there is a great distance between them and territorial communities, they care little for the development of the territorial community, and they are constantly looking for a better place to live. Territorial mobility is a prerequisite, however, for the more dynamic development of individuals and societies. Territorial mobility allows individuals to gain new knowledge, also allowing societies to ensure the transfer of knowledge. This means that it is necessary to actualise the fairly classical dilemma – intensive territorial mobility can promote the development of a society, but it can also create conflicts which hinder that development.

Social groups can have different or even diametrically opposite perceptions about a place. Links to a place ensure a sense of security and welfare, making it easier to demarcate borders between groups and to preserve collective memories. It is important for members of a territorial community to establish common identities. A sense of a place and one's roots are the foundation

<sup>1</sup> The concept of a region is broadly used in the public arena and in various areas of science. Like many other frequently used concepts, this one has several definitions, understandings and explanations, and it is difficult to find common ground among them all. In recent times, the words «region» and «regional» have often been used to describe the periphery or countryside, separating Rīga as the centre of the country from the rest of Latvia. It has to be said, however, that this is not a proper way to use the concept of a «region,» and it is not in line with regional policy positions or scholarly conclusions in regional research studies. In this text, we are using the word «region» mostly from the perspective of a sense of belonging to a place, applying it not just to cultural or historical planning regions, but also to places to which social communities feel a sense of belonging.

<sup>2</sup> Sociologist Aivars Tabuns has written about sedentarism, using various words in Latvian which are antonyms to the concept of being a nomad.

for a sense of stability. The self and a place are not independent phenomena, they overlap. The questions «Who am I?» and «Where am I?» cannot be separated, because places form social identity (Tabuns, 2007).

Places bring people together, but this proximity does not always create a sense of community. The most powerful type of a sense of place is existentially internal – the place is rich with meanings, even without considered and purposeful reflections. A place can be perceived without passion, and it can simply be seen as a background for events and activities. In that case people feel a split of sorts between themselves and the place where they are, and they feel no piety toward that place. People who identify themselves with a different territorial community may typically experience alienation and distancing from people and the place where they are forced to be (the person feels separate from «his or her» own space; the current place of residence is perceived as unpleasant or oppressive). Some people, however, characteristically have a sense that is existentially external – they are alienated from all places. Such people are never truly at home, and they know nothing about an emotional link or a sense of belonging to a specific place (Relph, 1976).

A sense of place is of particular importance today because time is substantially speeding up in the present-day world. This means that a place can enhance a sense of stability and succession among individuals, linking yesterday to today and history to the future. A place can be a source of pride or humiliation. A place is similar to a language – they overlap, in fact, and they both are key prerequisites for social links among people.

Statistics show that migration indicators have been quite high in Latvia ever since 1863. There were particularly intensive migration processes in Latvia after World War II (with 7.2 million long-term migrants between 1951 and 1990<sup>1</sup>). The migration rate declined a bit after 1991, but against the background of Latvia's total population it remained quite intensive. Between 1991 and 2010, the CSP registered 1.2 million long-term migrants, and it must be taken into account that these data are fairly incomplete when it comes to those who have moved abroad. Sociologists have not done much analysis of people who move from one place to another in the country, even though such migration is quite substantial. For instance, 476,000 residents moved from one place

to another in Latvia between 2001 and 2010 (CSP). Demographers use the concept of «long-term migration» to characterise these processes.

Statistical data at this time do not make it possible to assess the proportion of sedentarists (people who still live at their birthplace) in Latvia, but there was a sociological study conducted in the mid-1990s which showed that approximately one-third of respondents were living at the same place where they were born (International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), 1995). The amplitude in this regard varies very essentially among different countries, ranging from 61% or so of Italians, 49% of Spaniards, 48% of Slovaks and 46% of Bulgarians on one end of the scale to 3% of Americans, 6% of New Zealanders, 11% of Swedes, and 18% of Dutch people (ISSP, 1995). It has to be taken into account that there is a high proportion of single-family homes in the countries that are in the latter group, with strong traditions related to the self-governance of territorial communities which ensure self-regulation therein. It also has to be noted that most people in Latvia at this time have lived at the same place for more than a decade, and sociological data suggest that they have taken deep root in those residences over the course of that period of time.

## How can relations between a person and a place be described, and why is that important?

Of essential importance in the study of identity is not just national identity and one's belonging to a national community, but also a series of other important issues: How strong are regional identities and under what circumstances do they emerge, what are the territorial attitudes of residents, and how much do they feel a sense of belonging to territories and places of various sizes – the state, region, city, parish, neighbourhood or home (Anderson, 1983; DeGraaf, 2009; Paasi, 1991)?

A place is not just a spatial, territorial, geographic or cartographic phenomenon. **A place is a populated territory which is in a specific location in comparison to other places. It involves a physical infrastructure (buildings, roads, parks, industrial and agricultural territories, etc.), and there are everyday trajectories in terms of where people go and where they spend time. Also of importance is the meaning which people attach to a place** (Gieryn, 2000). A place can be of various sizes – a home, a neighbourhood, a region or a place of residence (Gieryn, 2000; Cresswell, 2004). When thinking about identity, a particularly important element of a place is the meaning that is attached to it. Also important are territorial attitudes – links between an individual and a place, as well as the relevant sense of emotional belonging. All of this has an effect on the individual's territorial behaviour.

Human behaviour and attitudes in relation to **various aspects of territorial planning and development** are often surprising in that the foundation for such activities does not always have obvious and rational economic

<sup>1</sup> Data from the Central Statistical Board (CSP), as calculated by Aivars Tabuns. This number speaks to those who immigrated to Latvia or emigrated from it, as well as those who changed their registered place of residence within Latvia. According to the CSP methodology, «long-term migration among residents represents the move of residents from one administrative territory to another with the purpose of changing their permanent place of residence at least for one year. Migration within cities or districts also includes people who migrate within the boundaries of the state but among various administrative territories. A person who moves from one place to another within a single city, parish or administrative district is not included in migration statistics.» See <http://data.csb.gov.lv/DATABASE/ledzsoc/lkgad%E7jie%20statistikas%20dati/ledz%E7vot%E2ji%20E%20Migr%E2cija/IE010lv.htm>. Viewed 5 July 2011.



justification. There are often very different aspects – community relations, the dynamics of the individual's social networks, as well as the ideas which people have about their place of residence, other people who live there, and other places that have emerged **as the result of diverse social and territorial experiences.**

British researchers have conducted studies about the **co-operation and conflicts** of various interest groups when it comes to **the development of rural territories.** They have concluded that various groups that are involved in rural development (farmers, people from the middle class who live in the countryside but work in cities) have very different ideas about the values of a place and about the way in which they see the development of their place of residence. Some people prefer the landscape, environmental quality, peace and security that are traditionally linked to idyllic rural life, while others emphasise the use of local resources for business or agricultural or industrial manufacturing (e.g., Marsden et al., 1993). These are not always rationally formulated interests. Often they represent territorial attitudes – a sense of belonging to a place, feelings about the place, the identity of the place, as well as various functional aspects of homes, the sense of a home, communities, the quality of the surrounding environment, and the structure of opportunities in the place. All of this leads to different experiences with places – ones which affect views and activities in relation to various aspects of territorial development.

Similar problems exist with **projects aimed at the regeneration of areas around cities** when it comes to the construction or reconstruction of buildings and infrastructural objects which improve the quality of life in rural areas (meeting houses, sports facilities, etc.). It is often the case that people who live in rural or urban areas have critical attitudes toward developmental and restoration projects elaborated by the planners (DeGraaf, 2009). One reason for this may be that such processes lead to substantial changes to one's accustomed environment. The building of new housing will attract other groups of residents to the place. These people often represent not just different lifestyles, but also different values and ideas about the place's development. For instance, when degraded urban districts are regenerated, the environment changes, properties become more valuable, and the composition of the local population changes as poorer people are forced out of their accustomed environment. In rural areas, in turn, agricultural or industrial manufacturing could be attractive to those who live in the area, own land and are interested in earning income. Opponents of such «productive» initiatives aimed at rural development may include those for whom the countryside is meant for recreation. Of key importance here is the issue of whether these regeneration projects are initiated and supported by the local community or whether their implementation has begun with a decision «from above» and without any thought given to the desires and needs of local residents. In the latter case, it is more likely that a well-intended regeneration project or construction of infrastructure will not achieve the goal

of improving the quality of life of local residents. That, in turn, means that people will not develop a sense of belonging to the improved place.

Territorial attitudes which represent the ideas and approaches which people take to their place of residence and other places can be reviewed in the context of three broader groups of attitudes: 1) **An emotional sense of belonging to a territory and various social communities;** 2) **Senses of belonging that are based on experience and identity** (a sense of place and identity), as well as; 3) **Functional links to a place** which relate to the structure of opportunities therein – opportunities to ensure the conditions that are necessary for a subjectively and objectively good life, as well as the level of satisfaction with the opportunities which the place of residence offers. The structure of opportunities at a place and the sense of emotional belonging are both important when thinking about territorial choices such as choosing or changing one's place of residence.

## How do places, related attitudes and the territorial behaviour of individuals change?

Territorial attitudes and identification to a specific place are mostly shaped by everyday experiences, but such experiences and everyday events in life are affected by organisers of regional policies at the state, regional and local government level. This applies to planners of territorial development, architects, and those who establish brands for territories (Gieryn, 2000). The place is also and equally shaped by various events and communications processes which strengthen identity (city festivals, the design of the urban area), support or lack thereof for infrastructure projects (roads, cultural centres, restoration of sports facilities, etc.), promotion of the various services that are available on an everyday basis (public transportation services), and the activities of local residents.

In places where people have convenient and simple access to jobs, as well as a diversity of high-quality everyday, social, public, cultural, entertainment and leisure time opportunities, it is very likely that local residents will have positive territorial attitudes. Environmental psychology is an area in which specialists tend to discuss satisfaction with a place and the ability of the place to correspond to the needs of people in a structural sense (Gustafson, 2006; Giuliani, 2003). Successful territorial planning (the location, links to other places, etc.) enable people to do things to ensure and enhance their welfare, while bad roads and transportation opportunities which limit the availability of jobs, educational and other services encourage people to leave the area, and those who can move to another location do so.

There have been various territorial and demographic processes in Latvia over the past decade that have fundamentally changed the places and communities in which people live in terms of scope and the availability



of services. These factors include an aging population, people moving from the countryside to cities or abroad, the economic crisis, as well as the administrative and territorial reforms. The size of the rural population is shrinking, these processes mean that the range of everyday services which people require is narrowing, and as the number of people of working age declines, provision of the social infrastructure that is necessary for a high-quality living environment becomes more expensive. **How can places be shaped so as to encourage a sense of belonging and linkage to a specific place under such circumstances? What are the demands of local residents toward the territory in which they want to live?** Of importance here is the functional side of a sense of belonging. Research (e.g., Stedman, 2002) shows that it is more possible to influence a person's territorial mobility than it is to affect other elements of identity and senses of belonging which relate to territorial attitudes.

The system of administrative and territorial reforms has set up new territorial units – administrative districts, which are very diverse in size. The administrative districts in many cases involve areas from the former system of territorial districts which have little or no cultural, historical and functional links amongst themselves; there are also administrative districts which do not have a real centre. Some administrative districts are very small, with just two or three parishes, while others are approximately of the same size as the former district. In thinking about these new administrative districts, there are several dimensions that are of particular importance when it comes to development plans for them. **What are the habits of people and the ability of people to find jobs and receive services in these new administrative districts? Do the everyday processes of individual occur inside a single administrative district or not? Are there differences among administrative districts? If so, what are they?**

Box  
3.1

### Main conclusions. The main task

#### Main conclusions

A sense of belonging to a place (regional identity) is an important element in the identity of many people, and so in the context of the development of the nation, it is important to find out how regional identity influences the ability of various social agents to act.

There are many different scopes and practices related to spatial belonging for individuals today. The behaviour and territorial attitudes of individuals and groups are of key importance in terms of various issues which have to do with territorial planning and development.

#### The main task

When it comes to human development in terms of improving the standard of living of individuals and their ability to find jobs, we must take into account the social, territorial and demographic processes which have occurred in Latvia over the last decade (an aging population, people moving from the countryside to cities or abroad, the economic crisis, as well as the country's system of administrative and territorial reforms). These have fundamentally changed the scope of places and communities, as well as the availability of services.

## 3.2. «Close Links Keep You Here in a Certain Way»<sup>4</sup> – Links to a Place and Factors and Types Therein

This section of the Report describes links to a place of residence, thinking about the elements which shape belonging and linkage to a place and are important for people who live at places of various levels of urbanisation. Do the elements of linkage differ from place to place? A sense of belonging and linkage to a place characterises the individual's **structure of opportunities in the place of residence** – available jobs, educational opportunities, a range of services, as well as **human needs, demands and lifestyles**. The issue is how to classify different places in accordance with these elements of linkage when it comes to establishing various types of linkage. Data from the national research programme «National Identity» have been used to study this issue, focusing on a 2011 national survey («NI: Place, Capability, Migration»).

<sup>1</sup> The text is from a poem by the Latvian poet Auseklis.


### Linkage to a place of residence: A general description

The following question was posed to respondents to find out what shapes a functional sense of belonging and linkage to a place: «In thinking about the city or rural area in which you live and about the kind of place where you would like to leave, please tell us which of the following elements link you to your current place of residence.» Respondents were given a list of answers, as well as an opportunity to write in their own answer. They were free to choose as many different answers as they wished (see Box 3.2).

The «NI: Place, Capability, Migration» study found that the elements mentioned by respondents most often were their **home** (79%) and the **proximity of families and relatives** (76%) – these are the two things which

Box  
3.2

### Elements shaping linkage to a place



Note: The question was as follows: «In thinking about the city or parish where you live now and the kind of place where you would like to live, please tick those items which currently link you to your existing place of residence» (the given answers are presented in percentages. All respondents, n=1009. Respondents were allowed to choose multiple responses, which is why the total sum is above 100%.

Source: «NI: Place, Capability, Migration». Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, 2010/2011

shape a sense of home. Two-fifths spoke about their surrounding area (43%) and a secure and peaceful living environment (42%). **Various services** were cited a bit less often as elements which linked respondents to their place of residence – a good public transportation and roads network, as well as everyday services (39% and 36%). Other services were mentioned less often – one fifth of respondents pointed to the quality of Internet and telephone services (23%), one-seventh (13%) focused on the availability of a high level of quality in education, one-eleventh (9%) plumped for the quality of the work of the relevant local government, while 8% mentioned social aid from the local government.

One-third of respondents said that **community** activities were important – surrounding people and neighbours (35%), cultural life (20%), and social life in the area (15%).

One-quarter of residents said that they feel a sense of belonging to their current place of residence because they can **earn a living** there (27%), while one-fifth spoke of opportunities to shape their jobs and careers (21%). Working people were more likely to mention earning opportunities as an element of belonging than non-working people were (36% and 14%). Similarly, work and career opportunities linked working people to a place three times more often than they did in terms of non-working people (30% as opposed to 9%). Opportunities to earn a living were also mentioned as one of the necessary elements in terms of the location where people were planning to move (an average of 33%, with this being the case more often with working people (39%) than non-working people (25%)). In other words, opportunities to find work and earn a living are not the main element which links a person to a place of residence, but for two-fifths of working people and one-quarter of non-working people, the potential to earn a living differentiates the existing place of residence from the desirable one.

## A description of linkage and the use of various services on the basis of the level of urbanisation in the place of residence

Riga, other towns and rural districts are populated areas with different population numbers, different structures of settlement, and various opportunities to receive services. There is reason to think, therefore, that the sense of belonging among local residents to these places will also be diverse (see Box 3.3).

People in **Riga, other towns and rural areas** were equally likely to say that the proximity of families and relatives were a factor which linked them to their place of residence. In discussing services and public life, however, the elements of linkage differed. Everyday services, public transportation, roads, the Internet, communications, the availability of education, opportunities to earn a living, cultural and social life – all of these more commonly linked **residents of Riga** to their place of residence than

was the case among people in other towns and in the countryside.

One's home, its surroundings, the local landscape, a peaceful and secure living environment and neighbours – these are more likely to be elements of linkage for **rural residents** and less so for people in other towns and in Riga. In comparing the structures of linkage, we see certain contradictions between people in Riga and in rural territories, while **residents of other towns** are partly similar to rural residents in that they attach more importance to the environment, their surroundings and a secure and peaceful living environment; they are less likely to be linked to a place because of earning opportunities, cultural and social life and a high-quality education.

Habits related to the consumption of work, studies and various services often relate to linkage to a place and the extent to which the structure of opportunities in that place satisfy the needs of people. **Where do people study, work and use various services? The survey shows that most people in Latvia work where they live (94% of employed people in Riga, 82% in other towns, and 62% in the countryside).** One-fifth of rural residents (22%) work in a different parish or town in their administrative district, while **85% of people in other towns and 85% of employed rural residents work within their own administrative district.** Most survey respondents (63%) said that it does not take them more than half an hour to get to work.




The authors have analysed employment, shopping, banking services, medical services, everyday services and others, as well as education, the frequency of attending cultural events, etc., at various places, finding that **people in Riga and other towns are more active in using various services.** What is more, they are more likely to have done so **at their place of residence.** By contrast, **rural residents more often went to other places in the administrative district, to Riga, or to another location in Latvia.** People in Riga and other towns have used various everyday services at their place of residence two times more often than rural residents (88% in Riga, 80% in other towns, 40% in the countryside). For rural residents, such services have been available in other towns or parishes within the territory of the administrative district (27%).

## Linkage to a place: Types of linkage among various groups of respondents

Linkage to a place makes it possible not only to characterise the type of place that it is, but also to describe what people expect from it. **What kinds of groups of people find that similar things attract them to a place of residence? What kinds of types of linkage are there, and how common are they?** Based on the elements cited in the survey in relation to elements which link people to a place, the authors identified groups of respondents who gave similar answers. This made it possible to divide the respondents up into four different groups (see Box 3.4).

Box  
3.3

## A sense of belonging: Elements which shape it at various places of residence



Note: The question was as follows: «In thinking about the city or parish where you live now and the kind of place where you would like to live, please check those items which currently link you to your existing place of residence.» (Respondents were allowed to choose multiple responses, which is why the total sum is above 100%.)

Source: «NI: Place, Capability, Migration». Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, 2010/2011

Is it possible to **anticipate and forecast types of linkage to a place of residence** on the basis of the individual's social and demographic characteristics? In other words, if we are aware of the respondent's age, gender, level of income, etc., can we determine the type of place where that person would wish to live? The regression model<sup>1</sup> indicates that to a certain extent, structural characteristics such as social and demographic descriptions are of importance, but the prognoses are not sufficiently precise. Among socio-demographic indicators that can be used to forecast types of linkage are the region in which the respondent lives, the level of

urbanisation in that region, the amount of time that the person has spent living in the location (10 years or longer), and the age and family status of the respondent. All of these determine needs and desires. Also of significance are household income and employment status.

### Linkage to a place: Type, emotional belonging to territorial and social communities, the ability to act

Is a functional linkage to a place related to emotional belonging? People with different types of functional linkage to a place of residence differ in statistically

<sup>1</sup> Multinomial logistic regression.

Box  
3.4

### Linkage to a place of residence: Type and characterisation thereof

Element of linkage	Description of linkage
The place where one has one's family and home	This element linked two-fifths (41%) of respondents, with people speaking only of their home in 68% of cases and people discussing the proximity of family members and relatives in 65% of cases. Other elements related to their place of residence are less important to them, because in most cases respondents cited only three elements of linkage. This type of linkage is equally common among various age and gender groups, as well as in terms of educational levels, the ethnicity of respondents, and the type of residence in which they lived. In statistical terms, these elements were cited rather more often in Latgale (53%) than in the Riga region (35%), and the same was more true among people who had lived in the specific location for less than 10 years (48%), as well as among those people who refused to state their level of income per household member (48%). The elements were mentioned less often by people with a high level of income (LVL 221 and above).
The place where there is concentrated access to services, transport, communications, jobs, education, cultural events and opportunities for social life	15% of respondents spoke of this. In addition to family and housing issues (81% and 89%), they feel linkage to everyday services (76%), a good network of roads and public transport services (75%), the quality of Internet and telephone communications (46%), a opportunity to earn a living (51%), opportunities related to work and one's career (44%), as well as the quality of educational processes (26%). Less common in terms of linkage were the surrounding people and neighbours (8%), as well as the local environment, nature and landscape (10%). On average, each respondent cited six elements of linkage. This was more common among people in Riga and those in other towns, among working people who said that they work in Riga, and among people with a high level or medium-low level of income.
The quality of the living environment (the «idyllic countryside»)	This was an issue addressed by one-fifth (21%) of respondents. They talked of family and their home (88% and 84%), a secure and peaceful environment (71%), the beauty of the surrounding nature and landscape (67%), surrounding people and neighbours (53%), and, less often, work and career opportunities to earn a living (14%), cultural and social life (12%), a good road and public transportation network (9% and 7%), and Internet and telephone services (2%). On average, each person cited five elements of linkage. This type of linkage is more common among rural residents outside the Riga metropolitan area, unemployed people, as well as people with low or medium income. Working people who talked about this form of linkage were more likely to have jobs at their own place of residence or in their own administrative district.
A high-quality living environment and a well-integrated network of public transport, communications and everyday services («idyllic suburbs or small towns»)	This element was cited by nearly one-quarter (23%) of respondents. They spoke of the proximity of family and relatives (82%), their homes (89%), the surrounding nature and landscape (87%), a secure and peaceful living environment (73%), a good network of roads and public transport (87%), the quality of Internet and telephone communications (67%), the availability of everyday services (57%), and cultural and social life (38% and 25%). Each person, on average, mentioned seven elements of linkage. This was more common among people who have lived at a place of residence for more than 10 years, those who have medium-high and high levels of income, and those who live in the metropolitan Riga area or in Zemgale. Working people were more likely to work at their place of residence or in Riga.

Note: The question was as follows: «In thinking about the city or parish where you live now and the kind of place where you would like to live, please tick those items which currently link you to your existing place of residence.» Respondents were given 16 answers and could choose all of the appropriate ones. The establishment of the types was based on the results of cluster analysis.



important terms when it comes to the emotional sense of belonging to the neighbourhood, parish, district, Latvia and other residents in the territory.

Respondents whose linkage to a place of residence is **characterised by the structure of various opportunities** are more likely to feel **emotional linkage** to the location. They are more satisfied with life as such, and they think more highly about their ability to defend their interests in the resolution of various issues which relate to events at their place of residence (Box 3.5).

It can be concluded here that two-fifths of respondents (41%) are only linked to family and home. They have less emotional linkage and less belief that they can affect political life in any way. One-fifth of respondents have a high level of emotional belonging to the relevant territory and its residents while also having a comparatively low level of trust and belief in their own abilities to affect things.

### What might be the desirable place of residence in Latvia?

The experience which people have with places of residence is of importance in establishing territorial attitudes and activities (e.g., migration). Experience with a specific type of residence (countryside, town, proximity of a large city, etc.) determines what people consider to be valuable and what they would like to preserve in their living environment if they were to move elsewhere. This experience also characterises the undesirable elements of a place of residence which the individual would like to change by moving to a different location. **Does the type of linkage to a place of residence influence visions about one's most desirable place of residence in Latvia and, if so, how does it do so?**

### A description of the desirable place of residence

Linkage to a place of residence and a sense of emotional belonging will not always be a sufficient reason for someone to stay at his or her existing place of residence, as opposed to moving elsewhere. In order to determine the essential elements which people consider when thinking about the place where they would most like to live, the researchers asked about the five elements that would be most important to respondents when selecting a place of residence in Latvia. The question: «In thinking about the town or parish where you live right now and the **place where you would like to live**, please choose the five aspects of a place of residence that would be most important to you in selecting a place of residence in Latvia.»

In thinking about the ideal place of residence and describing their experience with their current place of residence, two-thirds of respondents (65%) said that the most important thing for them would be their home, while more than one-half spoke of the proximity of families and relatives (55%). One-third (33%) said that it would be important to earn a living or to find a job and develop a career (29%). Working people mentioned these factors nearly two times more than people without jobs (39% of working people and 25% of unemployed people spoke of earning a living, while 38% of working people and 18% of unemployed respondents discussed a job and career opportunities). A similar percentage (32%) spoke of a secure and peaceful environment for life, the surrounding nature and landscape (31%), a good network of roads and public transport (30%), and everyday services (27%). For one-tenth (10%), the quality of Internet and telephone communications would be important, and the

Box  
3.5

#### Linkage to a place of residence – type, emotional sense of belonging, evaluation of other aspects of life

Type of location	Linkage to place – type, emotional belonging to territorial/social communities, ability to act
The place where one has one's family and home, 41%	A lower sense of belonging to all territorial and social communities, a lower evaluation about the ability to affect local government members on issues which have to do with the place of residence, less satisfaction with life in general, less trust in other people.
The place where opportunities are concentrated, 15%	A higher sense of emotional belonging to the city or parish in which one lives, more satisfaction with life as such, greater trust in people as such, but a lower sense of belonging to the immediate neighbourhood and to residents of the relevant town or parish.
«The idyllic countryside», 21%	Rural residents who feel a sense of belonging to their immediate environs and residents therein, but do not trust people as such very much and have a low assessment of their own capabilities in terms of local politics.
«Idyllic suburbs or small towns», 23%	A higher sense of belonging to one's environs and their residents, as well as to the city or parish; more importance attached to an ability to live in Latvia and in the specific town or parish; a higher evaluation of one's ability to affect local government issues related to the place of residence, more satisfaction with life as such, and more trust in other people.

same percentage spoke about the availability of a high-quality education. Neighbours would be of importance to one-fifth of respondents (19%), while one-eighth think about cultural life (12%), one-eleventh plump for social life (9%), and even fewer respondents think about the quality

of the relevant local government's operations (6%), as well as social aid from the local government. 6% said that they would have trouble in selecting the five major factors, while 1% said that they could not even think about those things which should be in place.

Box  
3.6

## Main conclusions. The main mission

### Main conclusions

Data from the *NI: Place, Capability, Migration* study show that the most important functional elements in terms of creating a sense of belonging or linkage to a place in Latvia are **homes and the proximity of families and relatives**. Next on the list is **the availability of services**, along with various aspects of the local community (good neighbours, cultural and social life). **Opportunities to make living** are only in the fourth place.

Although opportunities to find work and earn a living are not the main element to link people to a place of residence, potential earning opportunities do lead many people in Latvia (two-fifths of working people and one-quarter of unemployed people) to differentiate between their existing place of residence and their desired place of residence.

Analysis of the survey data makes it possible to distinguish among four different types of linkages to a place. For some respondents, the most important factor of linkage is **family and home**, for others it is **concentrated opportunities at the specific location** (services, transport, communications, jobs, education, cultural and social life), for the third group, the essential issue is the quality of the surrounding environment (the «**idyllic countryside**» – fresh air, the proximity of nature, healthy food, etc.), and finally there are those who focus on demands for a high-quality living environment that has an integrated network of public transportation, communications and everyday services (the «**idyllic suburbs or small towns**»).

### The main mission

Human development in Latvia's regions very much depends on the attraction of human capital. In thinking about this, it must be understood that a complex approach must be taken to the quality of life in regions, and particularly in rural areas. That is because the types of linkage between individuals and places are most diverse, and they are based on sets of various factors.

## 3.3. In Search for Local Government Strategies

How can places be made attractive for people? There are no factors which unquestionably guarantee the linkage between people and a specific place or, on the contrary, complete abandonment of the place. People are very flexible in adapting everyday plans to mutable circumstances, and things which are seen as shortcomings in one situation are turned into advantages in another one. Luckily, not all people who are ambitious and energetic abandon regions that are seen as backward to increase the population of a central location or to seek fortune in far-off lands.

EU policy documents increasingly are speaking not of «regional disparities,» but instead of «regional diversity.» This shift in accents reflects essential changes in the discourse which relates to rural and regional development. The need to even out regional development policies so that backward regions can achieve the level of more developed ones is being replaced by the understanding that each region has a unique path for development, taking into account its unique resources and opportunities and establishing individual developmental strategies. Without ignoring regional uniqueness, it is a serious challenge to create foundations for the successful development of the nation in Latvia so as to offer people equal opportunities for development, as well as to unleash the capacities of various social agents in pursuit of their goals (endogenous development). This is because the contemporary world offers extensive opportunities for anyone to select his or her place of residence, area of employment, and other conditions related to human lives.

### Administrative and territorial reform (ATR)

ATR was implemented on July 1, 2009, and it substantially changed Latvia's administrative and territorial structure. This particularly brought up the issue of how to strike a balance between the territorial belonging of the individual and various individual practices related to spatial mobility on the one hand – how far people must travel to get to work, to handle everyday tasks or to satisfy cultural or other needs, how extensive is the space which people see as recognisable and understood in terms of everyday activity, etc. – and territorial organisation of the relevant local governments on the other hand. The previous administrative and territorial structure was inherited from the area of Socialism, and local governments were little more than a formality when it came to the prevailing political

system. Local governments could not become true and responsible managers in their territories. They were not effective territorial units for regional development, because in terms of population numbers, area and budgets, parishes were simply too small as territorial units.

Globalisation of social life and, particularly, the development of modern technologies have facilitated the emergence of very diverse models of everyday movement. There are people who travel along several hundreds of kilometres every day to get to work and back home, and there are also those with very limited spatial trajectories (something which is influenced by the availability of personal and public transportation). People have very different abilities to earn a living, go shopping, visit a doctor, etc. It is also true that not all local governments have equal abilities to provide local residents with social services.

Latvia's administrative and territorial structure at this time is very much heterogeneous. Once administrative and territorial reforms were completed, territories were most diverse in terms of the development of local infrastructure. There is much diversity in this regard. There are territories related to former districts in which the network of social and transport infrastructure was fairly well developed in the past. Other administrative districts have irregular spatial configuration and no distinct centre. Fragmented road networks are seen there. There are also largish towns which used to be district centres and are now administrative districts with comparatively high levels of welfare. Some of the new administrative districts cover nearly all of the relevant former district, the existing social and transport infrastructure can be used, and the centre of the administrative district is the same as that of the former district (examples include the Alūksne, Talsi and Jelgava administrative districts). Other new administrative districts such as the Cibla, Beverīna and Tērvete administrative districts are small and without distinct centres, some are not compact (the Rauna Administrative District), and others have centres that are not easily accessible because roads are in poor condition, etc.

It may very well be that the map of administrative districts will undergo fundamental changes in the near future, because it is expected that there will soon be a discussion about second-level local governments. The situation is made all the more complex by the concentration of residents in the Riga metropolitan area, depopulation, and an aging population, which makes more expensive and, in many cases, makes impossible the provision of social services in the nearby proximity

Box  
3.7

## Parishes merging into administrative districts: The example of the Aizpute Administrative District

The process of administrative and territorial reforms led to the merger of the town of Aizpute and the Cīrava, Kalvene, Kazdanga, Laža and Aizpute parishes to establish the Aizpute Administrative District. It is one of the eight administrative districts in the former Liepāja District, and along with the Grobiņa Administrative District, it is the second largest administrative district in terms of population numbers.

### *An administrative district as a unified living space: Unifying elements and different elements*

The town of Aizpute was the central town in its pre-war district and, for a short time, the central town in the post-war district. In 1962 it was declared to be one of several towns in the Liepāja District, but it is basically a natural centre for the surrounding territories. A bit more than 10,000 people live in the new administrative district. Most of them live in the town of Aizpute itself.

There are elements in the cultural life of the administrative district which help to facilitate the emergence of a unified identity. There is a local television station which produces several stories each week. The administrative district also has its own newspaper. When decisions are taken, however, the interests of individual parishes often dominate. Education is an area in which this is true. The results of a survey of the population show that people have little information about what is happening in neighbouring parishes. Some parishes are not sufficiently involved in the life of the administrative district because of ongoing problems with public transportation.

In 2011, with the support of the ESF, the Aizpute Administrative District drafted a developmental programme for the period between 2012 and 2018. Researchers and students from the University of Latvia's Faculty of Social Sciences who were part of the State Research Programme «National Identity's» «National Identity and Capability» project conducted a study to monitor the development of the programme. Which areas in which a common vision is most needed for the administrative district? In the case of the Aizpute Administrative District, the focus is on the development of business and education.

### *In search for a common vision in business: Tourism, agriculture, industry, or something else?*

The administrative district has long-standing traditions of entrepreneurship. There are companies engaging in agriculture, food processing, the metal industry, road building and light industry (sewing). Businesspeople and members of the district's local government believe that a common developmental vision will make it easier to understand which sectors will be seen as priorities and will receive support, the point being that it is not possible to offer the same level of support to all sectors. Representatives of the administrative district say that a unifying element is tourism and the relevant services – the district's tourism development programme is meant for all of the relevant parishes, and it could serve as an integrative element which involves everyone.

### *The development of educational services: Availability of services, competitiveness, specialisation*

Optimisation of educational networks has led to much passion in many parts of Latvia. One of the goals in establishing administrative districts was to optimise expenditures related to governance and provision of services. Education is one area in which there have been substantial reforms, and educational planning is one of the most important jobs for administrative districts in that each parish wants to keep its own school.

There are 15 educational institutions in the Aizpute Administrative District at this time. Local residents believe that schools are of great importance in parish life, and no school has been closed since the establishment of the district. All of the preschools, elementary schools, high schools and art and music schools have been preserved, as have the local high school, vocational school and correspondence course high school. A sports school is available in partnership with the Grobiņa Administrative District, and thought is currently being given to the establishment of a sports school in the Aizpute Administrative District, as well. Leaders of the local government are also thinking about taking over management of a trade high school in Cīrava so as to provide extensive educational opportunities throughout the district. Educational institutions hope to limit competition over students in the region – something which always happens as student numbers decline. They are putting together specialised programmes and supporting the ongoing education and requalification of teachers.

Human resources are certainly the central problem for developing the Latvian state and its population. That is particularly true in rural territories and small towns, where a Catch-22 situation emerges – the fewer people, the higher infrastructural costs, and the worse the development of infrastructure, the harder it is to maintain (let alone increase) population numbers. Provision of goods and services becomes economically inefficient, ambitious people depart, and those who stay behind have no ideas or opportunities for entrepreneurship. The provision of the health care and education services that are of such importance in national development falls under threat, and it is harder and harder for people simply to earn a living.

What to do if the situation is becoming worse and the resources that are available to address it are shrinking? In many places local governments, NGOs and local activists are coming together in search of solutions. An example of successful partnership is described in the «National Identity and Social Human Security» project of the State Research Programme «National Identity».



of people's residences (high-quality medical services, education, etc.).

The new administrative districts are by no means homogeneous in terms of size and population numbers. Former infrastructural networks have been broken, and new ones have not been put in place. For instance, traffic to the former district centre is in good shape, while there are no roads leading to the new administrative district centre. Many new administrative district centres are more or less a formality, because they cannot offer important social services. Local residents still feel and are functionally more linked to former district centres or other larger towns that are easily accessible. The results of administrative and territorial reforms is that in many cases, territories which do not have functional links among them, have found themselves in a new administrative structure – the new administrative district.

Administrative and territorial reforms did not resolve many problems with regional development, instead making the situation even more complicated. The reforms are not complete, because the initial intention of setting up second-level local governments after parishes merged into administrative districts remains unclear, and the matter has been postponed to the unknown future. The structure of local governments has also undergone substantial changes since the reforms, and intensive work is being done at this time to revise administrative district developmental strategies to reflect the changes that have occurred.

## Adapt or Transform?

Because the territorial structure of Latvia changed as a result of the administrative and territorial reforms, intensive work is being done at present in Latvia on territorial development planning and developmental strategies. These are important local government planning documents. The new developmental strategies are supposed to address many problems such as the fact that much money is still being spent on the basis of out-of-date developmental documents. One example involves the so-called LEADER projects of the Rural Development Programme 2007-2013, with parishes in the Vecumnieki Administrative District still being divided up in accordance with the situation which existed before the reforms. Development and planning specialists, as well as other highly qualified specialists, are in short supply. The cost of infrastructure development and use is unacceptably high, and many local government employees see the maintenance of the infrastructure to be the most important thing of all, failing to think about the fact that the capability of social objects and the existing infrastructure are no longer in line with shrinking population numbers. A responsible local development strategy is a foundation for successful and sustainable human development in Latvia's regions.

Researchers from the Latvian Agricultural University (LLU) studied the socio-economic development strategies of Latvia's local governments and concluded

Box  
3.8

### A coalition of social NGOs in Valmiera – support for the local government

A coalition of NGOs that deal with social issues has been working successfully in Valmiera town. The main reason for its establishment was to ensure more structured dialogue with the local government, as well as to come up with unified NGO views with respect to issues that the local government was considering. Some 20 organisations took part, and it was the Valmiera NGO Support Centre which initiated the establishment of the coalition. The public organisation «Strategy» was established with financing from the Soros Foundation Latvia. Similar centres operate elsewhere in Latvia (see [http://www.nvo.lv/files/NVO\\_atbalsta\\_centri.pdf](http://www.nvo.lv/files/NVO_atbalsta_centri.pdf)). The coalition currently includes some 10 active organisations, and the Valmiera Administrative District Fund (VNF) basically serves as the umbrella organisation for them.

Thanks to the exchange of information and work in the coalition, social NGOs in Valmiera have implemented several joint projects, and they have been more sensible in managing the availability of facilities and other resources. For instance, the VNF shares its charitable warehouse facilities with the Valmiera Committee of the Red Cross, because that is of greater economic benefit. Facilities are shared by the «Valmiera City Pensioners» organisation, the Diabetes Association, and the Valmiera Association of the Politically Repressed. The organisations work together to support a day care centre for pensioners. The «Valdardze Centre» is an organisation which offers social rehabilitation services to children who have suffered violence and to non-violent people who accompany them. The centre works together with the Christian Mercy Centre, which offers a soup kitchen. Another important example of co-operation in recent times is the granting of local government facilities to four social NGOs – the «Opportunity Bridge» organisation, which offers day care and work to different ability individuals, the VNF, the Valmiera Committee of the Red Cross, and the Valmiera Association of Different Ability Children and Adolescents, «Little Sun.» «We could implement this project between ourselves and the local government only because we established a coalition and could agree on a partnership in the use of the facilities,» says one NGO activist.

The coalition has helped the growth of social NGOs by encouraging a spirit of positive competition among them. That encourages organisations to keep up with one another and to develop their own work on the basis of things which others are doing.



that even small and peripheral local governments have accumulated experience with positive changes. This was confirmed via interviews that were conducted in 2010 by the authors of the «National Identity and Capability» project that was part of the State Research Programme «National Identity». The local governments were all in northern Latvia – Aloja, Ainaži, Limbaži, Mazsalaca, Rūjiena, Salacgrīva, Staicele, and Valmiera.

Latvia's regions are dominated by small and medium companies with limited numbers of jobs and low levels of specialisation. These are companies which operate in traditional sectors such as wood processing, processing of dairy and agricultural projects, the tourism sector, etc. Among the leading employers in Latvia's regions, particularly during the circumstances of the economic crisis, have been local government institutions, because many private businesses have been forced to halt operations.

There are partnerships between local governments and companies which relate to market economy circumstances. The financial resources of local governments are directly proportional to the level of economic development. The more successful local companies, the wealthier are local residents and companies. They pay more taxes to the local government, so local government revenues are higher. One duty for local governments is to facilitate employment levels. The higher the level of economic development in a local government territory, the lower the level of unemployment. This means that market economy circumstances force local governments to be interested in shaping independent economic policies which are aimed at supporting local business operations and additional investments (Vanags, Vilka, 2005). Current circumstances, however, mean that local governments have limited budget resources, and so they do not have much freedom in this area. Still, local governments actively take part in projects financed by the EU's Structural Funds to improve infrastructural objects such as roads, water systems, heating systems, buildings that need renovation, etc. When local governments commission jobs related to construction, reconstruction or attracting investments, this supports companies and create jobs in a way which can seriously affect the business environment and stimulate economic growth:

«The local government has deepened and reconstructed breakwaters, and it has built a pier for fishermen, as agreed with them and with developers of yachts. We invested LVL 1 million of European money, and right now we see approximately LVL 3 million in private investments in the yachting and leisure sector.» (Salacgrīva)

Another interesting success story comes from the town of Rūjiena, where a company from Japan bought homemade products:

«The Japanese made one of the most productive offers related to business or, more precisely, to support for individual manufacturers. Rūjiena has people who

make goods of linen, carve wooden spoons or make necklaces. The shop in Japan sells the products which the local government has bought.» (Rūjiena)

There are some administrative districts in which manufacturing is less common. Auce, for instance, is making use of innovative technologies and highly qualified workers to develop metal processing, while people in Viļāni and Salacgrīva are using renewable energy resources:

«A successful example is the Tehnika Auce metal processing company, which employs some 80 people. It uses new and innovative technologies, and it ensures added value to the products. I have seen how the company trains employees to cut out details and engage in various other operations.» (Auce)

«The situation for small towns is gradually becoming better. Viļāni will have its own niche. There is interest among investors, and manufacturing in areas such as renewable energy is gradually undergoing rebirth.» (Viļāni)

Local government representatives say that economic development is most facilitated by a proper social infrastructure, including a network of railroads and roads. The development of Smiltene, for instance, is substantially facilitated by the fact that 12 roads cross in the town. Six roads cross in Cesvaine. In many administrative districts, businesspeople have been successful in preserving, restructuring and developing Soviet-era manufacturing facilities.

When asked about factors which hindered development before and after the crisis, local government officials and specialists speak to labour shortages, a lack of territories, and ill considered tax policies in the country:

«Those taxes or discounts give us nothing. In Auce, for instance, the real estate tax is around LVL 20,000. Fine, let's reduce it by LVL 2,000, 3,000 or 5,000 – that is the money which I got from the businessman anyway. We can only bring order to the environment in which we have our educational and cultural systems.» (Kūsis, Krūzmētra, Bite, 2008)

«The state really should improve the tax system so that businesspeople do not have to lose all of their money. If the business is not a huge monster but is a small or medium enterprise which pays all of its taxes honestly, then its owners might just as well sink into the swamp. This is something that is very sad, indeed.» (Ape)

The local governments of administrative districts are fairly well aware of their role in facilitating business operations, and they make use of their resources and strategies to facilitate the development of their territories:

- Tax relief for those companies in whose development the local government is particularly interested;

- Land for companies – sometimes granted for free or sold for a lower price;
- Local government financing for business development in areas such as road repair, bridge building, improvements to water and sewage systems, provision of public transportation services, etc.);
- Projects aimed at reducing water and air pollution;
- Simplification of administrative procedures in relation to permits, licenses and other documents;
- Improvements to infrastructure to create an attractive environment for businesses.

Local governments have made active use of these opportunities, but they do not make it possible to attract larger investors in an effective way, because administrative district resources are simply insufficient to support the development of a truly large enterprise. Locals, in turn, cannot make use of such opportunities, because they are usually taking their first insecure steps in entrepreneurship without any experience in the relevant area and with limited financial opportunities. What is more, the law limits the ability of local governments to become involved in business operations.

## Co-operation among local governments

Partnerships among Latvia's local governments are becoming ever more important in dealing with common problems. Administrative and territorial reforms represented a certain turning point in this. Second-level district councils were eliminated, and so local governments had to agree on taking over various objects such as sports complexes or building boards. Such partnerships have not lasted too long so far, but there is reason to believe that they are a foundation for ongoing mutual trust and co-operation.

The study that was conducted by the National Identity research project «National Identity and Capability» in 2010/2011 involved interviews with local government employees. Asked about forms of co-operation, local government representatives most often mentioned mutual payments related to educational services, orphanages and old age homes. Not all experts, however, agreed that this is a form of co-operation among local governments. They believe that evidence of co-operation is instead provided by jointly established institutions. The problem is that there are few such solutions in Latvia, and experts say that the main reason

for that is difficulty in dividing up responsibility and in dealing with complex financing procedures.

An important area of local government co-operation in recent years has been involvement in joint projects aimed at obtaining financing from EU funds. Interviews with local government leaders show that these projects mostly have to do with culture, sports and education. Local governments exchange information and engage in joint projects in relation to EU-financed projects. Some local governments have implemented long-term solutions such as business incubators in the context of joint projects. This can be seen as a foundation for ongoing co-operation among local governments.

Another opportunity that is offered by the law and is used by local governments is merging local governments into non-governmental organisations. The Latvian Association of Local Governments (LPS) is the organisation with the longest experience in defending the interests of local governments, and its staff say that it is a unique organisation in that it brings together all of Latvia's local government. Local governments from the LPS have also merged into smaller organisations aimed at dealing with specific governments. Examples include the Association of Coastline Local Governments, the Association of Local Governments in Small Administrative Districts, etc.

If relations among local governments are analysed in a broader context, then it has to be said that they are not making adequate use of potential for partnership. Local government staff are more likely to speak about competition and limiting themselves from others – something which is based on the desire to offer all services in the regular territory and to avoid co-operation with neighbouring local governments even though that might be more advantageous. All of this is based on a procedure that was established during the Soviet era – making use of vertical links (contacts with the relevant government ministries and parties), distribution of finances in accordance with the principle of ministries, and the desire of governmental institutions to get rid of any horizontal relationships. This means that co-operation among Latvian local governments at this time is still aimed at short-term goals, and they do not yet fully appreciate the economic and social benefits of co-operation. Local government experts say that it is essential and timely to speak about local government co-operation, emphasising good practices in this are so as to strengthen the capacities of Latvia's local governments.

Box  
3.9

## The main conclusions. Major tasks

### The main conclusions

Administrative and territorial reforms (ATR) have substantially changed Latvia's administrative and territorial system, but they have not fully resolved many fundamental problems related to human capital in regions. Not all of the new administrative districts are the same when it comes to their size and their population numbers. Not all local governments can attract residents in a sustainable way by offering a high-quality living environment and an effective network of social infrastructure. It is too early to make final judgments about ATR, because only one year has passed during which local governments are adapting to the new situation and seeking out new models for their activities.

Administrative district governments are looking for new strategies, are consolidating their resources in their district (e.g., by working with local governments), and becoming involved in partnerships with other administrative districts so as to avoid the competition and isolation that are promoted by the well-rooted trend of making use of vertical links (contacts with the relevant government ministries and parties), distribution of finances in accordance with the principle of ministries, and the desire of governmental institutions to get rid of any horizontal relationships.

### Major tasks

Second-level local governments are needed for the consistent implementation of ATR in terms of territorial approaches and the ability to overcome sectoral crumbling in the area of regional development. The distribution of functions and governance resources among governance levels of various kinds must be assessed.

Taxes and subsidies must be used to stimulate new businesses and the creation of new jobs in areas which receive special support. Local governments must have the right to receive a segment of corporate tax revenues from the relevant local government so that the money can be used to maintain and establish infrastructure (roads, engineering and technical networks, business incubators). At this time, local governments have limited opportunities and resources in terms of creating an environment which is favourable for businesses.

## 3.4. Individual Strategies at Capability: Challenges and Risks

New survival strategies and co-operation models are being sought not just by local governments, but also by local businesspeople, employers and employees who are the most important social agents in the economic life of administrative districts. ATR and the economic crisis have been the most important factors in changing the situation, creating new opportunities, expanding areas of operations, and creating new risks. In this section of the paper, let us look at various individual and collective strategies related to capability.

### «Groundbreakers»: Risks and capability in the labour market

Opportunities to earn a living and develop a professional career are an important component in any person's life, and so opportunities for a businessperson or employee to earn money near his or her place of residence are an important prerequisite for the development of the nation in the country's regions.

Risks in the labour market represent a challenge, an opportunity and a barrier. The presence of risks in the labour market is evidenced by the insolvency of employers, an end to business operations, as well as problems with employees such as unemployment rates and migration. When risks in the labour market are encountered, there must be capability for both employers and employees to overcome them. Capability in the labour market can be manifested as new business operations or as a change in existing ones. For employees, that may mean having to seek out, obtain or hold on to a job, or it can mean learning a new profession with all of the relevant skills, talents and knowledge. Each person establishes his or her own strategy on the basis of existing capacities and ideas. The capability of employers, in turn, can be manifested as the launching of new businesses, entering new sectors, or learning about new methods and forms of co-operation.

Both employers and employees face risks which are relatively new in Latvia's labour market. This means that there is a lack of experience from previous generations as to how to overcome these risks. There is also a lack of public mechanisms aimed at reducing the level of risks.

Data from several studies conducted by the University of Latvia's Faculty of Social Sciences (SZF) and the Advanced Social and Political Research Institute (ASPRI)<sup>1</sup> show that

<sup>1</sup> The study «Polycentric Development of Regions» (2009), commissioned by the Latvian Council of Science, the study «Sustainable Development of Cities and Regions» (2008), and the study «Proposals on Drafting Policies for Latvia's Cities» (2009), commissioned by the National Regional Development Agency.

employers in regions outside of Riga emphasise the need to take risks, to choose new sectors, and to change relations with employees who want to ensure long-time operations. An additional risk for employers in regions outside of Riga is insufficient capability among businesspeople, as well as a shortage of businesspeople as such. This makes it more difficult to compete with others not only at the international, but also at the local level.

In interviews, employers from the private sector emphasise the idea that elements of risk are mandatory when it comes to launching new businesses. This is full of risks. Private employers are most emotional in evaluating this, emphasising the need to take decisions and the joy which is experienced when something is achieved:

«There was a great deal of risk. Basically we mortgaged everything or practically everything that had been registered in the Land Book. We took out a loan from the Mortgage Bank, and theoretically the interest rate is not too high, but the payments are very substantial. The truth is, however, that we managed to crawl through the needle's eye. When we look back at what happened back then, it really does seem that we crawled through the needle's eye.»  
(Businessman in Vidzeme)

Another risk may be the business environment in which companies can face harsh and threatening activities on the part of competitors (*Business sharks didn't like us*», one businessman said). At the same time, nearly all of the private businesspeople in the countryside and in small towns say that there is too little competition, adding that the lack of opportunities for co-operation creates new risks for the sector in which there are few companies. True, that does not apply to retailing, where there is very much competition, indeed.

Public sector employers also encounter risks. The two main risks are implementation of political decisions about mergers or the organisation of local government work, as well as the consequences of policies which seem to centralise local governments and the country's regions. In some cases the managers and employees of institutions may face a loss of their jobs because the institution is being closed down. In other cases, employees are replaced because of a process of restructuring. Risks also have to do with demographic threats such as depopulation, and that has been admitted by representatives of various sectors such as wood processing and management of educational institutions.

The things which were inherited from the socialist management system hinder the implementation of effective business support strategies. The same is true of the distribution of responsibilities among various sectors – something that is changed. There can also be a lack of co-ordination among the institutions which supervise the various sectors. Supervision of sectors does not take into account regional divisions and local opportunities and does not encourage co-operation in terms of dividing up financing and writing up new laws. This means that there is a certain amount of «dependence on the trail» at the level of organised structures (DiMaggio, Powell, 2003).

Overcoming risks is a confirmation of capability among employers in various regions of Latvia. This can be based on the use of experience gained from the socialist society (personal acquaintanceship with the leaders of state and local government institutions, as well as making use of the lack of information and weak defence of interests among employees in terms of setting working hours and salaries). This is more to be seen as «dependence on the trail,» because skills and talents related to the previous socio-economic system, as opposed to looking for new techniques aimed at encouraging capability.

«Dependence on the trail» is also something which applies to some of the potential employees in Latvia's regions, because they have taken root in survival strategies and are not prepared to engage in long-lasting and targeted activities aimed at establishing market relationships.

At the same time, employers in Latvia's region «break up the trails» but changing previous statuses, relationships with employees, and the relevant sector in terms of establishing new products and working with scientists and among the employers themselves (e.g., fish nurseries in the Alūksne Administrative District or establishing a co-operative among processors of fruit at home in the Dobele Administrative District).

When employers in the regional public sector are rooted into traditions, dynasties and relatives, that can be seen both as a positive and negative factor in terms of establishing and maintaining labour market relationships. Local roots create stability and encourage labour market activities at the local level, but some public sector employers are also prepared to adapt to the new socio-economic situation in the labour market by changing the sector in which they work, their job, or their career path. This indicates that they can «break up the path.» This means capability in overcoming the social barriers and limitations which hinder adaptation to new circumstances in the labour market or readiness to change one's status (becoming an employer instead of an employee), one's sector (transferring from agriculture to retailing), or learning new skills (fundamentals of biological farming). Those who «break up the path» can be labour market agents (both employers and employees) who adapt to the labour market situation and are prepared to seek out new areas of professional activity and careers in Latvia's society.

## Local action groups: Let's all take responsibility for our district's development!

A place is based not just on the surrounding landscape, the regional policies of the country or the efforts of the local government, but also by people who live in that place. Endogenous development based on local initiatives that involve self-mobilisation in formulating developmental goals and then achieving them on the basis of available resources – that is one of the most important and fundamental principles of the European Union's regional development policies. The ability to establish a capable community in pursuit of the relevant administrative district's developmental goals will set out foundations for sustainable development of the relevant place. Local action groups are the nucleus for the responsibility and capability of the surrounding community.

Local action groups are to be seen as unique communities<sup>1</sup> which focus on rural development. Communities are an important element in a social structure, bringing together people who live in one or more geographic territories, but have common interests, socioeconomic or other problems, lifestyles, beliefs and identities. Everyday lives of people occur in groups and communities, and communities characteristically have district social network structures. A community means more than just spending time together at a single location or complying to specific criteria. Key elements in communities include a common identity, a common sense of place, relationships among people, the local environment, the local culture, and the capability of the community. At the level of communities, capability means that the community must be able to mobilise the resources and opportunities that are at its disposal, also acting in a very vigorous, targeted and corresponding way to achieve the goals that have been set out.

Local action groups are an important factor in mobilising local resources. They represent groups of local organisations and rural residents who act in a specific rural territory with a population of between 5,000 and 65,000 people. Such groups represent the interests of the relevant territory and deal with rural development issues at the local level. Another key element in local action groups is equal partnership at the level of organisational decisions making. This means that when the issue is an integrated rural development strategy and its approval and implementation, all representatives of local governments, the business work, local developmental organisations, and groups of residents must take part in the process (LR ZM).

<sup>1</sup> Such groups are very heterogeneous in terms of territory, ranging from former districts and ending with the single Ādaži Administrative District. This means that one can only conditionally speak of the residents of the relevant territory as a community. In this case, communities which engage in practices are made up of people who are involved in local action groups.



At present there are 40 local action groups in Latvia which have received funding from the European Agriculture Fund for Rural Development. That funding is aimed at implementing local developmental strategies. 24 of these groups relate to the fishing industry, and they have received support from the European Fishing Fund for the same purpose.

The 40 local action groups cover nearly all of Latvia, apart from the capital city of Riga and other major towns such as Daugavpils, Jelgava, Jēkabpils, Jūrmala, Liepāja, Rēzekne, Valmiera, Ventspils, Cēsis, Ogre, Salaspils, Talsi and Tukums, as well as the Garkalne Administrative District. Even if a local action group is registered in a larger town, the work of that group still applies to communities in the countryside or in small towns. This means that the relevant principles ensure the prevention of the centralisation of resources in major centres – in the large towns which, in the context of the new territorial division, are often seen as a threatening competitor by people who live in the countryside.

Local action groups were initially established to facilitate the absorption of funds from the EU's Structural Funds and particularly the LEADER programme. An institution was created which was legally registered. Its main function is to successfully integrate rural communities in making use of the opportunities which relate to EU financing. This meant the provision of information about open project tenders, consultations in grant writing, as well as the evaluation of the final option of applications and the identification of those projects that would be forwarded to the Rural Support Service (LAD), which would then decide on which projects would receive financing. Projects related to the LEADER programme have had a direct and indirect influence on rural development, and this influence has been so broad that it not just brings greater order to the rural environment and creates new jobs, but also attracts new service users to the relevant territories (tourists, users of public catering and accommodation services, lovers of active recreation, etc.). Also positive is the fact that this project leads to the improvement and restructuring of the existing tourism infrastructure. Latvia's countryside already has a fairly extensive but homogeneous offer to tourists, but LAP-supported projects help to bring greater order to the tourism sector, as well as further development of the quality and diversity of services that are provided. This is seen not so much in numbers as in the increased diversity of tourism offers that are focused on various groups of consumers (offering recreation to families with children, groups of schoolchildren, etc., as opposed to handling corporate events or weddings). There are new networks among tourism service providers in a single territory, and co-operation with owners of accommodations makes it possible to offer a diverse range of opportunities related to leisure and recreation.

People often do not use LEADER-related opportunities, because application for project financing is time-consuming, and there are problems with finding the necessary co-financing. Local government co-financing is a positive thing. Even though the available co-financing

is not substantial, target groups related to the LEADER programme (young businesspeople and people who wish to launch a business) do not find it easy to obtain even small sums of money. Preparation of the project itself also demands certain resources which are then not included in the applicable costs (e.g., when documents are prepared, people have to visit various government institutions with regional affiliates that are often located in different towns). Sometimes institutions order people to visit them so as to sign documents, make information more precise, etc., but these instructions are not always justified in that they mean extra expenditures for the applicants. Still, these problems do not keep many ambitious people from applying for project financing and then implementing the projects, thus ensuring benefits not just for themselves, but also for the entire community.

## The welfare trap: A new identity for poor people

Not all individual and collective survival strategies are equally successful in the long term. Some may lead people into a trap from which it is not easy to escape. The so-called «welfare trap» is a very good example of such risky strategies. Unemployment benefit payments, for instance, mean that the state and its local governments indirectly lead those people who are more passive and irresponsible to face a dead end from which it is very difficult to escape.

### The welfare trap

Unemployed people and those without substantial savings or other unregistered income must approach local government social services to receive various social aid and services. This process has been discussed in the press, and various institutions have compiled data in relation to it. The number of social aid recipients in Riga, for instance, increased by 34% during the first five months of 2011 in comparison to the same period in 2010. Aid of various kinds was received by 64,112 people in Riga during that period of time (the Riga City Council's Welfare Department). According to Latvia's Welfare Ministry, the number of people receiving aid aimed at ensuring guaranteed minimal revenues in 2010 grew from 28,800 at the beginning of the year to 69,000 people at the end of the year (Latvian Welfare Ministry, 2011b). There were some 300,000 people (including children and old-age pensioners) who received various types of income-based social aid from local governments in 2010 (Welfare Ministry, 2011a).

The question here is whether the social aid that is provided by Latvia's local governments in terms of subsidies and services create material and other types of stimuli which create the so-called welfare trap. The minimal **welfare trap** represents a situation in which it is more advantageous for individuals to continue to receive social aid than it is to look for a job or for other sources of income. Those who are in this welfare trap for a long time suffer reduced individual capability and face

stigmatisation which keeps the individual from joining or rejoining the labour market. This welfare trap creates additional burdens for state and local government budgets in that more money has to be spent on various subsidies and services.

There are two indicators used in scholarly research and statistics to identify the welfare trap – the unemployment trap and the poverty trap that is often known, too, as the low wage trap. The Latvian Central Statistical Board defines the unemployment trap as follows: «The indicators shows the percentage of gross income growth that is lost when paying labour-related taxes and no longer receiving subsidies or receiving less in the way of subsidies in a situation in which the unemployed person returns to the labour market» (Central Statistical Board, 2010). Box 3.10 shows EUROSTAT data related to the unemployment trap in Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania and the 27 member states of the EU. The data have been calculated in relation to childless people who, upon returning to the labour market, are paid 67% of the average wage in the relevant country.

Although the registered level of unemployment level has declined gradually in Latvia over the past year, the risk of falling into the welfare trap has not been reduced. The highest level of unemployment was registered in March 2010 (17.3%), and in April 2011 it was down to 13.9% (NVA, 2011c). Despite this positive trend, it has to be noted that during the last quarter of 2010, 37.8% of all registered unemployed people had been jobless for more than a year, and the largest percentage of such individuals found in Latgale (46.7%) (NVA, 2011b). The

latest data about April 2011 show that the proportion of people suffering long-term unemployment has increased a bit to 41.2% (NVA, 2011c). In other words, even though the level of registered unemployment has declined, there are still lots of people who cannot find a job for a long period of time.

State Employment Service (NVA) director Baiba Paševica said in an interview to the Baltic Business Service portal that 53% of unemployed people could not receive unemployment benefit payments in 2010 because mandatory social tax payments had not been made for them, or their period of employment was insufficient to qualify for such aid. In April 2010, only 20% of jobless people received unemployment benefit (LETA, 2011). This can partly be attributed to the aforementioned situation in which many people have been jobless for a long time. Among them there are those who received unemployment benefit for nine months, as specified by law, but did not receive it after that period had expired.

The low wage trap is another indicator of the welfare trap, showing the extent to which the social security and aid system facilitates or hinders the ability of those people who receive low wages to return to the job market. The Central Statistical Board defines the low wage trap thus: «This indicator shows the percentage of gross income growth that is lost by paying higher labour taxes, not receiving subsidies or receiving them at a lower level at a time when the employed person's gross wage increases» (CSP, 2010). Other factors which must be taken into account when calculating this indicator include GMI support, housing support, state support for families, as

Box 3.10

### The unemployment trap in Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and the EU 27 (%)

Country/organisation	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Latvia	88.0	88.0	87.0	85.0	87.0
Estonia	64.0	64.0	63.0	63.0	62.0
Lithuania	81.0	79.0	80.0	82.0	86.0
EU 27	74.84	85.74	74.90	74.61	75.32

Source: EUROSTAT, 2011 b

Box 3.11

### The low wage trap in Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and the EU 27 (%)

Country/organisation	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Latvia	48.0	52.0	58.0	81.0	92.0
Estonia	77.0	79.0	88.0	92.0	92.0
Lithuania	108.0	108.0	108.0	107.0	107.0
EU 27	57.78	60.06	57.50	57.05	59.84

Source: EUROSTAT, 2011 a

well as other income-based subsidies. Box 3.11 reflects the low wage trap in Latvia, its neighbouring countries, and the EU 27 as such. The indicator relates to a two-parent family with two children in which there is one employed person who receives 33% of the average wage in the country.

Individuals in Latvia are far more likely to fall into the low wage trap than is the average likelihood in the EU. Trends show that this risk has increased over the past several years due to various factors such as higher taxes, lower wages, lower subsidy ceilings and repeal of various limitations (e.g., in relation to GMI aid).

When individuals find work, they no longer receive unemployment aid, and they often lose access to other types of social support such as GMI or housing aid. Losing one's status as an unemployed person also means losing a considerable amount of income and other benefits, particularly among those who have a low level of education, a lack of work experience, and no hope of finding a well-paid job.

Not all social services and benefits can be calculated in monetary terms. This must be taken into account when analysing the motivation of unemployed people and social services. For instance, poor people are often allowed to visit doctors at no charge to themselves. Children from poor families can often receive a free lunch at school. This can have a favourable effect on the health of such individuals. Poor unemployed people can also save on heating services and transport expenditures which should be guaranteed for individuals when they find jobs and have to make do without social subsidies. The money that is saved can be spent on other needs – food, entertainment, education, etc.

Many politicians, representatives of governance institutions and even experts in the field of employment do not sufficiently appreciate labour-related costs which unemployed people face when they accept a new job. The costs relate to public transport, additional clothing, meals and beverages, as well as various social events. Families with juvenile children must spend considerable amounts of money on day care or kindergarten services. All of these considerations are important when understanding the motivation of unemployed people and clients of social services and also understanding why people in Latvia face such a great risk of falling into the low wage trap.

### Who is most likely to fall into the low wage trap?

There is no access to all-encompassing information about all recipients of social aid in Latvia. Local governments have established various types of support for different social groups and needs. No state or local government institution correlates the relevant information at this time. Detailed, but not completely precise information can be obtained with respect to so-called income-tested local government social aid (usually the aforementioned GMI and housing supports). Information from the Welfare Ministry shows that among such recipients, 42% are men, and 30% are underage people (Welfare Ministry, 2011a). More detailed information about recipients of income-tested support is found in Box 3.12.

Many recipients of income-tested aid are adults who are capable of work (approximately 45% of all recipients),

Box  
3.12

### The number of income-tested local government support payments in Latvia's larger towns and administrative districts, 2010

Major cities, districts	People receiving income-tested local government aid	... adult and work-capable persons among recipients	... among such recipients		
			Employed people	Unemployed people	People on child-rearing leave
Daugavpils	13,326	4,728	1,557	2,929	242
Jelgava	9,070	3,691	1,159	2,253	279
Jēkabpils	2,839	1,402	559	816	27
Jūrmala	4,387	2,296	649	1,488	159
Liepāja	14,710	5,738	2,263	3,099	376
Rēzekne	5,900	2,673	755	1,745	173
Rīga	58,783	23,346	7,265	14,170	1,911
Valmiera	3,924	1,442	564	747	131
Ventspils	9,080	2,123	765	1,216	142
Districts	178,601	89,467	22,704	61,828	4,935
Total in Latvia	300,620	136,906	38,240	90,291	8,375

Source: Ministry of Welfare

but are unable to find work or do not earn sufficient wages from their jobs. Among such people who received income-tested aid in 2010, 28% were employed and 66% were not. Some LVL 42 million were spent on such support in 2010 (Welfare Ministry, 2011a). There is another interesting fact here: Although the proportion of people in Riga is comparatively small (19.5%), such people have received a disproportionately large share of all aid (34.6% according to the author's calculations). This may suggest that the local government in Riga is far more generous than are other local governments in Latvia.

Social service workers who were interviewed offered general descriptions of what they consider to be typical social service clients. It must be added that most of the respondents could not offer precise numbers concerning the structure of their clients. An employee of the social service department in Riga said that the database related to the administration of social aid and services which is used by social workers in Latvia is not appropriate to prepare statistical reports. That is a time-intensive and complicated job which must involve the designers of the database. This basically means that it is impossible to prepare daily reports.

The interviews led to an understanding of various groups of social service clients: 1) Mothers after child rearing leave; 2) Young people with no work experience or education; 3) Families with many children; 4) People of pre-retirement age; 5) Pensioners. The demographic structure of clients is very different among various local governments, which means that the range of social services and subsidies that are offered will also differ. A representative of social services in Salaspils said that he believes that approximately 50% of subsidies are received by families with minor children, while the other 50% go to adults. The person also said, however, that his local government has not conducted any detailed analysis of the structure of clients. A social services specialist in Riga, in turn, said that differences in the range of subsidies can be attributed to differing age structures among the residents of various local government territories. In the Riga suburb of Mārupe, for instance, there are many young families with children, which means that the relevant local government must establish the appropriate infrastructure and aid system. In the region of Latgale, in turn, local governments must provide more support for elderly people.

Box  
3.13

### Main conclusions. Major tasks

#### Main conclusions

Unless an individual approach is found for each specific situation, state and local government aid related to unemployment can indirectly lead more passive and irresponsible people to face the unique dead end of the welfare trap from which it is very difficult to escape.

#### Major tasks

Local governments must have broader rights to specify procedures and amounts of social aid and services, taking into account the economic and social status of every individual and every family. The right of individuals to receive social aid must be more closely linked to various participatory obligations.

State and local government institutions must work more closely together when it comes to discussing and implementing decisions related to social policy. Duplication of subsidies and services must be prevented. There must be monitoring to see the way in which various taxes, subsidies and services affect the motivation and capability of individuals in the labour market.

The capability of individuals in regions could also be enhanced with the help of various small subsidies. In those cases where the job of an individual is far from home, the relevant local government could award discounts on public transportation by providing subsidies to transportation companies, doing so for a specific period of time. An additional stimulus to encourage individuals to return to the labour market would be the balanced and gradual reduction of subsidies over a longer period of time. Upon being offered a job, the individual and his or her family immediately loses a substantial amount of income from various subsidies.

# Conclusion

The relationship between people and places can be assessed in various ways in modern-day society. There is no question, however, that regional identity or the lack thereof can fundamentally influence the strategies of individuals, communities and local governments. As territorial mobility increases, there are greater and greater differences in the model of relationships between people and places. There are those who have an alienated and passionless attitude toward places, but their neighbours may be people for whom a distinct regional identity is an important component of life. This identity emphasises one's belonging to a community – a family, dynasty, colleagues, neighbours, etc., as well as to the place in which the individual spends his or her daily life. Even when individuals do not feel that a sense of belonging to a place is an important component of their identity, the environment in which people live is not a passive object of social life. Instead, it takes active participation in forming one's knowledge, experience and behaviours. Given that the link between people and their place of residence is established not just by rational motivations, but also by emotional ones, the role of regional identity in territorial development plans and practices cannot be ignored. Regional identity can be an important factor in mobilising the capability of individuals and communities alike, which means that it also helps to facilitate the development of the nation.

People are attracted to specific places not just because of a thicker layer of butter on their daily bread. This is seen in terms of regional development in Latvia since the restoration of the country's independence. The lack of a strategic view vis-à-vis regional development that is focused on human development and the delayed and inconsistent administrative and territorial reforms that have been implemented have meant that many people in Latvia are left to their own. When the taking of strategic decisions at the national level is postponed, local governments, NGOs, communities and people establish their own survival strategies. Some of these have been successful and sustainable, while others have been risky and lead people into dead ends and traps. Thoughtless approaches toward the development of social infrastructure has led to the mass closing of rural schools and small subsidies, to an inability to provide social services to residents in peripheral locations and to an inability to restructure the economy effectively. The

lack of leadership in the transfer to the market economy, in turn, has not just led to a decline in manufacturing output, but also to the emigration of many people in pursuit of work and a better life. Still, difficult experiences in survival have led people to learn how to make their lives in Latvia if they are hard-working and ambitious. These experiences also lead to consolidation between communities and local governments so that they truly become more responsible for the future of their region. That is a good foundation for successful development of the nation in the future.

Administrative and territorial reforms have particularly emphasised the issue of commensurability between the territorial linkage of individuals on the one hand and various subjective spatial mobility practices and territorial structuring of local governments on the other. The developmental strategies of local governments confirm significant capability in terms of mobilising various resources, achieving the stated goals and overcoming risks. Consistent movement toward strategic goals, co-operation among local governments in terms of common interests, private initiatives and mobilisation of resources in the NGO sector all serve to confirm the capability of local governments in terms of establishing responsible strategies in ensuring conditions for the development of the nation.

The ability to attract funding from the EU's Structural Funds is a significant challenge for local governments, businesses and NGOs. The boundary between trivial use of resources and activities that are based on thoughtful long-term developmental strategies can often be very fragile, indeed. Local action groups can be very good partners for local governments in which responsible people take part in developing local life.

Should people take the established path or «break it up?» This is something which relates to risks related to considered decisions, and it must be evaluated both by employers and employees. If local governments help residents to survive the depressive socioeconomic situation which prevails, they may unconsciously lead some residents into the welfare trap from which they will be unable to escape by themselves. Co-operation, networks, the search for partners and the mobilisation of resources that have not yet been put to full use – those are sustainable strategies for individuals, communities and local governments in terms of facilitating the development of the nation in Latvia.



Box  
3.14

## Main conclusions. Major tasks

### Main conclusions

Seeking out new strategies during an economic crisis is a matter of survival. Individuals and communities automatically look for solutions to their social and economic problems. Some of these solutions open up new opportunities and are sustainable.

Many people in the regional labour market can find innovative solutions, break down ancient stereotypes, and establish successful enterprises. Local action groups, in turn, show that people can come together when problems need to be solved.

Thoughtless solutions related to social policy have created the risk that more passive residents may fall into the tricky welfare trap – something which leads them to refuse active participation in the labour market and public life as such.

### Major tasks

Instead of reactive social policy solutions, there must be proactive approaches to those who have found themselves in a crisis situation. This creates co-responsible recipients of social aid, thus encouraging them to take responsibility for their own lives.

# Technical Information About the Survey Conducted Under the Auspices of the National Identity Programme, «National Identity», «NI: Dimensions. Historical Memory. LU SZF, 2010»

RESEARCH FIRM	SKDS Research Centre
POPULATION	Permanent residents of Latvia aged 18-74
PLANNED SAMPLE SIZE	1,000 respondents (representative of the community at large)
ACTUAL SAMPLE SIZE	1,004 respondents
SELECTION METHOD	Stratified random sampling
METHOD OF STRATIFICATION	Administrative territorial
SURVEY METHOD	Direct interviews at the place of residence of respondents
GEOGRAPHIC COVERAGE	All regions of Latvia (120 sampled locations)
TIME	November 11-16, 2010

## THE SAMPLE IN COMPARISON TO POPULATION STATISTICS

	Number of respondents in sample (%) before weighting	Number of respondents in sample (%) after weighting	Official population data as of September 23, 2010
<b>REGION</b>			
Riga	32.8	31.8	31.8
Riga environs	17.6	17.4	17.4
Vidzeme	10.8	10.3	10.3
Kurzeme	11.7	13.1	13.1
Zemgale	12.9	12.4	12.4
Latgale	14.2	15.1	15.1
<b>GENDER</b>			
Men	43.9	47.0	47.0
Women	56.1	53.0	53.0
<b>NATIONALITY</b>			
Latvians	58.2	57.7	57.7
Others	41.8	42.3	42.3
<b>AGE</b>			
18-24	11.7	14.4	14.4
25-32	18.3	19.5	19.5
35-44	16.5	18.4	18.4
45-54	20.2	19.2	19.2
55-74	33.3	28.5	28.5
<b>EMPLOYMENT STATUS</b>			
Employed	53.2	54.6	
Not employed	46.8	45.4	
<b>EDUCATION</b>			
Primary	12.5	12.6	
Secondary, specialised secondary	66.1	66.5	
Higher	21.4	20.9	
<b>CITIZENSHIP</b>			
Latvian citizens	82.6	83.0	
Others	17.4	17.0	

The data were weighted on the basis of region, nationality, gender and age.

# Technical Information About the Survey Conducted Under the Auspices of the National Identity Programme, «National Identity», «NI: Location, Capability, Migration. LU SZF, 2010/2011»

RESEARCH FIRM	SKDS Research Centre
POPULATION	Permanent residents of Latvia aged 18-74
PLANNED SAMPLE SIZE	1,000 respondents (representative of the community at large)
ACTUAL SAMPLE SIZE	1,009 respondents
SELECTION METHOD	Stratified random sampling
METHOD OF STRATIFICATION	Administrative territorial
SURVEY METHOD	Direct interviews at the place of residence of respondents
GEOGRAPHIC COVERAGE	All regions of Latvia (120 sampled locations)
TIME	December 14, 2010 to January 13, 2011

## THE SAMPLE IN COMPARISON TO POPULATION STATISTICS

	Number of respondents in sample (%) before weighting	Number of respondents in sample (%) after weighting	Official population data as of September 23, 2010
<b>REGION</b>			
Riga	32.9	31.8	31.8
Riga environs	16.0	17.4	17.4
Vidzeme	9.9	10.3	10.3
Kurzeme	11.8	13.1	13.1
Zemgale	13.0	12.4	12.4
Latgale	16.5	15.1	15.1
<b>GENDER</b>			
Men	45.8	47.0	47.0
Women	54.2	53.0	53.0
<b>NATIONALITY</b>			
Latvians	58.1	57.7	57.7
Others	41.9	42.3	42.3
<b>AGE</b>			
18-24	13.2	14.4	14.4
25-32	19.6	19.5	19.5
35-44	18.4	18.4	18.4
45-54	19.9	19.2	19.2
55-74	28.8	28.5	28.5
<b>EMPLOYMENT STATUS</b>			
Employed	55.6	55.4	
Not employed	44.4	44.6	
<b>EDUCATION</b>			
Primary	13.3	13.7	
Secondary, specialised secondary	65.1	65.2	
Higher	21.6	21.1	
<b>CITIZENSHIP</b>			
Latvian citizens	83.3	83.0	
Others	16.7	17.0	

The data were weighted on the basis of region, nationality, gender and age.

The survey was directed by Vineta Zeiferte.

The data were correlated by Liene Livmane.

## Explanation of terms

### THE SAMPLE

A micromodel of the Latvian population

### REGION

Riga: The city of Riga

Riga environs: The Aloja, Ādaži, Babīte, Baldone, Carnikava, Engure, Garkalne, Ikšķile, Inčukalns, Jaunpils, Kandava, Krimulda, Ķegums, Ķekava, Lielvārde, Limbaži, Mālpils, Mārupe, Ogre, Olaine, Ropaži, Salacgrīva, Salaspils, Saulkrasti, Sēja, Sigulda, Stopiņi and Tukums administrative districts, plus the city of Jūrmala.

Vidzeme: The Alūksne, Amata, Ape, Beverīna, Burtnieki, Cesvaine, Cēsis, Ērgļi, Gulbene, Jaunpiebalga, Līgatne, Lubāna, Madona, Mazsalaca, Naukšēni, Pārgauja, Priekule, Rauna, Rūjiena, Smiltene, Strenči, Valka, Valmiera, Varakļāni and Vecpiebalga administrative districts, plus the city of Valmiera.

Kurzeme: The Aizpute, Alsunga, Brocēni, Dundaga, Durbe, Grobiņa, Liepāja, Nīca, Pāvilosta, Priekule, Roja, Rucava, Saldus, Skrunda, Talsi, Vaiņode and Ventspils administrative districts, plus the cities of Liepāja and Valmiera.

Zemgale: The Aizkraukle, Aknīste, Auce, Bauska, Dobeles, Iecava, Jaunjelgava, Jelgava, Jēkabpils, Koknese, Krustpils, Nereta, Ozolnieki, Pļaviņas, Rundāle, Sala, Skrīveri, Tērvete, Vecumnieki and Viesīte administrative districts, plus the cities of Jelgava and Jēkabpils.

Latgale: The Aglona, Baltinava, Balvi, Cibla, Dagda, Daugavpils, Ilūkste, Kārsava, Krāslava, Līvāni, Ludza, Preiļi, Rēzekne, Riebiņi, Rugāji, Varkava, Viļaka, Viļāni and Zilupe administrative districts, plus the cities of Daugavpils and Rēzekne.

### TYPE OF POPULATED AREA

Riga: The city of Riga

Other cities: Daugavpils, Liepāja, Jelgava, Ventspils, Rēzekne, Jūrmala, Valmiera, Jēkabpils, and others

The countryside: Parishes, single family farms

### EDUCATION

Primary: A primary or unfinished secondary or trade education

Secondary, specialised secondary: A general or special secondary education or an unfinished higher education

Higher: A respondent with a higher education

### EMPLOYMENT SECTOR

Public sector: Respondents who work for state or local government institutions or companies with state or local government capital

Private sector: Respondents who work for companies with private capital

Not working: Homemakers, pensioners, schoolchildren, students, unemployed people

Others: People with occasional work, people who have salaried jobs at public organisations, as well as those respondents who cannot name a specific sector of employment.

### BASIC TYPE OF EMPLOYMENT

Manager: Higher or medium-level director, head of a company, firm, organisation or department, or a senior specialist at a company or institution

Specialist, civil servant: A civil servant or employee of a state or local government institution or a private company, a person who does not do physical work

Worker: An employee in industry, construction, agriculture, trade, the service sector or public dining services who does physical work

Farmer: A person who works at a farm which he owns

Individual work: Self-employed people, professional specialists (lawyers, doctors, etc.), company owners

Pensioner: A person who is retired and no longer works, as well as recipients of disability-based pensions

Schoolchild, student: A person who attends a full time educational institution

Homemaker: A person who lives at home and does not have a salaried job, including people who are on child care leave

Unemployed person: A person of working age who does not have a job

### INCOME

Income per family member, counting all revenues (wages, stipends, subsidies, pensions, etc.) after taxes, with income levels divided up into quintiles:

Low: Up to LVL 85

Medium low: LVL 81-125

Medium: LVL 126-160

Medium high: LVL 161-220

High: More than LVL 221

## Appendices for Section 1

A1

### A sense of territorial belonging depending on age

(% in the age group, adding up the number of respondents claiming «very close links» or «close links» to the relevant territory,  $n = 1,004$ )

Age group	Parish, neighbourhood	City	Region	Latvia	Russia	Baltic States	Europe
<b>All</b>	<b>74.0</b>	<b>81.9</b>	<b>66.8</b>	<b>78.3</b>	<b>14.8</b>	<b>20.2</b>	<b>20.6</b>
18-24	69.2	79.4	65.5	79.0	13.0	20.3	34.5
25-34	63.2	74.0	65.1	72.4	12.1	21.2	22.7
35-44	77.9	85.8	63.4	74.9	12.8	16.0	19.1
45-54	74.5	82.5	68.1	79.8	15.4	20.1	17.2
55-74	81.2	86.3	70.0	83.2	18.4	22.3	15.5

Source: National Identity. NI Dimensions. LU SZF, 2010.

A2

### Attitudes toward civic values depending on age

(% of age group, adding up the number of respondents saying that they are «important» or «very important»,  $n = 1,004$ )

Age group	Observing laws, rules	Paying taxes	Being informed about public events	Voting in elections	Actively opposing corruption	Helping those with worse lives	Staying in Latvia during an economic crisis
<b>All</b>	<b>87.1</b>	<b>77.0</b>	<b>75.8</b>	<b>75.3</b>	<b>70.4</b>	<b>62.7</b>	<b>39.5</b>
18-24	82.6	73.1	70.2	75.5	72.1	65.6	28.5
25-34	86.2	67.4	73.4	74.8	72.9	59.8	35.0
35-44	89.4	77.6	72.8	76.3	69.4	56.0	33.1
45-54	87.6	76.9	78.7	73.3	71.5	62.1	42.1
55-74	88.2	85.1	80.1	76.4	67.9	67.7	50.7

Source: National Identity. NI Dimensions. LU SZF, 2010.

A3

### Attitudes toward civic values depending on levels of education

(% of age group, adding up the number of respondents saying that they are «important» or «very important»,  $n = 1,004$ )

Level of education	Obeying laws, rules	Paying taxes	Being informed about public events	Voting in elections	Actively opposing corruption	Helping those with worse lives	Staying in Latvia during an economic crisis
<b>All</b>	<b>87.1</b>	<b>77.0</b>	<b>75.8</b>	<b>75.3</b>	<b>70.4</b>	<b>62.7</b>	<b>39.5</b>
Elementar, incomplete secondary	82.2	62.6	67.8	64.7	66.7	63.2	34.8
Secondary	84.6	76.2	71.8	74.2	68.0	61.1	38.8
Specialised secondary	88.1	78.6	78.7	74.5	70.9	63.2	42.1
Higher	91.9	84.0	81.2	84.8	75.3	63.5	39.0

Source: National Identity. NI Dimensions. LU SZF, 2010.



A 4

## Active civic values depending on age

(% of age group, adding up the number of respondents saying «fully agree» or «mostly agree»,  $n = 1,004$ )

Age group	Corruption must be actively opposed	Laws must be obeyed	Foreign residents must vote
<b>All</b>	<b>87.3</b>	<b>85.9</b>	<b>71.2</b>
18-24	89.5	82.4	69.0
25-34	78.9	75.6	67.3
35-44	93.5	87.7	74.6
45-54	86.6	88.4	71.6
55-74	88.5	91.9	72.5

Source: National Identity. NI Dimensions. LU SZF, 2010.

A 5

## Active civic values depending on gender

(% of each group, adding up the number of respondents saying «fully agree» or «mostly agree»,  $n = 1,004$ )

Gender	Corruption must be actively opposed	Laws must be obeyed	Foreign residents must vote
<b>All</b>	<b>87.3</b>	<b>85.9</b>	<b>71.2</b>
Men	87.7	82.7	68.8
Women	87.0	88.8	73.3

Source: National Identity. NI Dimensions. LU SZF, 2010.

A 6

## Active civic values depending on levels of education

(% of each group, adding up the number of respondents saying «fully agree» or «mostly agree»,  $n = 1,004$ )

Level of education	Corruption must be actively opposed	Laws must be obeyed	Foreign residents must vote
<b>All</b>	<b>87.3</b>	<b>85.9</b>	<b>71.2</b>
Elementary, incomplete secondary	87.6	79.1	70.5
Secondary	87.6	82.7	70.4
Specialised secondary	87.3	88.8	68.1
Higher	86.8	89.7	78.1

Source: National Identity. NI Dimensions. LU SZF, 2010.

A 7

### Attitudes toward ethnic nationalism values depending on income levels

(% of each group, adding up the number of respondents saying «fully agree» or «mostly agree»,  $n = 1,004$ )

Level of income*	Respecting state flag	Speaking state language	Knowing national anthem
<b>All</b>	<b>84.2</b>	<b>83.5</b>	<b>72.2</b>
Low: < LVL 80	77.1	79.6	66.2
Medium low: LVL 81-120	76.4	79.3	65.2
Medium: LVL 121-150	90.3	92.6	71.6
Medium high: LVL 151-200	88.1	83.4	78.6
High: > LVL 200	84.9	87.0	78.8

\* Here and elsewhere the level of income reflects the post-tax monthly income of families per family member.

Source: National Identity. NI Dimensions. LU SZF, 2010.

A 8

### Attitudes toward ethnic nationalism values depending on plans to leave Latvia

(% of each group, adding up the number of respondents saying «fully agree» or «mostly agree»,  $n = 1,004$ )

Plan to leave Latvia in near future	Respecting state flag	Speaking state language	Knowing national anthem
<b>All</b>	<b>84.2</b>	<b>83.5</b>	<b>72.2</b>
Yes, I have such plans	83.2	73.6	62.2
I may depart	75.8	78.6	62.9
I have no such plans	87.3	87.0	76.9

Source: National Identity. NI Dimensions. LU SZF, 2010.

A 9

### Attitudes toward ethnic and cultural values depending on gender

(% of each group, adding up the number of respondents saying «fully agree» or «mostly agree»,  $n = 1,004$ )

Age	Every resident of Latvia must speak Latvian	I like the colours of the flag	Latvian language, culture are foundations for unity	I am deeply touched by the national anthem	People of other nationalities cannot belong to Latvia	I would prefer it if only Latvians lived in Latvia
<b>All</b>	<b>84.7</b>	<b>80.9</b>	<b>71.8</b>	<b>58.5</b>	<b>29.8</b>	<b>28.8</b>
Men	82.7	77.4	71.0	62.9	33.1	31.0
Women	86.4	84.0	72.5	64.3	26.9	26.9

Source: National Identity. NI Dimensions. LU SZF, 2010.

A 10

### Attitudes toward ethnic and cultural values depending on income levels

(% of each group, adding up the number of respondents saying «fully agree» or «mostly agree»,  $n = 1,004$ )

Income level	Every resident of Latvia must speak Latvian	I like the colours of the flag	Latvian language, culture are foundations for unity	I am deeply touched by the national anthem	People of other nationalities cannot belong to Latvia	I would prefer it if only Latvians lived in Latvia
<b>All</b>	<b>84.7</b>	<b>80.9</b>	<b>71.8</b>	<b>58.5</b>	<b>29.8</b>	<b>28.8</b>
Low: < LVL 80	87.2	87.6	79.2	58.5	30.6	31.0
Medium low: LVL 81-120	84.7	81.0	67.5	56.4	25.5	31.1
Medium: LVL 121-150	88.5	85.8	74.7	69.9	27.6	27.1
Medium high: LVL 151-200	89.7	81.0	75.4	61.6	32.7	36.6
High: > LVL 200	90.5	83.6	70.4	54.5	35.4	22.2
Don't know	78.1	75.8	68.8	56.4	28.5	26.6

Source: National Identity. NI Dimensions. LU SZF, 2010.

A 11

### Attitudes toward ethnic and cultural values depending on plans to leave Latvia

(% of each group, adding up the number of respondents saying «fully agree» or «mostly agree»,  $n = 1,004$ )

Have any of your family members, relatives or close friends moved abroad?	Every resident of Latvia must speak Latvian	I like the colours of the flag	Latvian language, culture are foundations for unity	I am deeply touched by the national anthem	People of other nationalities cannot belong to Latvia	I would prefer it if only Latvians lived in Latvia
<b>All</b>	<b>84.7</b>	<b>80.9</b>	<b>71.8</b>	<b>58.5</b>	<b>29.8</b>	<b>28.8</b>
Yes, family members	80.6	80.6	70.2	49.9	29.8	28.8
Yes, relatives	84.3	81.3	74.0	60.1	26.8	29.2
No	85.4	84.2	73.1	65.1	31.6	29.2

Source: National Identity. NI Dimensions. LU SZF, 2010.

A 12

### Recognition of multiple cultures depending on nationality

(% of each group, adding up the number of respondents saying «fully agree» or «mostly agree»,  $n = 1,004$ )

Nationality	It is very good that many nationalities have cultural associations in Latvia	The state must support the preservation of the cultures and traditions of various nationalities in Latvia	I like the fact that there are people of different nationalities in Latvia with different cultures
Latvians	72.9	65.0	51.8
Russians	89.1	87.7	85.8

Source: National Identity. NI Dimensions. LU SZF, 2010.

A 13

### Recognition of multiple cultures depending on gender

(% of each group, adding up the number of respondents saying «fully agree» or «mostly agree»,  $n = 1,004$ )

Gender	It is very good that many nationalities have cultural associations in Latvia	The state must support the preservation of the cultures and traditions of various nationalities in Latvia	I like the fact that there are people of different nationalities in Latvia with different cultures
<b>All</b>	<b>79.9</b>	<b>74.9</b>	<b>66.0</b>
Men	79.0	73.5	63.9
Women	80.7	76.2	68.0

Source: National Identity. NI Dimensions. LU SZF, 2010.

A 14

### Recognition of multiple cultures depending on income level

(% of each group, adding up the number of respondents saying «fully agree» or «mostly agree»,  $n = 1,004$ )

Gender	It is very good that many nationalities have cultural associations in Latvia	The state must support the preservation of the cultures and traditions of various nationalities in Latvia	I like the fact that there are people of different nationalities in Latvia with different cultures
<b>All</b>	<b>79.9</b>	<b>74.9</b>	<b>66.0</b>
Low: < LVL 80	75.8	73.0	63.0
Medium low: LVL 81-120	76.8	69.3	58.9
Medium: LVL 121-150	89.2	79.8	71.9
Medium high: LVL 151-200	87.5	79.0	72.9
High: > LVL 200	87.3	81.9	68.3

Source: National Identity. NI Dimensions. LU SZF, 2010.

A 15

### Attitudes toward global civic values depending on levels of education

(% of each group, adding up the number of respondents saying «fully agree» or «mostly agree»,  $n = 1,004$ )

Level of education	A clean environment in the future	Respect for minorities	A clean environment in the world	Help for Haiti	Human rights in the world
<b>All</b>	<b>80.2</b>	<b>73.5</b>	<b>59.7</b>	<b>42.5</b>	<b>42.0</b>
Elementary, incomplete secondary	74.2	67.3	52.4	37.3	34.3
Secondary	78.7	68.6	57.5	41.7	44.6
Specialised secondary	80.8	78.4	62.1	42.7	40.6
Higher	84.8	75.9	63.1	46.2	45.3

Source: National Identity. NI Dimensions. LU SZF, 2010.

A 16

### Attitudes toward collective myths depending on levels of education

(% of each group, adding up the number of respondents saying «fully agree» or «mostly agree»,  $n = 1,004$ )

Level of education	If Latvia, like Finland, had remained independent in 1940, then the standard of living of local residents would be much higher	It was only thanks to the nationalities of the USSR that Latvia achieved a high economic and cultural level
<b>All</b>	<b>47.5</b>	<b>36.8</b>
Elementary, incomplete secondary	45.2	29.2
Secondary	44.9	38.9
Specialised secondary	45.6	39.9
Higher	55.8	33.2

Source: National Identity. NI Dimensions. LU SZF, 2010.

A 17

### Attitudes toward collective myths depending on income levels

(% of each group, adding up the number of respondents saying «fully agree» and «mostly agree»,  $n = 1,004$ )

Level of education	If Latvia, like Finland, had remained independent in 1940, then the standard of living of local residents would be much higher	It was only thanks to the nationalities of the USSR that Latvia achieved a high economic and cultural level
<b>All</b>	<b>47.5</b>	<b>36.8</b>
Low: < LVL 80	42.1	33.6
Medium low: LVL 80-120	40.8	33.6
Medium: LVL 121-150	44.3	38.8
Medium high: LVL 151-200	55.6	46.9
High: > LVL 200	57.2	36.2

Source: National Identity. NI Dimensions. LU SZF, 2010.



A 18

## Pride in the state depending on education

(% of each group,  $n = 1,004$ )

Level of education	Proud («very proud» and «mostly proud»)	Not proud («not particularly proud» and «not proud»)	Don't know
<b>All</b>	<b>59.9</b>	<b>30.7</b>	<b>9.4</b>
Elementary, incomplete secondary	57.5	30.5	12.1
Secondary	59.5	29.2	11.3
Specialised secondary	57.8	34.0	8.2
Higher	65.5	27.4	7.1

Source: National Identity. NI Dimensions. LU SZF, 2010.

A 19

## Pride in the state depending on plans to leave Latvia

(% of each group,  $n = 1,004$ )

Have any of your family members, relatives or close friends moved abroad?	Proud («very proud» and «mostly proud»)	Not proud («not particularly proud» and «not proud»)	Don't know
Yes, family members	52.8	37.9	9.3
Yes, relatives	59.5	34.0	6.5
Yes, close friends	56.5	32.9	10.6
No	63.7	26.3	10.1

Source: National Identity. NI Dimensions. LU SZF, 2010.

# A Brief Review of Human Development Indicators 2009/2010

The Human Development Index (HDI) reflects the nation's development in three major areas:

- Lifespan and health;
- Knowledge;
- The extent to which the standard of living satisfies human dignity.

The concept of human development will always be broader than these indicators. The Human Development Index does not present an all-encompassing image of the condition of human development. In order to gain a broader view of human development, the index must be supplemented with other important indicators in this regard.

This brief review of indicators related to human development is based on information from the Latvian Central Statistical Board (CSP) about 2009 and 2010, on data about the situation on June 1, 2011, and on information from individual surveys. Where necessary, the authors have also relied on information from government ministries, relevant institutions and international organisations.

## Health and lifespan

The declaration which was adopted 30 years ago at an international conference on primary health care in Alma Ata said that good health is a fundamental component in human welfare, as well as long-term economic and social development. The declaration states that «health for all» helps people to improve their quality of life, as well as peace and security in the world. People have always listed health as one of the main values of life along with jobs and income.

The following indicators are customarily used to evaluate the health of a nation: the fertility and mortality rate, natural population growth, infant mortality, as well as the expected lifespan of newborns.

During the period when the Report on Human Development has been published (from 1995 until 2010),

health indicators have demonstrated a certain amount of progress (see Table T 1).

At the same time, it has to be said that the health of residents in Latvia in comparison to that of people in other European Union member states remains dissatisfactory. In 2008, for instance, the expected lifespan of newborns in Latvia was 6.9 years shorter than the average in the EU.

There is also a fundamental difference in the lifespan of men and women in Latvia – 9.6 years less for men than for women. The difference in the expected lifespan of men and women in Latvia is more than 1.5 times higher than is the average in the EU (5.9 years) (see Table T2).

The Latvian Health Ministry's document on basic positions related to public health between 2011 and 2017 contains the goal of extending the average lifespan of newborns to 71.1 years for men and 79.6 years for women. The plan is also to reduce differences in the lifespan of men and women and to ensure that people are as healthy as possible during their lives.

Mortality and lifespan data show that men who were 60 in 2009 would, on average, live for another 16 years, while women of the same age would live for 22 years (the EU average is 20 and 24 years respectively).

Latvia's population is continuing to shrink. In 2010, the rate of the reduction was larger than the previous year – 0.83% (0.572% in 2009). Since the beginning of 2000, the population has shrunk by more than 133,000 people. Migration among residents has been the main cause for this.

19,200 children were born in Latvia in 2010 – 2,500 fewer than in 2009 (21,700).

Mortality data show that mortality increased in 2010 in comparison to 2009 (30,000 in 2010, 29,900 in 2009). The mortality rate in 2010 exceeded the fertility rate by a factor of 1.6 (see Diagram T3).

The main causes of death in Latvia have not changed. The three most common causes of death were coronary diseases, tumours and external factors. Coronary diseases were the most common cause of death in 2009, with

T1

### Trends in major health indicators, 1995-2010

	1995	2000	2005	2010
Fertility rate, number of newborns per 1,000 residents	8.7	8.5	9.3	8.5
Mortality, number of deaths per 1,000 residents	15.7	13.6	14.2	13.4
Infant mortality per 1,000 newborns	18.8	10.4	7.8	5.7
Expected lifespan of newborns, years	66.7	70.7	71.8	73.8

16,100 people dying because of them (54% of all those who died). Tumours killed 6,000 people (20.2%) in 2009 – men more than women. External causes (suicide,

accidents, poisoning, traumas) killed 2,152 people in 2009 (7.2%). Men die of external causes three times more than women do (see Diagram T4).

T2


### Average expected lifespan in EU member states, years

	Year	Men	Women
EU-27	2007	76.1	82.0
Latvia	2010	68.8	78.4
Estonia	2009	69.8	80.1
Italy	2008	78.6	84.0
Lithuania	2009	67.5	78.6
Finland	2008	76.5	83.3
Spain	2008	78.0	84.3
Germany	2008	77.6	82.7
Sweden	2008	79.2	83.3

Source: Eurostat, <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu>, as well as data from national statistical organisations


T3

### The fertility and mortality rate per 1,000 residents, 1995-2010



T4

### Major causes of death, 1995-2010 (per 100,000 residents)



The situation with public health has not improved to any significant degree in recent years. Health indicators are among the lowest in Europe, and mortality rates are among the highest.

The aforementioned Health Ministry document lists four major goals: Reducing the incidence of disease and mortality from non-infectious diseases, improvements to the health care of mothers and children, reduction of traumas and mortality caused by external factors, and improving the accessibility of health care. The health care sector is cited as one of the country's priorities, but the fact is that financing for the sector is not sufficient.

General government spending on health care compared to GDP in 2009, rose a bit in comparison to 2008 (4.7% as against 4.6%). Government financing as a proportion of GDP, however, remains among the lowest in the EU – around 4%, as opposed to as much as 7% of GDP in other EU member states.

## Education



Education is the most important prerequisite for the survival and development of a society. It is of key importance in the development of individuals and society at large. Latvia's long-term goal when it comes

to the development of the country's education system is to create a knowledge-based society in which cultural, social and economic growth are based on a high intellectual level among the country's residents. The government's position on the development of education states that the goal is to ensure that each resident can obtain a high-quality lifelong education in terms of his or her individual interests and capacities, as well as of the country's economic development needs.

People must have at least a secondary education if they are to participate actively in social and economic affairs (see Diagram T5).

Latvia's National Development Plan for 2007-2013 states that the main resource in achieving the level of public and individual development that is typical in developed countries is the level of knowledge and wisdom among local residents, as well as the skilful and targeted use of such knowledge and wisdom. An appropriate educational system is necessary to achieve these goals. Bringing greater order to the country's network of schools is one of the most important issues in this regard.

Over the last two years, the Ministry of Education and Science has been reorganising the country's education institutions, and the result was that the number of



general education schools declined very rapidly during the 2010/2011 school year (see Diagram T6).

Over the past several years, Latvia has seen a decline in student numbers at general education schools, as well as in the number of teachers. During this school year, 28,800 teachers are working in schools – 600 more than during the previous year, even though since 2005/2006, the number of teachers has declined by 5,600.

During the 2010/2011 school year, there were 858 general education schools with a total of 229,000 students – 10,800 or 4.5% fewer than during the previous school years.

Latvia's negative demographic situation has led to a decline in the number of elementary schools (Grades 1-9) students each year. During the last six years, the number of elementary school students has declined by 53,000 to 174,700 this year. There are concerns about the reduced proportion of elementary school students in the relevant age group (7-15), even though elementary education is compulsory in Latvia. During the 2010/2011 school year, the proportion of such students in the age group shrank to 94.3% (as against 95.2% in 2009/2010).

During the last school year, 19,000 students obtained a general secondary education – 107 fewer than during the previous school year. 58.9% of high school graduates entered higher education institutions after graduation. 4.2% continued their education at professional education institutions, while 36.9% did not continue their studies at all.

There are 63 special education institutions in Latvia for children with physical and mental development problems. There are 1,591 special needs students, however, who have been integrated into general education institutions.

According to the State Educational Quality Service, 11,300 students who are the age of compulsory education are not actually attending school this year. The proportion of people aged 18-24 who had not completed their secondary education and were not continuing with their education in 2009 was 13.9%. There can be all sorts of reasons for this, but socio-economic considerations are the most important ones.

**Ensuring the availability of primary and secondary education** is the main policy aspect aimed at reducing

the proportion of young people who do not finish school. The goal is to ensure a precise count of those who should be attending school, preparing normative regulations which would set out a unified procedure whereby an educational institution informs parents, as well as local government and state institutions if a child does not attend school without an excuse, also providing assistance to young people who face the risk of social alienation or have problems with their learning capacities. The plan is to implement this programme in full by 2013.


According to an informational report from the Ministry of Education and Science (11 September 2009), «improvements to the system of professional education involve a professional educational system which regulates itself and is in line with the needs of the state and its labour market – one which ensures that local residents can learn general and professional knowledge and skills which are in line with their abilities and interests throughout their lives. This will be ensured by optimisation of the network of professional education institutions, as well as the content of education and financing for the educational system.»

Work is being done to ensure greater order in the system and content of professional education so as to ensure the more effective use of resources, to improve the quality of education and to make sure that the education system is in line with the needs of the labour market. This involves the closing or merger of small schools, the transfer of schools with insufficient numbers of students to local governments so that they can be merged with general education schools, the establishment of competence centres, the consolidation of educational programmes and the establishment of branches for schools. Funding from the European Union Structural Funds is being used to make professional education more attractive, as well as to engage in other activities which help to achieve the relevant strategic goals.

During the 2010/2011 school year, there are 35,800 students in 83 professional educational institutions – a decline of 893 students and two educational institutions in comparison to the previous year (see Diagram T7).

T7

### Trends in the number of students at professional educational institutions, 2000-2010





During the past decade, the number of students at professional educational institutions has declined by 12,900.

Improvements to the system of higher education envisage reducing the lack of uniformity and improving the quality of study programmes, also facilitating the more rational and effective use of public financing and facilitating the availability of a higher education for students from poorer families.


There are 58 higher education institutions in Latvia. The number of students at such institutions, however, has been declining each year during the past five years. During the 2010/2011 academic year, there were 103,900 students at Latvia's universities and colleges – 8,700 fewer than during the previous year. The number of

students admitted to universities declined from 31,500 in 2009/2010 to 31,000 in 2010/2011. Last year 26,500 people graduated from institutions of higher education with an academic degree or qualifications.


Under the auspices of the EU 2020 strategy, Latvia has set out the goal of increasing the proportion of people aged 30-34 who have completed their higher education to 34-36%, as against 30.1% in 2009. The average goal in the EU is 40%, with a level of 32.3% in 2009 (see Diagram T8).

One basic problem in higher education is to ensure its compatibility with the needs of the labour market and the national economy. It is still the case that inadequate numbers of graduates in the fields of engineering, manufacturing, processing and other technologies are graduating.

**T8 Trends in the number of students admitted to and graduated from universities and colleges, 2000-2010**



**T9 The number of university and college students by type of tuition payment at the beginning of the academic year, %**



Most students in Latvia pursue degrees in the social sciences, commerce and the law (49.9%). 12.6% of students are enrolled in faculties which teach engineering, manufacturing and construction, while 5.5% are enrolled in faculties which teach the natural sciences, mathematics and information technologies.

The percentage of students whose tuition is covered by the state increased in the 2010/2011 academic year, but 66% of all students paid tuition themselves (see Diagram T9).

The main policy directions and projects aimed at increasing the number of people who have completed their higher education in Latvia include modernisation of higher education, modernisation of the material and technical basis of higher education institutions, an increase in the effectiveness of resource use, provision of equal opportunities to pursue a higher education, and improvements to the quality of studies and scholarly work.

The Ministry of Education has taken several steps to improve the export capacity of universities and to attract

students and financial support from other countries. Former Education Minister Rolands Broks has said that there are plans to change the financing model for higher education and to evaluate educational programmes to examine their quality, the possibility that programmes may overlap, and the workload of academic staff.

The aforementioned goals in the area of education can be achieved if relevant financing is found. Educational institutions in Latvia receive funding from the national budget, local government budgets, the resources of individuals and legal entities, as well as foreign aid programmes (see Table T10).

## Income

Income is an important aspect of the Human Development Index. Income allows people to access the important resources which are necessary for human development, expand the choices which people have, and are an important goal of government policy.


T 10

### Financing for Education

	General government spending on education, % of national budget	General government spending on education, % of GDP
2000	14.6	5.5
2001	16.0	5.4
2002	16.1	5.7
2003	15.8	5.5
2004	17.0	6.1
2005	15.7	5.6
2006	15.7	6.0
2007	16.1	5.8
2008	16.7	6.5
2009	15.0	6.6

T 11

### Household income, 2004-2009, lats per household member



Latvia's Poverty Risk Index increased from 19% in 2004 to 21.4% in 2009, and this is one of the highest levels in the EU. The Poverty Risk Index speaks to the proportion of people who are under the threshold of a risk of poverty (LVL 160 a month in 2009).

Latvia's EU 2020 goal is to reduce the Poverty Risk Index to 21% by 2020, which would mean that the risk of poverty would be eliminated for 121,000 residents.

One direction in pursuit of this goal is to **reduce income inequality and to facilitate the ability of people who are poor or facing the risk of social alienation to take part in and enjoy equal opportunities in the labour market in an effective way.**

Household income per household member in 2009 declined by an average of 16% or LVL 40 a month. The average monthly income is at a level of LVL 214, which is lower than in 2007 (see Diagram T11).

There are still differences among Latvia's various regions in terms of income differentiation. The highest income per household member was registered in Riga, while the lowest was registered in Latgale (see Table T12).

The risk of poverty increased in 2009 for several groups of residents, including young people up to the

age of 24, as well as households with children. Divorced families and families with three or more children face a far greater risk of poverty than is the average.

As economically active household members have lost their jobs, there has been a reduction in the proportion of households in which wages are the main source of income. Wage income per household member declined by 24% or LVL 46 between 2008 and 2009.

The average gross wage for working people in Latvia was LVL 445 in 2010, with a net wage of LVL 316. The average gross wage dropped by 3.5% in comparison to 2009. The reduction in the public sector was 6.8% (LVL 470), it was 8.2% (LVL 433) in the government sector as such, and 1.4% (LVL 427) in the private sector.

Latvia's residents have become far more reliant on social aid as economic activities have narrowed. In 2008, 19% of household income was based on social aid, but in 2009 the proportion rose to 28% of income.

Data about purchasing power parity in terms of Latvia's GDP show that on average, it is 52% of the EU-27 level – the second lowest indicator in the EU (see Diagram T13).

T 12

### Household income per household member in Latvia's statistical regions, 2008


	Riga	Riga environs	Vidzeme	Kurzeme	Zemgale	Latgale
2008	310	300	193	230	218	175
2009	261	231	183	191	188	160
2009 as % of 2008	84	77	95	83	86	91

Source: European Union statistics on income and living conditions (EU SILC)

T 13

### Per Capita GDP in EU Member States in Accordance With Purchasing Power Parity, 2009

(EU 27 = 100)



# The Human Development Index and Statistical Tables

The first Human Development Index (HDI) was published in the 1990 Human Development Report, and ever since then it has been of much interest among politicians, journalists and scholars. There have always been discussions about the components of the HDI and about the way in which it is calculated. The way in which the HDI is calculated and the relevant indicators have been chosen has been improved and altered since 1990.

The 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the HDI rolled around in 2010, and after a study of criticisms and discussions about the calculation methods, the indicators upon which the index

is based and the way in which the index is calculated were changed. More detailed information about these changes can be found at <http://hdr.undp.org/en/humandev/lets-talk-hd>.

The HDI is a combined indicator which helps to evaluate long term progress in three major areas of human development – education, health and income. The HDI clearly shows that development involves more than merely economic growth.

The following table shows how the method for calculating the HDI has changed over time.

Period	Indicators			Calculation method
	Health	Education	Income	
1990	Average expected lifespan of newborns	Proportion of literacy among people aged 25+	Real per capita GDP, PPP \$ (log)	Arithmetic average
1991-1994		(2/3) Proportion of literate people among adults (1/3) Average years spent obtaining an education	Real per capita GDP, PPP \$ (adapted)	
1995-1998		(2/3) Proportion of literate people among adults (1/3) Proportion of attendees at educational institutions at all levels	Real per capita GDP, PPP \$ (adapted)	
1999		(2/3) Proportion of literate people among adults (1/3) Proportion of attendees at educational institutions at all levels	Real per capita GDP, PPP \$ (adapted)	
2000-2009		(2/3) Proportion of literate people among adults (1/3) Proportion of attendees at educational institutions at all levels	Real per capita GDP, PPP \$ (log)	
2010		(2/3) Average years spent obtaining an education (1/3) Expected number of years spend obtaining an education	Real per capita GNP, PPP \$ (ln)	Geometric average

Until 2010, the HDI was calculated on the basis of a simple arithmetic average from indicators describing health, education and income. In 2010, the structure of three dimensions for the index was preserved, but new indicators were chosen for the segments of income and education, and the calculation method was changed from the arithmetic average to the geometric average. The arithmetic average method allows low achievements in one dimension to be compensated with high achievements in another. The geometric average method reduces the likelihood of replacing the various

dimensions in the index with one another, and it offers a more adequate reflection of the actual situation.

The HDI that is in this year's Human Development Report cannot be compared to indices from previous reports because of the differences in the calculation methodology.

Because of the changes in the HDI calculation method and indicators, we have republished Latvia's HDI from the Human Development Report of 2010 in this report. The full text of the report can be found at <http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2010>.

## The Human Development Index: Latvia

	Ranking in HDR 2010	Human Development Index	Expected lifespan of newborns, years	Average no. of years in education	Expected no. of years in education	Real per capita GNP (PPP 2008 \$)
2010	48	0.769	73.0	10.4	15.4	12,944

The internationally comparable data that are used to calculate the HDI come from the following sources of information: per capita gross national product from the World Development Indicator database of the World Bank (2010); the average amount of time spent in education and the expected amount of time spent in education from the UNESCO Statistical Institute database; and the expected lifespan of newborns from the 2008 revised report of the UNDESA Global Resident Perspective 1950-2050 (UNDESA, 2009).

Information in the Human Development Report 2010 shows that Latvia's HDI rose from 0.651 to 0.769 between 1980 and 2010, placing it in 48<sup>th</sup> place among 169 countries in the world. More detailed information about this can be found at <http://hdrstats.undp.org/images/explanations/LVA.pdf>.

Tables of indicators related to human development have been prepared in accordance with the indicators

of the UN Development Programme (UNDP). There are 18 statistical tables featuring the main aspects of human development. The tables reflect the most important indicators in describing social processes related to health, education, the environment, employment, etc. The source of information is data from the Central Statistical Board (CSP), supplemented as necessary with data from government ministries and institutions, as well as international organisations.

The statistical information in the tables is based on international methodologies. Since 1995, some of the indicators in the tables have been redefined, with new methodologies and classifications. Information has been reviewed, and data have accordingly been adjusted for the entire period. The data tables also use data from random cohort studies conducted by the CSP and other institutions. Information in the tables is current as of June 1, 2011.

## A characterisation of human development

	Expected lifespan of newborns, years	Maternal mortality		Residents per physician	Attendees at all levels of education, % of those aged 7-23	Higher education students, % of those aged 19-23		Per capita GDP, PPP <sup>1</sup>
		Per 100,000 newborns	Number of incidents			Total	Women	
1995	66.7	–	–	294	70.8	26.6	–	–
1996	69.3	40	8	283	75.9	37.8	45.5	–
1997	70.0	42	8	288	78.8	43.3	51.7	–
1998	69.9	43	8	301	81.5	50.7	63.5	–
1999	70.4	41	8	296	84.4	56.2	72.7	–
2000	70.7	25	5	291	87.8	63.2	79.6	7,000
2001	70.7	25	5	303	89.5	67.0	84.0	7,700
2002	71.1	5	1	294	90.5	69.7	87.8	8,400
2003	71.4	14	3	294	91.7	71.9	91.3	9,000
2004	72.1	10	2	287	92.5	72.2	93.1	9,900
2005	71.8	5	1	278	91.8	70.5	90.9	10,900
2006	71.3	14	3	274	90.4	68.6	89.3	12,200
2007	71.2	26	6	283	89.7	68.8	90.4	13,900
2008	72.7	13	3	269	89.5	68.4	88.9	14,100
2009	73.4	46	10	282	87.6	62.4	79.8	12,200
2010	73.8	21	4	280	86.7	58.7	73.1	–

<sup>1</sup> Source: European Union Statistical Bureau homepage: [http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/national\\_accounts/data/main\\_tables](http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/national_accounts/data/main_tables)



## Undesirable phenomena

	Unemployed people as % of economically active residents	Residents aged 25-64 with at least secondary education, % <sup>1</sup>	Proportion in income between 20% of richest and 20% of poorest residents <sup>2</sup>	Annual inflation rate in comparison to previous year, %	Deaths in traffic accidents per 100,000 residents	Divorces as % of marriages	Children born out of wedlock, % of all children
1995	6.6	...	...	125.0	25	70.6	29.9
1996	7.2	...	...	117.6	22	62.8	33.1
1997	7.0	...	...	108.4	22	63.0	34.8
1998	9.2	82.6	...	104.7	26	64.4	37.1
1999	9.1	83.5	...	102.4	25	63.9	39.1
2000	7.8	83.2	5.5	102.6	25	66.6	40.3
2001	7.7	79.6	...	102.5	22	62.0	42.1
2002	8.5	82.2	...	101.9	22	61.1	43.1
2003	8.6	83.2	...	102.9	21	48.3	44.2
2004	8.5	84.6	...	106.2	22	50.8	45.3
2005	7.4	84.5	6.7	106.7	19	50.6	44.6
2006	6.5	84.5	7.9	106.5	18	49.6	43.4
2007	4.9	85.0	6.3	110.1	18	47.8	43.0
2008	7.0	85.8	7.3	115.4	14	48.0	43.1
2009	16.0	86.8	7.3	103.5	11	51.4	43.5
2010	14.3	88.4	6.9	98.9	10	53.1	44.1

<sup>1</sup> Source: European Union Statistical Bureau homepage:  
[http://eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search\\_database](http://eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database)

<sup>2</sup> Data from the European Union Statistical Bureau homepage, «Income, Social Inclusion and Living Conditions»:  
[http://epp/eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search\\_database](http://epp/eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database)

## Undesirable phenomena (continued)

	Suicides per 100,000 residents		Per capita CO <sub>2</sub> emissions, kg per resident <sup>1</sup>	Per capita NO <sub>x</sub> emissions from stationary sources, kg per resident <sup>1</sup>
	Men	Women		
1995	72.0	14.9	15.3	3.2
1996	65.3	13.4	18.3	3.5
1997	62.8	13.9	13.9	3.9
1998	61.0	12.5	13.2	3.8
1999	53.9	13.3	9.8	3.4
2000	56.5	11.9	5.1	3.5
2001	52.2	11.2	3.8	3.7
2002	48.5	11.9	3.3	4.0
2003	45.1	9.7	2.6	4.4
2004	42.8	8.5	2.0	3.8
2005	42.0	9.6	1.4	4.2
2006	38.7	6.6	0.9	4.6
2007	34.1	7.7	0.8	4.6
2008	40.9	8.2	0.5	3.2
2009	40.0	8.2	0.5	3.2
2010	36.2	5.1	1.5	3.8

Source: Information from the Latvian Environmental Geological and Meteorological Centre

## Differences between men and women (women as % versus men)

	Anticipated lifespan of newborns	Number of residents (year's end)	Students in secondary education programmes	Graduates completing secondary education programmes at highest level	Higher education students (19-23)	Employed people <sup>1</sup>	Unemployed people	Average wage, national level
1995	120.3	116.9	108.0	120.1	155.2	–	109.7	78.3
1996	118.3	117.0	103.5	–	149.7	92.0	120.8	78.5
1997	118.2	117.0	101.8	132.1	145.1	94.8	146.2	79.7
1998	117.9	117.0	101.0	124.1	146.4	92.7	141.1	79.3
1999	117.4	117.1	99.7	122.3	157.4	92.6	134.6	80.0
2000	117.0	117.1	98.1	100.3	152.5	96.2	136.1	78.6
2001	117.6	117.2	98.0	113.8	142.1	97.8	134.6	80.2
2002	117.4	117.3	97.1	111.7	138.8	96.0	142.2	81.5
2003	116.7	117.1	98.0	101.4	140.0	94.8	140.9	83.5
2004	115.1	117.0	100.5	111.0	144.3	95.0	143.6	84.4
2005	118.0	117.0	102.2	111.3	145.8	94.0	149.3	81.9
2006	116.6	117.1	104.0	111.9	152.7	94.5	155.7	82.4
2007	116.2	116.9	104.3	111.6	156.9	95.1	160.2	83.9
2008	115.9	116.8	102.1	111.2	154.3	96.7	108.1	84.8
2009	114.3	116.7	97.4	111.9	150.4	105.4	103.4	83.8
2010	114.0	116.6	94.6	109.4	144.3	106.9	118.5	81.5

Source: Labour force studies, 1996-2001, focusing on people aged 15+ and, after 2002, between 15 and 74 years old.

## The condition of women

	Expected lifespan of newborn, years	Average age of first marriage	Maternal mortality		Girls aged 11-18 in high school, %	High school graduates as % of all women aged 18	Higher education students as % of all women aged 19-23	Proportion of women among employed people, % <sup>2</sup>	Proportion of women among managers, specialists, % <sup>2</sup>	Proportion of women among MPs, %
			Of 100,000 newborns	Number of cases						
1995	73.1	23.3	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	8 <sup>3</sup>
1996	75.6	23.7	40	8	84.3	–	45.5	47.9	60.5	8 <sup>3</sup>
1997	75.9	24.1	42	8	85.9	85.4	51.7	48.7	60.5	8 <sup>3</sup>
1998	75.5	24.5	43	8	85.8	86.4	63.5	48.1	59.1	17 <sup>4</sup>
1999	76.2	24.7	41	8	86.9	91.4	72.7	48.1	58.4	17 <sup>4</sup>
2000	76.0	24.9	25	5	88.2	87.6	79.6	49.0	57.7	17 <sup>4</sup>
2001	76.6	24.9	25	5	89.0	96.1	84.0	49.4	59.1	17 <sup>4</sup>
2002	76.8	25.4	5	1	88.9	98.5	87.8	49.0	57.6	18 <sup>5</sup>
2003	76.9	25.4	14	3	90.5	82.2	91.3	48.7	57.5	18 <sup>5</sup>
2004	77.2	25.6	10	2	88.9	81.1	93.1	48.7	57.5	18 <sup>5</sup>
2005	77.4	26.0	5	1	92.4	77.1	90.9	48.4	58.5	18 <sup>5</sup>
2006	76.8	26.3	14	3	92.9	83.2	89.3	48.6	58.1	19 <sup>6</sup>
2007	76.5	26.4	26	6	90.6 <sup>1</sup>	82.9	89.1	48.8	60.3	19 <sup>6</sup>
2008	77.0	26.7	13	3	90.2 <sup>1</sup>	86.3	88.9	49.2	61.6	19 <sup>6</sup>
2009	78.1	27.1	46	10	91.3 <sup>1</sup>	81.6	79.8	51.3	60.3	19 <sup>6</sup>
2010	78.4	27.4	21	4	81.8	93.2	73.1	51.7	59.3	19 <sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup> According to Cabinet of Ministers regulations on the classification of Latvia's educational system (11 April 2006), the first phase of secondary education covers Grades 7-9 (13 to 15 year olds), while the second phase covers Grades 10-12 (16-18 year olds).

<sup>2</sup> Labour force studies, 1996-2001, focusing on people aged 15+ and, after 2002, between 15 and 74 years old.

<sup>3</sup> The results of a parliamentary election on 30 September 1995.

<sup>4</sup> The results of a parliamentary election on 3 October 1998.

<sup>5</sup> The results of a parliamentary election on 5 October 2002.

<sup>6</sup> The results of a parliamentary election on 9 October 2006.

<sup>7</sup> The results of a parliamentary election on 2 October 2010.

## Demographic indicators

	Population, millions, end of year	Population increase, annual, %	Summary fertility coefficient	Proportion of dependents, %	Proportion aged 60+, % end of year	Expected lifespan for 60 year olds	
						Men	Women
1995	2.5	-1.2	1.27	43.1	19.3	14.2	19.3
1996	2.4	-1.0	1.18	42.3	19.7	14.8	21.2
1997	2.4	-1.0	1.13	42.2	20.1	14.2	21.3
1998	2.4	-0.9	1.11	41.0	20.5	14.3	20.9
1999	2.4	-0.7	1.18	40.6	21.0	14.1	21.5
2000	2.4	-0.7	1.24	41.1	21.5	14.8	21.3
2001	2.3	-0.8	1.21	39.7	21.9	15.4	21.5
2002	2.3	-0.6	1.23	39.2	22.1	15.1	21.8
2003	2.3	-0.5	1.29	37.6	22.1	15.1	21.5
2004	2.3	-0.6	1.24	37.2	22.2	15.9	21.6
2005	2.3	-0.5	1.31	36.1	22.1	15.0	21.8
2006	2.3	-0.6	1.35	35.6	22.1	15.0	21.5
2007	2.3	-0.5	1.41	34.4	22.1	15.3	21.1
2008	2.3	-0.4	1.40	33.8	22.3	15.6	21.7
2009	2.2	-0.6	1.32	34.0	22.6	16.1	22.0
2010	2.2	-0.8	1.18	34.2	22.9	16.1	22.0

## Health care indicators

	Mortality from coronary disease, % of all deaths	Mortality from malignant tumours, % of all deaths	Registered per capita alcohol consumption in litres <sup>1</sup>	Number of residents per physician	Health care spending as % of all government spending	Health care spending as % of GDP
1995	55.8	14.1	9.1	294	8.8	3.4
1996	55.5	16.0	8.4	283	8.3	3.1
1997	55.5	16.3	8.4	288	10	3.8
1998	55.5	16.4	8.9	301	10.2	4.1
1999	55.2	17.1	8.8	296	9.5	4.0
2000	55.5	17.3	8.4	291	10.5	3.9
2001	55.9	17.4	7.8	303	9.2	3.2
2002	56.0	17.4	8.5	294	10.3	3.7
2003	56.1	17.9	9.4	294	9.7	3.4
2004	55.9	18.2	8.9	287	9.8	3.5
2005	55.1	18.0	8.7	278	12	4.3
2006	53.6	18.2	9.5	274	12.8	4.9
2007	54.6	17.9	10.0	283	12	4.3
2008	53.3	19.8	10.8	269	11.8	4.6
2009	53.8	19.9	–	282	10.7	4.7
2010	54.2	20.1	–	280	–	–

<sup>1</sup> Estimate

## Education-related indicators

	Students at all levels, % of those aged 7-23	Primary school students, % of those aged 7-15	Secondary school students, % of those aged 16-18	Higher education students, % of those aged 19-23	Higher education spending, % of all education spending	Average spending per student at state universities, LVL	General government spending on education, % of all spending	General government spending on education, % of GDP
1995	70.8	89.3	82.6	26.6	16.3	–	16.5	6.4
1996	75.9	91.4	86.3	37.8	18.7	–	14.6	5.4
1997	78.8	92.2	91.5	43.3	18.5	–	14.9	5.4
1998	81.5	92.4	94.6	50.7	91.7	–	16.3	6.5
1999	84.4	93.3	100.4	56.2	20.8	–	14.9	6.2
2000	87.8	96.5	100.00	63.2	22.7	970	14.6	5.5
2001	89.5	99.4	97.0	67.0	23.4	950	16	5.4
2002	90.5	101.0	96.1	69.7	24.1	1,014	15.8	5.5
2004	92.5	103.1	97.6	72.2	25.5	1,173	17	6.1
2005	91.2	103.4	98.7	70.5	27.6	1,657	15.7	5.6
2006	90.4	103.3	98.7	68.6	27.2	1,945	15.7	6.0
2007	89.75	103.2	99.4	68.8	26.7	1,917	16.1	5.8
2008	89.5	102.9	101.9	68.4	25.5	3,013	16.7	6.5
2009	87.6	101.9	109.3	62.4	–	–	15	6.6
2010	86.7	99.9	106.6	58.6	–	–	–	–
2010	86.7	99.9	106.6	58.6				

## The intellectual potential of the nation

	Scientists, technical workers per 1,000 residents	Spending on R&D projects, % of GDP	Secondary school graduates, % of those aged 18	Higher ed. graduates, % of those aged 23	Recipients of doctoral degree, % of all graduates
1995	2.1	0.52	74.9	21.7	–
1996	1.9	0.46	71.6	28.2	–
1997	1.8	0.43	73.6	30.9	0.3
1998	1.8	0.45	76.4	32.2	0.5
1999	1.8	0.40	81.2	33.2	0.5
2000	2.3	0.45	85.6	47.9	0.3
2001	2.3	0.41	88.7	64.2	0.2
2002	2.3	0.42	80.2	58.9	0.3
2003	2.1	0.38	76.2	63.0	0.3
2004	2.9	0.42	76.0	71.2	0.4
2005	2.4	0.56	77.9	75.4	0.4
2006	2.8	0.70	82.5	71.1	0.4
2007	2.8	0.59	87.3	72.6	0.5
2008	2.9	0.61	81.5	66.2	0.6
2009	2.4	0.46	83.4	69.2	0.7
2010	2.4	0.50	–	–	0.5

## Employment

	Employed people, % of population <sup>1</sup>	Areas of employment, % of all employees <sup>1</sup>			Increase/decrease in wages of employed persons, %	Average weekly working hours <sup>1</sup>
		Agriculture	Industry	Services		
1995	–	–	–	–	21.7	–
1996	48.3	17	27	56	7.2	40.1
1997	50.6	21	26	53	12.3	41.2
1998	50.5	19	27	54	10.3	41.0
1999	49.6	17	26	57	5.4	41.2
2000	48.2	15	26	59	5.7	41.4
2001	49.2	15	26	59	6.1	41.3
2002	54.4	15	26	59	8.0	40.1
2003	55.4	14	27	59	10.9	40.0
2004	56.1	13	27	60	8.8	39.4
2005	57.1	12	26	62	17.0	40.0
2006	60.1	11	28	61	23.1	39.7
2007	62.0	10	28	62	32.0	39.2
2008	62.6	8	29	63	20.4	39.4
2009	55.2	9	24	67	-3.8	38.9
2010	53.1	9	24	67	-3.5	38.4

<sup>1</sup> Labour force survey, persons aged 15+ between 1996 and 2001 and persons between 15 and 74 after 2002

## Unemployment (end of year)

	Number of unemployed people (,000)	Unemployment rate, %		Unemployed young people (15-24), % of all unemployed	Spending on unemployment benefit, % of all state expenses <sup>1</sup>	Proportion of long-term (12 mo.+ ) unemployed
		Total	Among women			
1995	83.2	6.6	7.0	20.2	1.7	25.5
1996	90.8	7.2	8.1	20.0	1.1	31.2
1997	84.9	7.0	8.5	18.1	1.1	38.1
1998	111.4	9.2	11.0	16.4	1.6	26.3
1999	109.5	9.1	10.7	14.8	1.6	31.1
2000	93.3	7.8	9.2	14.8	1.2	29.0
2001	91.6	7.7	9.0	14.6	1.0	26.6
2002	89.7	8.5	10.5	13.9	1.1	26.4
2003	90.6	8.6	10.5	13.2	1.1	26.1
2004	90.8	8.5	9.6	12.8	1.0	25.6
2005	78.5	7.4	8.8	14.0	1.2	26.2
2006	68.9	6.5	7.7	14.0	1.1	23.1
2007	52.3	4.9	5.8	12.9	0.9	18.0
2008	76.4	7.0	5.2	13.6	0.9	11.1
2009	179.2	16.0	5.1	14.5	2.5	13.5
2010	162.5	14.3	5.4	14.3	–	37.8

<sup>1</sup> Beginning in 2007, this indicator has been calculated on the basis of the government function related to support for unemployed people, which includes spending on support payments for such people.



## Priorities in government spending

	Defence spending, % of GDP	Health care spending, % of GDP	Education spending, % of GDP
1995	1.1	3.4	6.4
1996	1.0	3.1	5.4
1997	0.8	3.8	5.4
1998	0.8	4.1	6.5
1999	1.0	4.0	6.2
2000	0.9	3.9	5.5
2001	0.9	3.2	5.4
2002	1.1	3.7	5.7
2003	1.2	3.4	5.5
2004	1.3	3.5	6.1
2005	1.2	4.3	5.6
2006	1.5	4.9	6.0
2007	1.5	4.3	5.8
2008	1.5	4.6	6.5
2009	1.2	4.7	6.6

## Environmental resources

	Territory, ,000 km <sup>2</sup>	Persons per km <sup>2</sup> , end of year	Agricultural land, % of all land*	Forestland, % of all land	Reclaimed land, % of farmland	Annual per capita water consumption, m <sup>3</sup> <sup>2</sup>
1995	64.6	38.2	39.3	44.6	–	183.3
1996	64.6	37.9	39.0	44.3	62.0	174.4
1997	64.6	37.5	39.0	44.9	62.0	166.1
1998	64.6	37.1	38.7	44.2	62.8	161.9
1999	64.6	36.9	38.5	44.2	62.9	143.2
2000	64.6	36.6	38.5	44.2	62.9	126.2
2011	64.6	36.3	38.5	44.4	62.9	126.3
2002	64.6	36.1	38.4	44.5	62.9	127.6
2003	64.6	35.9	38.3	44.5	63.0	121.9
2004	64.6	35.7	38.2	44.9	63.1	113.9
2005	64.6	36.0	38.3	45.2	63.1	118.8
2006	64.6	35.0	38.1	45.4	63.3	103.8
2007	64.6	35.2	38.0	45.4	63.1	109.3
2008	64.6	35.2	37.8	45.5	61.5 <sup>1</sup>	1328
2009	64.6	35.0	37.7	45.7	–	198.7
2010	64.6	34.8	37.7	45.8	–	–

<sup>1</sup> Data from the State Land Service

<sup>2</sup> Data from the Latvian Environmental, Geological and Meteorological Centre

## National income indicators

	GDP, million LVL	Agricultural added value, % of GDP	Industrial added value, % of GDP	Services, % of GDP	Personal consumption, % of GDP	Gross domestic equity capital, % of GDP	Tax revenues, % of GDP	General government spending, % of GDP	Exports, % of GDP	Imports, % of GDP
1995	2,615.1	9	30	61	63.5	13.6	33.2	38.6	42.7	44.9
1996	3,129.2	8	28	64	68.5	16.4	30.8	36.9	46.8	54.3
1997	3,631.9	5	29	66	67.4	16.9	32.1	36.3	46.8	54.7
1998	3,971.2	4	28	68	46.9	24.7	33.7	40.2	47.2	59.6
1999	4,265.0	4	25	71	63.1	23.0	32.0	41.8	40.4	49.6
2000	4,750.8	4	24	72	62.5	24.2	29.5	37.3	41.6	48.7
2001	5,219.9	4	23	72	62.6	24.9	28.5	34.6	41.6	51.1
2002	5,758.3	4	23	73	62.1	23.8	28.3	35.6	40.9	50.6
2003	6,392.8	4	22	74	62.4	24.4	28.5	34.8	42.1	54.6
2004	7,434.5	4	22	73	62.9	27.4	28.5	35.8	44.0	59.6
2005	9,059.1	4	22	75	62.5	30.6	29.0	35.6	47.8	62.2
2006	11,171.7	4	21	75	65.2	32.6	30.4	38.2	44.9	66.3
2007	14,779.8	3	22	75	62.3	33.7	30.5	35.9	42.3	62.4
2008	16,188.2	3	23	74	62.9	29.3	29.1	38.8	42.8	56.5
2009	13,082.8	3	21	76	61.6	21.4	26.6	44.2	43.9	45.4
2010	12,735.9	4	22	74	63.0	18.0	-	42.9	53.4	54.2

## Trends in economic development

	GDP growth/decrease (2000 chained prices), %	Per capita GDP growth/drop (2000 chained prices), %	Inflation rate, % compared to previous year	Export growth, % of GDP (actual prices)	Budget surplus or deficit, % of GDP (actual prices)
1995	-	0.5	125.0	-	-1.6
1996	3.6	5.0	117.6	11.2	-0.4
1997	8.3	9.4	108.4	6.4	1.5
1998	4.8	5.7	104.7	4.4	0.0
1999	3.3	4.1	102.4	-3.1	-3.9
2000	6.9	7.7	102.6	5.4	-2.8
2001	8.0	8.9	102.5	3.7	-1.9
2002	6.5	7.2	101.9	3.2	-2.3
2003	7.2	7.8	102.9	5.3	-1.6
2004	8.7	9.3	106.2	7.8	-1.0
2005	10.6	11.2	106.7	11.8	-0.4
2006	12.2	12.8	106.5	6.1	-0.5
2007	10.0	10.6	110.1	8.4	-0.4
2008	-4.2	-3.8	115.4	4.2	-4.2
2009	-18.0	-17.6	103.5	-9.1	-9.6
2010	-0.3	0.4	98.9	8.3	-7.6

## Violence and crime\*

	Prisoners per 100,000 residents	Juvenile criminals, % of all convicts	Registered rapes per 100,000 residents	Drug-related crimes per 100,000 residents	Intentional or attempted murder by men, per 100,000 men	Registered rapes per 100,000 women
1995	255.2	10.8	6.4	10.9	18.2	11.8
1996	253.7	11.9	5.3	14.7	18.4	9.8
1997	256.4	13.1	4.9	17.6	15.6	9.1
1998	242.7	13.0	3.4	16.1	16.7	6.4
1999	216.4	14.0	4.2	21.4	14.5	7.8
2000	209.4	14.2	5.6	27.6	12.0	10.5
2001	201.7	13.8	5.1	35.2	15.6	9.5
2002	199.0	14.2	4.5	27.0	13.4	8.7
2003	213.6	13.5	5.3	43.0	18.7	9.8
2004	215.5	13.5	13.8 <sup>1</sup>	49.8	14.5	25.6 <sup>1</sup>
2005	206.5	12.5	11.0	45.6	5.3	20.4
2006	208.5	13.5	5.4	43.6	6.1	9.9
2007	211.2	11.9	4.1	63.0	11.2	7.6
2008	220.3	10.0	4.4	11.1	6.0	8.2
2009	224.2	8.6	3.1	102.3	12.4	5.7
2010	212.1	7.8	3.5	97.8	3.9	6.6

<sup>1</sup> Between January and July 2005, one criminal case related to rape involved the registration of another episode of a criminal offence.

\* A new version of the Criminal Procedure Law took effect on October 1, 2005, and it included a new system of registering criminal offences. Accordingly, the data are not comparable to previous years.

## Welfare, poverty and social spending

	Per capita GDP, PPP <sup>1</sup>	Industrial added value, % of GDP	Income proportion of 20% richest and 20% poorest residents <sup>2</sup>	General government spending on social security, % of GDP	General government spending on education, % of GDP	General government spending on health care, % of GDP
1995	–	30	–	13.0	6.4	3.4
1996	–	28	–	13.4	5.4	3.1
1997	–	29	–	13.0	5.4	3.8
1998	–	28	–	14.3	6.5	4.1
1999	–	25	–	15.5	6.2	4.0
2000	7,000	24	5.5	13.1	5.5	3.9
2001	7,700	23	–	11.9	5.4	3.2
2002	8,400	23	–	11.4	5.7	3.7
2003	9,000	22	–	10.8	5.5	3.4
2004	9,900	22	–	10.4	6.1	3.5
2005	10,900	22	6.7	9.8	5.6	4.3
2006	12,200	21	7.9	9.5	6.0	4.9
2007	13,900	22	6.3	8.4	5.8	4.3
2008	14,100	23	7.3	9.5	6.5	4.6
2009	12,200	21	7.3	14.0	6.6	4.7
2010	–	22	6.9	–	–	–

<sup>1</sup> Data from the European Union Statistical Bureau:

[http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/national\\_accounts/data/main\\_tables](http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/national_accounts/data/main_tables)

<sup>2</sup> Data from the European Union Statistical Bureau, «Income, Social Inclusion and Living Conditions»:

[http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search\\_database](http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database)

## Communications

	Per capita cinema visits	Per capita museum visitors	Copies of daily newspapers per 100 residents	Published books per 100 residents	Passenger cars per 100 residents
1995	0.4	0.5	12.4	79.2	13.4
1996	0.4	0.5	9.2	80.0	15.5
1997	0.5	0.6	13.2	95.4	17.8
1998	0.6	0.6	12.6	107.7	20.1
1999	0.6	0.6	12.4	110.9	22.1
2000	0.6	0.6	8.3	107.3	23.5
2001	0.5	0.7	9.0	107.4	25.0
2002	0.5	0.7	9.4	108.1	26.6
2003	0.5	0.7	10.8	112.0	28.0
2004	0.7	0.8	10.9	112.0	29.7
2005	0.7	0.9	11.3	103.1	32.4
2006	0.9	0.9	10.8	106.1	36.0
2007	1.0	1.1	11.4	121.6	39.8
2008	1.0	11.1	11.6	126.0	41.3
2009	0.8	1.0	9.1	99.5	40.2
2010	–	–	7.5	90.9	28.6 <sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> On December 30, 2009, a new norm was introduced in Cabinet of Ministers regulations on registration of motor vehicles – exclusion of a motor vehicle from the register.

## Urbanisation

	Urban residents, % of all residents (end of year)	Increase/decrease in urban residents each year	Residents of major cities, % of all urban residents (end of year) <sup>1</sup>	Residents in cities with more than 40,000 residents, % of all residents (end of year)
1995	68.6	-1.4	76.0	52.2
1996	68.6	-1.0	75.9	52.1
1997	68.6	-1.0	75.9	51.8
1998	68.5	-1.0	75.9	51.8
1999	68.1	-1.3	75.8	51.6
2000	68.0	-0.9	75.8	51.5
2001	67.9	-0.9	75.8	51.4
2002	67.8	-0.7	75.7	51.3
2003	67.8	-0.5	75.6	51.3
2004	68.0	-0.4	75.6	51.4
2005	68.0	-0.5	75.6	51.4
2006	67.9	-0.6	75.6	51.4
2007	67.9	-0.6	75.5	51.2
2008	67.9	-0.6	75.4	51.1
2009	67.7	-0.7	75.4	51.0
2010	67.5	-1.3	75.5	51.0

<sup>1</sup> Because Valmiera and Jēkabpils are major cities, the number of residents was recalculated.

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